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‘Human Rights are better approached and defended in an integrated rather than a 
disparate fashion. The rights must fit the people, not the people the rights. This 
requires looking at rights and their violations from a person-centred rather than a 
formula-based position, and analyzing them contextually rather than abstractly.’  
– Albie Sachs1 
 
 
‘Clearly, our curiosity is selective and, obviously, this selection is political. The way 
we frame the problem and think about the law protects the dominant beliefs or 
practices that conform with them, the norm…. Who or what kind of human rights do 
we thus see and which rights are obscured?’ 
– Susanne Baer2 
                                                          
1
 Justice Albie Sachs, National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice [1998] South 
African Constitutional Court- CCT11/98: 9 October 1998, 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC); 1998 (1) BCLR 1517 (CC), para. 
112.  
2
 Susanne Baer, ‘Privatizing Religion. Legal Groupism, No-Go-Areas and the Public-Private-Ideology in Human 
Rights Politics’, 20 Constellations (2013) 68, at 73.  
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PART I 
*** 
CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
I. Setting the stage 
1. A fragmented law for a complex world 
Plurality and inequality are features of many of today’s societies. In this context, globalisation 
has made us very aware of growing divides not just between regions and states, but also 
among people. Differences along the lines of, for example, ethnic origin, religion, economic 
background, sex and sexual orientation, morals and lifestyles seem to have multiplied or 
become more visible. All this ‘diversity’, as it is usually labelled, has generated anxiety and 
concern, particularly in the last two or three decades. The concerns are largely motivated by 
the strong political and legal mobilisation that questions of social difference generate, as these 
differences translate into differences in power. As such, they give rise to claims of injustice, 
inequality, exclusion and disadvantage.
3
 This is where human rights, the prime language of 
political and legal mobilisation,
4
 come into play.
 
Whether from the viewpoint of emancipation 
or legitimacy, human rights law has been used and criticised for (not) dealing with issues of 
difference or diversity.  
Both states and individuals, especially those in non-hegemonic positions, expect human rights 
law to reflect and respond to their specific interests, values and needs. States have typically 
requested leeway to adapt human rights standards to their particular cultural, political and 
economic contexts. One body of literature has thus dealt with the relationship between human 
rights law and the so-called ‘non-Western’ states.5 But within states, individuals and groups 
have made similar demands. People claim that their rights are violated because their 
particularities are both taken and not taken into account in decision-making, in accessing 
social services or in the distribution of burdens and resources. The present research is situated 
at this level of analysis.  
It is argued that human rights law, particularly as regards the human protected by it, ‘simply 
does not do justice to the full complexity, the sheer fleshy variability and multiple forms, 
                                                          
3
 See e.g. Meena K. Bhamra, The Challenge of Justice in Diverse Societies. Constitutionalism and Pluralism 
(Ashgate, 2011), at 16 (arguing that ‘the goal of justice is a key imperative behind the need to understand our 
new diversities and pluralities’); Tariq Modood, ‘Difference, Multi and Equality’, in Michel Seymour (ed.), The 
Plural States of Recognition (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), at 153-155, 161-163 and 166; Davina Cooper, 
Challenging Diversity. Rethinking Equality and the Value of Difference (Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 
7-8.    
4
 Ben Golder, 'Beyond Redemption? Problematising the Critique of Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Legal Thought', 77 London Review of International Law (2014) 2, at 2; Michael Ignatieff, Human 
Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), at 53.  
5
 The discussion mostly refers to governments’ assertion of culture as regards Islam and ‘Asian values’. See e.g. 
Karen Engle, 'Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context', 32 International Law and 
Politics (2000) 291, at 312-333; Eva Brems, 'Reconciling Universality and Diversity in International Human 
Rights: A Theoretical and Methodological Framework and Its Application in the Context of Islam', 5 Human 
Rights Review (2004) 5, at 5-12.  
4 
 
colours, shapes and sex/genders of the embodied human personality in all its vulnerability’.6 
For the universal and abstract subject of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UNDHR) was the projection of those with power. This is to say that the interests and 
concerns of mainly Western middle-class, heterosexual, Christian, body-able men determined, 
to a large extent, what counted as a human rights issue.
7
 Still, those who do not represent the 
universal, but the particular, or ‘the different’ (i.e. women, ethnic and religious minorities, 
those living in poverty, etc.), continually resort to human rights law and its mechanisms. They 
bring claims of all sorts to national and international courts: rights claims to exemptions, to 
recognition, to ‘special protection’, to ‘new’ rights, to be protected against discrimination, to 
have access to resources or to have them distributed differently. Exclusion has thereby been 
fought by seeking inclusion in ‘the house of human rights’.8 Human rights law has not 
remained indifferent, though. It has responded by diversifying itself. New treaties and 
standards multiply and identity/group-based ‘compartments’ of norms strive to serve the 
interests of women, indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, and so on. Yet, the 
challenges continue and the demands of difference do not cease.
9
  
As with governments’ discourses of difference in the face of human rights law, it appears that 
the realm of cultural difference is one of the most contested when it comes to people’s rights. 
From believers complaining against dismissal or restrictions for dressing according to their 
religion; travellers wanting to live in their caravans and to have a place to park them; 
indigenous and other rural communities claiming collective land rights; to members of fox-
hunting associations requesting protection of their way of life, to mention just some examples 
– they have all brought their cases to human rights courts. Discussions then proliferate as to 
whether and how human rights courts (ought to) protect people’s cultural identity; whose 
identity and practices are recognised; what are the limits of accommodation; what is implied 
by neutrality, equality, secularism and national identity; to mention some. On the other hand, 
it appears that states and human rights courts also struggle with rights claims touching upon 
economic disparities, which, to be sure, have deepened.
10
 People living in poverty oppose the 
removal of their children on account of their lack of money. In view of their precariousness, 
they also claim a right to have legal assistance in civil matters, to be exempted from fees to 
access services and to be accorded ‘special’ consideration. Asylum seekers and other persons 
                                                          
6
 Anna Grear, ‘“Framing the Project” of international human rights law’, in Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas 
(eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 32.  
7
 Ibid., at 28-29. This issue has been at the heart of most contemporary critiques of human rights. See inter alia, 
Frédéric Mégret, ‘Where Does the Critique of International Human Rights Stand? An Exploration in 18 
Vignettes’, in Jose Maria Beneyto and David Kennedy (eds.), New Approaches to International Law. The 
European and the American Experiences (TMC Asser Press 2012), at 3-40; Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, 
‘Critiques’, in Daniel Moeckli et al. (eds.), International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), at 
60-71; William Twining (ed.), Human Rights: Southern Voices: Francis Deng, Abdullahi An-Na’im, Yash Ghai, 
Upendra Baxi (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Hilary Charlesworth, 'Feminist Critiques of International 
Law and Their Critics', 13(1) Third World Legal Studies (1994) 1.  
8
 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Where Does the Critique of International Human Rights Stand? An Exploration in 18 
Vignettes’, in Jose Maria Beneyto and David Kennedy (eds.), New Approaches to International Law. The 
European and the American Experiences (TMC Asser Press, 2012), at 28.  
9
 Costas Douzinas, ‘The poverty of (rights) jurisprudence’, in Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 74-75.  
10
 Ibid., at 74 (noting that the promise of socio-economic rights remains rhetorical in the face of extreme material 
differentiation and poverty, which are the driving forces of capitalism).  
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challenge the indifference of state agencies to their destitution. Others complain about 
discrimination on account of their impoverishment and claim protection against slave-like 
work.  
Interestingly, while these claims also relate to social differences, exclusions and inequalities, 
they are seldom discussed as part of the ‘diversity and human rights’ trope like similar claims 
from (impoverished) states are. Admittedly, this has to do with the way issues of diversity or 
difference have come to be understood.
11
 Inasmuch as they are bound up to identity, self-
assertion and group-based recognition, it is clear why debates about people’s diversity and 
human rights do not include ‘economic difference’. Those who live in poverty or have a low 
income are rarely seen as a group and they want to see their difference – their poverty – not 
recognised, but eliminated. Even so, the fact remains that these people draw attention to their 
specific circumstances and demand ‘special protection’, exemptions, protection against 
discrimination, ‘new’ rights, and so on, through human rights law. Therefore, also here human 
rights courts face difficult questions. Are people living in poverty a category entitled to 
‘special rights’ or exemptions? Do convention rights entail redistribution or duties to provide? 
How far can the European and the Inter-American Courts of Human Rights (hereinafter 
ECtHR and IACtHR, respectively) go on matters of socio-economic policy? Should they 
apply a standard of ‘reasonability’, a ‘minimum core’ or another standard of review?  
When studying these two contested areas of rights claims, namely, those involving issues of 
cultural and economic difference (or, we may say, disadvantage), I was intrigued by the way 
they were being addressed. I found that those issues were often examined by courts and 
scholars in a rather disaggregated manner. Sometimes they appear too concerned with abstract 
questions regarding legal categories or with the specific characteristics of people. What is 
more, such categories and characteristics are usually analysed in isolation. I wondered why 
the discussions on Roma and Travellers’ housing lifestyles or about religious accommodation 
in the workplace are rarely addressed from the perspective of social rights and structural 
inequalities. Why is it that problems of socio-economic disadvantage are seldom examined in 
terms of poverty-based discrimination or the use of harmful stereotypes, and not just in terms 
of states’ socio-economic obligations? I also wondered why the applicants and other 
implicated parties in these cases were often defined from the perspective of their cultural or 
religious membership, on the one hand, or their socio-economic circumstances, on the other, 
as if these were the only relevant features that marked their experience. I wondered how the 
analysis would change if all these cases were seen from the perspective of, for instance, 
gender, age and immigration background. And what if that holistic approach were also 
extended to rights? Many cases involving issues of cultural difference are certainly about 
culturally-driven rights, just as many cases of economic disadvantage are about economically-
driven rights. But surely both sets of cases are not just about that. What if these cases were 
approached from the angle of rights and harms not immediately visible?  
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I realised then that I was curious and concerned about how those claims and problems were 
legally framed. At bottom, I was wondering why not frame them differently, and whether 
doing so could enrich the legal analysis or illuminate useful avenues for tackling the 
challenges that come with those cases. In this context, it appeared necessary to consider how 
human rights law itself operates.
12
 Human rights law is supposed to rest on notions of 
indivisibility and interdependence, that is, on ideas of interconnection, unity and equal value 
across all rights. In practice, however, it is, as noted earlier, full of divisions: between types of 
right (civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights), instruments (with 
differing binding force), organs, themes, regions and beneficiaries, among others. Human 
rights law has, in other words, fragmented.
13
 Even within one general jurisdiction divisions 
abound. Different parcels of standards and principles seem to apply depending on whether the 
applicant is defined as, for example, indigenous, a woman, a Roma, a member of a religious 
minority, an asylum seeker or a child; whether the issue is one of the public or private 
exercise of rights; whether it concerns positive or negative obligations; whether it is about 
equality or substantive liberties; and which line of case law it fits. This fragmentation is no 
bad thing, though. After all, it reflects serious efforts to fine-tune legal responses to different, 
traditionally overlooked types of problem and experience.  
And yet, the question arises as to whether and how this compartmentalised normative 
landscape is being usefully applied to deal with a world of complex social relations and 
inequalities. The complexity lies, inter alia, in the fact that people belong to more than one 
group and are defined by multiple identities and roles. Further, a person may be 
disadvantaged in one dimension and quite privileged in another. We are no longer bound to 
our state of birth, nor do we necessarily recognise states as the main source of authority. 
Public power has come to be confused with or even eclipsed by private power and the 
national has become transnational. Norms and regulations interact and multiply in every field. 
Meanwhile, outward exclusion and discrimination are in retreat. Inequalities operate in 
inextricable ways while being usually clothed in neutrality and reasonability. What is more, it 
seems increasingly difficult to trace violations and disadvantages to individualised, isolated 
wrongdoings. Many are, rather, rooted in networks of widely accepted institutions, values and 
social practices.  
Against this background, the present study explores whether acknowledging this complexity, 
at least in part, in cases that are thought in terms of cultural and economic difference could 
add something to their resolution. The idea is not entirely alien to human rights law, as further 
discussed in Chapter 2. One may note, for example, that the most recent human rights treaties 
dealing with claims of difference (i.e. with the needs and concerns of the non-hegemonic) 
take a more comprehensive, integrated approach than previous, traditional human rights 
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treaties. Think of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
14
 Its novelty lies 
in bringing civil and political rights together with economic, social and cultural rights; 
considering multiple forms of discrimination as well as social and cultural barriers; 
acknowledging the fluidity of the category ‘disability’ and having regard to the fact that the 
majority of persons with disabilities live in conditions of poverty; encompassing different 
types of state obligation; and also cutting across other legal divides.
15
 This may suggest that 
there is increasing awareness of the need to capture the complexity of claims of difference and 
inclusion by looking at human rights law more holistically. But how could this be 
accomplished in the adjudicatory work of the European and the Inter-American Courts of 
Human Rights?
16
 This is one of the issues explored in this study.  
 
2. Why cultural and economic difference? 
Several considerations have led me to analyse the supranational adjudication of claims 
concerning cultural difference and economic disadvantage. First, they bring specific 
challenges to human rights courts which may explain, at least in part, the contestation that 
surrounds them. Secondly, the examination of cases of cultural and economic difference has 
potential. A final motivation to examine cases of these types is that they are rarely brought 
together in a single study. Let me briefly elaborate on each of these reasons.   
First: the challenges. When rights claims are framed or perceived, either by litigants or judges, 
as questions of cultural and economic difference/disadvantage, some interesting difficulties 
arise. This goes for both those seeking and those called to decide on redress. In what follows, 
I will highlight three common challenges. By no means are these the only challenges 
implicated in the resolution of cases involving claims of cultural and economic difference. 
Nor do I mean to deny the specificities that distinguish those claims. Having said this, 
consider the following difficulties. 
In the first place, we may note that cultural and economic criteria are usually accepted as 
rational, pertinent and legitimate grounds for social organisation. Their use seems to carry no 
prejudice to anyone in particular while being generally sound. For example, in most areas of 
regulation (whether public or private), it appears quite reasonable to establish restrictions or 
duties regarding dress, hairstyle, language and cultural knowledge. The same holds for the 
observance of economic requirements such as payment of fees, being employed and having a 
certain income. We are increasingly used to accepting that these cultural and economic 
criteria can fairly determine our entitlements and obligations in work, schools, public places, 
the housing market, immigration policy, the justice and welfare systems, and in many other 
areas of social life. The practical implication of assuming the legitimacy of all this is that 
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rights claimants may have a hard time in demonstrating the injustice of norms and practices 
that rely on those cultural and economic criteria. Judges may actually be inclined to uphold 
them or to view them as harmless. This problem can be summed up as ‘acute normalisation’. 
By this I mean that cultural and economic differences and importantly, the set of privileges 
and disadvantages that accompany them, are internalised, accepted or otherwise presumed 
normal in a particularly acute way. Compared to other grounds of difference (e.g. gender, sex, 
race or nationality), the question may be seen as one of degree. Most disadvantages ascribed 
to real or perceived differences tend to be normalised or accepted and thus, difficult to 
challenge. Nevertheless, while framing a claim as disadvantage based on gender, sex or race 
difference triggers some alarms, framing it as based on cultural or economic factors does not. 
This holds true for society at large and for legal actors.  
In the second place, questions of cultural and economic difference are often seen as something 
either too complex or too sensitive to be tackled by human rights courts. What usually follows 
from this premise is restraint or lenient reviews on the part of the judges. One line of 
argumentation emphasises that cultural and economic disadvantages are closely linked to 
complex structural, social and institutional issues. Complaints touching upon these issues 
should thus preferably be dealt with by means other than by seeking state liability in court, let 
alone in international courts. From another perspective, cultural and economic differences 
may be, respectively, an expression of deeply felt sentiments and traditions or particular 
histories and struggles. International courts should thus be careful about intruding into these 
areas. Not by coincidence, human rights law generally accords states substantial latitude on 
cultural and economic issues. The underlying assumption is, as discussed later, that human 
rights standards need to be adjusted to particular cultural and economic contexts better known 
by the states concerned – and not international courts. In other words, human rights courts 
would be ill placed and equipped to address such complex and sensitive matters. As a result, 
the judges siting in such courts are likely to be very deferential when examining claims of 
cultural and economic disadvantage. Doing otherwise may be perceived, particularly from the 
state’s point of view, as overstepping the mandate and compromising the legitimacy of the 
court. This second challenge can be described as an issue of ‘restraint’.  
In the third place, one may argue that complaints of cultural and economic difference are so 
variable and changeable that they may take the law too far, requiring never-ending flexibility 
or even transformation of existing standards. Cultural and economic conditions vary from 
place to place and may imply different things for different people. Cultural and economic 
issues are actually typical sites of divergence among and across states, communities and 
individuals. Nearly everyone could claim any kind of right on the basis of cultural and 
economic circumstances. Yet, courts and human rights law could not be expected to be 
attentive to everyone’s particularities, preferences or needs. Judges and other stakeholders 
may furthermore want to reduce divergent interpretations and solutions, for the sake of 
coherence and certainty. The list of rights and the list of successful claimants should not, in 
other words, be endless. Think, for example, of demanding exemptions from planning 
regulations, or ‘novel’ rights, on account of cultural particularities; or seeking accommodation 
of dress styles and working schedules for cultural reasons. Consider as well claims to socio-
economic assistance on the basis of provisions that seem far from being concerned with 
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economic entitlements, such as the prohibition of torture or the protection of private life. Or 
take a claim of discrimination in the housing sector on the basis of source of income. Where is 
the limit? How many special or new rights can be granted; how many exceptions to the rule 
are allowed; and whose cultural and economic claims are accommodated? These difficulties 
can be named as a question of ‘limits.’ 
One might argue that issues of normalisation, restraint and limits are not exclusive of cultural 
and economic claims, as they would also manifest in the handling of other types of case 
involving issues of difference and inclusion. This is a fair point. But from the perspective of 
the people who see their rights or social inclusion compromised for cultural and/or economic 
reasons, those issues are significant challenges in their quest for redress. Also for judges, the 
simultaneous confluence of issues of acute normalisation, restraint and limits in a single case 
certainly adds pressure to their task. In understanding the challenges described above, it is 
also relevant to bear in mind that the field of cultural and economic rights is one of the least 
elaborated areas of human rights law, not least owing to their relatively recent and limited 
development through adjudication.
17
 It thus comes as no surprise that the relationship between 
human rights law and cultural diversity, as well as that between human rights law and 
poverty, remain as current and contested subjects.  
A second reason for studying claims of cultural and economic difference is that doing so may 
prove relevant for other areas of dispute too. Why is this so? The basic reason is that cultural 
and economic inequalities represent two main realms through which injustice works. Think 
of, for instance, cases about same-sex rights, claims for recognition of care work and cases 
concerning adjustments for people with disabilities, just to mention some. In one way or 
another, all of them involve dimensions of both cultural and economic claims. Though often 
presented as totally separated realms, cultural and economic disadvantages (alongside 
privileges) are mutually implicated in most areas of social life.
18
 Therefore, since most – if not 
all – forms of social division and exclusion encompass cultural and economic aspects, 
studying typical claims of cultural and economic difference holds valuable potential for a 
large range of demands concerning difference and inclusion. Doing so may, in other words, 
provide useful insights for addressing many other ‘diversity issues’.  
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Finally, as already stated, my third motivation for examining cases regarding cultural and 
economic difference is that they are rarely brought together in a single study.
19
 Some human 
rights law scholars have focused on issues of cultural difference (or ‘diversity’) and 
inequality, while others have been concerned with questions of socio-economic disadvantage, 
poverty and economic rights. These two bodies of literature, however, rarely converge or talk 
to each other.
20
 By analysing both types of claims in the present study, I do not mean to 
equate them. As will be seen in Chapter 2, there are some notable differences in the way 
privileges and disadvantages accorded on cultural and economic grounds are confronted and 
remedied in law. My point is not to deny this. Rather, it is to consider whether and how an 
integrated approach to human rights can be helpful in questioning and addressing claims 
about what is typically regarded as either ‘cultural’ or ‘economic’ difference. Doing so, 
however, requires revisiting the ‘compartmentalisation’ prevailing in our legal thinking.   
 
3. Which fragmentation and why an integrated approach to human rights? 
As mentioned at the outset, over the years human rights law, as part and parcel of 
international law, has fragmented. Instruments and monitoring bodies have multiplied, each of 
them governing – with different normative force – diverse subject matters, geographic regions 
and groups of people. Among the most prominent divides we find, on the one side, a major 
separation of civil and political rights from economic, social and cultural rights. On the other 
side, group-based rights usually target those historically excluded or discriminated against. As 
Mégret notes, ‘one of the defining phenomena of the human rights project today is its 
increasing fragmentation along group lines (women, children, persons with disabilities, 
migrant workers, indigenous peoples, sexual minorities, etc.)’.21 As will become clearer in the 
course of this study, I do not see this fragmentation as per se problematic. Yet, its 
implications are worth considering.  
In this context, human rights courts such as the Inter-American and European courts of human 
rights may appear to be placed in a less disaggregated legal landscape. They oversee general 
human rights treaties with respect to groups of countries belonging to the same region. They 
can rule on a broad range of matters and are not bound to focus on one particular group or 
issue. Nevertheless, these two courts, unlike the one created in the African system, are almost 
exclusively concerned with civil and political rights. Most social and economic rights are, by 
contrast, outside their jurisdiction. In addition, even if their competence is not confined to any 
particular category of beneficiaries, in practice these courts have developed differentiated 
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standards based on, for example, identity and group vulnerability. The courts’ rulings have 
furthermore given rise to diverse lines of case law (e.g. on discrimination, indigenous rights, 
foreseeable risks to life and health, and socio-economic policy). And each of these, though 
based on the same treaty, comes with its own subset of principles.  
My assumption is that when it comes to cases involving cultural and economic difference the 
picture becomes even more fragmented. Though perhaps for different reasons and in different 
ways, cases defined by discourses of ‘cultural’ and ‘economic’ difference or disadvantage are 
prone to fall into further ‘compartments’. As will be further examined in subsequent chapters, 
legal arguments about cultural difference or disadvantage usually map onto one particular 
group (e.g. one religious or ethno-cultural group), one defined cultural or ethnic identity, one 
type of interest or harm (typically symbolic or related to people’s spirituality and lifestyle) 
and thus one relatively narrow set of rights. Legal arguments concerning economic 
differences and disadvantages, on the other hand, are also seen as dealing with one separate, 
bounded sphere (that of economy and markets), one particular kind of interest or harm 
(normally material provision and a lack thereof), one line of case law (e.g. that concerning 
social policy) and one specific type of right, namely, socio-economic rights. And if rights 
claims of economic difference are examined from the perspective of identity groups, my 
hypothesis is that most of the time only one identity or group will be considered.  
I think that this fragmented approach is problematic. Arguably, a major flaw of the thinking 
behind it is that it may lead to a focus on abstract questions and to attribution of the problem 
to the difference or disadvantaged condition itself. Besides failing to respond to the challenges 
posed by claims of cultural and economic difference, such compartmentalised thinking may, 
in turn, have two important effects: it may fail in making justice relate to people’s lived 
experiences and it may leave the roots of the alleged violations unexamined. Against this, it is 
submitted that a more integrated (read, holistic) approach is needed.  
At this point, though, a sort of paradox might be discerned. On the one hand, it appears that 
the fragmentation of human rights law is a response, and thus instrumental, to the handling of 
claims of difference and inclusion. This implies, to the contrary, that a more general, unified 
human rights law (as epitomised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) would be ill 
suited to dealing with those claims. Such a general, abstract model of protection tends to be 
insensitive to the particular concerns and needs of those with less power. On the other hand, 
however, I have advanced the idea that an integrated instead of a fragmented approach to 
human rights could be helpful to doing better justice in cases of cultural and economic 
difference. Is this not a contradiction? It may appear so, but it is not.  
To understand why, it is necessary to note, in the first place, that even though a great deal of 
the specialisation (fragmentation) undergone by human rights law has aimed at capturing the 
experiences of those excluded and marked as different, that per se does not solve the 
problems. I think one of the reasons it does not is because of the fragmented 
(compartmentalised) way in which the law undertakes the effort of coping with particular 
realities. In other words, my assumption is that diversifying the law does not ensure better 
justice for diversity because in real life, issues of diversity are not confined to separate 
compartments.  
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So for example, many claims of difference and inclusion are not fully accounted for as cases 
of cultural recognition, or women’s rights, or indigenous and minority cultural rights, or cases 
about socio-economic policy. Rather, the case may go more like this: a woman claims 
indigenous rights to achieve greater socio-economic security in the context of competing 
claims from other indigenous communities and private land owners. Or, a case may not just 
be about the preservation of a cultural lifestyle, but rather about a family of Travellers 
claiming a right to live in their caravan while having land security and access to schools for 
their children in a context of public good’s privatisation and prejudice against Travellers. 
Likewise, what may look like a case of socio-economic provision and social policy-making 
may also be about a single mother or a migrant man complaining against autonomy denial and 
negative stereotypes stemming from social policies aimed at improving theirs and others’ 
living conditions. So, what I find problematic is the compartmentalised (fragmentary) way in 
which even norms and standards sensitive to diversity tend to be applied. Even if cases may 
be framed and resolved in the light of indigenous rights, a minority’s identity or socio-
economic rights, which are all aimed at dealing with particular needs and contexts, often those 
frameworks are used in a rather unidimensional or partial manner, cutting off relevant 
dimensions of the actors, norms or interests involved.   
Searching for alternatives, I have turned to the idea of integration, that is, the idea that a more 
comprehensive approach to claims of cultural and economic difference could be useful. And 
here we return to the apparent paradox highlighted above. We need to bear in mind, in the 
second place, that by referring to an integrated normative framework I do not mean a general, 
abstract framework like that embodied in the Universal Declaration. By normative integration 
I mean, as further explained below, a normative framework that operates in a more holistic, 
interrelated and inclusive manner. For this, I take as a point of departure the integrated 
approach to human rights proposed by Brems. She argues that such an integrated view has 
two implications. First, it implies ‘a maximum widening of the range of human rights sources 
that are on the table’.22 Second, an integrated view requires ‘a maximum inclusion of human 
rights holders […] whose rights are affected by a particular situation’.23 As will be seen later, 
the integrated framework applied in this study builds upon and expands this notion of 
integration.  
 
II.  Aims and scope of the research 
This study has two main aims. It seeks, firstly, to reveal whether and how prevailing judicial 
approaches to claims of cultural and economic difference may foreclose useful avenues for 
dealing with them and with the challenges they bring. Secondly, the study aims at providing 
guidelines for litigants and courts to enrich their legal analysis of those matters with a view to 
both making justice relate to people’s lived reality and interrogating structural inequalities. 
For these purposes, the study focuses on the supranational adjudication of claims of cultural 
and economic difference before the ECtHR and the IACtHR. These are claims that basically 
seek protection against devaluation, disadvantage or exclusion on account of the applicants’ 
                                                          
22
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Integration’, 4 European Journal of Human Rights (2014) 447, at 452. 
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 Idem.  
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cultural and economic particularities (hereinafter also referred to as cases of cultural and 
economic ‘disadvantage’, or cultural and economic ‘diversity’). The claims under 
examination are therefore inclusive of both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ demands of difference: 
having a certain particularity taken into account and having it removed or undone. While 
analytically helpful, the line between the one and the other is often blurry and it also depends 
on whose point of view is defining the claim. Given the ambivalences and contestations 
surrounding any determination of what is ‘cultural’ and ‘economic’, a brief clarification is 
nonetheless in order.  
The present research does not endorse a folk or essentialist understanding of culture. In other 
words, it does not support a view that reduces culture to religion, language, dress, food, dance 
or other topical representations of traditions and ways of life. Instead, I subscribe to a fluid, 
boundless and dynamic conception of culture.
24
 On this basis, I understand that pretty much 
everything we are and do, and thus all forms of social differentiation, are cultural issues. This 
means that, for example, indigenous or religious rights claims are not seen as more 
‘authentically cultural’ than those contesting prevailing values about women, LGBTI persons 
or people with disabilities.
25
 Actually, this research, as explained below, is grounded in 
cultural studies and in an understanding of law as culture. Notwithstanding this, the present 
study examines claims of cultural difference in a rather narrow sense. The cases analysed 
concern, in fact, questions of tradition, way of life, religion, custom and the like. But the 
reason for this focus is not that I see these cases as being ‘the cultural cases’ par excellence. 
The reason is that cases of this kind are often addressed through discourses of cultural 
difference and identity rights, even if other normative frames are available (e.g. racism, 
gender inequality, socio-economic rights or political marginalisation). Hence, against this, one 
may wonder what if these cases were examined through a more comprehensive, inclusive and 
relational approach?  
A somewhat similar caveat applies to the scope of cases dealing with economic difference. 
Most rights claims concerning social differentiation and exclusion have an economic 
dimension. Thus, besides claims grounded in class or economic status, those based on gender, 
ethnic background or body-ability, for example, can also be analysed from the perspective of 
their economic implications. Cases concerning domestic violence, inaccessibility of buildings 
and services, or stereotypes that portray women as home-carers and persons with disabilities 
as unfit to work all involve questions of economic disadvantage or difference. So, again, my 
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focus on claims seeking recognition or remediation of disadvantage related to a person’s 
economic circumstances is not motivated by a reductionist understanding of economic issues. 
Yet, those claims are usually viewed as being about socio-economic hardship, social welfare 
and economic rights. That is why it is interesting to think of what may be missed by the use of 
this sort of narrative and what could be gained by viewing those claims in a more holistic 
fashion.  
As the above reflections suggest, this study mostly deals with some ‘paradigmatic’ claims of 
cultural and economic difference as put forward by persons in non-dominant positions. In the 
cases of ‘cultural disadvantage’ examined, these are members of ethno-cultural minorities or 
otherwise non-hegemonic groups.
26
 In the ‘economic disadvantage’ cases, those are persons 
who live in poverty or are otherwise socio-economically disadvantaged. The opportunities 
and limitations that follow from analysing cases brought by this particular segment of rights 
holders are explained below (infra subsection 3).  
Finally, it is important to underline that the study is primarily concerned with supranational 
adjudication. In that sense, it fundamentally speaks to judges and litigants. Nevertheless, and 
possibly as a result of its interdisciplinary character (further explained in the methodological 
section IV below), several aspects of the analysis undertaken here may also be relevant for 
policy-making.
27
  
 
1. Situating the research within a wider research project  
This study has been developed within the framework of an Inter-University Attraction Pole 
(IAP) research project called ‘The Global Challenge of Human Rights Integration: Toward a 
Users’ Perspective.’28 The starting point of the overall research project is the finding that both 
rights holders and duty bearers under human rights norms are confronted simultaneously with 
a multitude of human rights provisions differing as to their scope, focus, legal force and level 
of governance. This non-hierarchical accumulation of human rights provisions has resulted in 
a complex and uncoordinated legal architecture that may in some circumstances create 
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and ff. (‘Integrated anti-oppression looks at all the ways people can experience oppression and marginalization, 
and how those social locations intersect. This approach recognizes that individual contexts are different, and that 
people’s lived realities are complex. It is integrated because it asks us to combine information and values from a 
range of people and sources in order to get a fuller, more inclusive result.’). See also, United Nations 
Development Programme, Humanity Divided: Confronting Inequality in Developing Countries (UNDP, 2013), 
at 2 (noting that the complexity and multi-dimensionality of the drivers of inequality call for a complex and 
multi-dimensional response: one that involves e.g. social and fiscal policy, democratic institutions and anti-
discrimination initiatives).    
28
 This has been funded by the Interuniversity Attraction Poles Programme initiated by the Belgian Science 
Policy Office (Belspo). Further information on the IAP ‘The Global Challenge of Human Rights Integration: 
Towards a Users’ Perspective’ can be found at <www.hrintegration.be> (last accessed 5 December 2017).  
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obstacles for effective human rights protection. The central objective of the research network 
is the study of human rights law as an integrated whole from a users’ perspective.  
One of the effects of the multilayered experience of human rights is the tension between 
divergence and coherence in human rights law in theory and practice.
29
 This is the overall 
topic explored by the ‘work package’ in which the present study originates. The goals of the 
work package, as defined by the IAP research project, are (1) to produce new status questions 
on the tension between universality and diversity in human rights; and (2) to derive from 
current practice and theory a normative model for the simultaneous accommodation and 
control of divergence in human rights law.
30
 In the course of identifying areas of divergent 
interpretation in human rights law and while exploring the ‘universality and diversity’ debate, 
I decided to concentrate on questions of cultural and economic difference. I also undertook 
the task of devising a normative model to address some of the frictions that arise in their 
adjudication. But while in principle I was supposed to suggest a sort of catalogue of legal 
techniques for the regulation of divergence, the research took me in a slightly different 
direction. I proceeded on the assumption that perhaps more than a priori demarcation of how 
to respond to specific claims of accommodation or flexibility, we would first need to revise 
the way certain claims are framed and adjudicated. Perhaps prevailing approaches to claims of 
cultural and economic difference were adding to instead of alleviating the difficulties. I then 
started thinking about how to translate the lived reality of human rights integration into a 
normative framework. That is, a normative model that is useful for capturing the complexity 
and multiple interests that are at stake in cases that are typical sites of divergence and which, 
for present purposes, involve issues of cultural and economic difference.  
On that basis, I have proposed and then tested a guiding framework for approaching rights 
claims of difference in a comprehensive and non-categorical way. This means that ‘the what 
and who’ gets accommodated will not be defined simply by fixed legal categories, but mostly 
by having a fuller picture of the rights holders affected and the harms and norms involved in 
each case. So, as will become clearer in the coming chapters, the major contribution of this 
study to the IAP research project does not lie in providing a set of predefined conditions for 
achieving normative coherence or demarcating acceptable degrees of divergence in human 
rights law. The major contribution is, rather, situated in what an integrated and person-centred 
framework for human rights law could entail, in theory and practice, for the handling of cases 
that are typical sites of divergence.  
 
2. Research questions and premises 
The present study proceeds on the basis of the following questions. At the exploratory level, I 
enquire: (1) what are the main legal narratives and categories used by the European and Inter-
                                                          
29
 The concern underlying this point is the following: ‘On the users’ side, both states and rights holders may 
support a certain degree of divergence, as this may allow to take into account contextual needs and variations in 
value systems. Yet both may also prefer uniformity, as rights holders may wish to oppose local value systems 
through an appeal to universal standards, and as some state authorities may regret being held to higher standards 
than others on specific topics.’ See Human Rights Integration Project Proposal 2012-2017, Contract P7/27, at 21 
(on file with the author).  
30
 Ibid., at 21-22.  
16 
 
American courts of human rights (as well as the applicants before them) to address claims of 
cultural and economic disadvantage? In particular, (1.1) what place do identity-based 
categories and other normative classifications have in the adjudication process? (1.1) how 
comprehensive or fragmentary are those legal frames, as used by applicants and courts, in 
dealing with the cases studied? (2) what consequences follow from the use of those normative 
frames? More concretely: (2.1) do they allow the rights holders’ lived experience to be 
accounted for; (2.2) to what extent do those legal categorisations direct attention to the actual 
interests at stake; (2.3) do they interrogate the roots of the alleged violations or rather situate 
the problem in people’s particularities; (2.4) do they contribute to creating or maintaining the 
differences under examination or rather to challenging them?  
At the normative level, the research asks: (3) should the courts distance themselves from some 
of the legal categorisations currently employed for dealing with cases concerning cultural and 
economic difference? If so, (4) which alternative normative framework could assist the courts 
(and possibly litigants too) to address the complexity involved in those cases? In particular, 
could an integrated approach to human rights promote an analysis that makes better justice for 
people’s lived reality while engaging with the roots of the alleged violations? (5) How could 
such a framework be operationalised; which legal tools could be helpful? 
To put it in language that is familiar to, but still underutilised in, human rights law: the 
research basically intends to shed light on what interdependence, indivisibility and 
intersectionality can add to the resolution of cases concerning cultural and economic 
disadvantage. In doing so, it provides guidelines on how to operationalise those concepts in 
the practice of human rights courts.  
As already mentioned, the research rests upon the premise that when it comes to adjudicating 
cases defined by discourses of cultural and economic difference, a fragmentary legal approach 
based on normative compartments and categories is frequently applied. What is more, such an 
approach is not of much help in addressing the challenges brought about by claims of cultural 
and economic difference or in making justice applicable to rights holders’ lived reality. A 
more integrated interpretation on the part of human rights courts and of the actors who appear 
before them is desirable. The assumption is that better justice could be done by analysing in 
an inclusive and relational manner whose and which rights are actually at stake in those cases. 
  
3. Limitations  
This study only examines a segment of cases concerning cultural and economic difference. 
This implies that the research is not in a position to provide an understanding of the different 
discourses and responses within each area of diversity examined. As noted at the outset, a 
very wide range of claims is advanced in the name of cultural and economic difference or 
disadvantage. Think of cultural diversity cases. Catholics, Muslims, Travellers, indigenous 
people, Jews, members of Afro-descendant rural communities, immigrants and even fox-
hunters have all brought their cases to human rights courts. Similarly, people living in 
poverty, the rich and the not-so-rich from varied backgrounds and contexts have all claimed 
rights violations in connection with their economic condition or disadvantage. In virtually all 
areas of social life, claims of ‘difference’ are raised by those in non-hegemonic positions and 
17 
 
the powerful alike. One interesting question is then how and why the courts’ interpretations 
and discourses vary across those cultural claims, on the one hand, and across those cases of 
economic disadvantage, on the other. However, this is something that the present research, 
because of its scope, only illuminates in a limited fashion. As already mentioned, I only focus 
on claimants in non-dominant positions and on a fraction of claims of cultural and economic 
difference.  
A second important limitation concerns the scope of what an integrated approach to rights 
does and does not entail for regional and potentially other courts. To start with, the integrated 
framework applied here does not rest on the assumption that judges do all the work. It does 
not seem realistic to require human rights courts to engage in every single dimension of 
integration advanced in this study. Nor is it expected that they are the only ones called on to 
adopt an integrated perspective. The fact that this research emphasises the work of the 
judiciary does not deny the important role that other actors, such as lawyers, NGOs and third 
party interveners can play. They all have much to contribute to enriching the understanding of 
cases about cultural and economic difference.  
Finally, it is necessary to note the different position that the European and Inter-American 
courts of human rights have in the research design. The integrated framework to human rights 
proposed in this study, as well as some of the questions underlying it, were mainly conceived 
against the background of debates and litigation taking place in Europe. As a result of this, the 
framework of analysis I apply might provide quite dissimilar inputs for each court. For one 
thing, as a matter of fact questions of diversity and inequality have been widely debated in the 
European Court for a longer time than in the Inter-American Court. Yet, in the meantime 
these issues have attained growing attention in the Inter-American Court’s case law. For 
another thing, one does not need an exhaustive study of the Inter-American Court’s case law 
to notice that this court, unlike the ECtHR, has a general inclination to examine cases from a 
broad normative perspective. In particular, it is relatively easy to note that the IACtHR 
frequently relies on a large body of international norms, including a myriad of standards 
concerning groups discriminated against and arguments from expert opinions. This inclination 
is also likely to affect the assessment of what human rights integration, as applied in this 
research, may add to the resolution of cases of cultural and economic difference by each 
court.  
 
III. Terminological choices  
1. Difference, disadvantage and diversity 
The cases examined in this study could well be described as cases about diversity. Actually, 
most of the issues they bring to court are normally discussed in terms of the relationship 
between diversity and human rights law. And yet, throughout this research the words 
‘difference’ and ‘disadvantage’ are used far more than the term ‘diversity.’ Why is that? To 
speak of difference or disadvantage has some advantages for the purpose of this research. 
First, these terms can aptly capture the fact that the complaints analysed here are not simply 
about cultural and economic variety. Rather, they are about people whose cultural and 
economic roles or characteristics are somehow associated with deviance. Because ‘they are 
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different’, they are ascribed some form of disadvantage while others are accorded privileges. 
In other words, to speak of difference reminds us that what is legally relevant about cultural, 
economic or any other ground of social differentiation is not just a particular feature of 
people.
31
 What matters is the way in which society, through its norms and structures, 
identifies some as less valued and less able to participate in society and exercise rights than 
others.
32
 Talking about difference or disadvantage furthermore entails a relational dimension 
(different/disadvantaged from what or whom?) that draws attention to those whose position is 
unmarked and privileged.  
Second, the terms difference and disadvantage, while closely related to diversity, are 
relatively free from some important criticism directed against the latter. To make a long story 
short, speaking of diversity may have some drawbacks. Notably, diversity tends to be used in 
a rather decontextualised and politically neutral manner.
33
 Although the term is broad enough, 
it generally describes a state of heterogeneity often perceived as positive. It thus conveys 
recognition or valuation of differences and identities without addressing underlying issues of 
inequality and injustice, such as racism, sexism and economic oppression.
34
 In addition, 
diversity ‘increasingly comes to stand for “cultural diversity” in public debate’.35 Though the 
term has been progressively associated with gender, sexual and other differences, its scope 
still seems to be relatively narrow. Class or socio-economic differences, for example, are 
usually out of the political and legal reflection inspired by those who use the language of 
diversity.  
 
2. Integration and fragmentation 
                                                          
31
 In this vein, see e.g. Tariq Modood, ‘Difference, Multi and Equality’, in Michel Seymour (ed.), The Plural 
States of Recognition (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), at 153 (in discussing whether to use the language of 
difference or of culture: ‘to speak of difference rather than culture allows recognizing that the difference in 
question is not just constituted from inside but also from the outside, from the representations and treatment of 
the minorities in question.’); Iris Marion Young, ‘Structural Injustice and the Politics of Difference’, in Emily 
Grabham et al. (eds.), Intersectionality and Beyond. Law, power and the politics of location (Routledge 
Cavendish, 2009), at 275-276 (speaking of ‘positional difference’) 
32
 See e.g. Marta Minow, Making all the difference. Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law (Cornell University 
Press, 1990), at 80-84; Christine A. Littleton, ‘Reconstructing Sexual Equality’, in Diana Tietjens Meyers (ed.), 
Feminist Social Thought: A reader (Routledge, 1997), at 722 (‘What makes pregnancy a disability rather than, 
say, an additional ability, is the structure of work, not reproduction. Normal pregnancy may make a woman 
unable to “work” for days, weeks or months, but it also makes her able to reproduce. From what viewpoint is the 
work that she cannot do “work” and the work that she is doing not work? Certainly not from hers.’); Martha 
Albertson Fineman, 'Equality and Difference -The Restrained State', 66(3) Alabama Law Review (2015) 609, at  
621-622. For further discussion, see Chapter 2, section I.  
33
 See e.g. Julie Ringelheim, ‘Diversity and Equality: an ambiguous relationship’, in Gavan Titley and Alana 
Lentin (eds.), The politics of diversity in Europe (Council of Europe, 2008), at 36-39; Charles R. Lawrence III, 
‘Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning’, 31 University of San Francisco Law Review (1997), at 765 
(criticising the decoupling between diversity and the remediation of racism in the US debate on affirmative 
actions aimed at ‘diversity’ in education: ‘I argue that diversity cannot be an end in itself – it is substanceless. It 
has no inherent meaning and cannot be a compelling interest unless we ask the prior question: diversity to what 
purpose?’).  
34
 Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley, ‘More Benetton than barricades? The politics of diversity in Europe’, in 
Gavan Titley and Alana Lentin (eds.), The politics of diversity in Europe (Council of Europe, 2008), at 13 
(arguing that diversity, especially in Europe, entails a ‘decontextualized and deliberately ambiguous imaginary’ 
that is shaped by consumer societies. Diversity can be understood as ‘an attempt to re-brand multiculturalism 
while refusing to address the foundational problems of culture, race and socio-political power’).  
35
 Idem.  
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A second important clarification concerns the use of the terms integration and fragmentation. 
It has already been mentioned that this study gives both notions a quite singular connotation 
compared to those prevailing in constitutional and international law. Now it is convenient to 
elaborate a bit further on this point. In both constitutional and international law, questions of 
integration and fragmentation have arisen against the backdrop of diversity or plurality. In 
constitutional law, the concern often revolves around the existence of different political 
communities as well as diverse cultural and group-based demands within the same 
constitutional space.
36
 In this context, integrationists are supposed to stand in opposition to 
those advocating fragmentation, also known as supporters of accommodation. To put it 
simply, the latter would subscribe to the political and legal recognition of multiple identities 
and different ethno-cultural communities. The former, by contrast, would tend to be blind to 
difference and promote a common public identity.
37
 In international law, the integration and 
fragmentation debate goes along similar lines. The former aims at cohesion and unity in the 
face of an international law increasingly fragmented into separate compartments.
38
 Here, 
integration is often seen as a way to resolve the conflicts and the lack of coordination 
generated by the coexistence and simultaneous operation of diverse normative regimes, 
systems, organs, etc.  
This study addresses some, but certainly not all, of the above aspects involved in discussions 
of integration and fragmentation. To start with, my research is limited to human rights law 
and thus does not elaborate on the fragmentation of international law in general. It does, 
however, start from a reality of global legal pluralism.
39
 Nevertheless, the concepts of 
fragmentation and similar terms such as ‘compartmentalisation’ are not only used in relation 
to the several specialised sub-regimes of human rights law. They also serve to describe a way 
of thinking and analysing rights claims. When rights claims are interpreted and resolved by 
the manner in which they fit certain ‘boxes’ typically defined by group-based legal categories 
or by typologies of rights and other normative divides, then I speak of fragmentation or 
compartmentalisation.
40
  
                                                          
36
 In this vein, Sujit Choudhry Choudhry, ‘Bridging comparative politics and comparative constitutional law: 
Constitutional design in divided societies’, in Sujit Choudhry (ed.), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: 
Integration or Accommodation? (Oxford University Press, 2008), at 3-14.  
37
 Ibid., at 27. See also, John McGarry et al., ‘Integration or accommodation? The enduring debate in conflict 
regulation’, in Sujit Choudhry (ed.), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or 
Accommodation? (Oxford University Press, 2008), at 41 and ff.  
38
 See e.g. Carlos Iván Fuentes et al., ‘E Pluribus Unum – Bhinneka Tunggal Ika? Universal Human Rights and 
the Fragmentation of International Law’, in René Provost and Colleen Sheppard (eds.), Dialogues on Human 
Rights and Legal Pluralism (Springer, 2013), at 52-53 and 63 (analysing the proliferation of ‘pockets of law’); 
International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Finalised 
by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, paras. 7-13. For further discussion, see Chapter 2, section 
III. 3.    
39
 Paul Schiff Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’, 80 Southern California Law Review (2007) 1155, at 1159 
(‘arguing that the global legal system is an interlocking web of jurisdictional assertions by state, international, 
and non-state normative communities’); Barbara Oomen, ‘The application of socio-legal theories of legal 
pluralism to understanding the implementation and integration of human rights law’, 4 European Journal of 
Human Rights (2014) 471, at 479 and 493 (referring to a an international ‘multi-layered’ normative order with a 
wide variety of regimes and actors constitute human rights law while being constituted by it)    
40
 In the way I use the word ‘compartmentalisation’, I have taken inspiration from Janneke Gerards, ‘The 
ECtHR’s Response to Fundamental Rights Issue related to Financial and Economic Difficulties. The Problem of 
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Integration, in this context, is therefore not so much about unifying the diverse sub-fields of 
human rights law. Its main concern is not delivering similar normative responses across 
different human rights laws and bodies. The integrated perspective to human rights applied in 
this study, rather, designates a methodological and normative stance for examining legal 
claims (for present purposes, those of cultural and economic difference) more holistically. It 
basically implies an interest in understanding the multidimensionality of cases concerning 
cultural and economic difference. As explained below, this integrated perspective starts from 
the position of rights holders, whose lived experiences of identity, rights and social 
participation is complex and compounded, not fragmented.    
 
IV. Methodology 
As any research methodology, this one is mainly informed by research methods and the use of 
theory.
41
 Broadly speaking, the research combines a literature review and case law analysis. 
In doing so, it also takes an inter-disciplinary orientation. This is mostly reflected in the use of 
non-legal doctrine and in the application of unconventional legal methods inspired by fields of 
studies that include but are not limited to law. As to the literature review, which illuminates 
the theoretical perspectives guiding the research, I have relied on legal and socio-legal 
scholarship on issues of, inter alia, diversity and universality in human rights law; equality 
and non-discrimination; intersectionality; accommodation and difference; fragmentation, 
integration and legal pluralism; and poverty and socio-economic rights. But the research also 
goes across disciplines. It takes inspiration from political and social theory, particularly from 
debates on identity politics and multiculturalism, recognition and redistribution and on social 
inequality more generally.
42
 Finally, feminism and critical and cultural legal studies have 
yielded not just theoretical insights but also the main methodological tools for analysing the 
selected case law, which are further discussed infra in IV.3.  
 
1. Case law selection  
Talking about cultural and economic claims may refer us to a broad and abundant array of 
cases. This is true even if we take, as I do in this study, a rather restricted notion of ‘cultural’ 
and ‘economic’ difference. The need for narrowing down the sample of case law examined is 
particularly pressing with regard to the ECtHR, given the extremely large number of decisions 
and judgments it has produced. Just to give the reader an idea, in the field of freedom of 
religion alone (Article 9 ECHR – a typical expression of culture-based claims) the ECtHR has 
so far issued more than 500 rulings.
43
 Another important factor to consider in the selection of 
cases is that due to the scope and goals of this research, the rulings could not be selected 
simply on the basis of the Convention provisions covered, or on the basis of other clear-cut 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Compartmentalisation’, 33(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2015) 274, at 275. For further 
discussion, see Chapter 2, section III 3.  
41
 Patricia Leavy, ‘Introduction’, in Patricia Leavy (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research (Oxford 
University Press, 2014), at 4 (explaining that “methodology is a plan for how research will proceed –combining 
methods and theory […] the methodology is informed by the philosophical beliefs guiding the research, the 
selection of research methods and the use of theory”).      
42
 See the scholarship discussed in Chapter 2, which elaborates on the theoretical basis of the present study.   
43
 See Saïla Ouald Chaib, Belief in Justice: Towards More Inclusivity in and through the Freedom of Religion 
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, PhD Dissertation (Ghent University, 2015), at 65. 
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concepts or normative categories. Instead, a combination of elements was needed to 
determine which cases were suitable for this research. Hence, the case law has been selected 
on the basis of a mix of substantive and formal criteria.  
 
1.1. Substantive criteria 
From a substantive point of view, a general concern guiding the selection of case law has been 
the identification of cases about cultural and economic disadvantage for which an integrated 
approach to human rights law could have the most added value. With this in mind, I have 
aimed at rulings in contentious cases in which many of the following elements are present: 
   
- Cases where the main discourse is about cultural or economic difference (disadvantage) 
and which are representative of currently contested issues in Europe and the Americas. 
By taking this approach, I aim at cases that engender divergence and which are more 
likely to pose the challenges identified earlier (i.e. issues of normalisation, restraint, 
limits and abstract vs. real-life approach).  
- Cases brought by individuals or groups in non-dominant positions. Adopting this prism 
allows me to analyse the situation of people who are regarded as different and experience 
disadvantage as a result of or in close connection to that difference. These persons are 
prone to being devalued and stereotyped while also encountering material hardship. Thus, 
their claims are likely to involve different types of harm and allegations of inequality.   
- Cases which are likely to involve several rights holders with multiple affiliations, and 
which cut across divides between different types of harm and right, such as those that 
separate civil and political rights from social and economic rights. The multiplicity in 
actors, norms and interests involved is an indication that such cases may be in need of an 
integrated view of human rights law. 
- Cases in which claims of cultural and economic difference contest disadvantage in social 
participation. This focus is premised on the idea that complaints about state-sponsored 
persecution, bodily harm and killings tend to be less contested and solved in more 
pragmatic and contextualised ways than cases concerning social policies and practices 
regarding housing, education, legal services, the workplace, use of public places, etc.  
The application of the above criteria in the context of the ECtHR led me to focus on claims of 
cultural difference brought by Muslims and by Roma and Traveller applicants. As will be 
seen later, both sets of cases have given rise to significant debate in the European system, 
albeit for different reasons. With regard to all of them, I could look at issues of social 
participation, such as education, the workplace, housing and the use of public places. For the 
Inter-American Court, where the spectrum of claims of cultural difference is substantially less 
varied and numerous, I turned to cases brought by Indigenous and Afro-descendant 
applicants. These are virtually the only rights holders with regard to whom the IACtHR has 
addressed questions of cultural difference. Most of these cases concern social participation 
(e.g. land rights, political and economic integration, and education), although some also 
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include acts of persecution and bodily harm. The broader scope of this set of selected case law 
is explained below (see infra 1.3).  
As regards claims of economic difference before the IACtHR and the ECtHR, I focus on 
cases brought by persons in socio-economic disadvantage. Particular attention is devoted to 
complaints where the litigants and/or the courts frame the problem as one about poverty 
and/or disadvantage in socio-economic welfare in several areas of social life (e.g. access to 
legal services, health, education, family welfare and social housing). The way human rights 
law responds to poverty-related violations has been a topical issue for some time in the Inter-
American system.
44
 In the context of the Council of Europe, however, this issue has gained 
attention in the last decade.
45
 Given the multidimensionality of the rights holders, the harms 
and the norms implicated in most cultural and economic cases selected from the courts’ 
dockets, they are well placed to be analysed through an integrated normative framework.  
 
1.2. Formal criteria and search methods 
From a formal point of view, the sample of cases encompasses a varied range of rulings 
issued over a broad time span. It includes decisions, ‘routine’ judgments and high profile 
judgments, delivered by both supranational courts up until June 2017. Overall, I reviewed 
about 221 judgments and decisions. While this sample may not be exhaustive, it is certainly 
comprehensive enough for present purposes.
46
  
With regard to the specific search methods that enabled me to identify the relevant rulings 
from the ECtHR via the Court’s database HUDOC,47 I used keywords48 and a snowball search 
system. This was especially needed for identifying relevant cases of socio-economic 
disadvantage, for which no particular category of applicants could lead me to representative 
cases.
49
 The cases identified through the literature and through keywords allowed me to 
identify other cases and to refine or add some keywords to improve the search. I also 
                                                          
44
 During the decades of 1980 and 1990, the IACommHR had already issued a number of country reports 
addressing the human rights situation of people living in poverty. See e.g. IACommHR, Report on the Situation 
of Human Rights in El Salvador, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.46, 17 November 1978, Chapter XI - Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights; Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, 24 April 1997, 
aChapter II. B. In the 2000 decade, the Commission also devoted attention to this matter in its thematic reports 
and reports on the merits of individual complaints. The IACtHR, for its part, started to consider this question in 
contentious cases by the end of the nineties. See e.g. IACtHR, “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. 
Guatemala, Judgment of 19 November 1999, paras. 144 and 191.  
45
 This has been notably so in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crises. See e.g.  Françoise Tulkens, The 
European Convention on Human Rights and the economic crisis: The issue of poverty, European University 
Institute Working Papers AEL 2013/08 (2013); Council of Europe, Steering Committee for Human Rights 
(CDDH); The Impact of the economic crisis and austerity measures on human rights in Europe. Feasibility study, 
CDDH(2015)R84 Addendum IV, 11 December 2015.  
46
 In addition, I drew on a number of cases from both regional courts which concern issues or applicants different 
from the ones that are the main focus of study. Likewise, I reviewed advisory opinions from the IACtHR and a 
number of rulings from other regional and international monitoring bodies. These were referenced when so was 
deemed necessary for explanatory purposes.  
47
 ECtHR, HUDOC database at < https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng>  
48
 I used the words ‘lifestyle’, ‘poverty’, ‘financial means’, ‘financial hardship’, ‘afford’, ‘social disadvantage.’  
49
 As I could by contrast do with Muslims and Roma/Travellers in cases of cultural difference.  
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benefited from some ECtHR factsheets
50
 and from biweekly meetings in which fellow 
researchers and I used to discuss the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights.
51
  
In order to identify the relevant IACtHR case law, by contrast, there was no need to take 
certain treaty provisions as guidance or to use keywords. A quick review of all existing 
judgments was feasible.
52
 Besides this being a manageable number, I benefited from previous 
knowledge of the IACtHR’s case law gained through past professional experience. Therefore, 
the identification of the relevant rulings from the Inter-American Court, which are regularly 
published on its webpage,
53
 was carried out mostly on the basis of the substantive criteria 
mentioned above.  
 
1.3. Under-inclusion and over-inclusion  
If we look at the sample of cases selected for this study, one may observe instances of under-
inclusion for the ECtHR and instances of over-inclusion for the IACtHR. I will briefly explain 
why. As noted earlier with regard to the ECtHR, neither all cases involving questions of 
cultural difference nor all cases involving questions of socio-economic disadvantage were 
included. I have explained that claims of cultural difference raised by individuals and groups 
in non-dominant positions other than Muslims, Roma and Travellers are not covered by the 
chapters discussing the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. The rulings concerning these categories of 
rights holders satisfy the substantive criteria mentioned above while also being numerous 
enough. Still, within the claims of cultural difference brought by Muslims, Roma and 
Travellers, I have confined myself to certain areas of social participation where different 
rights holders and harms are involved.
54
 Similarly, not all complaints of socio-economic 
disadvantage are examined here. For example, most of those dealing with cuts to socio-
economic benefits in times of economic crisis were excluded, the reason being that often they 
were not brought by persons living in poverty or in significant socio-economic hardship, but 
rather by people with a middle and upper class background.  
When it comes to the IACtHR’s case law, however, the question is more one of over-
inclusion with regard to the stated selection criteria. For instance, I have included cases 
involving acts of persecution and bodily injury associated with actual or perceived ethno-
cultural and economic difference. The need to include them flows from the number and types 
of cases that have reached the IACtHR as well as the way such cases are framed, which, as 
                                                          
50
 Notably, I used the ECtHR’s factsheets on ‘Roma and Travellers’ from July 2015 and January 2017 as well as 
the factsheet on ‘Religious symbols and clothing’ from November 2015. All of them available at 
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will be seen later, can be quite dissimilar to what occurs in the ECtHR. As one would expect, 
a few additional cases from these courts and from other quasi-judicial bodies have also been 
incorporated because of their relevance for illustrative or explanatory purposes. Further 
details of the decisions and judgments (not) examined are provided in Chapters 3 to 6. For 
now, it suffices to highlight that the dividing line across cases has been drawn mainly by 
reference to the narrative and legal categories that have more salience in the respective 
judgement/decision. I focus on those whose narrative concerns cultural and economic 
difference (or disadvantage) and which rely on categories such as cultural and religious 
identity, group-based differences of culture or lifestyle, on the one hand; and poverty and 
socio-economic welfare, on the other. This entails important consequences for the 
comparative scope of this research, namely that the cases studied from each court are not 
‘mirror cases’. 55 
 
2. Comparative scope: the European and Inter-American courts of human rights 
As already mentioned, this study takes a comparative view. It examines the adjudicatory work 
of the European and Inter-American courts of human rights. But why these courts? To start 
with, regional courts appear relatively well suited to adopting an integrated approach to 
human rights, for they deal with general treaties applicable to a whole region. This contrasts 
with the work of many UN treaty bodies which, save for the Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
and lately also the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural rights (CESCR), receive 
individual communications under instruments dealing with one subject matter or with one 
target group.
56
 At the same time, though, a number of these UN treaties, especially the most 
recent ones, are framed in a rather holistic fashion.
57
 That is, they integrate economic, social 
and cultural rights with civil and political rights. They also regulate areas typically defined as 
public and private and some even require the consideration of multiple or complex forms of 
discrimination. All in all, then, regional courts appear better placed for, and at the same time 
more in need of, an integrated approach to rights than most UN treaty bodies.  
A second aspect of relevance is that the ECtHR and IACtHR are both judicial bodies issuing 
binding judgments. This makes their legal discourse, at least formally, more authoritative than 
that of quasi-judicial bodies. In addition to the difference in normative force, it should be 
noted that the reasoning of both regional courts is substantially more detailed than that of their 
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closest counterpart at the UN level, the Human Rights Committee. Moreover, the rulings of 
the ECtHR and IACtHR are increasingly used by civil society organisations, lawyers and 
other actors, while also referenced by national courts. Actually, both regional courts are closer 
than UN organs to the national courts to which people bringing claims of cultural and 
economic difference first resort. In this sense, the analytical and normative frameworks 
applicable to adjudication carried out by the ECtHR and IACtHR may also be of relevance for 
national courts and for other stakeholders at the domestic level.  
The question persists, however as to why this study does not include the African Court of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter, ‘the African Court’). This court stands as the third 
and the youngest supranational judicial body of human rights. Two main reasons, one 
normative and one practical, militated against the inclusion of the African Court within the 
scope of the present research. From a normative perspective, it appears that the need for an 
integrated perspective, particularly in the field of cultural and economic differences, is 
considerably less pressing in the case of the African Court than in those of the ECtHR and 
IACtHR. The premise rests, to a great extent, on the integrated view of rights and rights 
holders embedded in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (hereinafter, the 
African Charter). The latter has, remarkably, incorporated group rights, socio-economic rights 
and rights of ‘solidarity’ such as the rights to peace, to development and to a healthy 
environment, as well as duties towards the community.
58
 As Mutua puts it, ‘among the major 
human rights instruments, only the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights attempts 
the comprehensive unification of these conflicting notions of community, individual rights, 
and duties to the family, the community and the state’.59 In addition, the African Court enjoys 
by far the most comprehensive ratione materiae jurisdiction. Unlike the ECtHR and the 
IACtHR, it can basically rule on any relevant human rights instrument ratified by the states 
concerned.
60
  
The regional boundaries of this study are also motivated by practical considerations. In the 
first place, as a result of its short existence the list of judgments issued by the African Court 
remains very brief. Being still in an early stage, its case law offers limited material for the 
present study. Faced with this, a proper analysis of the African Court’s jurisprudence would 
have required turning to the decisions of the African Commission, the quasi-judicial body that 
has been monitoring the African Charter since before the Court was set up. But how could I 
then do so without examining the decisions of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights too? The problem is that adding the latter was not a realistic possibility either.
61
 So, 
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taking an all-encompassing perspective in terms of regional courts was, in the second place, 
simply not feasible for a three-year project. Thus, not only normative but also pragmatic 
grounds justified restricting the analysis to the European and Inter-American courts’ case law.  
  
3. Methods of feminist theory and of cultural and critical legal studies 
The present research is informed by feminist scholarship, cultural studies (particularly in the 
field of literature and law) and by critical legal theory.
62
 While many of these theoretical 
perspectives are known for their substantive positions or political and epistemological claims, 
they also provide research methods. These are, in other words, tools or strategies for data 
collection and, especially, for qualitative data analysis.
63
 Frames of analysis of feminism, 
cultural studies from and critical legal theory have thus been particularly helpful in defining 
the methods and the theories behind the integrated view of human rights law underpinning 
this study. In fact, for this study, human rights integration is about both method and 
substance.
64
 As a substantive stance, it designates a normative practice that aspires to do 
justice to the lived reality of people and to the ideals of indivisibility and interdependence of 
rights. As noted earlier, this is particularly desirable in the adjudication of complex cases or in 
areas that are prone to being examined through abstract or unidimensional legal categories. As 
a method, integration provides guidance in how to approach human rights cases in order to get 
there. In what follows, I sketch the main analytical/methodological insights I use to approach 
human rights law in an integrated, relational and inclusive manner. 
From feminist studies, I have borrowed three main tools for approaching and analysing my 
data. These are (1) intersectionality, operationalised as ‘cross-thinking’, (2) relationality and 
(3) practical, inclusive reasoning. Let’s start with intersectionality. Since this concept is 
further examined in Chapter 2, here I will provide only a basic overview of what 
intersectionality is and how I apply it to analyse my main data: the case law.  
 
3.1. Intersectionality as cross-thinking 
While in politics and in law we are used to thinking of people as defined by one trait, a single 
identity or one type of experience, in real life things are more complex. People have multiple 
affiliations and experience oppression and privilege on account of interacting power relations. 
Single-axe schemes of legal protection (such as those based on belonging to one protected 
category) are therefore ill-equipped to capture this complexity. One of the consequences of 
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this is that those who face manifold disadvantages become invisible, getting little or no legal 
protection. Intersectionality then serves to capture the fact that their experiences are not 
compartmentalised, whether from the perspective of gender, race, age, body-ability, cultural 
background, class or any other source of social hierarchy. Although intersectionality is mostly 
known as a legal technique in antidiscrimination law to provide redress for discrimination 
based on multiple or overlapping grounds, it also serves as a method of analysis. To use 
intersectionality this way, Matsuda proposes to ‘ask the other question’. She explains:  
The way I try to understand the interconnection of all forms of subordination is 
through a method I call “ask the other question”. When I see something that looks 
racist, I ask, “Where is the patriarchy in this?” When I see something that looks sexist, 
I ask, “Where is the heterosexism in this?” When I see something that looks 
homophobic, I ask, “Where are the class interests in this?”.65  
So, also as a method, intersectionality helps law to be responsive to real life’s complexity. In 
the words of Mackinnon ‘intersectionality [is] a method for fitting law to reality, rather than 
reality to law’.66 
Building upon this understanding of intersectionality, I propose to examine the case law 
through what can be called ‘cross-thinking’. In short, this is like ‘to ask the other question’ 
but over a wider set of issues. To explore who rights holders are, what harms are at stake and 
which norms are implicated in any given case, it uses one dimension of them to interrogate 
another. Thus, if the applicant’s experience in a case seems to be constructed by courts or by 
litigants through the prism of one single identity or status (say, ethnic origin or cultural 
background), the research considers whether other possible identities compounded her 
experience (e.g. gender and class). But in addition, where cases are mainly read as an instance 
of interference with one type of harm or right (say, cultural disrespect and the right to private 
life), the research also looks at other types of harm and right that may be at stake as well (e.g. 
maldistribution, or political marginalisation and socio-economic rights). As such, I argue that 
cross-thinking is a method well suited to approaching human rights law from an integrated 
perspective. It allows us to look at cases beyond legal divides and categorisations that are too 
often taken for granted. In so doing, it helps us to consider the situation presented to us as a 
whole.  
 
3.2. Relationality 
The second insight taken from feminist studies is relationality. This notion is very much 
connected to intersectionality in that it rejects binary (either/or) thinking to focus instead on 
interconnections.
67
 This can be applied to all kinds of social entity: individuals, institutions 
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and, of course, the law. The assumption is that neither people nor laws stand in isolation. 
They work through relations while at the same time structuring further relations. As Nedelsky 
puts it, ‘each individual is in basic ways constituted by networks of relationships of which 
they are part –networks that range from intimate relations with parents, friends, or lovers to 
relations between student and teacher, welfare recipients and case workers, citizen and state, 
to being participants in a global economy, migrants in a world of gross economic inequality, 
inhabitants of a world shaped by global warming’.68 This also holds for laws and rights. Even 
if legal regimes appear self-contained, even if human rights law is separated into different 
‘compartments’, we know that all these norms, like judicial decisions, are in constant 
interaction. But what does this mean for research as presented here? Basically, it means that 
attention is directed to how people (rights holders), on the one hand, and norms (human 
rights), on the other are not isolated but interrelated. As further explained in Chapter 2, this 
view of norm interaction is closely related, although not limited, to the ideas of indivisibility 
and interdependence of human rights. Yet, it is interesting to note that while this normative 
interaction is at least theorised in human rights law, the relational aspect of rights holders is 
often left unexplored. The way this study applies relationality compensate for that.  
Taking a relational view also leads to examining disputes and cases in a situated manner. It 
makes the legal analysis more concerned with addressing real life experiences within a given 
context rather than with conceptual coherence or with normative categories. This is linked to 
the third main feminist method underpinning this study, namely, practical and inclusive 
reasoning.  
 
3.3. Practical, inclusive reasoning 
Practical reasoning does not approach problems as dichotomised, abstract conflicts. Rather, it 
views them as ‘dilemmas with multiple perspectives, contradictions, and inconsistencies’.69 
To put it simply, this reasoning is practical insofar as it focuses close attention on the actual 
interests that are at stake in a case and to the effects of laws and practices over formal and a 
priori judgment. Feminist-inspired practical reasoning is also inclusive because it views the 
multiple perspectives and tensions generated by new, unique contexts as a source of insights 
that are valuable for decision-making.
70
 As Barlett argues, feminist practical rationality 
‘acknowledges greater diversity in human experiences and the value of taking into account 
competing or inconsistent claims […] and to open up the possibilities of new situations rather 
than limit them with prescribed categories of analysis’.71 This drive toward inclusiveness in 
legal reasoning can be described as an interest in having as full as possible a picture when it 
comes to deciding a dispute.
72
 The present study is animated by this pragmatic and inclusive 
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drive. My examination of complaints of cultural and economic difference brought to regional 
courts is guided by a concern about what is seen and what is obscured by legal categorisation, 
including competing claims or conflicting interests. Further, in this research I am not so much 
interested in discussing the case law from the perspective of state obligations, types of right, 
themes, or the formal consistency of legal reasoning. Rather, I am interested in the practical 
effects of certain legal frames and in what can be gained from enriching the picture offered to 
judges in certain cases. 
 
3.4. Cultural and critical legal studies  
Several of the above frames of analysis converge with elements of literary and critical legal 
theories, taken as part of the broader field of cultural studies of law.
73
 In fact, similar to the 
insights of relationality, understanding law as a narrative or discursive process
74
 underscores 
the point that law does not just respond to societal problems and demands. It also constitutes 
them; it shapes them.
75
 In other words, viewing law as discourse reveals that law, like other 
narratives, is not free from cultural constraints and social meanings while simultaneously 
creating them.
76
 This is, furthermore, one of the premises of critical discourse analysis.
77
 For 
the latter, it is possible to explore the discursive elements of law to understand, criticise and 
then reconstruct both legal and socio-cultural institutions. A narrative approach to law is 
likewise helpful for thinking along the lines of practical reasoning. This follows from the 
understanding that discourses do not only represent things. They also perform social 
functions.
78
 Therefore, besides asking how legal discourses portray people’s identities, social 
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differences and grievances, we can think as well of the effects that such discourses (about 
who people are and what they are entitled to) may have in a case, in law or in society.
79
  
Another important insight of a literary analysis of law is that law, like other narratives, has the 
capacity of imagination and thus, of empathetic, flexible thinking. Through narrative, we may 
more easily put ourselves in others’ shoes, getting closer to the experience of those who are 
least like us.
80
 Conceiving of legal claims and decisions as having this potential for 
empathising with others’ needs and values, however different to the adjudicators they may be, 
is therefore useful for exploring how courts respond to claims of cultural and economic 
difference. An empathetic stance also makes it easier to appreciate the multidimensionality of 
people and human rights law as well as the latter’s effectiveness. 81 In sum, stimulating a 
flexible, empathetic way of accounting for rights claims and conflicts is relevant for a project 
interested in human rights integration. That is, a framework that promotes a comprehensive 
and contextual understanding of the individuals, the rights and the specific interests and social 
arrangements involved in the cases studied.   
 
3.5. An overview of the methods at work: analysis and structure of the case law  
So how, concretely, have I applied the analytical tools of feminism and of cultural and critical 
legal studies? As will be seen hereunder, the use of the methods explained above, and notably 
that consisting of cross-thinking, is particularly well reflected in the framework I developed 
for the analysis of case law and for structuring and presenting this analysis. In fact, I propose 
to use a framework that promotes an integrated, relational and inclusive approach to cases 
dealing with cultural and economic difference and which proceeds in the following way. First, 
it starts by looking at rights holders. Here, the study suggests considering not only applicants, 
but also other persons potentially affected by the issue contested in the case (this is necessary 
because people do not stand in isolation from each other – a relational view is needed). Then, 
in appreciating who these rights holders are and how they are presented, I take into account 
their multiple identities or affiliations (intersectionality as cross-thinking). But there is more. 
While immersed in this research, I realised that not only people’s identities tended to be seen 
in an either/or fashion. Especially in the context of the ECtHR’s case law, I noticed that in 
legal discourses people’s agency was often presented in a similarly dichotomic way. 
However, in real life people are not fully autonomous, self-made individuals. Neither they are 
fully constrained or dependants. Rather, our agency is shaped by social relations and 
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structures. Thus, I also suggest taking a more comprehensive and less fragmentary approach 
to rights holders’ agency (intersectionality, relationality).  
When it comes to examining the norms involved in the case law, I apply a similar logic of 
analysis. In identifying the relevant norms, one needs to ask oneself whether besides the 
harms and rights immediately associated with the dominant legal narrative of the case, other 
harms and rights may be implicated too. Thus, if a case is presented as concerning the 
accommodation of a particular lifestyle and an alleged disrespect for cultural identity and 
private life, one would also consider whether social rights, discrimination and socio-economic 
exclusion are involved (intersectionality as cross-thinking). Further, because human rights 
norms are part of a broader normative environment at both the national and international 
levels, the research encourages ‘pluralism awareness’. That is, having regard for related 
sources of norms, i.e. human rights norms from specialised treaties or from other monitoring 
bodies, as well relevant state and non-state regulations (relationality).  
The above normative and methodological framework is not aimed at theoretical or technical 
accuracy. Rather, it is inspired by the belief that such an integrated perspective may enrich the 
legal analysis in such a way that justice could better account for people’s lived reality and for 
the social structures underpinning claims of cultural and economic difference – and possibly 
other claims too. This twofold motivation may appear, at first sight, as holding an internal 
contradiction. Indeed, it is argued that too much of a focus on the individual and her specific 
circumstances may sideline the role of group inequalities and social structures.
82
 Conversely, 
others claim that a structural approach may come at the expense of losing sight of the 
individual concerned and her particular needs.
83
 Nevertheless, the proposed integrated 
framework tries to reconcile both concerns. It incorporates both the agency and the structural 
dimension. It does so by viewing people and norms in a relational and inclusive way. The 
premise is that none of them are floating in the air. They are interdependent and embedded in 
social relations and structures.  
Integration, as understood here, also implies that cases are resolved in a contextualised, 
pragmatic manner, with attention to the different interests that are actually at stake (practical, 
inclusive reasoning). Further, it presupposes that law is flexible enough to move across legal 
compartments and has the transformative potential to go beyond peoples’ differences and 
scrutinise the roots of violations (narrative and critical legal studies).           
 
4. Shifting attention toward rights holders: a user’s perspective 
Up to this point I have provided an overview of what human rights integration entails for this 
study in terms of both method and substance. Now it is time to clarify which viewpoint is 
                                                          
82
 Marius Pieterse, ‘Finding for the applicant? Individual Equality Plaintiffs and Group-based Disadvantage’, 24 
South African Journal of Human Rights (2008) 397, at 398-400; Moritz Baumgärtel, ‘Perspectives on the User: 
Unpacking a Concept for Human Rights Research’, 8(2) Human Rights & International Legal Discourse (2014) 
142, at 150-154 (discussing the ‘structural critique’ to a user’s perspective in human rights).  Shifting attention 
from individual to group and structural inequality is also a major concern of advocates of substantive or 
structural equality. See infra Chapter 2, section III. 4.   
83
 Pok Yin S. Chow, ‘Has Intersectionality Reached its Limits? Intersectionality in the UN Human Rights Treaty 
Body Practice and the Issue of Ambivalence’, 16 Human Rights Law Review (2016) 453, at 459 and 472.  
32 
 
taken and why human rights law is to be analysed in an integrated fashion. As must be evident 
by now, I have deliberately opted for a framework of analysis that starts by looking at rights 
holders instead of norms. This does not mean that each dimension can be set apart or analysed 
independently from the other. Nor does this choice express a hierarchical relationship. Rather, 
adopting the situation of rights holders as an entry point serves two main aims. First, it 
redirects attention to a dimension that is often undertheorised in discussions about 
fragmentation/integration and human rights law in general. Second, and perhaps more 
crucially, looking at human rights integration from the perspective of rights holders serves to 
illuminate issues that a purely normative inquiry may not easily reveal.  
The common point of departure of legal scholarship in the field of integration and 
fragmentation and diversity is that of states’ obligations, convention provisions, limitation 
clauses and norm conflicts.
 84
 By situating rights holders as the first step of inquiry instead, 
the research contributes to the study of human rights from a ‘user’s perspective’, in keeping 
with the overall aim of the project within which this study is situated.
85
 This means that ‘the 
perspective from which the analysis is undertaken is that of the person, group, organisation or 
institution engaging with (“using”) human rights – and thus not the perspective of a specific 
legal instrument, theme or right’.86 In redirecting attention to rights holders, the present study 
attaches great significance to the real-life experience of the bearers of rights. Admittedly, this 
research is not premised on the standpoint of one particular user of human rights law – for 
example, that of the alleged victim, her lawyers, NGOs or judges. When examining claims of 
cultural and economic difference, the research considers both the experience of claimants – as 
expressed by their arguments before human rights courts – and the way the respective court – 
the IACtHR and the ECtHR – engages with those claims.87 Moreover, and in light of the 
integrated rights framework used here, the study considers the situation of other persons 
potentially affected by the measure contested in the respective case. The fact that the study 
does not focus on one specific actor and relies on ‘desk research’ rather than on ‘field 
research’ does not preclude the adoption of a user’s perspective. Following Desmet, what is 
more characteristic of this approach is that ‘the starting point of analysis, the perspective 
taken, is that of a certain user (or different users), not a particular theme’.88 This is precisely 
what this study does in developing an integrated approach to human rights and in applying 
this to the analysis of the selected case law.  
In addition, by taking rights holders as a point of departure, the study seeks to provide 
elements for a more critical and transformative view of human rights law. A focus on state 
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obligations and legal categories does not necessarily challenge pre-existing inequalities.
 89
 The 
reason is that the analysis of state obligations and other legal categories starts from the status 
quo. Inequalities, however, tend to exist prior to laws. Thus, if ethno-cultural minorities, such 
as Travellers, seek adjustments in planning/land regulations so as to be able to have security 
of tenure while living in caravans, a convention right/state obligation approach will translate 
this as a request for a positive obligation to provide (i.e. allocate land, housing) or to grant 
special treatment (i.e. exemptions, accommodation). If we start instead from the perspective 
of the rights holders’ experience, the framing of the issue changes. The same claim would 
rather appear as an obligation to remedy or put an end to the systematic exclusion of people 
whose needs and interests were not considered in planning regulations in the first place. 
Hence, as Porter argues, ‘shifting the focus of legal analysis from the nature of claimants’ 
rights to the nature of state obligations may often serve to cover up systemic patterns of 
injustice which are only apparent from the claimant’s perspective’.90  
By a similar token, analysing normative concepts at the expense of the claimants’ perspective 
may easily lead judges to reason in a rather abstract, disaggregated manner, which is the 
opposite of what human rights integration is about. Note, for example, that judicial and 
scholarly debates on cases about poverty or socio-economic disadvantage often lack a rights 
holder approach. Quite frequently they rely on frames of analysis centred on state obligations 
and formal, abstract categories. Many of these concern the scope of state’s obligations in the 
face of economic constraints; how poverty is defined; specific legal categories applicable to 
economic, social and cultural rights, such as ‘reasonability’, ‘minimum core’; or abstract 
questions of social policy and resource allocation.
91
 By focusing on these categories and 
leaving aside the perspective of rights claimants we may easily overlook what a concrete 
person is asking for in a certain context at a particular place and time. A purely normative 
inquiry may, in other words, pass over issues of context, structural inequalities and practical 
questions, such as individual circumstances and the actual interests that are at stake in a 
particular case.  
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V. The structure of the thesis 
The present study is structured in four parts. Part I introduces the research and provides its 
theoretical foundations. Part I contains Chapter 1 (the present ‘General introduction’) and 
Chapter 2 (‘Conceptual and normative exploration’). This chapter provides the theoretical 
basis of the thesis. It discusses the legal and political mobilisation of claims of difference, its 
link with so-called identity politics and the criticism directed against it. On that basis, the 
discussion moves on to how human rights law has dealt with issues of difference, identity and 
group-based inequality, and how this relates to its fragmentation. Having problematised 
fragmentary legal thinking, with particular attention to the centrality of group identity frames 
of protection, the chapter turns to the search for integrated frameworks, both in theory and 
practice. Towards the end, the discussion also attempts to situate the ECtHR and the IACtHR 
in the regional and international context, shedding light on their opportunities and limitations. 
The subsequent two parts take this normative and conceptual baggage to the actual case law. 
Part II ‘Rethinking cultural difference from an integrated perspective on human rights’ deals 
with legal discourses of cultural difference before the ECtHR and the IACtHR. It is 
subdivided into Chapter 3 (‘An integrated approach to cultural difference in the European 
Court of Human Rights’) and Chapter 4 (‘An integrated approach to cultural difference in the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights’). Part III ‘Rethinking economic difference from an 
integrated perspective on human rights’ turns to the European and Inter-American case law 
regarding claims of economic difference. Part III is subdivided into Chapter 5 (‘An integrated 
approach to economic difference in the European Court of Human Rights’) and Chapter 6 
(‘An integrated approach to economic difference in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights’). The final part of the study, Part IV, presents the concluding chapter, which 
elaborates on the findings of the research, notably, whose and which rights are seen in the 
cases studied and what normative consequences follow from that. The chapter also reflects on, 
for example, the legal tools that are instrumental for an integrated normative perspective, the 
opportunities for and limitations on its implementation by the ECtHR and IACtHR, and 
suggestions for future research.   
Now, what does rethinking cultural and economic difference from an integrated perspective 
entail in practice? Or, in other words, how does the analysis of case law in Parts II and III 
proceed? These two parts of the study attempt to show which ‘fragments’ of the cases are 
seen by the courts and which ‘fragments’ are rather obfuscated. In so doing, they also aim to 
reveal what the picture might look like if at least some of the fragments were brought 
together. The four chapters in Parts II and III (chapters 3 to 6) start with a brief introduction 
(section I). This is followed by discussing the role that identity group-based legal categories 
and other normative ‘compartments’ play in the adjudication process (section II). The 
discussion then turns to how the courts define the applicants’ experiences, which other rights 
holders are considered and how they are portrayed (section III). Then it also explores what 
kinds of harms and norms are taken into account by the courts and which ones are left out and 
what could be gained by a fuller normative picture (section IV). The reader will find these 
discussions organised as indicated hereunder:  
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II. Group identity boundaries and other forms of fragmentary thinking  
III. Whole humans: looking through and across rights holders 
IV. Integrated rights: cross-thinking about harms and norms 
 
Before seeing the proposed integrated framework at work in cases of cultural and economic 
difference in the ECtHR and the IACtHR, the following chapter (Chapter 2) turns to the 
theoretical basis of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 - A CONCEPTUAL AND NORMATIVE EXPLORATION 
I. Introduction: Differences and social participation 
It is clear that we inhabit a world of differences. We are crossed by and live among distinct 
identities and cultural values, as our societies are more plural than ever. Furthermore, social 
inequality divides us across and within regions, since the world never had so much wealth 
concentrated in so few hands.
92
 We are increasingly aware of our differences in terms of 
religion, ethnicity, culture, sexual and gender identity, body ability and economic resources, 
among many others. Globalisation processes characterised by (neo)liberalisation trends and 
increased flows of ideas and persons are some of the factors which have rendered liberal 
democracies more diverse or have made diversity more visible. Either way, both cultural and 
socio-economic disparities have widened. What is more, many claim that being singled out as 
different and having their difference overlooked both have the effect of excluding them from 
the socio-economic, cultural and political life of their communities. These claims have, 
already for a while, been expressed as issues of difference, identity and human rights. As 
such, they have reached not only domestic courts and political bodies, but also international 
human rights courts. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) both have to deal with a growing number of such legal 
claims. 
The above has taken place against the background of decades during which the language of 
difference and diversity gained currency while multiculturalism was widely embraced in 
Europe and the Americas.
93
 More recently, however, the general context is also one of 
retreat.
94
 Some argue that multiculturalist efforts have failed, that the accommodation of 
differences went too far and that we live in fractured societies.
 
On the left-liberal side of the 
spectrum, critics point out that too much celebration of diversity undermines solidarity among 
the oppressed, diverts attention from economic injustice and destabilises the welfare state.
95
 
On the right side, claims of social unity and cohesion have been increasingly mobilised 
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against several daunting threats, usually embodied in immigrants, and capitalised by growing 
xenophobic political forces.
96
 But the political and social divisions around questions of 
diversity have not just added complexity to the debate. Claims for the protection and/or 
accommodation of distinctive groups or identities pursuing a myriad of interests multiply – 
from, for example, religious believers struggling to have a place in educational and 
professional settings, to LGBTI individuals dissatisfied with family welfare regulations, to 
parents in poverty, indigenous people and even fox hunting communities demanding 
recognition and support for their livelihoods. Courts, in turn, wonder how far they can go in 
their responses; where to draw the line in defining protected identities and ‘deserving’ groups; 
which grounds of differentiation are problematic and why. In this regard, claims based on 
cultural and economic difference are particularly challenging, as explained in Chapter 1. Can 
people living in poverty or irregular immigrants be portrayed as sharing an identity or as 
being a ‘discrete minority’ that deserves protection? Which cultural expressions are to be 
accommodated and why? How can human rights courts object to seemingly reasonable 
cultural and economic criteria? Should human rights protect our distinctiveness to the extent 
that this is socially valuable? If not, how should human rights deal with claims about 
differences and social inclusion?  
Most of this chapter aims at exploring the conceptual and normative basis for the questions 
posed above. In doing so, the idea is advanced that part of the complexity posed by claims of 
cultural and economic difference could be addressed by moving away from fragmentary 
frames of analysis. But before discussing all this, the following section will first provide some 
clarification as to which differences matter and why.  
 
1. Embedded differences 
In order to understand why and how rights claims about social difference emerge, it should be 
noted that institutions and social structures rest on a set of norms distinguishing who is and is 
not entitled. Indeed, it has been argued that the distribution of symbolic and material goods in 
society occurs on the basis of ‘rules about membership and access’.97 These do not consist 
merely of explicit distinctions among people to the exclusion of some. Institutional 
differentiation also consists of unstated prescriptions about what is normal or acceptable to the 
exclusion and differentiation of those who cannot fit the norm.
98
 This norm is produced by 
people in positions of power who project their own experiences and values as neutral and 
universal.
99
 These are typically identified with the experiences and values of a Western self-
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sufficient white middle-class man, who has been the subject traditionally protected by law, 
including human rights law.
100
 As a result, the categorisations and assumptions underlying the 
operation of a number of social institutions produce stratification and embedded views about 
people’s differences.  
Mindful of the above, this research is primarily concerned with embedded, rather than 
embodied, differences. These two concepts, borrowed from Martha Fineman,
101
 serve to point 
out that beyond the way individual embodiment differs, it is relevant to enquire how we are 
differently situated in social relations and institutions.
102
 Being different from others – those 
others who are implicitly our point of reference – usually makes us think that the difference is 
in us.
103
 Yet, differences become salient and important insofar as formal and informal social 
structures rely on them to determine who is accorded or denied a certain right, good or 
service.
104
 Thus, many claims of difference and identity do not emerge from the mere fact of 
diversity; they rather arise from their designation as deviation and from their attendant 
disadvantage. Claims about individual and group differences are therefore intimately 
connected to problems of inequality and exclusion. 
 
2. Social participation and exclusion 
Social exclusion has been traditionally equated with questions of socio-economic 
disadvantage.
105
 Later, however, its link with the lack of opportunities to participate fully in 
society in meaningful ways has been widely acknowledged. The notion of social exclusion 
has thus evolved and become a mainstream policy concern that encompasses aspects of 
material deprivation as well as deprivation in the form of marginalisation from social 
interaction.
106
 In this broader account, the concept appears connected to inequalities across 
marginalised positions, such as those constructed around the lines of gender, ethnicity, 
migration background, religious affiliation, disability, race and class. Discrimination actually 
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features prominently among the drivers of social exclusion.
107
 Probably it is here that the 
connection between legal claims about social difference and exclusion looks more evident.  
But in addition, as pointed out by Sen, the concept of social exclusion allows us to think about 
the relational causations of a given deprivation.
108
 In this respect, one may argue that the idea 
of social exclusion also draws attention to the way social attitudes, institutions and 
conventions create an environment where some people are placed at a disadvantage while 
others retain the resources and power to define the terms producing the former’s 
subordination. Viewed in this light, the idea of inclusion – the remedy to exclusion – can be 
understood as meaning something other than providing access to entitlements and spaces 
denied to the excluded.
109
 Inclusion should rather translate into full social participation. 
Achieving this may require challenging and transforming the institutional norms governing 
the distribution of goods and benefits.
110
  
The relationship between group-based claims and social exclusion is especially strong in the 
context of welfare capitalism, as this encourages the formation of corporate group 
identities.
111
 The effects of institutional differentiation, and hence the roots of many group 
identity rights claims, are particularly noticeable in education, healthcare, employment, land, 
housing, family and social protection. These goods are usually allocated or differently 
attained depending on the social location of the person concerned (e.g. whether one is a 
member of an ethnic minority, a single mother, or disabled; whether one lives in a rural 
community, in a privileged urban centre or in a context of high marginalisation).
112
 As noted 
in the general introduction, economic and cultural criteria are among those that frequently 
govern (formally and informally) the enjoyment of employment, education, and access to 
justice and to other services or spaces of social interaction. And at the same time, this 
enjoyment has a large impact on people’s life outcomes with regard to both material well-
being and self-respect. All this makes it relevant to study legal claims of cultural and 
economic difference aimed at increasing social participation. The multiple actors, types of 
right and obligations involved in such complaints are, however, likely to make their resolution 
a complex and contested task. 
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Having contextualised the relevance of claims about social difference and explained which 
differences matter for the purposes of this research, the next four sections follow the 
following trajectory. Section II explores how claims of difference have been theorised as well 
as politically and legally mobilised. Particular attention is paid to social and political theories 
that explain and problematise the normative appeal of arguments based on a distinctive group, 
culture or identity. Questions of difference, especially those grounded in particular cultural 
and economic realities, are then taken into the dimension of human rights. Section III explores 
how human rights law has diversified or fragmented and how this has favoured 
compartmentalised analysis. From fragmentation, the chapter moves on to a search for more 
integrated approaches to dealing with complex claims of difference and inclusion. Section IV 
is thus devoted to an exploration of conceptual and normative frameworks that work 
comprehensively, such as intersectionality, indivisibility and the social model of disability. 
Finding it desirable and potentially useful to adopt a person-centred, integrated perspective to 
human rights law in order to deal with claims of difference, the chapter finally asks how much 
might be done by the European and the Inter-American courts of human rights. So, finally, 
section V offers a reflection on the limitations and opportunities that these courts and human 
rights law in general encounter in this field. The closing words of the chapter are preliminary 
conclusions. 
 
II. The Political and Legal Mobilisation of Difference  
Claiming difference has political and legal traction. As mentioned earlier, many social 
movements and interest groups articulate their demands through self-assertion of their 
distinctive identities and experiences. This is, generally speaking, what is referred to as a 
politics of difference.
113
 Relying on this form of mobilisation, many feminists, cultural and 
ethnic minorities, LGBTI and religious groups as well as disability rights movements advance 
a positive account of their identity and a concern about hegemonic cultural values. That is 
why a politics of difference is commonly equated with a politics of identity, culture or 
recognition. Thus, broadly speaking, the politics of recognition encompasses a wide range of 
political assertions which converge in an emphasis on group identity and a concern about 
exclusion and distinctiveness.
114
 Commonalities notwithstanding, for the sake of conceptual 
clarity, the following lines will attempt to further demarcate the normative implications of a 
politics of recognition, identity and difference in order to identify the theoretical framework 
that is best suited to the present research.  
 
1. Recognition and identity politics 
The normative correlate of a politics of recognition is a theory of justice that, as grounded in 
the work of, notably, Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth, focuses on the injustice produced by 
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the cultural devaluation of and social disrespect for certain identities and lifestyles.
115
 
Recognition is an intersubjective process by which our own sense of self, our identity, 
depends on acknowledgement from others. Recognition, identity and self-realisation are 
therefore closely tied. The harm or oppression resulting from misrecognition operates, so goes 
the argument, by ‘imprisoning someone in a false, distorted and reduced mode of being’.116 It 
follows that identity is vital for individual subjectivity, as it is inextricably linked with how 
one’s mode of being is understood by oneself and others. This not only illuminates the 
connection between identity, self-esteem and respect, on the one side,
117
 but also that between 
recognition and difference, on the other. So long as recognition has to do with what makes us 
authentic and unique, it is also about what makes us different from others.
118
  
Building upon similar reasoning, identity politics can be understood as a form of political 
mobilisation whereby marginalised groups seek emancipation from the demeaning way others 
-in dominant positions – define their identity and burden them with living according to 
imposed values.
119
 These oppressed groups also assert their identity positively, deploying 
pride and revaluing despised attributes or characteristics associated with their identity.
120
 The 
negative and positive invocation of identity is thus linked to experience of subordination. As 
Young argues, dominant groups occupy an unmarked position that makes it unnecessary to 
raise consciousness about their group identity. By contrast, oppressed groups, the victims of 
cultural imperialism, cannot forget their identity.
121
  
This account takes note of a social reality comprised of several groups which are dissimilar in 
power as well as in identity and cultural values. It acknowledges that despite the illegitimacy 
of odious distinctions on the basis of ascribed characteristics, some groups are still oppressed 
and regarded as deviant. A politics of identity or recognition accordingly advocates for 
differentiated or special treatment for such groups. It furthermore highlights both the cultural 
roots of their subordination and the pivotal place of people’s affiliations or attachments to 
specific modes of living which may deviate from those of the majority.
122
 Not surprisingly, 
therefore, notions of collective identity and culture are at the forefront of this politics.  
 
2. As ambiguous as powerful: culture and identity 
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What culture and identity are, however, remains uncertain and contested. Eisenberg argues 
that ‘identity refers to the attachments that people have to particular communities, ways of 
life, sets of beliefs, or practices that play a central role in their self-conception or self-
understanding’.123 But in fact a wide range of practices, values and activities may be regarded 
as meaningful in the construction of who we are. And since people appeal to their identity in 
very different contexts and with an infinitude of aims, the task of determining what constitutes 
an identity is fraught with complexity. Moreover, whereas it seems that beliefs and ways of 
life that are typically labelled as ‘cultural’ – such as language, religion and dress – have 
special salience in shaping identity,
124
 in practice culture and identity are often used as 
interchangeable terms. As Seila Benhabib argues, ‘culture’ has become a ubiquitous synonym 
of identity.
125
 And the reference to culture does not shed more light either.  
In fact, what sociologists and anthropologists have taught us in recent decades is that culture, 
like identity, is dynamic, multi-vocal and ever-changing.
126
 These insights not only reshape 
the way culture, identity and groups are conceived. They also change the relationship between 
culture and human rights themselves, as the cultural character of the latter is also unveiled. 
Hence, the connection between culture, groups and human rights is such that instances of 
legal recognition by way of new/specific rights also play a relevant part in creating and 
reconfiguring identities and groups.
127
  
Within all this conceptual volatility, however, at least two things seem relatively clear. First, 
culture is a concept mostly invoked in relation to traditions or lifestyles and thus, to a specific 
context. As an embodiment of the particular, it is not hard to see why culture is usually 
situated in opposition to human rights and to equality, which are the hallmarks of universal 
ideals. Second, a remarkable feature of identity and culture is their capacity to express 
normative commitment, which explains their widespread utilisation via rights claims. 
According to Waldron, identity claims are put forward as versions of rights. Such claims, like 
rights claims, are usually presented as non-negotiable: They represent who I am, which cannot 
be sacrificed for the benefit of others. Identity claims are ‘reservations which one is entitled to 
insist on for oneself and which others have to recognise as constraints’.128 Moreover, as 
pointed out by Dembour and Wilson, these claims are likely to carry more weight in litigation, 
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and thus they are used to ground not only typical cultural interests, but also political and 
socio-economic claims such as access to land, education, environmental protection and 
employment.
129
 Possibly, this is facilitated by the flexibility of notions such as ‘cultural 
rights’ and ‘culture’ more generally, which makes their use especially apt for bringing onto 
the human rights agenda issues that would otherwise not easily fit. Almost any human right, it 
has been asserted, could be linked to culture and there is still no agreed definition or list of 
cultural rights.
130
 Indeed, it is argued that the field of cultural rights remains one of the least 
elaborated by international human rights law. This opens up possibilities for claims that 
contest prevailing understandings of social, political, cultural and economic life.
131
  
And thus, an ever-increasing multitude of actors uses the human rights discourse and norms to 
claim entitlements, resources and benefits that are deemed indispensable for the protection of 
one or more aspects of their identity or cultural specificity. This includes not only claims from 
disempowered groups pushing for causes branded as ‘progressive’. It also includes rather 
reactionary claims from states, nationalist groups and other actors in more hegemonic 
positions.
132
  
There can be no doubt then that identity is a powerful device. The so-called ‘cultural turn’ 
prompted by identity politics has impacted profoundly on the political and legal debates of 
liberal democracies. Having one’s own sense of self distorted or disrespected – the 
psychological dimension of misrecognition – is, with good reason, taken more seriously, as is 
our cultural belonging.
133
 In fact, identity injury in the form of stigma, shame and lack of self-
esteem can all provoke serious harm that may encroach upon human rights, such as the right 
to health, the right to integrity or the right to private life. And yet, from a normative viewpoint 
the tendency to equate recognition with identity, or misrecognition with identity injury, 
should be treated with caution.  
 
3.  Problematising the centrality of culture and group identity 
The emphasis on identity harm and the centrality accorded to culture have been criticised on a 
number of grounds. Notably, this focus would go hand in hand with the reification of culture, 
fixed identity group boundaries and erasures of gender, race, class and other grounds of social 
stratification. Probably the best-known weakness of identity politics is its inclination towards 
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essentialism or reification. This criticism, already introduced in section II 1, basically points 
to the reductionism of conceiving groups and cultures as bounded entities whose members can 
be identified by reference to certain traits which also define the group or culture itself. Put 
briefly, it is argued that these essentialising views, even in their progressive strategic 
deployments, risk reifying identity, erecting artificial group boundaries and sidelining some 
voices and forms of oppression.
134
  
Anne Phillips usefully distinguishes four forms of essentialism.
135
 The first is ‘the attribution 
of certain characteristics to everyone subsumed within a particular category’.136 This is the 
kind of essentialism deployed when we make generalisations, such as ‘women are caring’, 
‘indigenous persons are rural-oriented’ or ‘welfare recipients are lazy’. It is the type of 
essentialism that rapidly turns into stereotypes, that is, as explained by Cook and Cusack, 
generalised views or preconceptions about the attributes of members of a particular group or 
about the roles they should perform in society.
137
 The second type of essentialism described 
by Phillips consists of the reification of a social category by attributing certain characteristics 
to it.
138
 This is at play when we perceive groups as different and try to explain their difference 
by reference to characteristics deemed essential to each group. These attributes can be 
regarded as biological (e.g. body-able/disabled) or cultural (e.g. Muslim/Christian). By doing 
this, we naturalise what are mostly socially constructed differences and hierarchies,
139
 or, to 
use the nomenclature proposed above, we see embedded differences as embodied.  
The third kind of essentialism takes place when the group or collective entity is presented as 
relatively homogeneous for the purposes of political action or contestation.
140
 This is quite 
familiar to rights rhetoric, especially to that of applicants who turn to courts and increasingly 
resort to groups’ vindications and identity grounds in seeking protection. Such a move leads 
to the paradox that Minow calls the ‘dilemma of difference’: by using essentialism 
strategically to combat the stereotypes it has produced, the same difference that is targeted for 
elimination is reproduced.
141
 The fourth kind of essentialism pointed out by Phillips operates 
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by determining who belongs to the group or culture. Membership is controlled by verifying 
whether the individual exhibits the traits that supposedly define the group. This appears to be 
a common exercise undertaken by courts when they decide who fits a certain category. 
However, this is also done by insiders who claim to speak from within the collectivity. 
Phillips argues that this essentialism is the least visible of the four, possibly because it is more 
openly grounded in the socially constructed character of the attribute. In fact, this reasoning is 
regularly used with regard to culturally defined groups. It is to be noted that when recognition 
is reduced to identity celebration or cultural protection through the law, the latter indeed 
appears to have to define what constitutes a given identity or group. On that basis, judges will 
accord rights and deliver protection. This raises a number of difficulties that are more closely 
examined in section III 4 below. 
But the politics of identity faces further objections, as already pointed out.
142
 One of these is 
the concealment of other differences and the role of social barriers. As discussed earlier, a key 
aspect of processes of differentiation is their embeddedness in social relations and institutions. 
Yet, legal and political discourses usually reduce social identities to a matter of personal 
characteristics, something that simply lies with each person. Fineman, however, reminds us 
that ‘social identities are manufactured within institutional relationships and prevalent 
ideologies, not found in the designation of attributes associated with individual characteristics, 
actions, or affiliations, such as race, sex, religion, or sexual orientation’.143 What matters, 
then, is how social institutions and relations working through those socially defined identities 
distribute power and disadvantage.
144
 This feature also implies that notions of culture, 
recognition and identity can hardly be seen in isolation from those relations and institutions, 
including those that shape socio-economic arrangements. The place of this structural 
dimension, however, remains rather contested in the conceptualisation of the politics of 
recognition or identity, which has been charged with downplaying the role of social barriers 
and power imbalances.
145
  
A good account of this concern is provided by Young’s late work. In her view, the politics of 
cultural difference focuses too much on questions of cultural expression and toleration while 
at the same time bringing in a normalising discourse. In so doing, she argues, the politics of 
cultural difference obscures issues of structural inequality, such as racism.
146
 As an example, 
she considers how the debates concerning the accommodation of Muslims in a multicultural 
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Europe emphasise issues of cultural difference, while overlooking underlying structural 
inequalities. ‘The claims of such Muslims that they should have the freedom to wear 
headscarves or make their prayer calls in the public square in the European cities where they 
live should not be divorced from this context of broad and entrenched structural privilege of 
majorities and social and economic disadvantage of minorities.’147 Young furthermore 
contrasts such a politics with what she calls a politics of ‘positional difference’.148 This 
stance, similar to that adopted by Minow and Fineman, is concerned with groups constituted 
by social interactions and structures that distinguish between people and place them in 
hierarchies.  
From a constitutional law perspective, Susanne Baer also criticises what she terms 
‘groupism’, that is, basically, to ‘construct human rights conflicts as group issues’149 whereby 
rights are posited as claims about one’s culture. She observes several problems with this 
strategy, particularly in the context of religious pluralism. Besides stereotyping and the issue 
of elitism – in the sense of who defines the collective claims at stake – she argues that 
groupism in human rights requires people to conform to standards that human rights should be 
able to challenge
150
 Furthermore, this group focus may trump the individual rights of 
minorities within minorities as well as the rights of those who are identified with non-
majoritarian cultures. In her view, ‘groupism’ works to shield sexism and racism while also 
‘othering’ inequalities.151   
 
Dhamoon has a similar concern about the centrality accorded to identity and culture in the 
analysis of tensions and conflicts that trouble Western multicultural societies. She argues that 
the preoccupation with culture diverts attention from questions of power, as expressed in 
racism, Islamophobia, poverty, ableism
152
 and homophobia.
153
 The consequence of adopting a 
focus on identities and differences themselves, instead of taking a relational view of how 
                                                          
147
 Ibid., at 291.  
148
 Ibid, at 275-276. (‘This approach theorizes social groups as constituted through interactions that make 
categorical distinctions among people in hierarchies of status or privilege.’). 
149
 Susanne Baer, ‘Privatizing Religion. Legal Groupism, No-Go-Areas, and the Public-Private-Ideology in 
Human Rights Politics’ 20(1) Constellations (2013) 68, at. 75. She relies on Brubaker’s work on ‘groupism’. See 
Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, (Harvard University Press, 2004).  
150
 Susanne Baer, ‘A Closer Look at Law: Human Rights as Multi- Level Sites of Struggles Over Multi-
Dimensional Equality’ 6(2) Utrecht Law Review (2010) 56, at 59-60.  
151
 Susanne Baer, ‘Privatizing Religion. Legal Groupism, No-Go-Areas, and the Public-Private-Ideology in 
Human Rights Politics’ 20(1) Constellations (2013) 68, at 74-75. (‘When sexism is practiced in the name of 
religion, it is shielded from the very reach of human rights, since religion employs the well-known strategy of 
insulating its private sphere from intervention’); Susanne Baer, ‘A Closer Look at Law: Human Rights as Multi- 
Level Sites of Struggles Over Multi-Dimensional Equality,’ 6(2) Utrecht Law Review (2010) 56, at 61-62. (As 
an example, she refers to multicultural politics that focus on gendered violence in Muslim or other 'immigrant' 
families only. By ‘othering sex inequality’ majorities protect themselves ‘from challenges to the normalcy of 
privilege’).  
152
 According to Campbell, ableism refers to ‘a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a 
particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as the perfect, species-typical and 
therefore essential and fully human. Disability then is cast as a diminished state of being human.’ Fiona Kumari 
Campbell, Contours of Ableism: The Production of Disability and Abledness (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), at 9, 
cited in Carol Thomas, ‘Disability and diversity’ in Steven Vertovec (ed.), Routledge International Handbook of 
Diversity Studies, (Routledge, 2014), at 47.  
153
 Rita Dhamoon, Identity/Difference Politics. How Difference is Produced, and Why It Matters, (UBC Press, 
2009), at 2 and 6-8. 
48 
 
differences and identities are produced and signified, is that problems of structural or material 
difference go disregarded.
154
 Moreover, she argues that the overemphasis on culture promotes 
a ‘unidimensional analysis of difference’ whereby cultural forms of identification are 
prioritised, while its interaction with other axes of difference gets obscured.
155
 In a similar 
vein, it is argued that restricting legal protection to identity-based claims or grounds may have 
the additional problem of working against those in the most subordinated positions. Being 
able to organise around any given identity and make it visible presupposes favourable 
conditions and resources for identity recognition and mobilisation. As such, not all those who 
are disadvantaged would be in a position to mobilise in that way.
156
 Those struggling with 
poverty, for example, would have much more difficulty in doing so.  
A similar line of thought seems to drive redistributionist perspectives insofar as these worry 
about the oppression resulting from socio-economic structures. They admit that arguments 
about class and socio-economic equality have lost their appeal, while cultural difference and 
identity have become the new idiom of social justice.
157
 Yet, advocates of redistribution argue 
that identity-centred politics and the emphasis on difference tend to displace legitimate 
concerns over maldistribution and economic disadvantage.
158
 In an era of stark poverty and 
globalised inequalities, that would constitute a serious flaw. Nonetheless, this kind of 
criticism does not need to reject recognition politics altogether, as Nancy Fraser shows. In 
fact, her writings challenge the division between recognition and redistribution, or more 
broadly, the separation between the cultural and the economic, the symbolic and the material. 
The dislocation of recognition from redistribution would be reflected, inter alia, in the types 
of collectivity and harm that are paradigmatically at the heart of each realm. While 
recognition appears concerned with groups defined by (cultural) identity, redistribution would 
deal with groups determined by their class position. The former would suffer from cultural or 
identity domination and the latter, from maldistribution.
159
 Against this, Fraser argues that 
virtually all collectivities are bivalent in the sense that they are defined by both cultural and 
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economic forces while being harmed on both grounds.
160
 At the heart of her theory lies the 
affirmation of a mutual imbrication between recognition and redistribution and a 
reconceptualisation of justice as recognition.  
 
4.  From recognition as identity affirmation to social participation  
While mindful of the psychological, social and legal relevance of collective identity and 
culture, it is submitted that normative analysis should pay more attention to embedded 
difference and social recognition, that is, to an understanding of recognition grounded more in 
social participation than in identity injury. The importance of moving away from a view of 
recognition centred on group identity to one based on social standing is illuminated by the 
integrated theory of justice propounded by Fraser. Importantly, she frames recognition not as 
a question of identity or intersubjective valuation, but as a matter of justice concerning social 
status.
161
 Thus, unlike the conceptualisation of misrecognition articulated by Taylor and 
Honneth, misrecognition for Fraser consists of being rendered as inferior, invisible or in any 
other way less than a full partner in social interaction through institutionalised patterns of 
cultural value.
162
 
By using this framework, it is possible to analyse the lack of recognition experienced by those 
who would hardly be able to mobilise an identity-based framework of protection, for example, 
people living in poverty.
163
 In addition, viewing recognition as an issue of equal social 
participation suggests that the harms involved in cases of misrecognition will frequently go 
beyond identity injury or devaluation. They will often encompass, for instance, questions of 
socio-economic exclusion and political marginalisation. Finally, this approach makes it is 
easier to avoid essentialist impulses while emphasising that differences, in the sense that 
matters here, are defined not merely by personal (cultural or identity) features, but primarily 
by an external environment that dictates who are different from, and thus less equal than, 
others.
164
 This is not to say, however, that identity and culture are of secondary importance or 
that debates about them can be circumvented. People care about what they regard as their 
identity and culture and these questions hold a central place in current political and legal 
battles, which is unlikely to recede in the near future. What is nonetheless suggested is that 
rights claims concerning recognition or difference should not be resolved by focusing merely 
on cultural groups or on identity injury. Neither should those claims be divorced from 
interlocking social categories and structures of privilege and disadvantage. This implies, 
among other things, taking a point of view that integrates issues of both recognition and 
redistribution.  
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5. Interactions between recognition and redistribution in theory and practice 
Politically speaking, Fraser explains typical ‘recognition’ claims as those which mainly 
oppose patterns of social representation, communication and cultural oppression, that is, 
cultural domination. Redistribution claims, on the other hand, archetypally aim at combating 
marginalisation, destitution and exploitation, that is, socio-economic domination.
165
 In social 
theory terms, Fraser relates redistribution claims to forms of subordination arising from a 
class structure that institutionalises economic mechanisms that impede some from taking part 
in social life. Recognition claims, in turn, would respond to subordination arising from a 
status order. This status order is hierarchical and operates by institutionalising ‘patterns of 
cultural value that pervasively deny some members the recognition they need in order to be 
full, participating partners in social interaction’.166 Fraser and other scholars regret that these 
two spheres of justice appear to be divorced in political and legal thinking. Such a stance 
obscures the fact that cultural subordination and socio-economic inequality are more often 
than not intertwined, and hence that oppression must be fought on both sides.
167
  
As already pointed out, the way misrecognition and maldistribution are intertwined in practice 
is most obviously evident in the experience of people facing structural discrimination, who 
embody undervalued identities and are disproportionately socio-economic disadvantaged.
168
 
As a result of this interplay, reversing cultural devaluation and misrecognition may, 
depending on the context, open up opportunities to overcome socio-economic exclusion.
169
 
And conversely, socio-economic intervention may also assist in combating prejudice and 
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cultural subordination.
170
 At the same time, many socio-economic measures (e.g. pensions, 
education, housing and wages) turn a blind eye to cultural diversity, resulting in the exclusion 
of those who do not conform to the norm or the reinforcement of their stigmatisation.
171
 On 
the other hand, overlooking socio-economic aspects may strengthen misrecognition. This is 
due to the fact that socio-economic inequalities tend to generate more homogeneous societies 
that misrecognise or disrespect (culturally) non-dominant groups. A recent report on 
inequalities from the United Nations Development Programme explains this dynamic:  
As dominant groups benefit from better access to resources, they have an incentive to 
maintain the conditions of inequality that benefit them [reference omitted]. For this, 
they rely on crafting inequality-justifying ideologies. These ideologies are translated 
into stereotypes and norms that define the ways in which groups supposedly differ and 
embed these beliefs into social interactions as well as into legal and cultural 
institutions.
172
  
Moreover, financial crises have contributed to deepening group identity inequality and social 
exclusion.
173
  
In spite of these interactions, it is all too common to insulate each of these dimensions of 
justice. Mapping onto the separation between the cultural and the economic, politically and 
legally the divide reproduces itself as one between group identity and socio-economic justice. 
To understand the acceptance of the division, some scholars note the different logics that 
underpin each realm. Individual and group differences, especially in terms of race, gender, 
disability and sex, are usually seen as embodied, monolithic and immutable, while socio-
economic conditions are not.
174
 Socio-economic arrangements are constructed around the idea 
of equality of opportunity; they are perceived as neutral and give the impression of being 
governed by individuals’ free choices.175 None of them are thus seen as imposed, nor are they 
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unchangeable aspects of individuals. Individuals’ choices, rationality and objectivity actually 
hold an important place in how we understand socio-economic arrangements and also in 
explaining socio-economic differences.
176
 These elements are, by contrast, out of the question 
when the difference is perceived as ‘inner’ or immutable. When the marker of difference is 
not regarded as unchangeable – as happens with religious or other ‘cultural’ markers – they 
are associated with subjectivity, volatility or even coercion, in contrast to the objective and 
stable character of socio-economic matters. Being different is furthermore often equated with 
deviance, while socio-economic conditions are rarely seen as a matter of difference or 
deviation. Rather, they tend to represent the status quo, which is somehow a given.  
From a normative perspective, Fredman identifies the above divide with the two main facets 
of inequality. One is the impairment of ‘status-based’ equality (which includes issues of 
accommodation of different identities). The other impinges on ‘socio-economic’ equality.177 
While the first has easily translated into legal rights, usually through anti-discrimination laws, 
socio-economic equality tends to be located in the terrain of social policy and welfare. Status-
based equality claims have often been identified with negative obligations – to refrain from 
something. Socio-economic equality claims, by contrast, have been seen as paradigmatic 
examples of positive obligations – duties to provide. It therefore comes as no surprise that 
courts have typically been more open to adjudicating status-based than socio-economic 
equality claims. By the same token, ‘courts operating within a traditional human rights model 
have rejected attempts to reformulate socio-economic inequality as a status-based wrong’.178 
Even when the two perspectives are brought together in a case, under a substantive notion of 
equality, for example, they do not sit comfortably together. In fact, tackling one may often 
result in overshadowing the other.
179 
Finally, when it comes to the normative responses 
expected for claims of identity-based and socio-economic difference, further divergence 
arises. While the paradigmatic ideal of justice in the socio-economic field seeks to erase group 
differentials and to emphasise equality, the ideal of justice advanced with regard to questions 
of identity difference, especially in recent decades, promotes the recognition and valuation of 
distinctive identities and cultures.  
The tension and mutual imbrication between recognition and redistribution, as well as the 
implications that follow from that, also find expression in human rights law. While in 
principle human rights law holds the promise to be instrumental in combating both cultural 
and socio-economic injustice, human rights law itself has been challenged on both cultural 
and economic grounds. Moreover, as seen below, both dimensions often remain split in rights 
talk and practice.  
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III. Diversity and fragmentation in human rights law 
1. The cultural and economic critique(s) of human rights 
Postmodern feminism and postcolonial perspectives, in particular, have usefully tied cultural 
and economic concerns together in their critiques of human rights law. By deconstructing 
identity categories such as gender and sex, the former has demonstrated that it is not enough 
to denounce the male orientation of human rights. Given that there is no such thing as an 
overarching female identity or experience, we need to enquire whether human rights are able 
to capture the needs of concrete women situated in different cultural and economic contexts, 
especially of those in less powerful positions.
180
 In that respect, human rights – with its ‘false 
universalisms’ – has appeared to be insufficiently responsive to, for example, poor black 
women and indigenous rural women, whose needs and concerns differ from those of white 
middle-class women.
181
  
From a postcolonial point of view, cultural critics usually point to the civilising, Eurocentric 
and imperialist ethos of universal human rights norms.
182
 With Europe and America as their 
point of reference, they argue that human rights law has built upon secularism, capitalism and 
political democracy. It has accordingly disregarded certain values, such as solidarity, while 
assuming, for example, the elevation of the individual and the devaluation of collectivities.
183
 
In addition to problems of cultural bias, they say that the Eurocentric and liberal human rights 
agenda tends to neglect issues of inequality and poverty.
184
 As a corollary, human rights law 
would be unable to account for the needs and concerns of those enduring socio-economic 
subordination.
185
 The second rank of social and economic rights would be the most blatant, 
albeit not the only, evidence of human rights’ ambivalence in the face of inequality. A further 
indication of this would be that human rights law remains somewhat aloof from ‘private 
violence’, meaning that it fails to protect the most disadvantaged against both powerful 
private actors and market forces.
186
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In addition to questioning the responsiveness of human rights law to ‘private’ issues, to 
collectivities, to poverty and to specific cultural contexts, both strands of criticism also 
coincide in advocating the need to reject the conception of individual autonomy underlying 
liberalism and human rights, which specifies a free, rational, self-reliant agent who owns what 
he does and has.
187
 This image denies the social embeddedness of all human beings. It thus 
fails to acknowledge how individuals’ choices may be structurally constrained, either because 
of broader social and material conditions or because their choices are frequently the result of 
entrenched value patterns that condition their behaviour and opportunities.
188
  
Underlying these critiques about who qualifies as a bearer of human rights and what qualifies 
as a human right are several challenges to the normative assumptions of the universality of 
human rights.  
 
2. Diversity and universality 
This brings us to the by now familiar story of diversity and universality in human rights. For 
quite a while this was a story of rivalry, particularly during the decades that followed the 
American Anthropological Association Statement on the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UNDHR).
189
 The ensuing cultural critiques pointed to the genealogy of human rights 
law. Because this was the historical, cultural and ideological by-product of certain dominant 
actors,
190
 human rights were said to be limited in their legitimacy and/or utility. These 
limitations were usually characterised by reference to the foundational role of liberalism and 
its accent on the autonomous individual, his property and formal equality (the use of ‘his’ is 
deliberate).
191
 They likewise pointed to the narrow range of interests and experiences that 
moulded the ideal of the human to be protected and which found expression in the themes and 
areas covered by human rights law. The latter would, for example, oversee the public, not the 
private sphere; the political, not the economic arena. And yet, human rights norms have been 
extensively used to assert what was originally left out from their reach. Marginalised voices 
(e.g. women, ethnic minorities, people with disability, people living in poverty and many 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
‘Social Rights in a Global Economy’, in Jean-Christophe Merle (ed.), Spheres of Global Justice - Volume 2: Fair 
Distribution. Global Economic, Social and Intergenerational Justice (Springer, 2013), at 476-477.  
187
 Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations. A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and the Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2011) at 120; Ratna Kapur, ‘Human rights in the 21st century: Take a walk on the dark side’, 28 Sydney 
Law Review (2006) 665, at 675; Annie Bunting, ‘Theorizing Women's Cultural Diversity in Feminist 
International Human Rights Strategies’, 20 Journal of Law and Society (1993) 6, at 7-8; See also, Jeanne M. 
Woods, ‘Justiciable Social Rights as a Critique of the Liberal Paradigm’, 38 Texas International Law Journal 
(2003) 763, at 768-770.  
188
 Martha Minow, Making all the difference. Inclusion, Exclusion and American law (Cornell University Press, 
1990), at 73.  
189
 Executive Board, American Anthropological Association (AAA), ‘Statement on Human Rights’, 49(4) 
American Anthropologist (1947) 539. On the AAA’s position, see e.g. Karen Engle, ‘From Skepticism to 
Embrace: Human Rights and the American Anthropological Association from 1947 - 1999’, 23(3) Human Rights 
Quarterly (2001) 536, at 536-559. The AAA statement inaugurated the ‘cultural relativist’ critique of human 
rights. These are usually identified with critiques coming from the ‘Asian value debate’, as well as from African 
and Islamic particularist views. For an analysis of these, see Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and 
Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff, 2001), at 33-90; 91-181 and 183-290.   
190
 David Kennedy, ‘The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?’, 15 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal (2002) 101, at 114.  
191
 For a critique of the implications of liberalism for social rights, see Jeanne M. Woods, ‘Justiciable Social 
Rights as a Critique of the Liberal Paradigm’, 38 Texas International Law Journal (2003) 763. 
55 
 
others) have increasingly used human rights law to advance a varied range of demands. Along 
the way, human rights law has become increasingly attentive to group rights, cultural claims 
and other demands for identity recognition.
192
 In other words, human rights law itself has 
diversified. Thus, the narratives of diversity and human rights have come closer. 
But coming closer is not the same as becoming one. Tension between both discourses persists, 
particularly with respect to cultural diversity. Merry observes that human rights discourses 
tend to view culture as backward, static and as an obstacle to progress.
193
 Meanwhile, scholars 
keep worrying about the dangers of cultural practices that appear at odds with human 
rights.
194
 At the same time, though, notions of human rights that are receptive of culture and 
diversity, and vice versa, have been on the rise, as this link is seen as a precondition for the 
local effectiveness of rights.
195
 So while the tension may not have been fully resolved, both 
narratives have converged in important ways. The mixing of the diversity and universality 
‘genres’ is well illustrated in headings such as ‘relative universality’,196 ‘inclusive 
universality’,197 ‘differentiated universalism’198 and ‘culturalization of human rights’.199 They 
summarise the generally accepted idea that if human rights are to live up to their promise for 
everyone, they must be attuned to specific and distinct contexts.
200
 Human rights should and 
can be hospitable to a varied range of values, concerns and experiences. From this 
perspective, it becomes clearer that the basis of human rights’ universalism resides in its 
emancipatory potential and not in its moral truth or philosophical transcendence.
201
 On this 
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basis, the commonalities across diversity, multiculturalism and human rights extend to shared 
narratives about processes of exclusion and marginalisation of powerless groups or minorities; 
the valuing and/or protection of cultural distinctiveness; and a concern with the management 
of diversity. 
While the above certainly creates an enriched story, it is important to observe that some 
salient aspects of these narratives may foster fragmentary accounts which may need revision. 
One of these is the tendency of some discourses to concentrate primarily on identifying 
protected groups, casting them in terms of discrete identities and seeing cultures as bounded. 
A second is the prioritisation of certain identity traits or cultural problems over others, 
especially those of ethnic ascendancy, while overlooking other intertwined markers of 
inequality which are also expressed in cultural patterns and disadvantage (e.g. gender, 
disability, sexuality and class). A third is the framing of cultural problems and identity 
differences as value issues that stand in parallel to structural considerations of power and 
socio-economic inequality.
202
 
A significant part of the theorising and policy making on diversity and human rights has been 
driven by an ethnic and cultural focus. This is unsurprising considering that Kymlicka, one of 
the most authoritative voices on multiculturalism, regards the latter as dealing with ‘ethno-
cultural minorities’.203 Of course, there are good reasons for this focus. But there are also 
good reasons to enquire to what extent questions of diversity might be constructed too 
narrowly in certain cases and what effects would follow from that. Emphasising the cultural 
preservation of specific group identities alone, for example, appears to risk disaggregation on 
at least two counts. In the first place, it may reinforce the contested idea that cultures and 
identities are somehow bounded entities, which easily translates in essentialism,
204
 a problem 
already examined in this chapter.
205
 As explained, conceiving of cultures and groups as 
identifiable wholes erases the complexity of the human experience by turning overlapping 
identity facets and social roles into a monolithic self. Additionally, it may increase the chance 
of losing sight of particular social, political and economic contexts that condition the claims 
made in the name of culture or identity difference.
206
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What has just been said does not amount to arguing that gender, class, race and other sources 
of social categorisation, alongside their respective systems of subordination (patriarchy, 
racism, etc.), should go disregarded in normative discourses about difference or diversity. To 
the contrary, these categories are indeed important for those working in the diversity field. 
Rather, the assertion advanced here is that, all in all, problems of social difference and 
inequality are often insulated or, we may say, compartmentalised. 
 
3. Fragmentation in theory and law 
Thus, even when other forms of differentiation, such as those based on gender, sex, disability, 
class and race, may occupy a relevant place in discourses on diversity and human rights, there 
is a certain tendency to place them along parallel lines to ethno-cultural differences. At one 
end of the spectrum, we often find that one line of thought and norm articulation concentrates 
on sex, gender, race, body ability and other ‘inner’ or embodied differences. At the other end, 
questions of cultural identity, such as those related to religion and the lifestyle of ethnic 
communities, are frequently grouped under another conceptual and legal framework.
207
 This 
separation, even when analytically helpful, may convey the (misleading) message that only 
the second set of differences is socially constructed, while leaving under-examined the 
interplay between them, and between these and broader societal factors.  
The literature provides interesting illustrations of the above separations. For instance, it is not 
rare to find that discussions of indigenous land claims, of complaints brought by Roma and 
Travellers which concern housing and planning, as well of other cases involving demands 
from cultural minorities in areas such as education, the workplace and social security, are 
somehow bifurcated. While a set of scholarly work examines those cases as instances of 
cultural identity struggles for accommodation,
208
 another set takes them to analyse what are 
seen as normative developments in the field of socio-economic rights, such as the rights to 
land, housing and social security.
209
 The interplay between both dimensions is, however, 
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rarely discussed.
210
 Similarly, a number of debates on the rights of religious minorities in 
plural societies, even when considered in the context of the workplace or the educational 
system, seem to engage primarily with the question of recognising and valuing religion or 
group identity, whereas the impact of losing one’s job or the opportunity of quality education 
is accorded little attention.
211
 Furthermore, a number of writings have adopted a single-
identity focus. They address the rights of the groups ‘women’, ‘persons with disabilities’, 
‘indigenous peoples’, ‘LGTBI people’ and so forth.212 Meanwhile, some strands of diversity 
are far more absent from public and academic reflection. Lister, for instance, argues that 
discourses of difference have tended to marginalise social class.
213
 
There may be good reason to retain some distinctions in terms of group, identity and harm for 
analytical purposes. This actually seems to be part of a wider phenomenon of specialisation 
whose epistemological benefits cannot be denied. But the extent to which we engage – or do 
so only occasionally or not at all – in cross-cutting thinking is also reflective of how we 
account for and seek solutions to questions of difference and exclusion. In this vein, it is 
submitted that too much of a division obscures an understanding of how the law, and human 
rights law in particular, may be part of both the problem and the solution for inclusionary 
deficits in our diverse and unequal societies. Put differently, the diversity-human rights stories 
need to contain more complexity, be more integrated. There are several scholars and 
practitioners on diversity and human rights, as well as theorists of social policy, that have 
adopted more integrated approaches, as underscored below. Nevertheless, compartmentalised 
approaches seem to be prevalent in our normative thinking. 
If we look at human rights law itself, it appears that this has embraced a relatively 
disaggregated group identity focus. First, the catalogue of rights holders and entitlements has 
progressively expanded through new specific instruments and specialised bodies to monitor 
state compliance. Notably, a growing number of human rights instruments target the rights of 
women, children, indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, etc.
214
 Second, in doing so, 
human rights law has fragmented. In the words of Mégret, the increasing demands for 
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inclusion made by various groups in the form of societal acceptance of a diversity of ways of 
being human: 
has led to a fragmentation of international human rights law. Women, indigenous 
peoples, sexual minorities, migrants, persons with disabilities have sought to claim 
their rights in specific instruments they have insisted on reframing what human rights 
mean for them. More than merely about inclusion within the liberal house of rights, 
[they demand that] this house be fundamentally remodeled to accommodate a rich 
diversity of life-worlds – or indeed that it no longer be a single house at all.215 
While human rights law evokes a sense of integrity or unity premised on the universality of 
human rights and the equal dignity of every person,
216
 in reality the picture is one of 
dispersion. This picture is usually described as fragmentation within a global context of legal 
pluralism.
217
 Human rights as law, Brems argues, ‘are fragmented: found in a multitude of 
different legal sources, several of which have their own monitoring bodies, each with their 
own dynamic’.218 To be sure, this is not something exclusive of human rights law. It is 
international law in general that has fragmented, although it is doubtful whether international 
law ever was a unified body outside lawyers’ imagination.219 Human rights law thus stands 
alongside the law of the sea, humanitarian law, trade law, environmental law, criminal law 
and the many other normative strands into which international public law has divided. Each 
has its own set of rules, principles, organs and specialised professionals.
220
 Whether or not a 
reflection of postmodernist anxieties (as Koskenniemi puts it), the fact remains that concerns 
over fragmentation revolve around norm interactions. More precisely, the ‘fragmentation 
debate’ about human rights law, as in other areas of international law, is marked by questions 
of conflict of norms and divergent normative practices.
221
 Pointing this out is important 
because the present study, while starting from this reality of legal pluralism and norm 
interaction, uses the idea of fragmentation in a broader way. 
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The present research takes the word fragmentation to denote the way legal thinking and 
practice is articulated in, so to speak, ‘boxes’.222 By this I mean, in the first place, that human 
rights law, even within one regional realm (say that of the ECtHR or the IACtHR) is applied 
through different, separated ‘compartments’. Normative divides or ‘boxes’ run across, inter 
alia, different beneficiaries, types of right and lines of case law. This is the likely result of the 
co-existence, and thus the influence, of a number of global and regional human rights 
instruments each focused on a specific subject matter or right (e.g. prohibition of torture, 
enforced disappearance) and, notably for our purposes, on different categories of rights (civil 
and political, socio-economic) and groups of rights holders (e.g. rights of women, children, 
indigenous peoples). This research especially takes issue with this last kind of 
compartmentalisation, as this provides some of the most salient categorisations used in 
political and legal debates over difference and inclusion.
 223
 In fact, this idea of fragmentation 
may be extended to the way human rights courts envision rights holders. When it comes to 
determining who are affected by a rights-restrictive measure in a given case, there is a 
tendency towards compartmentalised thinking too. Dividing lines separate applicants from 
other affected rights holders, while each is also split by an either/or view of, for example, their 
identity, social position and autonomy. While this issue could certainly be approached from 
the perspective of group-based norms, I suggest it is worth doing so by looking at rights 
holders themselves. After all, the choice of normative ‘box’ will depend on which rights 
holders are seen and how they are construed. The assumption is, as pointed out earlier, that 
they are often seen and construed in a rather fragmentary fashion.  
Further ‘boxes’ may in fact be at play in adjudication, for their use is related to the legal 
categorisation needed to apply general legal precepts to particular facts.
224
 Examining the 
ECtHR’s case law dealing with economic justifications and austerity measures, Gerards 
observes that ‘the Court’s case law is, to a large extent, fragmented and 
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compartmentalised’.225 She argues that ‘differences in approach can be explained by the 
Court’s reliance on traditional dividing lines between the different Convention rights, between 
socio-economic and civil and political rights, and between the different “categories” or 
“compartments” of cases decided under their scope’.226 Others have similarly argued that 
most human rights mechanisms, at the national and international levels, have ‘tended to 
compartmentalise human rights violations into discrete categories, as much as the policy 
arrangements and institutions tended to separate the promotion and protection of human rights 
into different sectors’.227 Another form of fragmentary thinking is often at play in the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights, as Porter observes. One of the main problems he 
identifies in this field is that domestic and international jurisprudence on such rights has 
‘associated legal enforceability with a project of disaggregating rights into components’.228 In 
seeking immunity from the principle of progressive realisation, the adjudication of socio-
economic rights has been too focused on abstract and universal categories such as ‘minimum 
core’ and types of state obligations. These ‘components’, as Porter calls them, tend to be 
assessed independently of socio-historical factors, individual circumstances, subjective 
interests, state context and the competing rights of other groups.
229
  
The disaggregation in legal analysis may additionally be fostered by further conceptual 
divides. Principles and norms which are the basis of constitutional and human rights law 
claims of difference and inclusion are often interpreted in dichotomic ways, as the following 
debates attest.  
 
4. Equality, difference and other divides  
It is commonplace to position issues of justice concerning social difference by reference to a 
so-called tension between equality and difference. Said tension furthermore traces a number 
of other dichotomies, such as those between equality and freedom, neutrality and 
accommodation, or universalism and particularism. As happens with most binary thinking, it 
will be seen that such oppositions are less irreconcilable than they pretend to be. Partly, this is 
due to the constant contestation and reformulation of those same politically loaded concepts. 
It is submitted that reviewing some of the analytical shifts surrounding these ideas is quite 
useful for understanding how human rights law has come to deal with claims about difference 
and social inclusion, what challenges have arisen as a result, and which normative avenues 
may offer a way out.  
 
4.1. Formal equality, neutrality and difference 
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The normative attention devoted to difference relates to the ‘rise’ of a substantive notion of 
equality. To appreciate the latter, it is useful to recall briefly the classical ideal of equality 
against which it emerged: formal equality. The classical idea of equality is ‘formal’ insofar as 
it is concerned with the fairness of treatment among individuals as defined by a rational 
relationship between means and ends. Through the prohibition of discrimination, it enquires 
whether individuals are selected or accorded rights and benefits on the basis of grounds that 
are deemed functionally related to the purported aim.
230
 Personal merit, for example, is the 
kind of supposedly objective and reasonable criterion that passes the test posed by this 
equation. Typically, then, a norm that prevents women from gaining access to a certain 
professional position is considered arbitrary and therefore, discriminatory, inasmuch as sex 
cannot be rationally connected with the achievement of a legitimate goal, such as merit or 
productivity. In this framework, the complainant needs to be positioned against a comparator 
(in the example, women would be compared to men) and the impermissibility of the criterion 
employed operates symmetrically. This is to say that it is as bad to distinguish on the basis of 
being a woman as on the basis of being a man. The procedural and comparative character of 
formal equality is in line with Aristotle’s formula of treating like cases alike, while treating 
unlike cases in an unlike manner.
231
 Equality of treatment is nonetheless always preferred and 
presumed legitimate, whereas differences in treatment need to be justified by compelling 
reasons.
232
  
Because the ideal here is to provide legal protection to everyone regardless of their 
differences, the formal equality norm is premised on a universal subject that is disconnected 
from particular circumstances; it is abstract as the law.
233
 So understood, equality goes hand 
in hand with ideals of impartiality and neutrality. Both principles commit governments not to 
endorse or favour any particular view of the good life so as to ensure that people are treated in 
equality.
234
 One of the ways in which states seek to secure neutrality is through secularism, 
the assumption being that separating the state from the church and religion from the law 
allows states to be neutral.
235
 This basically means securing a neutral public space, while 
religions and other minority cultural expressions are then confined to the private sphere.
236
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Neutrality and secularism in turn would support tolerance, as they would generate the 
preconditions of mutual respect for human diversity.
237
  
However, it is argued that while such abstraction reflects a move against former regulations 
that explicitly denied many people the quality of subjects of law, it is yet a projection of, and 
a call to conform to, the viewpoint of some, who are usually those in dominant positions.
238
 
Hence, this equality carries an assimilationist force. Taking a metaphor used by Calabresi, 
such equality works through the logic of the ‘melting pot’: ‘equality will not be granted until 
the group which seeks equality is melted into the pot’.239 In other words, equality comes at the 
price of embracing the values of and behaving like the dominant group.
240
 Women ‘only’ 
need to show that they are just like men, gays and lesbians like straights, or Muslims like 
Christians. Along these lines, neutrality has also gradually fallen out of favour. It is argued 
that most governments, in one way or another, reflect or uphold majoritarian or historically 
rooted cultural values.
241
 Furthermore, neutrality is grounded in a non-realistic account of 
society that ignores asymmetries of power among distinct segments of the population. As a 
consequence, it burdens some more than others.
242
 Similarly, the idea of tolerance has been 
criticised for naturalising hierarchically organised social differences and for constituting an 
act of power by which the deviant other is admitted and regulated.
243
  
 
4.2. Equality and liberty 
It is also worth noting that the division drawn between equality and difference somewhat 
echoes the longstanding, and usually overstated, tension between equality and liberty. In this 
opposition, equality is viewed as being inclined towards uniformity or homogeneity, 
particularly when it is displayed in the name of its redistributive goals. Liberty, in contrast, is 
viewed as enabling an unconstrained human flourishing, which leads to diverse and unique 
forms of living.
244
 Those who follow this reasoning, therefore, worry about the sacrificing of 
liberty, archetypally represented by individual rights, as the cost of ensuring material equality. 
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This would be the case, for instance, where welfare policies provide material support on 
condition that certain human rights are given up.  
In addition, liberty and equality have also been portrayed as standing in a strained relationship 
with recognition and identity struggles. Thus, where group-based egalitarian demands seek 
societal respect and accommodation of their particularities, libertarians may object that such 
an enterprise tends to disregard the liberties – the rights and freedoms – of others who are 
forced to show acceptance of the group or its values, even against their own convictions. An 
example of this conflict can be found in religious objections to endorsing or supporting same-
sex marriage legislation.
245
 In other instances, some of which are reflected in the case law 
discussed in the following chapters, claims about difference and inclusion seem to be framed 
in such a way that liberty (individual rights) and equality (the prohibition of discrimination) 
are an either/or issue.  
Some of the debates that have taken place in the context of the United States Supreme Court 
concerning LGBT rights are illuminating in this regard. One line of argument posits that 
equality, rather than liberty, is the right normative framework for litigating LGBT cases. One 
of the reasons for this is that equality allows a more comprehensive analysis than that 
provided by a fragmentary liberty-based approach. As Gerken puts it, the liberty paradigm: 
seems to require members of the LGBT community to litigate pieces of their 
humanity, one by one. First they assert their right as human beings to have intimate 
relations with another person. Then they assert the right to marry or to have a family. 
To work. To serve their country. These are all fine things. But it seems to me they do 
not capture the essence of what is at stake in these debates, which is to recognize not 
the parts of personhood […] but to acknowledge the entire person before us whether 
we share anything or not.
246
  
A different standpoint is offered by Yoshino, who sees more benefits than drawbacks in the 
move from (group-based) equality analysis towards one that is liberty-based.
247
 He contends 
that this move fosters a more universalistic and less essentialising form of protection. It 
diminishes the ‘pluralism anxiety’ of courts (i.e. the concern with endless groups claiming 
protection), while still embracing egalitarian considerations.
248
     
The oppositional forces between equality and difference or between equality and liberty are 
not, however, restricted to what the ‘external’ dimension of a group demands of the state or 
mainstream society. The difficulty also arises with respect to intra-group relations whereby 
one or some members complain against practices or norms validated by the group.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
This tension is typically exemplified by reference to women (or others in their name) who 
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vindicate equality rights against the freedom of their religious community to maintain rules 
which restrict women’s rights or participation. 
 
4.3. From form to substance 
To be sure, formal equality operationalised through anti-discrimination measures works well 
in some contexts. Today, it may serve to address cases of blatant under-inclusion, just as it did 
in the past. Nonetheless, the problem that unfolded with the traditional view of equality is that 
its formal relational assessment of treatment among individuals is not able to tackle the use of 
seemingly neutral and rational criteria which, however, entail great detrimental impact on 
some people.
249
 Think, for instance, of a norm that subjects social benefits to the performance 
of a full-time job or a company’s regulation that requires employees to work on Saturday. The 
first norm would probably put a higher burden on women, especially on those in living in 
precarious socio-economic circumstances. The second norm in turn is likely to impact more 
negatively on Seventh-day Adventists. This is what we now know as indirect discrimination: 
the inability of minorities or disempowered populations to meet ostensibly neutral and 
‘objective’ criteria based on majoritarian or dominant parameters. But perhaps more critically, 
formal equality does not grasp the inequality entrenched in wider patterns of exclusion and 
disadvantage that do not fit the mould of direct or indirect discrimination cases.
250
 Consider, 
for example, the problem of institutional passivity in the face of violence against women or 
the pervasive exclusion of people with disabilities, who are impeded from accessing buildings 
and using services. This is to say that formal equality fails to tackle structural biases.
251
  
The formal anti-discrimination ideal has also proved to be an obstacle to taking action in 
favour of those sectors of the population that remained, in practice, historically disadvantaged 
in most spheres of social life. This is because the suspicion of irrationality embodied in 
certain identity markers applies all across the board, casting as illegitimate even those 
distinctions that attempt to provide ‘preferential’ treatment for, or improve the situation of, 
those who are unable to take part in social interaction on an equal footing. ‘Affirmative’ or 
‘positive’ action, as well as ‘special measures’ – terms used to describe those attempts to 
further effective equality – to redress inequalities experienced by, say, women, racialised 
people, indigenous people or persons with disabilities, can easily be frustrated under a formal 
equality framework.  
But why is it that formal equality falls short when it comes to addressing factual inequalities 
and claims for social differences to be taken on board? After all, it is widely admitted that 
Aristotelian equality not only mandates equal treatment for those similarly situated, but also 
requires different treatment for the dissimilar.
252
 Is not this part of equality quite enough to 
respond to demands of accommodation and other justice challenges in diverse and unequal 
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societies? At first glance, it might look like that. However, delivering equality for the equals 
and difference for the dissimilar is not very promising. Such a principle does not say anything 
about where to draw the line for comparison and which perspective defines who are viewed as 
alike and who as unalike.
253
 Nor does it provide any substantive criteria for ascertaining those 
factors. Ignoring this question leads us to accept judgments on whether people are similar or 
different according to socially entrenched views about identities and roles. By doing so, we 
fail to see how the problem may stem from institutionalised and internalised norms that 
produce those views of difference and similarity in the first place.  
All these considerations has prompted the reformulation of classic equality. A substantive or 
anti-subordination approach to equality has been advanced as a way to overcome the 
drawbacks of formal equality pointed out above. Unlike the latter, substantive equality 
abandons a blind-justice paradigm in order to see and recognise differences among 
individuals and social groups, so as to redress power imbalances and subordination.
254
 This 
equality distances itself from the individual accent of its formal counterpart and becomes 
specifically responsive to group subordination.
255
 It is, therefore, attentive to context and is 
reconciled with differential treatment as this may serve to remedy the disadvantaged position 
of oppressed groups.
 
It might be argued that this is not something unique about substantive 
equality, since even under a formal equality inquiry there is a group-based element. This is so 
by virtue of the prohibited grounds of discrimination, which refer to personal characteristics 
historically used to marginalise those who appear to share them. Nonetheless, it is argued that 
the novelty of the attention to group identity paid by substantive equality is that it allows the 
tracing of social disadvantage,
256
 looking at groups asymmetrically and placing their 
disadvantage in a more social or collective framework.  
Some clarifications need to be introduced into this analysis, however, as substantive equality, 
like all normative concepts, has more than one interpretation. Notably, the group aspect 
involved in substantive equality facilitates the reduction of this concept to the recognition of 
distinctive identities and the promotion of disadvantaged groups, thus treating different people 
differently.
257
 However, substantive equality may mean more than that and more than 
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opposition to indirect discrimination. Substantive equality is also interpreted as a call to undo 
the way social norms and structures define and entrench our differences by disadvantaging 
those who occupy certain social positions or ‘identities’.258 And under this prism, the key 
aspect is not group or cultural identity, but changing the roots of subordination or, in the 
words of Mackinnon, of hierarchy.
259
 It is in this light that substantive equality allows us to 
acknowledge how societies have been premised on the vantage point of a few. As a 
consequence, those who do not share the dominant traits and experiences are prevented from 
interacting in society on an equal footing. This is why instead of focusing on celebrating or 
eliminating group differences and identities, substantive equality aims at removing the 
hierarchies and disadvantages constructed around them.
260
 Herein resides the greatest 
potential of substantive equality to supplement the use of formal equality. 
In any case, it is not only the principle of equality that has undergone transformation. It 
should be observed that the idea of neutrality is being refashioned too. Pierik and Van Der 
Burg, for example, argue that neutrality does not need to be understood solely in its narrow 
liberal conception of hands-off or as what they call ‘exclusive neutrality’. For it may be 
conceived also as ‘inclusive neutrality’.261 So reconstructed, neutrality takes account of and 
includes different cultures, religions and worldviews in the public sphere and in its debates. 
Governments not only allow people to organise around and express their particular identities. 
They may even support and accommodate such expressions. What is more, while in some 
contexts this neutrality primarily needs to take issue with the representation of minority 
groups, in other contexts it may need to go further and even take structural inequalities on 
board.
262
  
Similarly, the language of toleration has been replaced by that of accommodation, which is 
generally seen as one type of differential treatment backed by substantive equality.
263
 
Moreover, so long as substantive equality is viewed as a vehicle for challenging and changing 
the norms underlying structures of inequality, accommodation is gradually ceding space to a 
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language of ‘transformation’.264 For some, this would reflect a sort of ‘universal’ turn in 
equality.
265
  
 
4.4. Equality divided: from substance to socio-economic equality? 
Thus far, the discussion of distinct paradigms of equality has underlined the question of who 
is the subject of an equality inquiry. It was stated that while formal approaches to equality put 
the accent on individual harms and wrongs, substantive visions of equality focus on 
disadvantaged groups or minorities. But the issue of the equality/difference of what also 
merits some consideration, if only to find that normative thinking is divided on this as well.  
One clear area of concern for achieving equality is ensuring dignity and respect. To do so, 
measures promoting equality seek to combat prejudice as well as stereotypes that diminish 
and insult people, especially those belonging to historically disadvantaged groups. Along 
these lines, we can discern the recognition side of equality. Nonetheless, equality measures 
are also concerned with questions of socio-economic justice. That is their redistribution side. 
The link to the latter traces back to the resource-distribution approach taken by influential 
egalitarians such as Dworkin and Rawls.
266
 Mindful of the arbitrariness of birth and the unfair 
consequences derived from an inherited social class, they draw attention to what individuals 
deserve and which inequalities are the result of injustice and misfortune.  
The accent on the individual associated with resource equality and the attention devoted to 
groups by the ideal of equal recognition/respect suggest a sort of correspondence between 
substantive equality and identity or recognition politics, on the one hand, and between formal 
equality and redistributive accounts of justice, on the other.
267
 However, some nuances are 
required. It was explained above that substantive equality is not just about granting different 
treatment to different groups. To that extent, there is no straightforward equivalence between 
substantive equality and identity politics. Likewise, socio-economic concerns are not 
exclusive of formal equality. In fact, the nexus between equality and socio-economic justice 
strengthens the closer we get to substantive equality, as this presupposes an active state and a 
                                                          
264
 And substantive equality is viewed as encompassing a transformative equality that ‘transforms’ the 
underlying norms and structures of inequality. See Simone Cusack and Lisa Pusey, ‘CEDAW and the Rights to 
Non-Discrimination and Equality’, 14 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2013) 1, at 11 (explaining that 
the CEDAW Committee has tended to view transformative equality as part of substantive equality); Sandra 
Fredman, ‘Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality: Towards a New Definition of Equal 
Rights’, in Ineke Boerefijn et al. (eds.), Temporary special measures: Accelerating De Facto Equality of Women 
under Article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (Intersentia, 
2003) at 115.  
265
 Sandra Fredman, ‘Disability Equality: A Challenge to the Existing Anti-Discrimination Paradigm?’, in Anna 
Lawson and Caroline Gooding (eds.), Disability Rights in Europe. From Theory to Practice, Essays in European 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2005), at 206-207. For a critique of the ‘universal turn’ in the context of sexual 
harassment and anti-bullying regulations in the workplace in the US, see Jessica A. Clarke, ‘Beyond Equality? 
Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections’, 86 Indiana Law Journal (2011) 1219.  
266
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is equality? Part 1: Equality of welfare’, 10(3) Philosophy & Public Affairs (1981) 
185; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971).   
267
 In this vein, Davina Cooper, Challenging Diversity. Rethinking Equality and the Value of Difference 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 74 (‘while resource equality largely focuses on the individual, the 
paramount concern of much writing on equal recognition is the group or collectivity.’). 
69 
 
commitment to redressing group disparities.
268
 This contrasts with the anti-discrimination 
paradigm, which is charged with rendering socio-economic inequalities invisible.
269
 Thus, 
according to Fredman, substantive equality ‘moves the anti-discrimination agenda into areas 
often inhabited by anti-poverty, welfare, or social inclusion’.270And the link goes beyond 
theoretical reflection. Material equality has been an important leitmotiv in egalitarian 
struggles, such as those undertaken by Afro-descendant and gay liberation movements.
271
 
Porter, for instance, explains how more than 20 years ago equality seekers in Canada 
conceived the substantive equality provision in the Constitution as encompassing socio-
economic rights.
272
  
And yet, the prevailing normative approaches see non-discrimination as an issue divorced 
from socio-economic equality. Equality is fragmented between identity-based and socio-
economic equality.
273
 Anti-discrimination measures are confined to combating expressions of 
prejudice or disrespect on the basis of group attributes, while usually remaining alien to socio-
economic disadvantage. Socio-economic equality issues, on the other hand, are seen as a 
matter of social policy and needs.
274
 In this account, non-discrimination has little to say about 
the fact that certain segments of the population are socio-economically disadvantaged or that 
these are disproportionally deprived of their rights. Furthermore, even stereotypes related to 
socio-economic conditions and measures that have a disparate impact on socio-economically 
disadvantaged people are rarely scrutinised under the prohibition of discrimination.
275
 This is 
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further examined in chapters 5 and 6. In any event, the fragmentation is unfortunate in the 
face of societies marked by multiple and intersecting inequalities.  
Of course, the above are not the only divides and compartments prevailing in human rights 
law. Some, such as those between civil/political and socio-economic rights, as well as the split 
of rights holders’ identities and agency, were mentioned earlier and will be further 
problematised below. But there are other important separations worth mentioning. One is the 
well-known public/private dichotomy, a longstanding target of feminist critiques. In spite of 
the progress made on women’s rights, the divide persists in the practice of human rights 
courts.
276
 Another outstanding split is that separating individual rights from collective or 
group rights, which emerges from the idea that human rights are geared towards individuals 
only. As some authors have argued, while these compartmentalisations may be instrumental 
for certain (powerful) agendas, looking at the lived experiences of people exposes their 
artificial and untenable character.
277
  
Now, admitting the value of group-based approaches to violations, as a substantive notion of 
equality reveals, it is also necessary to recapitulate why too much of a focus on groups and 
identities can be problematic. As already stated, this is one notable driver of fragmentation in 
human rights. The following sections deal with this question, as well as with the difficulties 
posed by other forms of compartmentalised thinking. 
 
5. A cautious approach to group identity and other compartments in human 
rights law 
It was pointed out above that human rights law has evolved with a remarkable group-identity 
orientation. This should not be conflated with a proliferation of collective rights or rights 
accorded to collective right holders.
278
 To be clear, the individual rights framework remains 
the dominant paradigm within human rights law. But while protection continues to be 
afforded mainly to individuals, great importance is attached to individual membership in a 
collectivity affirming a certain identity or experiencing exclusion and cultural devaluation. 
Not only specialised human rights instruments attest to this, but also the work of 
(quasi)judicial human rights organs. Human rights courts are, for instance, increasingly vocal 
in protecting people against violations affecting core aspects of their identity. Likewise, 
concepts such as ‘cultural identity’ and ‘vulnerable group’ have gained leverage,279 
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particularly when they serve to justify special rights or differentiated treatments, such as 
exemptions or additional support not available to the majority. Against this backdrop, it is 
convenient to recall the problems this group identity lens may bring along. The arguments of 
political theory and legal practice reviewed in the previous sections suggest the following 
difficulties.  
Firstly, too much of an emphasis on group identity or culture may lead to a restrictive framing 
of the claims and interests at stake. This follows from the unidimensional analysis that such 
an approach promotes, which easily obscures overlapping identities and rights as well as 
issues of socio-economic disadvantage. Secondly, the identity group ‘compartment’ invites 
judges and legislators to define the identity or the group in question. The complexity of such 
an enterprise seems obvious when we think of how to answer the question of what is Islam or 
indigeneity, or who is a Roma or a Rastafari. Equally challenging is, however, to define 
groups and identities that do not appear to be typically ‘cultural’ – a fact that only reinforces 
the fluidity and socially constructed character of all identity markers. Thus, if we take the 
cases of disability and gender or sex, we will find that courts and legislative bodies encounter 
a great deal of definitional trouble. Are fat people disabled? Are people with fertility problems 
disabled? Is womanhood determined by having female genitals or by feeling oneself to be a 
woman? As can be expected, from the moment courts answer those questions, essentialism 
enters the stage. The group or identity in question is defined by reference to certain attributes 
that are imagined to constitute the whole. As a result, judges may reify people and practices as 
well as take a stance on the values and merits of a given culture or identity. So, thirdly, going 
down this road risks relegating insiders’ voices while taking courts far away from the ideal of 
neutrality they normally seek to uphold. Fourthly, the exercise of identity demarcation carries 
a double-edged sword for litigants. Basically, they are left with the choice of either showing 
that they belong to the group, share its identity and thus conform to the norm according to 
which the identity or group is defined, or risking being left unprotected.
280
 Finally, under an 
identity group analysis, it is disquieting that judges are invited to identify and situate social 
groups prior to the relations and institutions producing inequality. This conceals how social 
categorisations and groups may actually be the result of those relations. As argued by Cooper, 
such an approach can ‘produce excessively fragmented accounts which neglect more 
systematic connections’ to understanding relations of oppression and privilege.281  
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While this study is particularly interested in the identity group framework – because of its 
prominence in claims of difference and inclusion – it is clear that this is not the only form of 
normative disaggregation deserving attention. It has been argued that strategies for the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights that focus on abstract categories such as minimum core 
and types of state obligations are both counter-productive and unhelpful.
282 
Counter-
productive because a focus on those legal categories tends to divorce the rights claims from 
their specific circumstances, giving judges the impression that they have to decide on 
universal entitlements or abstract questions, which of course they are reluctant to do. This is 
related to the challenges of limits and restraint highlighted in the general introduction. When 
courts perceive that they are being asked to rule on general duties of socio-economic 
assistance or on socio-economic entitlements for everyone, they will likely conduct a very 
lenient review of the actual claims at hand. At the same time, a categorical thinking revolving 
around types of obligations is not helpful. The reason is that in practice most social rights 
claims bring together and combine different categories of state obligations.
283
 In the context 
of the ECtHR, Gerards also contends that the Court’s compartmentalised view in cases 
involving budgetary justifications is problematic. In the first place, a focus on types of right 
and lines of case law leads to different standards of protection and different outcomes to 
substantially similar types of claims, without a principled justification. In the second place, 
and even if such analysis seems understandable from the perspective of the structure of the 
Convention, doing so runs against the effective and equal protection of all Convention rights. 
It undermines the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights. 
 
 
While legal categorisation and fragmentation may be inevitable, finding ways to lessen their 
perils is not straightforward. To that end, looking at more integrated frameworks of normative 
analysis could reveal helpful insights.   
 
IV.  In search of further integration  
In the previous sections I highlighted how our increasingly plural and unequal societies 
generate multiple and cross-cutting forms of exclusion that operate through institutionalised 
norms that distinguish between people. In this vein, Fraser observes that the contemporary 
status order has become more complex and so has its modes of subordination.
284
 The 
boundaries between cultures are no longer clear and societies encompass a range of sub-
cultures with divergent values. People are not locked into one single status; rather, they 
occupy and move across multiple axes of subordination and privilege, which are in turn not 
only part of the status order of cultural values, but also of the economic realm.
285
  
 
1. A few theoretical and normative proposals 
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Fraser’s normative response is guided by a single moral principle that integrates both 
dimensions of justice – redistribution and recognition. Such a principle, namely ‘parity of 
participation’, requires that social arrangements allow all (adult) members of society to 
interact with one another as peers.
286
 Parity of participation is therefore a substantive standard 
for evaluating claims of both redistribution and recognition. But there is more: the standard 
also has a procedural character. It provides a parameter for deliberating and deciding on both 
kinds of claims. When it comes to status – value pattern – subordination, for instance, parity 
of participation determines the conditions under which decisions will be made on whether and 
how people are to be recognised. The conditions are those of a democratic public dialogue 
that permits the full, free intervention of all implicated parties.
287
  
Several scholars, including some aligned with multiculturalism, have similarly underlined the 
need for more integrated frames to help grasp, for example, the complementarity between the 
cultural and economic, or between recognition and redistribution.
288
 These are, in fact, 
increasingly perceived as entangled dimensions of justice, or more precisely, of equality. 
According to de Sousa Santos, ‘we have the right to be equal whenever difference diminishes 
us; we have the right to be different whenever equality decharacterizes us’.289 In a similar 
vein, but from another doctrinal tradition, Fredman argues that substantive equality 
encompasses recognition, redistribution, and more. She advocates for a multidimensional 
notion of substantive equality, in which she integrates four distinct aims: recognition, 
redistribution, transformation and participation.
290
 The recognition strand of equality tackles 
stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence. The redistribution aspect seeks to remedy 
social and material disadvantage. The third component aims at transforming the norms 
underlying structures and institutions instead of requesting conformity with them. Finally, 
participation requires hearing and responding to the voices of those experiencing inequality. 
Importantly, these four dimensions are viewed in constant interaction and therefore all of 
them should be considered when evaluating laws and policies.
291
   
From a constitutional law perspective, Baer also proposes a more holistic understanding of 
how fundamental rights work. Her proposal rests on a triangular relationship between 
equality, liberty and dignity.
292
 Instead of colliding or standing in isolation, as they are usually 
presented and applied to legal disputes, these three rights should be seen as interdependent 
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and as enriching each other.
293
 In so doing, they provide a framework that is more attentive to 
context and thus, more apt for dealing with complex cases, that is, the kind of case that 
involves multidimensional inequalities. These are cases that, in other words, cannot be 
understood as being about sex, ethnicity or disability alone, for they are ‘shaped by 
interdependent inequalities, in specific contexts and with specific effects’.294 In the context of 
economic, social and cultural rights advocacy, Porter similarly promotes ‘a holistic, rather 
than a disaggregating approach to rights’.295 By this, he does not simply mean the integration 
of civil/political rights with socio-economic rights. Rather, he means looking at obligations, 
standards of review and other legal categories ‘from the standpoint of particular claimants in 
particular circumstances and through a purposive approach to the right that is to be 
protected’.296 Such an approach is necessarily sensitive to context and to the interdependence 
of rights.
297
   
Pragmatic reasoning also favours a more integrated view of cases involving claims about 
difference and social inclusion. Notably, adopting a compartmentalised approach does not 
shed light on the real difficulties in responding to a given claim. For instance, the 
controversies regarding LGBTI claims to be entitled to benefit from social protection, 
inheritance rights or health services are hardly separable from the challenge they pose to 
dominant value systems concerning the family and gender and sexual binaries. Similarly, it is 
quite difficult to explain the resistance encountered by claims about cultural identity and ways 
of life if we ignore the fact that they are made in the context of challenging spatial planning 
policies, claiming access to land, gaining employment or having access to other resources. 
Arguably, many responses to those claims would not be the same if at stake were something 
different or of a different nature.
298
  
 
2. Integrated frameworks in human rights law 
The search for more integrated frameworks that may cope with the complexity exposed above 
also has resonance in human rights law. There are three themes that express the aspiration to 
foster integration and reduce fragmentation/compartmentalisation within human rights law. 
The first is the concept of intersectionality, which maps onto the problems of essentialism and 
the prioritisation of some identities over others. The second is the notion of indivisibility, 
which counterbalances the tendency to displace socio-economic issues and connects identity-
based violations with those that are redistribution-driven. The third is the social model of 
disability, which is the most serious effort by human rights law to unveil the way social 
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institutions and relations embed (body-ability) differences while dealing with them in a 
comprehensive manner. Drawing on these three integrated models, a rights holder-centred and 
integrated approach to human rights law is suggested towards the end.  
 
2.1. Integration as intersectionality  
The notion of intersectionality arose in response to the problems of identity politics, 
particularly essentialism and its erasure of ‘intragroup differences’.299 Pushed from within 
critical race theory and feminist studies, intersectionality first came to contest the monolithic 
representation of women. It was argued that the category of women actually spoke for a 
subset of them: white middle-class women. Meanwhile, black women were sidelined and 
neither the category of race nor the category of gender could fully grasp their experiences.
300
 
According to Crenshaw, ‘sex and race discrimination have come to be defined in terms of the 
experiences of those who are privileged but for their racial or sexual characteristics’.301 This 
focus marginalised those who were disadvantaged on multiple grounds. In response, 
intersectionality challenged the idea that discrimination had to do with discrete forms of 
subordination and that identity was a matter of ‘either/or’.302 In law, this claim mainly pointed 
to the insufficiencies of anti-discrimination frameworks, which relied on a single-axis scheme 
of protection. It was then suggested that experiences at the intersections be recognised, 
acknowledging the multidimensionality of the individual and taking account of the fluidity 
and contingency of our identities. This implied, in other words, overcoming ‘the fragmenting 
of identity by legal analysis’.303  
Soon this analysis extended beyond the markers of race and gender to encompass other 
identity locations, such as those of disability, sexuality and so forth.
304
 In this way, 
intersectionality has come to be interwoven with identity. In its most extended usage, it is a 
theory and methodology that focuses on the particular disadvantages produced by the 
interaction of multiple identities. The benefits of such approach are obvious. Not in vain is 
intersectionality considered to be one of the most crucial contributions made by feminist 
theory.
305
 And yet, conceiving of intersectionality purely in terms of overlapping identity 
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might still fall short of dealing with questions of difference and social exclusion. Joanne 
Conaghan, for example, argues that intersectionality ‘tells us little about the wider context in 
which such experiences are produced, mediated and expressed’.306 Put differently, so long as 
intersectionality is bound up with questions of identity formation, it tends to neglect the social 
relations and structures from which identity divisions and intersections derive. Conaghan 
explains:  
Issues of identity are but an aspect, not a substitute for, fuller investigation into the 
operation of gender and race within inequality regimes within which identities are 
formed, navigated and resisted. In addition, the concept of identity is less suited to 
certain kinds of analysis. Take, for example, the uneasy status of class in 
intersectionality discourse.
307
  
Moreover, as a matter of identity, intersectionality has also been branded as ‘separatist’ or 
‘fragmentary’. Intersectionality allegedly ‘breaks groups into ever smaller sub-groups’.308 So 
understood, intersectionality would produce the opposite effect to integration.
309
  
While the criticism of identity politics is warranted, equating intersectionality with identity 
politics seems misplaced. Since its very origins, intersectionality has been conceived as 
encompassing more than composite identities. A crucial part of intersectionality concerns 
social structure.
310
 When Crenshaw elaborated what she termed ‘structural intersectionality’, 
she analysed the need to account for multiple grounds of identity in view of their imbrication 
with ‘systems’ of domination. In that framework, Crenshaw explained, for example, how 
shelters serving women who suffered from domestic violence and immigration regulations 
were unresponsive to poor immigrant women, especially black women, as these institutions 
overlooked disadvantages compounded by, for example, poverty, child-care responsibilities, 
employment and housing practices, lack of access to resources, and cultural barriers.
311
 Later, 
McCall explicitly engaged with an intersectional approach, though from a non-legal 
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perspective, to explore questions of multiple social categories and structural inequality.
312
 
And more recently, Smith has claimed that ‘intersectionality is a tool which can be used for 
precisely the examination of the root causes of inequality […] [and that] the language of 
identity is just the way that the inquiry into the power structures operating beneath 
discrimination is articulated’.313  
Intersectionality has been introduced gradually into international law and human rights bodies 
are showing a growing interest in it.
314
 As in domestic jurisdictions, anti-discrimination and 
equality treaty provisions are the main vehicles for operationalising it. Terms such as 
‘multiple discrimination’ or ‘intersectional discrimination’ are thus used to capture those 
situations in which different grounds of discrimination operate simultaneously and 
intermingle. Unlike the additive approach of ‘multiple discrimination’,315 intersectionality 
helps identify the unique types of violation occurring at the interface of an array of systems of 
inequality.
316 
It illuminates the way hierarchies and power structures create the experiences 
associated with the grounds of discrimination.
317
 In doing so, intersectionality avoids not just 
the reification of such categories along a single axis, but also their treatment as compartments 
dislodged from the social forces that define them.
318
 Given the incremental purchase of 
intersectionality within human rights law and its aptitude for ensuring that experiences of 
oppression and privilege are not compartmentalised, it is a concept worth retaining for the 
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present research. It enables us to enquire whether and how human rights bodies take account 
of the way socio-economic, cultural and other differences structure social relations and 
institutions such as land, family and housing regulations, welfare measures, educational 
policies and the workplace. In doing so, intersectionality helps to account for the complexity 
of human experience. In this way, we may also come closer to appreciating rights holders as a 
whole.  
 
2.2. Integration as indivisibility and interdependence  
The premise that human rights are indivisible, as well as interdependent and interrelated, is a 
well-known dogma of human rights law. Scholars in the field of human rights history situate 
the impetus for indivisibility in post-colonial efforts to revise the human rights project, that is, 
across the 1950s and 1960s, when newly independent states joined the United Nations.
319
 
During this time and for the two following decades, the basis of the idea of indivisibility 
appeared to be tied to claims for economic justice and development that attempted to situate 
socio-economic rights as a priority.
320
 So what is often presented as a qualitative divide 
between both categories of rights and which has traditionally privileged civil and political 
rights is the result of ideological struggles. While these were mostly shaped by the Cold War, 
they were deepened during the eighties, when the ideas promoted by the Washington 
Consensus eroded the state’s capacity to create conditions of socio-economic security.321 
Indivisibility, conceived as a reunion of the ‘universal’ rights that were split into the two main 
covenants, would crystallise in the 1993 World Conference of Human Rights. The Vienna 
Declaration, which marks the official and broad endorsement of indivisibility, proclaimed: 
‘All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the 
same footing, and with the same emphasis.’322  
Though efforts have been made to distinguish indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelatedness,
323
 the three concepts are frequently invoked as a single package. Definitional 
precision in this respect is beyond the scope of this work, so I will limit myself to flagging the 
normative force behind the idea of indivisibility and its implications. Put simply and broadly, 
indivisibility expresses the unity and mutually reinforcing character of human rights, with 
particular reference to the integration of civil and political rights with social, economic and 
cultural rights. This idea of unity is mostly predicated with regard to the implementation of 
rights, with socio-economic rights being declared to be as justiciable as civil and political 
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rights, and with regard to the equal importance of both categories of rights. More recently, 
Quane also asserts indivisibility and interdependence in terms of the content of rights, 
pointing to existing rights overlaps that blur the boundaries between the content of different 
kinds of rights.
324
 In addition, indivisibility has been interpreted as having deeper 
implications. Crooms, for instance, posits that to characterise international human rights as 
indivisible is to recognise that oppression is caused by interlocking and interdependent 
institutions, in a way that echoes the operation of Collin’s ‘matrix of domination’.325  
Despite divergences in the scope and impact attributed to indivisibility, it is relatively safe to 
affirm that this principle seeks to depart from a fragmented understanding of human rights 
and to promote a more holistic view across themes, types of right and other divisions in 
human rights law. In other words, indivisibility bolsters human rights integration.
326
 Here 
resides the relevance of this concept for the present research. One of the methods conceived to 
give legal effect to indivisibility and interdependence is in fact called the ‘integrated or 
holistic approach to human rights’.327 This approach, which is closely related to the 
‘permeability’ doctrine, is based on the idea that civil and political rights have socio-
economic dimensions. As such, the latter can be adjudicated via civil and political rights. At 
the same time, though, it has been argued that ‘in spite of the formal acceptance of 
universality, indivisibility and interdependence as foundational human rights principles, there 
is no common agreement as to how they should be operationalised in policies or in the legal 
work of the UN’.328 Hence, the need to find mechanisms to implement these principles seems 
to remain.  
 
2.3. Integration by shifting to social structures: the social model of disability 
For a long time, disability was not seen as a human rights issue. Its official incorporation into 
mainstream human rights took place through the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
329
 The treaty has brought about a paradigm shift, not just 
on account of enlarging the subject protected by human rights law, but also on a number of 
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other grounds. One of them is the endorsement of a social model of disability.
330
 According to 
this, disability is not a matter of individual impairment, but rather a social construct. It is the 
way we have structured our society and social relations that renders a person unable to 
participate in the political, economic and socio-cultural life of a community.
331
 As such, the 
understanding of disability has been reconfigured, moving away from an individualised 
medical conceptualisation of disability as a health issue of physical or mental impairment.
332
 
Focusing instead on social relations, cultural meanings and institutions, this model reveals 
how dominant notions of body-ability are the tacit norm against which people with disabilities 
have been depicted as abnormal.
333
 It also demonstrates that social barriers are not inevitable; 
they can be removed. This reminds us of Minow’s work, in which, as discussed earlier, she 
argues that social differences are not in people, but are rather dictated by a social environment 
constructed upon unstated norms of what is normal and acceptable.  
This approach is matched by further normative innovations. Indeed, the CRPD also endorses a 
substantive view of equality which includes a commitment to achieving de facto equality and 
a state duty to ensure reasonable accommodation.
334
 Reasonable accommodation conveys the 
idea that equality requires being responsive to peoples’ differences. It is linked to the adoption 
of special or positive measures directed towards ‘protected’ minority groups or categories.335 
Underlying this duty is the acknowledgement that society has been premised on the basis of 
able-body experiences. Supposedly neutral regulations and arrangements which would 
otherwise burden or exclude people with disabilities should therefore be adjusted so as to 
incorporate their needs and concerns, allowing their social participation. Yet, the duty of 
reasonable accommodation has an individualised nature and its potential impact is curtailed 
by the requirement not to impose a disproportionate burden on the actor providing the service 
in question.
336
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Notwithstanding its observed group-based orientations, the convention simultaneously makes 
a significant turn towards more ‘universal’ strategies. This is most clearly reflected in 
requirements of accessibility and universal design.
337
 Both notions envisage an environment 
that operates with the widest range of users in mind, thereby avoiding ‘separate’ or ‘special’ 
solutions which may carry stigmatisation.
338
   
The novelties sketched above are part of an overall revision of the mainstream conception of 
human rights. As pointed out by Mégret, what is remarkable about the CRPD is how this 
treaty challenges, more than any other convention, important biases and dichotomies 
underlying the whole body of human rights law.
339
 Notably, the convention takes significant 
steps towards bridging the divides inherent in the dichotomies of, for example, civil/political 
rights vs. socio-economic rights, individual vs. community and state vs. society.
340
 The treaty 
brings together socio-economic and civil and political rights while also combining the 
standards of review typically applied to each set of rights.
341
 The convention also takes 
account of the socio-economic disadvantage usually faced by people with disabilities and 
recognises ‘the critical need to address the negative impact of poverty’.342 It furthermore 
acknowledges the fluidity of disability, insofar as it regards it as an ‘evolving concept’.343 At 
the same time, the treaty takes heed of the intersectional experience of most people with 
disabilities, ‘who are subject to multiple or aggravated forms of discrimination’.344  
These normative changes attempt, in sum, to deal with rights claims related to the experience 
of disability through a more integrated view of human rights. Importantly, such a holistic 
framework holds promise for dealing with social differences in general. In fact, there is 
nothing peculiar about disability that could preclude looking through similar lenses at other 
human rights issues concerning difference and exclusion. This follows from the socially 
constructed character of all markers of difference and the fluidity of and the interaction 
among identities, as well as their institutional embeddedness. One may then wonder whether 
the premises of the social model will be able to travel further within the human rights law 
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edifice to make it less disaggregated and better suited to dealing more comprehensively with 
claims about difference and exclusion.
345
  
It is worth noting that the integrated approach to human rights law adopted in this study draws 
on the three integrated legal perspectives discussed above. As will become clearer in 
subsequent chapters, the insight of intersectionality is most clearly reflected in the first layer 
of integrated analysis proposed here namely, looking at rights holders as a whole. For its part, 
the idea of integration as indivisibility and interdepence is a core aspect of the second layer of 
integrated analysis used in this study. This is a normative stance that promotes ‘cross 
thinking’ about harms and norms while encouraging awareness of legal pluralism. Finally, it 
is submitted that using these two layers of legal analysis in a relational manner may help to 
redirect attention to social barriers and structural inequalities. In fact, having a fuller 
understanding of rights holders and the norms and harms at stake in a given case tends to shift 
the focus away from the group or individual concerned and from predefined normative 
categories. This paves the way for looking at social constructs or unnestated norms and trying 
to make human rights work within a complex reality.            
But how much complexity and comprehensiveness can human rights courts take on board? 
  
V. A few words on the (im)possibilities of human rights law and its courts 
This research is fundamentally concerned with the way supranational courts of human rights 
address cases involving claims about difference and social inclusion. It therefore studies legal 
claims in adjudication settings. Pointing this out is important because significant limitations to 
the adoption of a more integrated framework for dealing with those claims may appear, in 
principle, inherent to law and to the adjudication task performed by human rights courts.  
 
1. Some limitations and opportunities 
On the one hand, human rights courts, like many other courts, confront important difficulties 
in grappling with the complexity of people’s lived experiences. Crucial among the obstacles is 
the seemingly inevitable task of categorisation that courts undertake. Law works with abstract 
concepts and judges try to determine who or what falls within them.
346
 So when a claimant 
raises issues of discrimination, accommodation or otherwise special treatment, the court will 
inquire whether the complainant fits a protected category or belongs to a ‘vulnerable’ group. 
Is the complainant a woman, an indigenous person, a person with a disability, a national, a 
Roma, a Christian? To the extent that courts engage in this process of categorisation, the 
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meaning of those categories will tend to be essentialised.
347
 Furthermore, as stated earlier, 
‘cultures’ and ‘identities’ may be shaped or formed as a result of that process. Yet, though 
categorisation may be inherent to law and to adjudication, the expectation that the law should 
be able to capture the lived experiences of people and the complexities of inequality is not 
senseless. After all, public confidence in the law as a governing mechanism relies, to an 
important extent, on the belief in its capacity to respond to and regulate an intricate social 
life.
348
 This justifies the insistence on conceptual and normative frameworks that could help in 
building that capacity.  
On the other hand, when it comes to assessing specific cultural and economic circumstances 
and arrangements, courts in general and human rights courts in particular find themselves in 
an uncomfortable position. Claims based on particular cultural and economic realities unsettle 
the universal validity and abstraction of human rights norms, and thus, the courts’ ability to 
deal with them. Moreover, the structural nature of some of the underlying problems, such as 
widespread prejudice and unfair institutional design, challenges the adjudicatory model set up 
by human rights treaties. In particular, under an individual justice model of adjudication, 
human rights courts are ill equipped to deal with structural violations.
349
 In other words, the 
ECtHR and IACtHR are not only constrained by the cultural background and the legal culture 
in which they are embedded, but also by their legal mandate and the type of justice they are 
supposed to deliver.  
When comparing one type of claim to another, human rights law, as well as courts, seem 
better suited to addressing recognition-driven claims (identity-based difference) than those 
involving redistribution issues (socio-economic difference). The elasticity of identity and 
cultural rights,
350
 the use of equality and non-discrimination and the whole group-based 
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development of human rights facilitate the handling of complaints dealing with cultural or 
identity differences. Coping with challenges to socio-economic arrangements is trickier. 
Setting aside restrictions on adjudicating socio-economic rights or social policy issues, and 
assuming that courts may be able/willing to intrude into this arena, the question remains 
whether human rights norms are flexible enough to address violations grounded in socio-
economic disparities. In this respect, the liberalist imprint of human rights has led to 
scepticism. Golder’s position is quite illustrative. In his opinion, ‘the context of global 
capitalism sets a limit to the contingency of human rights such that any dissident vision of 
what it means to be human that seriously challenges the operation of market systems appears 
simply unintelligible or unrealizable’.351 
As will be seen later, the above-mentioned constraints have triggered interesting normative 
strategies. For instance, the ECtHR has adopted the principle that when sensitive cultural 
matters are at stake, it will preferably defer to states, which will enjoy a broad latitude 
(‘margin of appreciation’) to resolve the matter. And the same goes for cases posing questions 
of socio-economic policy. For similar reasons, courts may also be inclined to rule on both 
types of claim on the basis of procedural rather than substantive grounds. Underlying human 
rights courts’ reluctance to intrude into both culturally and socio-economically sensitive 
terrain is also the subsidiary – and at best, complementary – role of supranational adjudicatory 
bodies. They are far away from and insufficiently familiar with the social reality in which 
rights violations take place.
352
  
But the analysis of the normative responses provided by the ECtHR and the IACtHR requires 
us, additionally, to be attentive to the particular conditions determining whether and how 
rights are interpreted and adjudicated by each court. These conditions are given by, for 
example, the institutional, historical, cultural and political context of the courts as well as the 
type of litigation taking place before them.
353
 While many of these aspects differ significantly 
for each regional court, as seen below, there is one common circumstance that offers not just 
challenges but also some interesting opportunities, that is, a multi-layered legal environment. 
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Neither the European nor the Inter-American Court of Human Rights sits in isolation and both 
oversee legal regimes that are far from being self-contained. Rather, they are part of an 
international environment in which distinct actors, norms and institutions are in constant 
interaction, a context of global legal pluralism.
354
  
Underlying complaints about difference, identity affiliation and social inclusion there is 
usually a normative landscape marked by legal overlaps and competing authorities. They 
disclose a normative plurality made up of interactions between, for example, government 
legislation and policies, local development plans, constitutional norms, human rights law, 
private actors’ practices and norms arising from ethnic, religious and cultural affiliations.355 
Taking a pluralist approach may favour, in the words of Berman, mechanisms and practices 
that expand the range of voices heard or considered, which, in turn, could potentially help to 
channel or tame normative conflict.
356
 Sheppard, for her part, argues that the complexity and 
dynamic character of legal regulation (characterised by several socio-economic, cultural and 
political realities) has critical implications for the constitutional recognition of diverse social 
groups.
357
 Any affirmation of related constitutional rights should therefore be assessed against 
that context.
358
 Thus, while taking into account legal plurality may upset the idea of 
adjudicating the law
359
 – i.e. the ECHR or the ACHR – doing so may provide some valuable 
opportunities. Notably, it may counterbalance the temptation to adopt compartmentalised 
views that reduce cases concerning recognition and social inclusion to, for example, cases 
primarily about a religion, a lifestyle or about pensions, welfare or about equality. Following 
Baer, the resolution of those disputes would be ‘enriched by a larger pool of arguments’.360 
Whereas considering this is no easy task, ‘the multiple levels of and the varieties in regulation 
which ensure human rights would allow us to reveal the inconsistencies of “law”, of claims of 
“secularism”, of “the right to religious freedom” or “the right to equality”’.361 In other words, 
more integrated accounts of such cases not only presuppose thinking of situated rights holders 
as a whole, of interdependent rights and interacting forms of power. They also require us to 
think more broadly, more inclusively, about the law(s) that are relevant to adjudicating rights 
claims about difference and inclusion, such as those analysed in the subsequent chapters.  
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2. A quick overview of two regional courts 
It is not possible to provide a detailed account of the history, functions and current practice of 
the two regional courts examined in this study. However, for the sake of contextualisation, in 
what follows I will highlight a few key features of each court so as to give an idea of how and 
why they work the way they do.   
 
2.1. The European Court of Human Rights 
The European Court of Human Rights was created under the auspices of the Council of 
Europe to oversee state compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
which was adopted in 1950 and entered into force in 1953. The ECHR was drafted by 
European governments in the post-war years in response to the atrocities of the Second World 
War and to the spread of communism in Europe.
362
 Albeit born at the time that saw the 
emergence of the welfare state, the Convention nonetheless reflects the divisions of the Cold 
War. Social and economic rights were thus largely left out of the Convention, which primarily 
protects a wide range of civil and political rights. It is important to point out that until 1998 
the Court coexisted with the former European Commission of Human Rights (ECommHR). In 
this system, for a petition to reach the Court the Commission had to have declared it 
admissible and adopted a report on the merits. This is, as seen below, how supervision in the 
Inter-American system currently works. With Protocol No. 11, however, the ECommHR was 
replaced by the new permanent Court, which absorbed all the adjudicatory work with 
mandatory jurisdiction over all member states.
363
 Since then, individuals have had direct 
access to the Court, which can rule on individual petitions and inter-state complaints.
364
 Over 
the years, the ECtHR has become the most developed international adjudicatory body.
365
 And 
the number of individual complaints, which can be submitted by individuals or groups of 
individuals and legal persons, has sky-rocketed.
366
  
But in which conditions has the Court’s extensive case law developed? It is said that the 
ECHR has ‘been used primarily to raise questions of particular violations of human rights in 
states that basically conform to its requirements and are representative of “the common 
heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedoms and the rule of law” […] or, in the case of 
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post-communist member states […] that committed themselves to move in this direction’.367 
The increase in member states that followed the fall of the Berlin wall brought about 
significant changes for the Court, especially for its workload and the types of case to be 
decided. Importantly, the Court started to deal more often (or more explicitly) with systematic 
and structural violations.
368
 The emergence of the ‘pilot judgement’ procedure is the most 
remarkable effort it has made to deal with both structural violations and the exponential 
caseload.
369
 While there is still debate over the extent to which the Strasbourg Court is 
confined to delivering retrospective individual justice or rather provides constitutional-like 
justice or both, other characteristics of the Court are more firmly established. For present 
purposes, it is relevant to highlight the Court’s reliance on the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation and the notion of normative consensus.
370
 On the basis of the former the Court 
will, under certain circumstances, grant some latitude or defer to the solutions adopted by 
national authorities.
371
 The margin will usually be wider in the absence of consensus among 
member states, that is, a common ground or shared approach across states as to the standards 
applicable to a given matter, especially those considered sensitive.
372
 A further significant 
feature is the fact that the ECtHR’s remedial powers (outside pilot procedures) are very 
limited. Save for compensation and very occasional requests for restitution measures, the 
Committee of Ministers is the body entrusted with overseeing the execution of judgments 
(including all necessary steps to comply with them).    
 
2.2. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
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It is not possible to start a conversation about this Court without referring to the 
Commission.
373
 The Inter-American system, like the European system in its origins, rests 
upon two supervisory organs: the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights. The Commission was the first of the two supervisory organs to be created. 
So by the time the American Convention entered into force in 1978 and established the Court, 
the Commission had already been operating for about two decades.
374
 The Commission’s 
functions are broad. They comprise both contentious and promotional activities.
375
 The latter 
include the preparation of country-based and thematic reports, the holding of general and 
thematic hearings with different stakeholders, the review of states’ periodic reports on the 
implementation of human rights and the undertaking of on-site visits, among others. The 
breadth and flexibility of the Commission’s promotional functions have allowed it, among 
other things, to deal with structural violations and complex policy matters, which are rather 
difficult to tackle via the adjudication of individual cases.
376
 Even so, and because the 
Commission continues to intervene in the submission and substantiation of individual 
petitions before the Court, its views on those matters have influenced the Court’s 
interpretation. The Court’s powers, by contrast, are relatively limited. It delivers binding 
judgments in contentious cases submitted by the Commission or by state parties against 
(other) states that have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court can also issue advisory 
opinions requested by OAS member states and organs, including the Commission.
377
 Unlike 
the European system, then, individuals do not have direct access to the Inter-American Court. 
Nevertheless, a number of reforms have improved the participation of alleged victims before 
it.
378
  
To understand many of the procedural and substantive features of the Court, it is crucial to 
consider the context in which it has operated. The creation of the Court ‘can be seen as a 
strong response to dictatorships and the appalling situation of human rights in many of the 
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Organization of American States (OAS) Member States’.379 Hence, unlike what happened in 
the European system, the Inter-American organs strove to secure democracy and respect for 
human rights across countries that largely ignored or were even hostile to both.
380
 Albeit 
today the region is no longer under the rule of dictatorships, serious democratic deficits and 
inequalities persist. Deregulation, corruption, defective justice systems, acute socio-economic 
disparities, racial discrimination and other structural problems are still unresolved challenges 
for several American democracies. As a result, ‘new’ human rights issues have been brought 
to the Court’s docket – such as equality claims from different groups, indigenous rights and 
freedom of speech. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a significant proportion of the 
Court’s judgments continues to deal with gross and systematic violations such as 
disappearances, torture and summary executions.
381
 Having to work for the promotion of and 
respect for human rights in these conditions has been a major driver for the Court’s creative 
interpretations. The Court’s ‘quasi-constitutional’ role,382 its distance from the margin of 
appreciation doctrine and broad remedial powers as well as several other aspects of its case 
law and working methods should be seen in this context. As a former judge observes, ‘the 
Court has developed its case law with a view to finding the most appropriate solutions to the 
ailments of the people on the continent’.383  
 
VI. Concluding notes on Chapter 2 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully explore the doctrinal debates addressed in this 
chapter and the way they have evolved up to the present. But the succinct review given above 
suffices for noting the following key points. Firstly, whereas in the past many would have 
asserted that people’s differences should not matter, for quite some time now the point seems 
to have been exactly the opposite. Claims about identity, difference and social inclusion have 
attained political and legal salience and have generated a number of responses. In this context, 
and despite the complexity involved in such claims, they tend to be approached in rather 
dispersed ways. Notably, our normative thinking seems to favour a group-identity focus, the 
prioritisation of some identities or social positions over others and the inclination to 
disconnect identity-driven differences from socio-economic issues and from broader 
contextual questions in which the former take meaning. The attempt to reduce complex cases 
to the elucidation of what constitutes a certain identity and whether it is valuable, or to the 
application of certain abstract categories, makes it too problematic to justify who and what 
deserve protection. Arguably, the prevalence of these approaches adds considerable difficulty 
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to the resolution of some legal claims, especially when they come before human rights courts 
such as the ECtHR and the IACtHR.  
At the basis of this fragmentary thinking are, inter alia, doctrinal and political divides 
regarding the place of identity, culture, recognition, redistribution, etc.; the diversification and 
ensuing fragmentation of human rights law; and a number of competing narratives and 
dichotomies regarding key concepts such as equality, difference, neutrality, liberty and further 
normative divisions. Against this background, the message conveyed is not that collective 
identities and social groups are insignificant. They are indeed crucial elements in agency 
formation, solidarity, and legal and political mobilisation. Moreover, they provide useful 
insights into power differentials in society. The argument posited is rather that we nonetheless 
need to pay attention to the limitations of an identity- or group-centred legal analysis (as well 
as to the use of other ‘compartments’) for dealing with rights claims advanced in contexts of 
great diversity and inequality. What is more, we need to work with more integrated 
frameworks that help us to grasp the interactions between complex forms of inequality and 
exclusion.  
One may therefore wonder: are there conceptual and normative tools that might help us to 
transition from that fragmentation to a more holistic outlook? A number of scholars resort to 
conceptual and normative devices such as parity of participation, multidimensional equality 
and an integrated view of human rights, all of which may assist a more comprehensive 
analysis. What is more, the problems highlighted above and the need for more integrated 
accounts have resonance in human rights law as well. Here, it is suggested that insights be 
taken from the notions of intersectionality, the indivisibility of human rights, the social model 
of disability and the overall normative environment of human rights courts. Building upon 
these insights, a rights-holder-centred and integrated framework is applied to the case law 
analysed in the following chapters.  
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PART II 
*** 
EMBRACING COMPLEXITY: RETHINKING CULTURAL DIFFERENCE FROM AN INTEGRATED 
PERSPECTIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Introduction to Part II  
Abundant literature discusses the responses and interpretations adopted by human rights 
courts on questions of ethno-cultural diversity, particularly with regard to ‘new and old 
minorities’. This second part of the study, while interested in this line of case law, hinges on a 
different question. It deals with the use of an integrated human rights framework for the 
adjudication of cases concerning ethno-cultural difference by the European and Inter-
American Courts of Human Rights (ECtHR and IACtHR, respectively). This is done 
throughout two chapters (Chapters 3 and 4) focusing, respectively, on the work of each court. 
Several institutional and socio-historical factors distinguish both regional courts and their 
legal methods. The present discussion does not lose sight of this. Nevertheless, the 
assumption underlying Part II is that both courts have in one way or another addressed several 
claims from persons belonging to non-dominant ethno-cultural groups through a relatively 
compartmentalised approach of cultural difference. As such, it is submitted that the ECtHR 
and IACtHR could benefit from a more comprehensive analysis.  
It is submitted that an important driver for a ‘fragmented’ approach is the protection of group 
identity and culture prompted by identity politics, which has been facilitated by an 
increasingly specialised body of human rights law. At the same time, the individual model of 
adjudication and the actual or perceived limitations of the courts’ material competence may 
also play a role in limiting the legal frames available to deal with those cases. The interest in 
enriching existing legal narratives in ethno-cultural diversity cases has to do with the 
challenges that these pose to human rights courts. There are at least three challenges with 
which I am particularly concerned. The first is how to avoid dealing with issues of cultural 
difference without displacing the concrete individual concerned or wider issues of social 
inequality. The second is how courts could escape of what Minow calls ‘the dilemma of 
difference’. That is, courts may recreate the ‘stigma’ of difference by both ignoring difference 
and by focusing on it.
384
 The dilemma arises out of the fact that in both strategies the 
difference is always located in the minority raising the claim. The third hurdle holding 
particular relevance here is the growing difficulty in justifying who gets to enjoy ‘special 
protection’ or accommodation and when. Thus, while admitting that an integrated model of 
human rights can be beneficial to the adjudication of all kinds of rights complaints, I am 
particularly interested in what such a model may offer to the handling of diversity cases and 
to the challenges they bring. 
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With this background in mind, I examine about 158 cases, comprising decisions and 
judgments of both regional Courts.
385
 For the European Court of Human Rights, I discuss case 
law dealing with the ethno-cultural distinctiveness and social inclusion of Roma, Traveller 
and Muslim applicants.
386
 On the other side of the Atlantic, I discuss so-called cultural 
diversity cases submitted by indigenous and Afro-descendant individuals and communities. It 
should be noted that while the sample of cases from the ECtHR (selected in accordance with 
the criteria explained in the introductory chapter) represents a small fraction of a vast array of 
cases concerning cultural, ethnic and religious rights claims, the selection of cases from the 
IACtHR actually covers the whole spectrum of cultural diversity cases brought to its 
attention, with the exception of those dealing with acts of persecution and violence.
387
 In fact, 
as already pointed out, the study focuses on cases in which arguments of ethno-cultural 
difference generally aim at increasing social participation, rather than at being protected 
against state-sponsored acts of criminalisation and bodily injury.
388
 Within this scope, the 
cases analysed in this chapter include rights claims seeking protection against discrimination, 
cultural accommodation and access to resources. The areas of social participation involved in 
the cases are varied. They include: land planning and housing, education, the workplace, 
social protection, the use of public spaces more generally, and spheres of public power or 
political representation. A few additional cases dealing with applicants or issues different 
from the ones described above are included to the extent that they provide illustrations or 
insights relevant to the analysis. The same has been done with rulings from other international 
and regional monitoring bodies.
389
     
As already mentioned, this part of the study is subdivided into two chapters (3 and 4). The 
first is dedicated to the European Court of Human Rights, while the second deals with its 
American counterpart. Within each of these chapters I follow the same structure of analysis, 
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June 2005. For further details on this line of case law, see infra Chapter 4.  
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 In particular, I have considered a few rulings from the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). These are discussed in Chapter 3.  
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which is based on the methodology that the general introduction to this study explained at 
length.  
Following an introduction (I), both chapters begin with an exploration of the most salient 
forms of fragmentation or legal compartmentalisation at play in the cases reviewed, that is, a 
normative approach centred on the protection (not) granted along the lines of group identity 
and culture (II). Then, distancing from such an approach, I move on to discuss what an 
inclusive and relational exploration of the real-life rights holders (III), on the one hand, and of 
the harms and norms involved in the cases (IV), on the other, could reveal. These last two 
areas of analysis trace the layers of the integrated framework followed in this study.  
As explained in chapter 1, a key feature of this integrated view is its emphasis on interactions 
(cross-thinking). Using a language familiar to human rights law, this analysis relies heavily on 
the notion of intersectionality. Thus, when it comes to (III) rights holders, I suggest that 
viewing individuals as a whole requires appreciating existing interactions at the level of their 
(1) identities and social conditions, (2) their autonomy and (3) their standing alongside other 
individuals.  
In the second place, a relational and integrated view implies looking across the harms and 
norms at stake in the cases (IV). Turning to these, each chapter examines the interaction 
between the immediately visible wrongs and laws and others that are less evident. This 
basically means drawing attention to (1) the indivisibility and interdependence of rights and 
(2) the reality of legal pluralism into which human rights courts are inserted.  
Approaching the rights holders, the norms and their context in this way implies, in the cases 
studied, either distancing from or complementing the courts’ discourses of culture and group 
identity examined at the beginning of chapters 3 and 4. In suggesting that regional courts 
embrace the complexity (or at least part of it) of cases raising issues of cultural difference, I 
hope to demonstrate that more often than not the picture in front of the Court is richer than 
what is assumed to be. Acknowledging this may open a way out of some of the problems the 
ECtHR and IACtHR are faced with while also providing better chances of doing justice to 
people’s lived experiences.  
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CHAPTER 3 - AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO CULTURAL DIFFERENCE IN THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
I. Introduction 
The European Court of Human Rights has been confronted with an enormous volume of cases 
concerning questions of ethno-cultural diversity. The most direct avenues for advancing rights 
claims to recognition of cultural differences are Article 8 (right to respect for private and 
family life), Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), Article 2 of Protocol No. 
1 (right to education) and Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR).
390
 From the existing case law in this area, this chapter focuses on 
complaints brought by Roma and Travellers as well as Muslim applicants.
391
 The former set 
of cases mainly relies on Article 8 ECHR, often accompanied by Articles 1 (right to property) 
and 2 (right to education) of Protocol No. 1. Muslim applicants, in turn, mainly invoke Article 
9 ECHR, Article 2 Protocol 1 and Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. Both Roma/Travellers and 
Muslim applicants share the frequent invocation of the prohibition of discrimination (Article 
14 ECHR).  
Broadly speaking, in the cases studied Roma, Travellers and Muslims generally seek 
protection against discrimination; redress of disadvantages associated with their actual or 
perceived difference, and accommodation of cultural/religious aspects of their life. As will be 
seen below, these complaints are varied in scope and relate to different areas of social life, 
such as land planning and housing, education, the workplace, social protection, the use of 
public services and public spaces, political representation and participation in other spheres of 
power. As such, most of the cases reviewed not only concern the opportunity to live in 
accordance with one’s cultural/religious identity. They also touch upon socio-economic and 
participation rights. In this context, and because I am interested in what an integrated 
normative framework can offer to the adjudication of cases otherwise addressed through a 
relatively narrow approach, I will draw particular attention to those judgments and decisions 
where, despite the complexity and multidimensionality of the problems under review, 
emphasis is put on questions of ethno-cultural difference and competing group demands. In 
other words, I will examine more closely the subset of rulings where the Court has adopted a 
normative approach mostly anchored in ethno-cultural and religious identity (i.e. being a 
‘Roma’, being a ‘Muslim’), as this focus is quite representative of a compartmentalised frame 
of analysis. In the case of Roma and Travellers, these are mostly cases dealing with a so-
called ‘Gypsy’ way of life involving the occupation of caravans. For Muslims, a large part of 
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reason for this is that this study focuses on the claims made by (natural) persons who represent the culturally and 
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quite responsive to the ‘institutional’ plights of such applicants. On this last point, see Javier Martínez-Torrón, 
‘The (Un) protection of individual religious identity in the Strasbourg case law’, 1(2) Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion (2012) 363.     
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such identity-based cases concerns the wearing of the Islamic veil (whether the hijab or 
niqab).  
Rights claims for recognition of cultural differences, whether in the framework of substantive 
provisions such as Articles 8 and 9 or through the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 
ECHR), place the individual within a cultural or religious community. These individual 
complaints consequently have not only an individual but also a collective dimension. One of 
the Court’s starting points in the examination of culturally-related cases is in fact the 
identification of the applicant’s membership of an ethno-cultural or religious collectivity.392 
Moreover, the Court has observed, for example, that in contexts of religious plurality, the role 
of the State ‘is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that 
the competing groups tolerate each other’.393 This underscores the fact that cultural diversity 
cases also concern social relations among groups. Quite often such relations are regarded as 
relations of inequality, usually between minorities and majorities, which is an important factor 
driving judicialisation. Still, one criticism courts are prone to encountering is that they are too 
concerned with the individual, while disregarding group-based inequalities.
394
 The point is, in 
other words, that the extent to which the outcome of litigation goes beyond the individual 
parties, as well as the framing of the case against a broader social context, does matter. The 
issue of group and cultural membership is therefore critical for the legal analysis of the cases 
examined here.  
But does this require courts such as the ECtHR to focus on group identity and its definitional 
features as such? What opportunities and drawbacks are at play in that sort of categorisation? 
As these questions may suggest, the collective aspects that are of interest here do not concern 
corporate issues or otherwise institutionalised collective cultural expressions, such as places 
of worship and the organisational autonomy of culturally-based communities.
395
 Rather, the 
questions explored in the following lines concern the Strasbourg Court’s approach to ‘the’ 
social group to which the applicant allegedly belongs and which significantly shapes her 
social standing and rights claims.
396
 How, then, does the Court conceive of Roma and 
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 These aspects are especially salient in the field of religious diversity and are manifested, for instance, in the 
relationship between organised religious communities and the state, as well as in their association through 
religious institutions.  
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 I use ‘the’ within quotation marks because courts tend to locate individual applicants in relation to one single 
social group. However, in practice, people belong simultaneously to several groups. For a fuller discussion of 
this issue, see infra II and III.  
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Muslims and how does this affect the way the Court conceives of their rights claims and 
adjudicate them? As explained below, the Court has usually conceived of them as ethno-
cultural/religious bounded groups whose claims relate to the handling of cultural/religious 
difference.
397
  
 
II. Cultural difference as a legal compartment: crossing group identity 
boundaries? 
While this lens enables the Court to acknowledge the cultural embodiment of the applicants 
and guides it in determining the standards applicable to the case, the group cultural identity 
concern is quite unidimensional. It focuses only on the applicant and on others like her; it 
presents her as member of one group or culture/religion, and it draws attention to a limited 
repertoire of grievances and norms – those that are assumed to be immediately linked to the 
exercise of the culture/religion in question. It is submitted that by taking this road, other 
concerns easily fall out of sight, for example, other aspects of the applicants’ identity and 
social location and the position of other rights holders, as well as a wider spectrum of relevant 
harms and norms.  
The reduced line of sight has to do, at least in part, with the problems entailed by a focus on 
Culture ‘with capital C’, to use Anne Phillips’s expression.398 As she explains, this means to 
cast ‘culture itself as protagonist. “Culture” becomes the explanation and people’s activities 
the explanandum. This is a route that brings us to an essentialised version of culture.’399 It is 
argued that the Court has actually taken this route in many of the cases studied. And in doing 
so, it has attempted to define and evaluate, often narrowly, the cultural identity and the 
problems faced by the collectivity in question. As these aspects of the judicial analysis are 
problematised below, we may consider the possibility and convenience of looking beyond 
cultural identity and crossing group boundaries.   
 
1.  The Roma way of life under Article 8 ECHR  
Two themes have been recurrent in the Court’s narrative regarding the collective identity of 
Roma and Traveller people under Article 8 ECHR: the ethno-cultural specificity of the 
Roma/Travellers and their vulnerability. I will start by examining the first: the ethno-cultural 
identity. The Court has underscored the applicants’ membership in a group defined by its own 
history, traditions and values. This discourse of ethno-cultural distinctiveness has been a 
constant for the cases examined, whether they concern the recognition of Roma rites and 
beliefs;
400
 the educational segregation of Roma children (although to a lesser extent);
401
 or the 
                                                          
397
 The bounded view of social groups relates to the idea of ‘groupism’, as envisaged by Baer and Brubaker. This 
portrays some human rights conflicts as group issues and reduces people ‘to specific characteristics that are then 
politicized, as boundaries, in the processes of othering.’ See Susanne Baer, ‘Privatizing Religion. Legal 
Groupism, No-Go-Areas, and the Public-Private-Ideology in Human Rights Politics’, 20(1) Constellations 
(2013) 68, at 75 and  Rogers Brubaker, ‘Ethnicity without Groups’, 43(2) Archives Européennes de Sociologie 
(2002) 163, at 164.  
398
 Anne Phillips, ‘What's wrong with Essentialism?’, 11(1) Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 
(2010) 47, at 54. 
399
 Idem.  
400
 Such as in ECtHR, Muñoz Díaz v. Spain, App. no. 49151/07, Judgment of 8 December 2009.  
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planning regulations hindering the private and family life of Roma and Traveller people.
402
 It 
is probably in this last sphere, however, that the rhetoric of a Roma/Traveller cultural identity 
has been more prominent.  
One may find it surprising that the aforementioned complaints concerning cultural-identity 
rights could rely on Article 8 ECHR (the right to private and family life) since, especially 
when compared to freedom of religion (Article 9 ECHR), the cultural dimension of Article 8 
seems at best tenuous. However, this provision has been interpreted as comprising the 
protection of a way of life and a minority identity. This goes back to the time when the former 
European Commission of Human Rights examined indigenous peoples’ complaints against 
European Nordic countries.
403
 The Saami claimed property over lands they had traditionally 
used for reindeer herding, hunting and fishing in Norway. But the Commission reframed their 
property claim as an issue of private life under Article 8 ECHR. And within that framework, it 
stated that minorities were, in principle, entitled to claim the right to respect for a particular 
way of life which they could lead as private life, family life or home.
404
 The applicants lost 
their case, but the above interpretation paved the way for the protection of ethno-cultural 
minorities and potentially for other people seeking protection of a particular lifestyle. 
Surprisingly, however, most developments in this field are not to be found in indigenous 
rights cases, which still remain relatively scarce within the Court’s jurisprudence.405 With 
only a few complaints about indigenous peoples’ rights decided by the ECtHR on the merits, 
it has actually been in the framework of Roma’s and Travellers’ claims concerning the 
stationing of caravans that the protection of a minority way of life has evolved and gained 
leverage.  
In fact, the idea of a ‘Gypsy way of life’ has evolved through a number of cases – mostly 
against the United Kingdom and France - dealing with evictions or threats of eviction of 
nomadic and sedentary Roma and Travellers who lived in caravans stationed in contravention 
of land-use regulations. Most infringements are grounded in visual amenity and 
environmental protection. In this context, and especially during the early phase of this 
jurisprudence, the Court defined what it has called a ‘Gypsy way of life’ mainly by reference 
to living in caravans and in itinerancy. Since the Grand Chamber judgment in Chapman and 
the other judgments delivered along with it, the occupation of caravans has become an 
integral part of the Roma/Traveller identity protected under Article 8 ECHR. In the Court’s 
view, this identity reflects the minority’s long tradition of a travelling lifestyle, a tradition that 
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persisted despite many Gypsies (as the Court calls them) having adopted a settled existence. 
This last remark notwithstanding, itinerancy gained salience as an ‘essential’ element of 
Roma culture. Even when at the time of those judgments the Court formally acknowledged 
that many Roma and Travellers no longer lived a nomadic life,
406
 it still went on to conclude 
that those who appeared not to be pursuing an itinerant life any more fell outside ‘the 
traditional itinerant Gypsy lifestyle’.407 Accordingly, a narrow view of Roma lifestyle 
received protection.
408
 Practical consequences would follow from this, some of which attest to 
the problems that the scholarship associates with essentialism.
409
  
Referring to the situation of Roma and Travellers in the British context, Poulter has observed 
that ‘by defining travellers by what they do (or by folkloric expectations of their behaviour), 
the state has retained the power to control their use of the land, differentiate their 
authentication and respond to the prejudices of the majority population’.410 In the context of 
the Strasbourg Court, the depiction has had implications for the practices and the people 
granted legal protection. Recognising and protecting a Gypsy way of life to the extent that it is 
nomadic leaves sedentary Roma in a difficult situation. For one thing, the interest in matching 
the cultural identity that is offered greater legal protection is likely to push sedentary Roma 
into nomadism. This, however, exposes Gypsies and Travellers to a life that is no longer 
economically viable, one based on precarious and insecure occupations.
411
 Such itinerancy 
could also carry further disadvantages, such as exclusion from access to services that require a 
fixed residency, a problem well reflected in the experience of the applicant in Connors.
412
 For 
another thing, the protection of a narrow Gypsy way of life made it harder for some Roma and 
Travellers to convince the Court, and arguably domestic authorities too, that they belonged to 
the protected minority and were entitled to redress. This is suggested by the fact that the Court 
had routinely found against applicants who did not appear to follow the traditional ‘Gypsy 
lifestyle’, like those in Chapman, Coster, Clark and others.413  
With time though, the Court has shown greater awareness of these problems and moved away 
from its previous legal emphasis on nomadism. In Connors v. The United Kingdom, for 
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instance, the Court points out that while many Gypsies remained nomadic just in spirit, the 
domestic law continued regarding nomadism the raison d’être of special regulations that 
allowed summary evictions from official sites.
414
 The Court then criticised the United 
Kingdom for placing major obstacles in the way of those pursuing an itinerant lifestyle while 
also excluding from procedural protection those living a sedentary life. Furthermore, in more 
recent case law the sedentary lifestyle of Roma and Travellers, as marked by, for example, 
community life with strong family and social ties, has also received heightened protection 
under Article 8.
415
 Though the reduction of a ‘Gypsy’ culture to itinerancy was abandoned by 
the Court, questions about group identity resurfaced in another fashion. In 2011, in deciding 
the admissibility of Horie v. The United Kingdom, the Court was of the opinion that unlike 
Romani Gypsies and Irish Travellers, ‘New Travellers live a nomadic lifestyle through 
personal choice and not on account of being born into any ethnic or cultural group’.416 The 
assertion was obiter dicta, but it disclosed another disquieting form of controlling and 
reinforcing group boundaries. The Traveller identity was defined by an ethnic origin 
physically determined. In other words, issues of behaviour and belief were attributed by the 
Court to biologically inherited characteristics. An outstanding implication of this approach is 
the potential disregard for rights claims associated with needs and concerns that are, by 
contrast, perceived as ‘chosen’. As further discussed infra III. 2, both the premises and the 
consequences of this stance are problematic.  
But as it will be seen below, the attempt to grasp the stakes of the case by focusing on a 
certain distinctive cultural identity is not exclusive to the Court’s case law on Roma lifestyle 
under Article 8 ECHR. Contested judicial appraisals of culture and group boundaries take 
place as well in the context of religious diversity cases, such as those concerning Muslims and 
Islam. While these are discussed in the next subsection, it is important to keep in mind the 
question of whose and which interests and norms remain visible.   
 
2.  Islam defined and Muslims’ identity under Article 9 ECHR 
As already noted, while scholars consider the Court to be fairly attentive towards collective 
aspects of freedom of religion, such as those concerning the autonomy of religious 
communities,
417
 a marked difference is evident in how the Court’s discourse constructs the 
ethnic-religious groups to which applicants allegedly belong. In this respect, difficulties of 
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essentialism and group boundaries are notably at issue in cases involving Islam, particularly 
those on state prohibitions of ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols and headscarves in schools, the 
parliament, universities, the workplace, the judiciary and in other contexts.
418
 In order to rule 
these cases, the Court has put considerable emphasis on religious difference, mostly by 
focusing on the applicants’ religious practice, set against state neutrality.419  
A series of decisions and judgments issued by the Court on the wearing of the hijab in public 
settings provide a good overview of the Court’s initial approach to Islam and Muslims, 
especially Muslim women. By attributing certain values and meanings to the Islamic veil, the 
Court has delineated the contours of Islam and Muslims’ identity.420 A number of definitional 
features were set out through cases dealing with restrictions and bans on veiling that were 
challenged by Muslim women and girls in the context of public educational institutions, such 
as Karaduman, Dahlab, Sahin, Dogru and Kervanci. First, the Court – and the Commission 
before it – was of the opinion that the hijab was a ‘powerful’ or ostentatious symbol which 
exerted pressure or had a proselytising effect.
421
 Second, the Court presented it as coercive 
and contrary to gender equality, insofar as it appeared to be imposed on women by the 
Qur'an.
422
 The hijab was thus situated in opposition to the tenets underlying the European 
Convention, inasmuch as it ‘could not easily be reconciled with the message of tolerance, 
respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination’.423 Third, the 
aforementioned rulings, as well as those dealing with the discharge of Muslim men studying 
or working in the army on account of professing Islam, also connected their religious identity 
to radicalisation or fundamentalism and thus to intolerance and threats to public order.
424
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Though constructed mostly in the context of religious garments, the above value assessment 
of Islam persisted and even deepened with the Grand Chamber judgment on the 
constitutionality of the pro-Islam Welfare Party in Turkey.
425
 The case concerns the decision 
of the Turkish Constitutional Court to dissolve an established political party, the Refah Party, 
for aiming at activities contrary to secularism. Additionally, six of its leaders were barred 
from taking part in political party activities for five years. In upholding the unconstitutionality 
of the party, the Grand Chamber, like the Chamber, found it ‘difficult to declare one’s respect 
for democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on Sharia, 
which clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law 
and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervenes in all 
spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts’.426 Strikingly, the 
passage also refers to the ‘stable and invariable’ character of Sharia, an assertion that stands in 
open contradiction to the unbounded and changing character of cultures so repeatedly stressed 
by anthropologists elsewhere.
427
 The Grand Chamber reasoned along similar lines in Yiğit v. 
Turkey, a case dealing with a widow who was unable to obtain a survivor pension as a result 
of having married under Islamic rites only.
428
 Besides the importance Turkey accorded to the 
principle of secularism, the Court noted that the state party ‘aimed to put an end to a marriage 
tradition which places women at a clear disadvantage, not to say in a situation of dependence 
and inferiority, compared to men’.429 This line of reasoning has, unsurprisingly, attracted 
abundant criticism.
430
 
Some relevant shifts, however, took place in the 2013 case of S.A.S v. France. Here the Court 
examined the French blanket ban on the full-face veil (niqab) in public places. In this context, 
and unlike previous cases, the Court did not define Islam in terms of its alleged opposition to 
gender equality. It stated that ‘a State Party cannot invoke gender equality in order to ban a 
practice that is defended by women’.431 The full-face veiling was then considered ‘the 
expression of a cultural identity which contributes to the pluralism that is inherent in 
democracy’.432 The Court furthermore noted ‘the variability of the notions of virtuousness and 
decency that are applied to the uncovering of the human body’.433 Ultimately, however, the 
Court accepted the ban, this time on the basis of the extra-conventional ground invoked by 
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France of preserving the conditions of ‘living together’.434 While the association between 
Islam and fundamentalism also receded within public order considerations, the full-face veil 
appeared to compromise security and social cohesion due to the importance of individuals’ 
faces for identification and social interaction. However, as discussed below, evidence as to 
how a face veil could make social life impossible or as to the likelihood that the ban would 
improve social interaction was lacking in the judgment. For the dissenting judges, the 
majority’s decision built on uneasiness and fears around Islam and the full-face veil, the 
sources of which are the philosophical and symbolic meanings attributed to them.
435
 This last 
observation may find support in the fact that, although the ban is general and not addressed to 
anyone in particular, so far only the covering of the face inspired by Islam, and no other forms 
of face concealment that occur in our societies, has engendered so much debate and 
unsettledness that it has been found necessary to enact a blanket ban.  
Although the same line of reasoning of S.A.S. was restated in the 2017 case of Dakir v. 
Belgium,
436
 some judgements between the two offer a different discourse, one in which the 
focus on the distinctiveness of Islam appears mitigated. In Ebrahimian v. France, a case 
brought by a social worker of the psychiatric ward of a public hospital whose contract was not 
renewed because she wore the hijab, the Court’s analysis does not revolve so much around 
the characteristics attributed to the hijab or to Islam. Instead, most of the Court’s reasoning 
concerns public servants’ duty of neutrality and the centrality of secularism in the French 
context. Yet, it is interesting to observe that the hijab was still regarded as an outward symbol 
inherently conflicting with the equal treatment and impartiality owed to all users of public 
services.
437
 At the same time, while the reasoning seems to abandon the emphasis on Islam 
and religious identity, it does move somewhat towards a normative analysis of French identity 
as expressed in neutrality and secularism. This alerts us to movement from a normative 
framework centred on one narrow category, say that of group identity, to one centred on 
another. In both scenarios, the risks of keeping the analysis at a fragmented and abstract level, 
losing sight of the multiple identities of rights holders and of the whole range of affected 
rights, are quite similar. As Minow noted decades ago, ‘the use of a specific notion of identity 
to resolve a legal dispute can obscure the complexity of lived experiences while imposing the 
force of the state behind the selected notion of identity’.438     
It should be noted though that the adjudication of other cases involving Muslims’ religious 
practices has been largely devoid of group identity and religious determinations. Cases of 
religious exemption from school lessons such as Hasan and Eylem v Turkey and Osmanoǧlu 
and Kocabaş v. Switzerland are examples.439 In the former, two parents unsuccessfully 
requested the school authorities to exempt her daughter from lessons on religious culture and 
ethics since their content was based on the Sunni understanding of Islam, while the applicants 
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were adherents of the Alevi faith, a minority branch of Islam. The case of Osmanoǧlu and 
Kocabaş, in turn, concerned a request from Muslim parents to exempt their daughter from 
compulsory mixed-gender swimming classes on religious grounds. Likewise, another 
normative approach can be seen in a case concerning the wearing of Islam-related attire in the 
public space but which, unlike the cases discussed above, involved male Muslims.
440
 What 
these cases show is that their resolution did not require the Court to endorse a normative 
analysis reduced to questions of religious difference and group identity. Actually, to different 
degrees, these judgements took heed of the specific situation of the applicants and other rights 
holders, bearing in mind who they were and in which contexts the restrictions applied. I will 
return to these judgments below.   
Given the Court’s emphasis on the (negative) appraisal of Islam and Islamic veiling in 
particular, the perils of cultural essentialism displayed in some cases involving Muslims and 
Islam may seem evident by now. Former Judge Tulkens noted some of them when dissenting 
in Sahin, a case brought by a medical student challenging a ban on the wearing of the Islamic 
headscarf in universities and other state educational institutions in Turkey. The judge argued 
that ‘it is not the Court’s role to make an appraisal of this type – in this instance a unilateral 
and negative one – of a religion or religious practice, just as it is not its role to determine in a 
general and abstract way the signification of wearing the headscarf or to impose its viewpoint 
on the applicant’.441 Against the background of prevailing (Christian-based) notions of 
secularism and religion understood as ‘privatised belief’,442 the impact of the Court’s 
assumptions about Islam and Muslims’ way of life upon the application of Article 9 ECHR 
should not be underestimated. Framing the normative inquiry as one about what is accepted or 
permitted for a ‘different’ religious tradition characterised by outward manifestation, pressure, 
fundamentalism and threats to equality is likely to predetermine any subsequent analysis, 
whether in relation to the State’s margin of appreciation, the protection of public order or the 
rights of others. Moreover, as further discussed below, a discourse too concerned with a 
distinctive identity or religious practice – for example, the wearing of headscarves – feeds a 
quite unidimensional way of understanding who are the persons affected and what are the 
harms at stake in the cases. Note, for example, how in the cases discussed earlier the analysis 
focuses on veiled Muslim women and those who might be negatively affected by an exposure 
to them. It also examines how such practice undermines the agency of those persons; how to 
deal with the religious injury of banning headscarves, and with threats to gender equality, to 
social cohesion and to neutrality and secularism. Viewed this way, several dimensions of the 
cases seem to be sidelined, as will be seen later.    
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3. Roma’s vulnerability and Muslim’s invulnerability  
As stated at the outset, in several cases reviewed here the Court has emphasised that Roma 
people constitute a vulnerable group. In characterising the Roma as a minority in a vulnerable 
position, the Court has notably relied on Council of Europe recommendations.
443
 These 
contend, inter alia, that Gypsies are ‘a true European minority’ who ‘greatly contribute to the 
cultural diversity of Europe (…) be it by language and music or by their trades and crafts’.444 
Such recommendations also situate their group vulnerability in relation to ‘a double minority 
status’, as the Roma belong to an ethnic community and to some of the most socially 
disadvantaged groups.
445
 The Court has also linked this vulnerability to a history of 
discrimination and social exclusion widely acknowledged by the Council of Europe and by 
several human rights monitoring bodies.
446
 Though not as salient as the Gypsy way of life, 
group vulnerability also shapes in significant ways the framing and outcome of the case. 
Spelling out the legal consequences of group vulnerability, the Court has held that ‘the 
vulnerable position of Roma/Gypsies means that special consideration should be given to 
their needs and their different lifestyle, both in the relevant regulatory framework and in 
reaching decisions in particular cases’.447 A positive obligation to facilitate the ‘Gypsy way of 
life’ has thereby been imposed on States.448 This does not go as far as to exempt Roma people 
from the application of general laws. But it does make of their minority and vulnerable status 
an element to be considered by the state when crafting regulations and implementing them.
449
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It also narrows the state’s margin of appreciation,450 not a minor effect in cases dealing with 
cultural and social policy matters. In fact, states have been granted a wide margin of 
discretion on social issues such as planning, housing and educational policies (typically 
challenged by Roma and Traveller complaints), especially where they involve a multitude of 
local actors or where there is significant diversity of practices across member states.
451
 The 
special protection afforded to Roma/Travellers as a vulnerable group has thus extended to 
different fields, including education, planning and housing. In the judgments on educational 
segregation of Roma children, for example, the status of vulnerable group was linked to a 
specific form of disadvantage related to longstanding prejudice and discrimination.
452
 In 
practice, however, the incidence of group vulnerability was quite limited in most cases 
concerning the stationing of caravans.
453
 Or at least it was until the 2013 case of Winstertein 
v. France, a judgment dealing with the eviction faced by mostly settled Travellers living in 
mobile homes de facto tolerated by the authorities. Here the Court found for the applicants on 
the ground that the state had failed to take into account the needs of evicted Travellers seeking 
relocation in family plots.
454
 According to the Court, the vulnerability and lifestyle of the 
group had a role to play not only when assessing the proportionality of eviction, but also when 
deciding on the specific arrangements applicable in the event of removal, including timing 
and alternative shelter.
455
  
The Court’s interest in coming to grips with the disadvantaged (‘vulnerable’) situation of the 
Roma as a group seems not only justified, but also potentially beneficial for the protection of 
human rights in a number of cases. Qualifying this and other groups as vulnerable might help 
in unveiling group asymmetries and social barriers, placing individual disadvantages – 
cultural or otherwise – within a social context.456 A few examples of these opportunities have 
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already been introduced. Take, for instance, the way in which vulnerability gave rise to the 
State’s procedural obligation to facilitate the Gypsy way of life. This may increase the 
participation of Roma people in the design and enforcement of institutions (e.g. development 
plans, housing policies, education programmes) usually crafted without their involvement. 
This obligation also has the potential to set out a duty to accommodate their needs and 
practices, so far largely disregarded in most European countries. Another illustration is 
provided by the Court’s finding of indirect discrimination in cases of systematic placement of 
Roma children in separate classes or separate schools, which was based on an analysis of the 
group’s de facto social exclusion.457  
Yet, and bearing in mind that it is beyond the scope of this study to unpack fully the notion of 
vulnerability or its effects,
458
 there are some risks in adopting the group vulnerability frame as 
applied in the cases studied. First, group vulnerability, especially when it operates more as an 
identity attribute than as something contingent, may overshadow the specific circumstances of 
its members as well as the social structures that are a source of vulnerability. This could 
explain, for example, the fact that despite the recognition of Roma’s vulnerability, the Court 
has not in practice accorded much weight to the intersecting vulnerabilities experienced by 
some applicants or the constraints they faced as a result of housing and planning policies, 
which are further examined below.
459
 A second difficulty is, as pointed out by Peroni and 
Timmer, the possibility of portraying some groups, and hence their members, as inherently 
vulnerable, which may undermine their agency and empowerment.
460
 As further analysed 
below, this may also reduce the Court’s understanding of the case. A third risk to consider, 
also noted by the same authors, is the adoption of a fixed view of ‘what is allowed to fall 
under the vulnerable-group concept’461 in a way that ‘unduly limits the application of group-
vulnerability reasoning’.462 Possibly grounded in the belief that group protection concerns  
‘discrete insular minorities’,463 this may foster the perception that only some groups are 
vulnerable. It is as if the vulnerable groups were ‘out there’ awaiting judicial recognition. The 
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Roma appear to be one of those ‘true’ minority groups, Muslims do not. In contrast to the 
rulings dealing with the Roma, the judicial discourse on Muslims and Islam evolved, in the 
cases studied, without any allusion to group vulnerability. But if group vulnerability has 
something to do with social disadvantage, widespread prejudice or a history of discrimination, 
then it is quite surprising – to say the least – that the Court has not considered this religious 
group through the prism of vulnerability. There is, in fact, abundant material within and 
beyond the Council of Europe documenting the exclusion, discrimination and stereotyping of 
Muslims (especially women).
464
 And recognition of vulnerability in the Court’s case law is 
not trivial. As explained with regard to the Roma, it does affect the course of adjudication.  
 
4. Crossing group boundaries and moving down to the real-life human  
A legal focus on group boundaries, whether fixed around ethno-cultural and religious identity 
or around vulnerability, may reduce the visual range of the Court in a number of ways. A first 
difficulty to note has to do with the centrality that cultural/religious difference acquires within 
the overall judicial discourse. This may lead the Court, and indeed it is argued it has done so, 
to overemphasise a group identity represented by cultural symbols (such as the wearing of 
headscarves) and traditional practices (such as living in itinerant caravans) at the expense of 
the specific needs and interests of applicants and other rights holders.
465
 What is more, so long 
as such an emphasis locates the social conflicts underlying the cases within one 
culture/religion or group, then the culture/religion or group itself becomes the reason for the 
dispute. When this happens, it is more likely that the Court will pass over broader issues of 
power imbalance, such as widespread discrimination, poverty, racism, islamophobia and so 
on. This could be one of the reasons why, as will be seen below, little attention has been 
accorded to racial discrimination and socio-economic inequality in the so-called ‘caravan 
cases’. A similar concern goes for the so-called ‘headscarf cases’. In these cases, the emphasis 
on religious difference and identity is in reverse proportion to the analysis of discrimination 
and islamophobia.
466
 At the same time, that emphasis has come with several abstract 
questions such as the meaning of neutrality, secularism and pluralism.   
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A second problem, which is further examined below, is that besides giving rise to stereotypes 
about the collectivity and its cultural identity, the reification of a social group also mobilises 
stereotypes about its members. Besides compromising equality and non-discrimination norms, 
such stereotypes operate as a way of controlling, once again, the boundaries of the group. In 
the cases studied, these stereotypes of Muslims and Roma furthermore tended to obscure the 
actual experience of the applicants before the Court. As a consequence, stereotypes made it 
easier to adjudicate on the basis of abstract considerations instead of evidence regarding the 
specific interests and harms experienced by rights holders.  
A third problem relates to the group identity assessment carried out by the Court, which 
carries implications beyond the cases discussed above. Why are some cultures or groups more 
deserving than others and whose viewpoint is taken into account in coming to that decision? 
There is certainly something troubling about restricting protection or accommodation to 
practices representative of cultures or identities deemed worthy enough of judicial 
approval.
467
 Besides the problems enumerated above, the positive or negative assessment of 
any given culture or identity risks undermining the ideal of judicial neutrality, understood as 
impartiality and fairness. Indeed, charges of possible bias and double standards have already 
been voiced against the Court, particularly with regard to its case law involving Islam.
468
 
Former Judge Kovler critically raised this point: ‘on the one hand, the Court recognised the 
specific character of Romas’ way of life and the necessity of its protection (…) on the other 
side, in some cases the Court manifested a certain hostility in respect of Islamic values and 
institutions.’469  
This question holds special relevance for a Court that is actually called on to rule on a wide 
range of culturally driven claims.
470
 So long as the Court faces more claims for 
accommodation or for ‘special’ rights from a growing range of culturally-defined groups, 
there is greater pressure to elucidate the grounds on which the Court takes such decisions. 
This scenario should incentivise the Court to look beyond cultural identity and group 
boundaries for the purposes of justification. An integrated normative framework like the one 
developed in this chapter is therefore equally useful for setting limits to the flexibility of 
human rights law. Consider, for example, the case of individuals and a countryside 
association from the United Kingdom which invoked Article 8 ECHR and the protection of 
their lifestyle and cultural traditions as rural ‘hunting communities’ to challenge a state ban on 
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fox and other animal hunting with dogs.
471
 One main reason adduced by the Court to declare 
the complaint inadmissible was that the applicants did not belong to a ‘discrete minority 
group’ like an ethnic or national minority.472 While this conclusion might appear self-evident 
here, the line-drawing is likely to be much more debatable in a number of other cases. As 
such, the other – more crucial – considerations provided by the Court with respect to the harm 
actually experienced by the applicants were very much warranted. Notably, the Court argued 
that the ban did not take away their employment, nor did it stigmatise them in the eyes of 
society.
473
 These constitute legitimate and relevant normative grounds for denying the special 
protection sought by the applicants in that case.   
Hence, moving away from normative approaches entailing judicial determinations of the sort 
criticised here is desirable. And, importantly, it is feasible too. The adjudication of rights 
claims related to cultural difference does not need to set culture or group identity as the 
protagonist. This does not mean denying the relevance of individuals’ cultural attachments 
and collective identities, let alone that of group inequalities. It does mean, however, that the 
Court should be wary of forgetting that culture is dynamic, that people embody several 
identities and that cultural/religious rights are usually only part of the problem brought before 
the Court. In sum, a range of reasons call for courts like the ECtHR to remain aware of the 
fluidity of culture while also acknowledging group heterogeneity. And since group 
heterogeneity stems from the fact that groups are composed of people who are simultaneously 
members of several groups, a first step in that direction is to pay greater attention to 
intersectionality. The next section turns to this and to other aspects of individuals’ complexity. 
 
III. Whole humans: looking through and across rights holders  
As we have seen, cases dealing with questions of ethno-cultural diversity tend to bring one 
aspect of individual applicants to the forefront: their cultural or ethnic affiliation. This appears 
quite reasonable. The litigants’ strategic choices, the categorisation inherent to adjudication 
and the prevalence of a one-sided view of discrimination claims all reinforce the salience of 
individuals’ cultural attachment. Yet, in real life, individuals are more than that; considered as 
a whole, their experience is more complex. That is why this section builds upon an 
intersectional framework. To borrow the words of Hill Collins and Bilge: ‘Intersectionality is 
a way of understanding and analysing the complexity in the world, in people, and in human 
experience.’474 Complexity flows from people’s multiple affiliations or ‘identities’ and, more 
crucially, from the set of social relationships in which they are embedded. Hence, a first 
question arises: does the Court integrate facets of individual identity and social location other 
than culture and ethnicity into its adjudication of these cases? And how can taking this on 
board contribute to the handling of these or other cases? This is the first issue to be explored 
here.  
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Still connected to life complexity, the two other issues discussed in this section also relate to 
another important feature of intersectionality. As the same authors referred to above remind 
us, intersectionality is grounded in ‘relational thinking’.475 This kind of thinking rejects 
‘either/or’ binary rationales and focuses instead on relationships. From this perspective, I 
examine the Court’s approach to individual autonomy, a feature of rights holders quite often 
debated in the adjudication of the cases studied. Does the Court take into account that 
autonomy unfolds across intricate relationships? Does it acknowledge that, like individuals’ 
affiliations, autonomy is not an ‘either/or’ issue? Lastly, a final layer of complexity and 
relationality is worth noting. Because people do not stand in isolation from others and from 
social relations, usually a wider range of rights holders are affected by the measure allegedly 
hindering cultural or religious aspects of applicants. Some of these individuals concur with 
the applicant, and some, instead, compete with her. This is the third issue addressed below. It 
will be seen that whether the Court acknowledges or overlooks all this complexity has 
important normative consequences. 
 
1. Enriching the cultural identities of rights holders 
1.1. A more integrated view of Roma and Traveller applicants 
The majority of the complaints brought by Roma and Travellers struggling with the stationing 
of caravans and eviction threats posited an allegation of violation of Article 14 ECHR. 
Regardless of the exact framing employed, they mainly pointed to indirect discrimination. 
The allegation was basically this: despite the ostensible neutrality of planning regulations, 
they disadvantaged Gypsies and Travellers, whose lifestyle deviated from that of the majority 
population. The state, in sum, failed to accommodate their specific needs.
476
 The Court, 
however, having decided on Article 8 ECHR, routinely found that there was either no 
violation or no further issue to examine under Article 14.
477
 For a while, the Court’s response 
was that affording different treatment to Gypsies would raise an issue of discrimination 
against the non-Gypsy population. The applicants, in its opinion, were ‘not worse than any 
non-gypsy who wants to live in a caravan and finds it disagreeable to live in a house’.478 But 
who were those ‘Gypsy’ applicants and how was their experience so comparable with those 
‘non-gypsies’?  
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A closer look at the cases discussing Roma/Traveller lifestyles reveals that most of them were 
brought by women, either single or in a couple, living with their children. The applicants’ 
view on their rights deprivation was therefore marked by that experience. For example, in 
Buckley, Chapman and its twin judgements (as well as in subsequent cases) the cultural claim 
was accompanied by concerns such as ‘to provide a safe and stable environment for her 
children and to be near to the school they were attending’.479 This last concern explains the 
allegations of violation of the right to education (Article 2 Protocol 1 ECHR) in such cases, a 
claim that the Court barely addressed. In cases such as Smith, Easton and Connors (all against 
the United Kingdom), the applicants also invoked issues of caring and family health 
concerns.
480
 At the same time, it is not hard to appreciate that most Roma applicants, men and 
women, had a deprived economic situation and that this too informed their plight. In several 
rulings, including those in the line of Chapman, the Court did not only require attention (on 
grounds of group-vulnerability) to their ‘different lifestyle’, but also to their needs; and it even 
mentioned humanitarian considerations.
481
 However, although this suggests awareness of the 
social precariousness experienced by Roma and Travellers, it does not seem that the Court 
had ascertained whether and how their general destitution materialised in the case of the 
applicants, particularly in the light of their eviction.
 482
  
Already in Buckley v The United Kingdom, the first judgment of its kind, the Court’s approach 
to the applicant appeared quite fragmented. A ‘Gypsy’ woman claimed that the prohibition of 
living in her caravan on her own land, coupled with the actual unavailability of alternative 
sites, constituted a disproportionate interference with her right to private and family life and to 
respect for her home. She asserted a right to settle on a safe and stable site and a right to live 
in a caravan and keep travelling (according to her Gypsy lifestyle) when possible. The Court 
turned down the Commission’s finding of an Article 8 violation. And the partly dissenting 
Judge Repik precisely criticised the majority for not considering the impact of eviction on the 
applicant ‘given her financial and family situation’.483 Along these lines, Dembour argues that 
by overlooking these facets of the applicants’ experience the Court disappoints those who 
may expect it ‘to become more attuned and responsive to women’s positions as carers’.484 
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Equally disappointing is that not only in this case but also in similar subsequent cases the 
Court had assumed the applicant’s freedom to move somewhere else, notably, to private sites. 
It stated that ‘in principle gypsies are at liberty to camp on any caravan site which has 
planning permission; there has been no suggestion that permissions exclude gypsies as a 
group’.485 The Court reached that conclusion in spite of the documented incidents of violence 
and other safety issues that Ms Buckley, and other applicants like her, had experienced.
486
 The 
Court also forgot that no freedom to move to private sites existed for those Roma applicants 
who could not afford them or were rejected on the basis of entrenched prejudice.
487
 A similar 
oversight of compounded socio-economic disadvantage is observable in Wells.
488
 In this case, 
the domestic courts regarded the applicant’s precarious circumstances and the fact he had 
nowhere else to go as irrelevant to justifying his ‘incapacity’ to comply with an enforcement 
notice. The ECtHR limited itself to endorsing the domestic court’s finding to that effect and 
observed that many other persons were not able to continue residing on sites or houses 
‘attractive’ to them.489 But there are some exceptions to this compartmentalised line of 
reasoning. A notable example is Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria. In this case, which 
concerned the forcible eviction of Roma families living in an informal settlement and is 
further discussed below, the Court is explicitly sensitive to the socio-economic hardship of 
Roma applicants. Interestingly, however, this is a case where the argument of ethno-cultural 
difference, unlike the aforementioned cases, does not play a significant role in the applicant’s 
submissions or in the Court’s analysis. In fact, the Court appears to place much emphasis on 
the applicants belonging to a socially disadvantaged group ‘regardless of the ethnic origin of 
their members’.490  
Intersectional lenses can also illuminate cases such as Muñoz Díaz v. Spain and Yiğit v. 
Turkey.
491
 Both concerned the denial of a survivor pension to the applicants, widows and 
mothers of six, on account of the lack of legal validity of their marriages, which were 
performed according to Romani and Islamic rites, respectively. Irrespective of the important 
factual differences between the cases (e.g. that Spain, unlike Turkey, had recognised the 
validity of certain religious marriages performed in good faith), it is relevant to observe that 
their ethno-cultural attachments were not the only sources of disadvantage. Gender, and thus 
the power asymmetries constructed around it, were also at issue. This was so not really 
because only women were granted survivor pensions – which actually did not appear to be the 
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case. Rather, it was because gender relations were constructed in such a way within the 
applicants’ religious and ethnic communities (and also within the broader society) that both 
devoted most of their lives to caring for their children. And as they did not take part in 
remunerated work, or did so only partially, economic deprivation was likely to follow without 
their husbands. The particular way in which the non-recognition of their cultural marriages for 
the purpose of a survival pension burdened the applicants is what intersectionality exposes. 
Part of this concern was reflected in the Court’s regard for the specific life circumstances of 
Ms Muñoz Díaz. Alongside her ethnic and community affiliation, the Court recalled that the 
social benefits already granted by the state recognised the applicant as ‘a wife and the mother 
of a large family, this situation being regarded as particularly worthy of assistance’.492 It is 
unclear, however, how the Court weighted these factors in the case of Mrs Yiğit, who was 
ultimately denied access to social security rights after having taken care of the home, the 
deceased spouse and six children. In this case, much of the Court’s analysis focused instead 
on the importance Turkey accorded to the principle of secularism and on its view of Islam and 
its marriage tradition.
493
  
The Court has, however, come closer to an intersectional perspective in cases concerning the 
school segregation of Roma children, such as D.H v. Czech Republic, Sampanis v. Greece, 
Oršuš and Others v. Croatia and Horváth and Kiss v Hungary. In the landmark judgment D.H 
v. Czech Republic, the Grand Chamber relied on extensive statistics and reports to
 
hold that 
the special educational system provided for Roma children amounted to indirect 
discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin (in violation of Article 14 ECHR jointly with 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1).
494
 Although the finding rested on the situation of the applicants 
as members of the Roma community, the Court assessed the seriousness of the interference 
with the right to education in view of the fact that the ‘applicants were minor children for 
whom the right to education was of paramount importance’.495 However, this intersectional 
starting point did not really unfold by, for example, incorporating into the analysis specific 
standards tailored to the children’s needs or by further assessing their experience in that 
position. In this vein, one author notes critically that the Court was too focused on the Roma 
as a disadvantaged ethnic group and on the parents’ consent, while remaining quite detached 
from the interests of the applicants as children.
496
 Additionally, it should be noted that the risk 
of being placed in a segregated school in D.H. had to do with the applicants’ socio-economic 
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position too. Third-party interveners in the case actually drew the Court’s attention to the 
situation of Roma children from vulnerable families. They argued that ‘the Czech Republic 
was notable for its placement of children in segregated settings because of “social 
disadvantage”.’497 Yet, this dimension of the applicants’ experience was not included in the 
Court’s analysis.498  
In the similar cases that followed, the Court paid greater attention to the applicants’ 
circumstances as children. In Horváth and Kiss v Hungary, the Court made some links 
between the applicants’ ethno-cultural specificity and their socio-economic condition. The 
applicants had explicitly situated the misdiagnosing of Roma children within their context of 
social deprivation and cultural distinctiveness. They stated that ‘the definition of mental 
disability as comprising social deprivation and/or having a minority culture amounted to bias 
and prejudice’.499 The Court findings, as in previous cases, were limited to indirect 
discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin or race. Nonetheless, this time the Court at least 
considered the applicants’ social deprivation for the purposes of explaining the operation of 
the educational misplacement of children and how this reinforced their social exclusion.
500
  
 
1.2. A more integrated view of Muslim applicants  
Turning to Muslims’ rights claims regarding religious attire, reflections inspired by a richer 
view of rights holders are equally in order. Not all people who feel attached to a religion can 
exercise their freedom of religion and other rights in the same manner. Crucial dimensions of 
the cases dealing with religious expression and Islamic veils would be missed without an 
intersectional approach. They can only be captured once we appreciate that applicants are, for 
example, Muslim women and girls (many with a migrant background) studying or working as 
teachers in public primary and secondary education; women who went into a court room as a 
party or as a lawyer, who want to take office in parliament or walk in public places while 
wearing a hijab or a niqab.
501
 Several applicants argued that the contested bans on covering 
constituted discrimination in violation of Article 9 and/or other provisions in conjunction with 
Article 14 ECHR. But their claim was not only one of religious discrimination. It was also 
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one of discrimination based on sex and even on ethnic origin. In some cases they contrasted 
their situation with that of, for example, Muslim men and boys, with Muslim women who 
chose not to wear the veil, and with Christians who could conceal their faces with masks or 
dress the way they wanted during Christian festivities.
502
 Thus, the point was that other 
religious women and Muslim men were able to work, to study and to enter public spaces 
without being subjected to any form of prohibition or exclusion. Although here, in contrast to 
the aforementioned Roma/Traveller cases, the claim of intersectionality (violations based on 
inequalities attached to religion and gender and/or ethnic origin combined) appears relatively 
clear in the applicants’ arguments, the Court did not take it up either.  
While in cases involving prohibitions of conspicuous religious symbols the Court devoted a 
not insignificant number of paragraphs to the religious practice of Muslim women, it rapidly 
ruled out discrimination because the measures were supposedly ‘not directed at’ or ‘unrelated 
to’ the applicant’s religion.503 They were rather aimed at ensuring neutrality and secularism in 
the public sphere. A similar answer was provided in cases in which Muslim women claimed 
sex discrimination.
504
 The reasoning was furthermore reinforced by the argument that, in any 
case, the measure applied equally to a whole category of persons. That is, the ban ‘could also 
be applied to a man who, in similar circumstances, wore clothing that clearly identified him as 
a member of a different faith’.505 It follows, then, that the Court’s main concern was the 
(non)existence of formal direct discrimination. The issue was, in other words, whether the 
state openly targeted one personal trait or one group defined by one common characteristic. 
Underlying this was the formal and single-ground comparator-based inquiry so typical of anti-
discrimination law.
506
 This line of reasoning does not lend itself well to assessing the 
allegations of real-life experiences of discrimination discussed here. For one thing, the 
formula seems to fit blatant forms of discrimination typical of past times, when people’s 
characteristics were openly singled out by laws and regulations disfavouring them. For 
another, as further explained below, the reasoning behind formal discrimination is blind to 
compounded experiences. Looking at complaints against veil and face covering bans through 
the perspective of the individuals concerned exposes how they were affected as both women 
and Muslim believers. As such, they shared some experiences with both Muslim men and 
women from other faiths. Yet they also confronted a unique and specific form of violation.  
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In the Grand Chamber judgment in S.A.S v. France as well as in the recent case of Dakir v. 
Belgium, the Court conceded that it was ‘aware of the fact that the impugned ban mainly 
affects Muslim women who wish to wear the full-face veil’.507 Yet, it downplayed the 
implications of this conclusion by saying that it ‘finds it to be of some significance that the 
ban is not expressly based on the religious connotation of the clothing in question but solely 
on the fact that it conceals the face’.508 ‘Some significance’ actually made all the difference 
because the Court simply returned to the direct discrimination logic. Since the ban was based 
on the concealing of the face, it could not be discrimination. Interestingly, in the S.A.S case 
the Court for the first time raised concerns about Islamophobia and ‘the risk of contributing to 
the consolidation of the stereotypes which affect certain categories of the population’.509 
However, these concerns were not connected to the decision on the case at hand. 
The human rights implications of the intersection between religion and gender did not totally 
escape the Court’s analysis, though. The latter did identify, in most of the cases reviewed, a 
worrisome interplay to the extent that it showed concern about the way religion may endorse 
oppressive gender roles burdening mostly women. But did the Court recognise that nearly all 
religions and cultures, and thus pretty much everyone involved in them – not only some – take 
part in that?
510
 And was the Court ready to explore the stereotypical views based on religion, 
gender and ethnic origin that could be assumed or promoted by the contested bans? For the 
most part, the Court failed to scrutinise this issue closely or to explore the implications that 
the impugned restrictions had for the lives of the women and girls concerned. In this regard, it 
is worth noting that similarly to the educational segregation cases commented on above, in 
both S.A.S. v. France and Dakir v. Belgium third-party interveners also provided relevant 
insights as to the lived reality of women like the applicant.
511
 This could have assisted the 
Court to approach rights holders in a more integrated fashion. However, the Court did not 
incorporate those insights into the legal analysis.  
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Reflecting upon the specific experience of the affected rights holders should lead the Court 
not only to consider their identity, but also their social positions. The latter should be 
understood in a broad way and not limited to socio-economic position. Since an intersectional 
perspective is interested in who the concrete applicants are, it is important to distinguish how 
the restriction in question affects them and is tied to their particular circumstances. For 
example, in many ‘headscarf cases’, the Muslim women negatively affected were public 
servants. This is not the same as experiencing the ban as a child/adult student (as in Dogru, 
Sahin and others), or as a private party seeking access to the justice system or to public spaces 
(as in S.A.S, Dakir and Lachiri v. Belgium).
512
 An examination and distinction of these 
circumstances has been largely absent in cases concerning the wearing of the hijab, despite 
the fact that such analysis is not alien to the ECtHR. It has done so in Ahmet Arslan and 
Others, where it declared the disproportionality of the Turkish ban on religious attire in light 
of the fact that the Muslim men concerned were mere citizens, not public servants, making 
use of the public space.
513
  
 
1.3. Intersectionality within the antidiscrimination review: indirect discrimination 
and stereotypes  
Regulations or practices that uphold harmful stereotypes, even when unintended, raise issues 
of discrimination and, particularly, of indirect discrimination. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, 
this dynamic works in a circular way. The stereotypes assigned to members of the group 
confirm the reification of the group or religion itself, thus reinforcing the group/cultural 
boundaries and hierarchies discussed in the previous section.
514 Assumptions such as ‘Muslim 
women are victimised and subordinated’ while ‘Muslim men are oppressors and 
fundamentalists’ are clear examples of compounded stereotypes, that is, stereotypes made up 
of two or more stereotypes combined that assign attributes to members of sub-groups.
515
 
Importantly, as we have seen in cases involving the Islamic veil (whether the hjiab or niqab), 
the use or upholding of stereotypes obfuscated the real-life experience of the specific 
applicants concerned.
516
 Intersectionality then helps by bringing the individual, her interests 
and the harms experienced back into the analysis. Something similar goes for stereotypes such 
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as ‘Gypsies are nomads’ or ‘Gypsies are born Gypsies’. Albeit the merit evaluation and forms 
of ‘authentication’ are different in both types of case, the consequences are similarly 
problematic.
517
 In the Roma/Traveller cases discussed, the overlapping identities and the 
specific gender, economic and other concerns of the applicants tended to fade from the 
Court’s proportionality analysis.   
As explained in Chapter 2 and further demonstrated here, intersectionality usually goes hand 
in hand with questions of discrimination. This is reflected in several allegations discussed 
above which relied on Article 14 ECHR. Regrettably, too often the Court has not even 
examined the merits of the complaint. And when it has done so, the judicial query has been 
limited to direct discrimination. To the extent that the Court confines itself to asking whether 
the measures challenged by applicants distinguish on the basis of one personal characteristic 
or targeted one particular group of people, intersectionality is bound to fade, at least from the 
discrimination analysis. Conversely, the prohibition of indirect discrimination constitutes an 
important tool for tackling intersectional violations. This, however, presupposes a move 
towards a substantive conception of equality. Recall that according to this conception and in 
contrast to formal equality, what matters is not so much the comparator or the instrumentality 
of the treatment. What matters is the concrete effect of the restriction measured by a 
substantive standard: disadvantage in the enjoyment of rights or dignity.
518
   
Thus, a first reason for synergy between intersectionality and indirect discrimination is 
evident. Direct discrimination does not work for intersectionality. The formalism and single-
ground comparator focus of the former do not leave space for the latter. But a second and 
important link between intersectionality and indirect discrimination is that, by tackling 
measures couched in neutral terms, indirect discrimination is suitable for dealing with the use 
of proxies for discrimination.
519
 That is, indirect discrimination can interrogate regulations 
based on ‘relevant’ and ‘objective’ criteria which, in certain contexts, may nonetheless 
translate into unacceptable exclusions of persons who would otherwise be identified with a 
protected category (e.g. race). As we have seen, a primary education system based on 
language and psycho-intellectual tests may result, despite their neutrality and reasonability at 
face value, in the exclusion of Roma children. Likewise, dress codes that forbid the covering 
of the hair or the face in public institutions or in public places may marginalise Muslim 
women as well as women and men from religions not rooted in the Christian tradition. When 
the people who are disfavoured by regulations based on language or dress style or any other 
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allegedly neutral, rational criterion are, in practice, nearly undistinguishable from those who 
would be disfavoured if the measure were to rely on sex and ethnic origin and/or religion, for 
example, then there is a strong indication that those social locations or identities have become 
too intertwined for their attendant disadvantage to be captured by a single ground. 
To be sure, claiming or making a finding of indirect discrimination can be based on one single 
identity. This is in fact usually the case, as reflected in the complaints and judgments 
discussed above. Most of these relied on ethnic origin or religion. Framed in this way, indirect 
discrimination would not make visible the intersecting identities and social positions of the 
applicants. However, since the one-sided perspective is not the only flaw in the classical 
conception of anti-discrimination law, the question of how many identity grounds are used is 
not so decisive for the Court’s ability to adopt an intersectional analysis. Crenshaw, who is 
credited with devising intersectionality, argued that an additional problem of anti-
discrimination law was the way each discrimination ground was conceived of. Each category 
tends to be constructed as reflecting the experience of those who are more privileged 
therein.
520
 Thus, if the claim is one of gender discrimination, implicitly the lenses for all the 
other social positions of the woman in question are those of privilege. As Fredman explains, 
‘this assumes that all her other characteristics are on the privileged side of the relationship. In 
other words, she is assumed to be a white, able-bodied, heterosexual woman, of the dominant 
religion or belief (which could include secularism) etc’.521 And the same goes for a claim 
based on race, religion and so forth. The result is that those who are most disadvantaged go 
unnoticed.
522
 This reminds us that intersectionality is not simply a question of identifying 
overlapping identities. Rather, it is about identifying rights violations which are more likely to 
affect those who are at the intersections of systems of inequalities.  
As such, Fredman argues that even when the examination of discrimination focuses on a 
single ground (say, religion or ethnic origin), it is still possible to engage with 
intersectionality. To do so, she proposes ‘a capacious approach to the discrimination 
grounds’.523 By an extensive interpretation of each ground, she means that ‘all aspects of an 
individual’s identity should be taken into account even within one identity ground’.524 
Coming back to the previous example, this is to say that the category woman should cover all 
women, in all their diversity (e.g. black, Muslim, poor, young women). Looking at the cases 
studied through this perspective, one could argue that the Court went in this direction in D.H. 
and Others v. the Czech Republic and in similar subsequent judgments. In fact, although the 
Court in such cases mainly deals with the discrimination ground of ethnic origin, it does so in 
a manner that is inclusive of the experience of those who may be less visible within the Roma 
community, namely children and, to a lesser extent, the poor among them.  
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1.4. Intersectionality beyond the antidiscrimination review 
Building upon the above suggestion, it is submitted that a similar intersectional perspective 
could be used outside the confines of discrimination grounds. It may well be extended to the 
interpretation of other Convention provisions. For example, whose experience or vantage 
point is used for interpreting who is a ‘believer’ or a ‘Muslim’ under Article 9 ECHR? Or 
who is the reference point to construe the follower of a ‘Gypsy way of life’ or ‘the Traveller’ 
in Article 8 ECHR? Thinking of them as if they are women, children, poor, sedentary, etc. 
makes these norms reflective of a wider array of human experiences. This is another way of 
moving in the direction of intersectionality and challenging the unstated norms that 
marginalise those who are at the crossroads of several identities and power differentials.  
All in all, the case law discussed thus far demonstrates that in order to capture what was at 
stake for the applicants it was not enough to take account of their Roma origin or 
cultural/religious traditions. The interplay between several identities and social locations (e.g. 
gender, socio-economic position, age) can play an important role in the adjudication of ethnic 
diversity cases. But this role does not need to be confined to the application of anti-
discrimination clauses. Anti-discrimination is certainly the best-known tool for 
operationalising intersectionality in law. And possibly, assuming the availability of evidence, 
some of the discrimination complaints reviewed above could also have been grounded in the 
combined effect of ethnic origin, religion and social origin and/or gender. Yet, conceived as 
an analytical and normative framework – as it is in this study – an intersectional approach 
may provide a broader set of normative insights.  
Notably, on account of its incidence in defining the point of view adopted to appreciate the 
relevant norms and the way these are interpreted, intersectionality holds relevance for the 
framing of the case. As demonstrated by the cases discussed above, intersectionality may 
shape the proportionality review of rights interferences, since it sheds light on the importance 
and impact of the restriction on the rights of the concrete individuals affected. Accordingly, 
an intersectional perspective can affect the width of the state’s margin of appreciation too. 
One of the factors shaping the scope of the margin of discretion enjoyed by states is the nature 
of the right restricted, its importance for the individual and the intensity of the restriction.
 525
 
Identifying the multiple identities and social positions of the applicant makes it possible to 
give appropriate weight to these aspects. Finally, accounting for those who are subjected to 
multiple disadvantages not only makes law more responsive to them, but also serves to 
identify the type of diversity that requires legal intervention.
526
    
 
2. Problematising the ‘either/or’ view of individuals’ agency and choice 
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Another way of ignoring individuals’ complexity is to reduce their agency to a zero-sum 
game whereby they are viewed as either fully autonomous or as deprived of agency. Both 
understandings disregard how individuals are embedded in social relations and structures and 
how their agency therefore unfolds in a continuum rather than in an all or nothing fashion.
527
 
An integrated approach to rights holders acknowledges this as part of their lived experience. 
Moreover, as this approach avoids assigning a meaning to their identities, so it avoids 
assigning a meaning to their choices. The question of how we understand individuals’ 
autonomy may seem a mere theoretical issue, but it is not. Important normative consequences 
follow from it. I will start by exploring those related to the first extreme of the spectrum: the 
judicial construction of an unencumbered subject.  
 
2.1. The autonomous, unconstrained fragments of rights holders  
The way in which the understanding of individuals’ autonomy has shaped the scope of 
protection afforded to rights holders in cultural diversity cases can be appreciated in the 
examination of questions such as (1) whether the personal characteristic in question was out 
of people’s control (such as race or ethnic origin) or chosen and changeable (such as culture 
and religion), and (2) whether the interference complained of could be attributed to the 
individual’s choices and autonomy. As will be seen below, when the personal trait was 
perceived as having been chosen or when she or he was regarded as having unconstrained 
choices, the Court tended to see her or him as less deserving of protection.
528 
The issue of 
choice appears particularly salient in cases involving Article 9 ECHR.
529
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In fact, in several of the cases studied the ECtHR not only narrowly defined rights holders in 
terms of a certain cultural or religious script. It also did so by considering their standing as 
one of fully autonomous free-will subjects. This was particularly so for some Roma/Travellers 
and for most Muslim applicants. In short: these applicants appeared to be endowed with 
plenty of free choices. Looking back, they could have chosen not to accept a job or position 
which required them to give up what they claimed as their right. They could have chosen not 
to keep breaching the regulation restricting their cultural or religious expression and accept 
the ‘inconvenience’. Looking forward, they usually had the choice of finding another job, 
studying somewhere else or moving and living elsewhere, depending on the case. The 
existence of these unconstrained choices had the effect of reducing or denying legal 
protection.  
Illustrative of this logic are some of the Roma and Traveller cases where the Court 
downplayed the applicants’ grief in view of their alleged autonomy to move with their 
caravans to private sites, although, as outlined above, for many that was not a real option.
530
 
Likewise, in Muñoz Díaz v. Spain and Yiğit v. Turkey one of the arguments raised by the 
respondent states was precisely that both women had had the choice to contract a civil 
marriage. In Muñoz Díaz, the Court appropriately rejected the argument. It held: ‘The 
prohibition of discrimination enshrined in Article 14 of the Convention is meaningful only if, 
in each particular case, the applicant’s personal situation in relation to the criteria listed in that 
provision is taken into account exactly as it stands. To proceed otherwise in dismissing the 
victim’s claims on the ground that he or she could have avoided the discrimination by altering 
one of the factors in question – for example, by entering into a civil marriage – would render 
Article 14 devoid of substance.’531 
However, the unconstrained autonomy reasoning has often played out in the Court’s rejection 
of minority claims of religious accommodation and protection against discrimination.
532
 In the 
cases studied here, we may note that in contrast to Muñoz Díaz, the Grand Chamber in Yiğit v. 
Turkey found that the applicant was aware of her situation and had had sufficiently long time 
(twenty-six years) to contract a civil marriage.
533
 Returning to the former Commission, a 
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Muslim teacher who complained that the state school in which he worked had refused to 
arrange his timetable so as to enable him to take 45 minutes off for praying on Fridays at the 
mosque was found to be free to resign.
534
 Muslim men in the Turkish Army who were 
discharged encountered a similar response. It was their choice to pursue a military career and 
accept a system of military discipline which could entail the restriction of their rights.
535
 The 
trend continued with the so-called ‘headscarf ban’ cases. In Karaduman and Bulut (both 
concerning university students who were prevented from obtaining a degree certificate in 
Turkey for refusing to provide an identity photograph without a headscarf) as well as in 
Kurtulmuş (regarding the dismissal of a Turkish university professor on account of wearing 
the headscarf), the applicants’ choice to study or work in public educational institutions 
governed by secularism was a reason to conclude that their freedom of religion was not even 
restricted.
536
 In later cases involving students covering their hair in public schools – several of 
them against France – the Court observed that pupils were free to attend the school provided 
that they complied with the prohibition on conspicuous religious symbols. The Court 
furthermore noted that pupils had the chance to keep studying by correspondence. The 
normative consequence was the same.
537
  
Against this backdrop, the Court’s shift in the 2013 Eweida and Others case is remarkable. 
This case did not concern Muslims or Roma people, but it is highly relevant to the present 
discussion. One of the applicants, a practising Christian woman, was prevented by her 
employer, British Airways, from wearing a visible necklace with a cross, as was required by 
the company’s uniform code. The Court moved away from the idea of a free choice to resign 
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or find a job elsewhere. Instead of holding that the possibility of changing jobs would negate 
any interference with the applicant’s right to manifest her religion, the Court stated that ‘the 
better approach would be to weigh that possibility in the overall balance when considering 
whether or not the restriction was proportionate’.538 It then found the proportionality 
requirement unmet, as too much weight had been given to the corporate image of British 
Airways, which in any case was not a right protected under the Convention.
539
  
 
2.2. The constrained, passive fragments of rights holders  
A sceptical stance towards the free choice of applicants, to the point of depriving them of 
agency, can be found in D.H. v. Czech Republic and the other similar cases of school 
segregation of Roma children. The state argued that parents had consented to the placement of 
their children in special schools and the fact that these children had not pursued secondary or 
higher education was the result of their choices, not of their special education.
540
 The Court 
disagreed, as it was ‘not satisfied that the parents of the Roma children, who were members of 
a disadvantaged community and often poorly educated, were capable of weighing up all the 
aspects of the situation and the consequences of giving their consent’.541 The result was 
certainly responsive to the applicant’s plight, but at the cost of the Court’s paternalism.  
Likewise, the rhetoric of autonomous individuals was strongly mitigated or absent when the 
Court examined whether the restriction of the applicants’ religious manifestation was 
necessary to secure ‘the rights of others’ adversely affected by the applicants’ exercise of 
rights.
542
 Thus, against the rights of female applicants prevented from wearing a headscarf in 
the workplace and in educational institutions, the Court considered the rights of other women, 
other girls and their parents whose agency appeared impaired or threatened. In Dahlab, for 
example, the Court examined the impact produced by ‘such a powerful external symbol’ ‘on 
the freedom of conscience and religion of very young children’ (aged between four and eight), 
who are ‘more easily influenced than older pupils’.543 Similarly, the Court recalled in Köse the 
need ‘to protect adolescents when they are at an impressionable age’.544 In Sahin, the Court 
stated that ‘it must borne in mind the impact which wearing such a symbol […] may have on 
those who choose not to wear it’.545 And in the recent case of Ebrahimian, the Court weighed 
the applicant’s freedom to manifest her religion against the state of fragility and dependency 
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of the patients and users with whom the applicant was in contact.
546
 The Court appeared 
generally sympathetic towards the interests of these other rights holders. 
Concerns about exposure to pressure or greater dependency limiting the autonomy of 
individuals may appear well placed in some cases. For example, they seem justified when the 
Court worries about the impact of the headscarf worn by a Muslim teacher upon pupils aged 
between four and eight in Dahlab. The same could be argued about the Court’s concerns 
regarding psychiatric patients in Ebrahimian. Nevertheless, the more grown-up and the least 
psychologically and physically impaired people are, the less convincing it appears to treat 
them as fragile, passive or non-autonomous. From this perspective, it is difficult to explain 
why the Court regards adolescents in Kose and adults in Sahin strongly malleable and 
constrained. Viewed in this light, another question arises within the framework of the cases 
discussed. How can it be explained that while the autonomy of adults and adolescents whom 
the Court intended to protect was deemed so weakened, the applicants in those same cases 
were by contrast portrayed as fully endowed with autonomy and free choice? At the same 
time, in the cases where headscarf bans were justified by reference to gender equality and in 
which the Court perceived the veil to be ‘imposed’ on women,547 the kind of women who 
were regarded as fully autonomous to avoid the interference were suddenly stripped of agency 
and regarded as subordinated. Thus, at one extreme, Muslim women appeared endowed with 
plenty of choices. At the other extreme, they had none. How can sense be made of this?   
Without any pretension of exhaustion, it is submitted that looking at the issue with respect to 
which individuals were positioned may illuminate the difference. Note that individuals were 
seen as constrained when positioned against culture or religion. They were, however, seen as 
unencumbered with regard to socio-economic matters, such as education, employment or 
social security. This suggests the need to revise the lines commonly drawn between the 
cultural and material realms. Scholars have pointed out that socio-economic arrangements are 
usually perceived as neutral and governed by individual free choice, whereas the opposite 
occurs with ethnic and cultural aspects.
548
 The latter are either viewed as embodied and out of 
our control, as is the case of race and ethnic origin, or they are conceived as intricately 
subjective or coercive, as happens with religions and cultures (especially with some). As the 
examples above demonstrate, the dichotomy is not only artificial, but also ideological.  
 
2.3. Integrating the autonomous and the constrained fragments of rights holders 
Some of the cases discussed above suggest that the Court has failed to capture the lived reality 
of an individual autonomy which runs across a spectrum, instead of being expressed in an 
either/or formula. To that extent it has fallen short of acknowledging the social reality of 
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individuals and its effect on their choices.
549
 In fact, agency changes with time and 
circumstance. And there are, by definition, no areas in which individuals are fully 
autonomous and others in which they are passive recipients.
550
   
Whether in the context of substantive provisions alone or in combination with anti-
discrimination clauses, it is important to realise that the individual free-will rationale is not a 
given. Using that argument not to interfere with the status quo is actually a normative choice. 
It has purchase because it resonates with the familiar liberal idea that the state should refrain 
from intervening with the choices made by autonomous individuals.
551
 Yet, as revealed by the 
cases examined in the present study, the argument is problematic in several respects. Firstly, it 
takes for granted that there are immutable and mutable personal traits, ignoring the great 
extent to which all of them are socially constructed.
552
 Secondly, it introduces an 
‘assimilationist bias’ into the normative analysis, insofar as the scale is, from the beginning, 
inclined towards conforming to the norm.
553
 Moreover, as pointed out by Ringelheim, to 
present the issue as one of individual free choice obscures the legal background against which 
the facts take place. That is, the legislation usually reflects and protects the cultural concerns 
of the majority.
554
 And since the law is but one manifestation of larger social structures and 
institutions, thinking of individuals as unencumbered in fact conceals the many limitations 
imposed by markets, patterns of discrimination, material inequality, etc. This is why the Court 
should not simply assume that the past and future choices of applicants are unconstrained, nor 
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should it ascribe them any unequivocal meaning.
555
 This reinforces the need to pay attention 
to the social context in which cultural differences acquire salience (as discussed in Chapter 2) 
and adopt an integrated perspective on the cases.  
 
3. A broad view of rights holders 
As the above discussion demonstrates, grasping the complexity of who and whose rights are 
at stake in a case goes beyond the applicants’ experience. Following Brems, the applicants in 
a case are the most visible right holders, but not the only ones. ‘The human rights of other, 
less visible, rights holders are equally important as a matter of principle and need to be 
respected, protected and fulfilled equally.’556 Most of the cases examined here provide a clear 
example of how these other rights holders include both those who are affected in a similar 
way to the applicant and those whose interests, rather, oppose those of the applicant.
557
 As we 
have seen, the Court often looks at this last kind of rights holder. It notably does so when it 
examines the state aim of safeguarding ‘the rights of others’. In most of the ‘religious cases’ 
referenced above, the Court examined the applicants’ complaints against competing claims of 
equal treatment for other women, men, pupils and public service users. Incorporating these 
competing rights holders into the story constitutes a necessary and healthy exercise. But the 
fact that the Court does not always integrate all the relevant rights holders into the picture or 
that it is inconsistent in doing so in some cases can be problematic.  
It is submitted that the integration of other affected rights holders should be inclusive and 
non-selective.
558
 Consequently, the Court should pay equal attention to individuals who, like 
the applicant, are negatively affected by the measure contested. As argued by Brems with 
regard to the Dahlab case, assessing the impact of a headscarf ban at educational institutions 
requires the rights of other students and teachers covering their hair to be taken into account. 
One would therefore need to consider that those pupils ‘may experience stigmatisation and 
pressure due to such a measure’.559 Similarly, this reasoning required the Court to pay 
attention to the rights and needs of the children and other dependents living with the 
applicants in Buckley, Chapman and the other similar cases regarding Roma and Traveller 
people. However, these other rights holders, who were, like the applicants, directly and 
negatively affected by the eviction threats, were hardly mentioned by the Court, which 
noticed them and interference with their rights only in passing.  
Another example of the added value of a comprehensive view of the rights holders is provided 
by S.A.S. v. France. In this case, the full-face covering ban in question did not target any 
religion, as the government and the Court observed, but just the covering of the face in public 
                                                          
555
 For a similar approach but in the context of the South African Constitutional Court case law, see Marius 
Pieterse, ‘Finding for the Applicant? Individual Equality Plaintiffs and Group-Based Disadvantage’, 24 South 
African Journal on Human Rights (2008) 397, at 411-412.  
556
 Eva Brems, ‘Should Pluriform Human Rights become One? Exploring the benefits of Human Rights 
Integration’, 4 European Journal of Human Rights (2014) 447, at 458.  
557
 Ibid., at 458-461 (referring to ‘conflicting rights’ and ‘competing rights’).  
558
 Eva Brems, ‘Should Pluriform Human Rights Become One? Exploring the Benefits of Human Rights 
Integration’, 4 European Journal of Human Rights (2014) 447, at 458. 
559
 Ibid., at 461. In the same vein see CRC, Concluding observations: Germany, CRC/C/15/Add.226, 26 
February 2004, para. 30. 
129 
 
places. On account of this, it is plausible to think that several kinds of rights holder besides 
the applicant and Muslim women like her were exposed to criminalisation. One can imagine 
that women and men with tattoos concealing their faces, motorcycle riders or runners wearing 
a balaclava could all be affected.
560
 An examination of whether and how their rights were 
restricted by the face-covering ban could have further illuminated the Court’s analysis of the 
proportionality of the measure as well as its compatibility with equality and non-
discrimination.  
A more integrated approach to rights holders was in fact taken by the Court in the recent case 
of Osmanoǧlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland. The applicants, Muslim parents, requested the 
authorities to exempt their two daughters – who were under the age of puberty – from 
compulsory mixed swimming lessons. The Court partly supported its finding of non-violation 
of Article 9 ECHR by reference to the situation of similarly situated children who were 
nonetheless less socially privileged that those of the applicants. In responding to the 
applicants’ argument that their daughters were taking private swimming lessons, the Court not 
only regarded school lessons as a vehicle for the development and social integration of the 
children.
561
 It also held that allowing exemptions on the basis of the possibility to have private 
lessons would create an unacceptable inequality for children whose parents did not have the 
financial means to afford them.
562
  
Finally, it is important to observe that whether the complexity and the whole range of 
individuals affected is acknowledged or not has consequences beyond the issues identified 
above. Notably, it may also provide important insights as to the sorts of harm at stake, which, 
in turn, may return us to the norms potentially applicable to the case at hand. Identifying, for 
instance, individuals’ identities and social locations may reveal community or other non-state 
norms to which individuals feel bound. Furthermore, an intersectional perspective can lead 
judges to have regard for specific international norms governing the rights of, for example, 
children, women, indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities and so forth. In addition, overcoming 
the reduction of individuals to an unencumbered self-sufficient being paves the way towards 
integrating structural disadvantages and harms that could otherwise go unnoticed, such as 
exclusion from employment, structural discrimination and restrictions of socio-economic 
rights. These normative aspects of the cases are discussed in the following sections. 
 
IV.  Integrated rights: cross-thinking about harms and norms 
As happens with rights holders, when it comes to the harms and norms at stake in a case the 
picture is often more complex than it might first appear. Many complaints dealing with 
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minority cultural and religious claims emphasise harms such as stereotype, disrespect and lack 
of accommodation of certain beliefs and modes of living. Most of these harms, which we may 
label ‘recognition harms’,563 are examined by the Court through Articles 8 and 9 ECHR. Very 
occasionally they are addressed via Article 14 ECHR too. Nevertheless, further grievances are 
usually involved and applicants put them forward. In some instances, people’s political 
participation is injured too. But perhaps more notably for our purposes, a large proportion of 
the cases studied also touch upon what we may call ‘redistribution harms’.564 Indeed, 
applicants lost their jobs, were excluded from schools and universities, found themselves 
unable to access social security or were evicted from their lands and homes. The question then 
is whether and how these harms were integrated by the Court and through which norms? To 
put it in human rights law language: how much did the Court engage with the indivisibility 
and interdependence of human rights when adjudicating claims concerning ethno-cultural 
difference? 
 
1. Integrating redistribution and structural issues into recognition wrongs 
By virtue of its mandate, the Court cannot apply the whole range of human rights which 
would arguably capture all the kinds of violations posed by a case. One notorious limitation in 
this respect is that most rights set forth in the ECHR and its protocols falling within the 
Court’s jurisdiction correspond to those that are commonly regarded as civil and political. The 
exception includes a few social rights – often invoked by applicants in the cases studied – 
such as the right to property (Article 1 Protocol 1) and the right to education (Article 2 
Protocol 1) ECHR. The latter is relevant in both its limbs of ‘access to educational institutions 
existing at a given time’ (paragraph 1) and respect for ‘the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions’ 
(paragraph 2). As will be seen below, only in a few instances has the Court made use of these 
provisions to scrutinise in relative detail the restrictions placed on the property or education 
rights of applicants.  
Meanwhile, some cases disclose important restrictions on other social rights that are not found 
in the Convention, such as the right to work and to social security. While these rights are not 
enshrined in the ECHR or in its protocols, some of them have found protection indirectly via 
other Convention provisions, such as Article 1 Protocol 1 and Article 8 ECHR. Examples are 
the cases of Muñoz Díaz v. Spain and Yiğit v. Turkey, which concerned not only a lack of 
recognition of the applicants’ cultural and religious marriages but also their inability to obtain 
a survivor's pension and social security benefits based on the entitlements of their deceased 
spouses. Here, the Court explored the applicants’ socio-economic distress by analysing the 
right to property in conjunction with the prohibition of discrimination.
565
 The Court’s analysis 
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of work-related rights, however, has been more limited, at least in cases involving Islam and 
Muslim women.  
 
1.1. Indivisibility or invisibility in cases involving Muslims 
In the Grand Chamber judgment in Sahin v. Turkey, the Court had to deal with the right to 
education (Article 2 Protocol 1) ECHR. However, it simply transposed its considerations 
under freedom of religion to the allegations concerning the right to education.
566
 The Court 
noted that the applicant could reasonably have foreseen the risk she ran if she continued to 
wear the headscarf in defiance of the prohibition. ‘Consequently, the restriction in question 
did not impair the very essence of the applicant’s right to education.’567 No concrete 
assessment was carried out by the Court in terms of the actual impossibility of finishing her 
medical studies in Turkey, the fact that she had to move abroad to study and the alleged 
difficulties with following her profession in Turkey. Similarly, the Court’s decision in Dogru 
limited itself to reaffirming that the right to education does not preclude the imposition of 
penalties, while finding no separate issue to address apart from freedom of religion.
568
 The 
way in which the schooling of girls covering their hair was impaired (the girls were expelled 
and had to resume their studies through correspondence) hardly received attention. Recently, 
however, the Court adopted a more integrated stance in the aforementioned case of 
Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland. Although in this case, which concerned a school’s 
religious exemption, the respondent state was not a party to Protocol 1 ECHR, the Court 
nonetheless decided to consider Article 2 of this Protocol (right to education). It did so ‘for 
the sake of completeness’, because the Convention had to be read as a whole and Article 2(2) 
Protocol 1 (child education in conformity with the parents’ religious convictions) was lex 
specialis regarding Article 9.
569
  
The integration of socio-economic harms and structural barriers has been especially meagre in 
the context of labour rights. Consider, for example, the inadmissibility decision in Dahlab v. 
Switzerland, which dealt with a headscarf ban applied to public schools on account of which 
the applicant was fired. An issue disputed by the parties was whether teaching in private 
schools remained an option open to the applicant. For the applicant, effective access to those 
schools was doubtful, for the state practically had a monopoly on infant classes and the few 
private schools left were non-denominational or were affiliated to religions other than that of 
the applicant.
570
 This meant that the applicant – and other teachers like her – was virtually 
prevented from working in her professional capacity at all. Despite the seriousness of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the applicant in Şerife Yiğit also lacked access to social security rights after having taken care of the home, the 
deceased spouse and six children. 
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alleged harm, the Court’s decision did not even examine these allegations. In Kurtulmus, a 
Muslim teacher complained that her dismissal had deprived her of her sole source of income 
and of access to social security benefits, in violation of Article 1 Protocol 1. But the Court’s 
response was brief and formal. It simply pointed out that since an amnesty had been applied, 
the applicant was able to seek reinstatement to her teaching post. It also added that a public 
servant’s removal from office and the resultant loss of future income did not affect his or her 
‘possessions’.571  
The lack of attention to the actual effects of losing one’s job and to existing barriers to 
engaging in certain occupations may be seen as an extension of the fragmented view of rights 
holders’ autonomy discussed earlier, or as an extension of what Ouald Chaib calls the 
‘freedom to resign’ doctrine in cases involving religious rights claims.572 The doctrine arises 
out of a number of cases in which the Court argued that where an employee had freely entered 
into a labour contract and had knowingly deviated from the conditions imposed by it (e.g. by 
breaching a dress code or working schedules on religious grounds), a dismissal would not 
amount to interference with his or her freedom of religion. This perspective presents as 
reasonable the setting aside of the (self-inflicted) socio-economic harm suffered by the 
dismissed applicant from the balancing or proportionality analysis undertaken by the Court.  
Needless to say, the Court cannot be expected to adjudicate on the right to work or the right to 
social security. Institutional constraints cannot be ignored. But we know, because the Court 
made it clear long ago in the Airey case,
573
 that the Court should not simply ignore socio-
economic harms. Actually, some engagement with the interdependence and indivisibility of 
all human rights is possible. One way of doing so is by assessing socio-economic injuries in 
the proportionality analysis conducted by the Court when weighing the legitimacy of state 
restrictions of convention rights. This is precisely what the Court did in the previously 
mentioned Eweida case. Here, the first applicant, a Christian woman prevented from wearing 
a cross at work, alleged that the enforcement of the uniform code was not only ‘deeply 
humiliating and offensive; in addition, the loss of her salary for four months created 
significant financial hardship’.574 Protection of her religious freedom, so went the argument, 
could not be requested at the expense of her job. Similarly, the fourth applicant, a practising 
Christian man who claimed –unsuccessfully – a religious exemption from his duties as a 
psycho-sexual counsellor, underlined the severity of the harm resulting from employment 
dismissal.
575
 While in previous case law the Court had had regard to the consequences of 
being excluded from a range of jobs, it had done so in response to an explicit prohibition from 
engaging in certain occupations and for contextual reasons other than cultural/religious 
ones.
576
 Hence, Eweida stands as the first case of its kind in which the Court rightly took into 
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account the seriousness of losing one’s job as well as the possibility of changing jobs in its 
proportionality analysis under Article 9 ECHR.
577
 
This kind of engagement with the indivisibility of rights is especially needed when the 
applicant is not only facing dismissal or non-renewal of contract, but also a virtual bar on 
finding a job in a whole field (e.g. public service) or in a whole area of expertise (e.g. 
employment as a teacher). From this perspective, it is difficult to understand why no traces of 
the Eweida approach are to be found in the 2015 case of Ebrahimian v. France, an omission 
underscored by the concurring-dissenting judge.
578
 In this last case the Court accepted that a 
strict implementation of the principles of neutrality and secularism consisting of a ban on 
religious garments could hold not just for public servants in the education field, as it had ruled 
in previous cases, but also for all kinds of civil servant. As a result, the non-renewal of the 
applicant’s contract on account of wearing a headscarf was found legitimate. Although the 
Court referred to the specific functions performed by the applicant (a social assistant in the 
psychiatric unit of a public hospital), to the particular circumstances of the patients with 
whom the applicant was in contact (persons in a state of relative fragility as a result of their 
psychiatric condition) and to the absence of complaints of pressure or proselytism against the 
applicant,
579
 the Court’s conclusion was determined primarily by rather abstract reasoning 
based on the concepts of secularism and neutrality.
580
  
The legitimacy of a general ban on religious symbols, especially those outwardly visible, 
among all public officials is derived in Ebrahimian from two main grounds. The first is from 
the place that secularism and neutrality holds in the French constitution. The second is the 
legitimacy that flows from the wide margin of appreciation granted to the state given the 
‘profound differences’ on religious issues that exist within democratic societies.581 The 
Court’s review ends up being deferential and abstract. In its proportionality review it simply 
defers to that undertaken by the domestic authorities and relies on taken-for-granted notions 
of secularism and neutrality. In so doing, the Court also fails to assess the applicant’s loss of 
employment, as well as further obstacles to employability. As noted by Brems, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
course of their working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of 
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interpretation adopted in Ebrahimian basically left the applicant without a chance of working 
in the entire French public sector.
582
 And yet, this element finds no place in the judgment. It is 
therefore regrettable that serious socio-economic issues and even a growing context of 
structural discrimination in the form of Islamophobia were obscured by a focus on neutrality, 
secularism, religious difference and French identity.
583
 All the above supports the view 
advanced by scholars that casting the rights claims of Muslim women as a matter of religious 
difference and identity, neutrality or secularism tends to ignore the socio-economic aspects of 
their lives and the role of the state in ensuring their socio-economic integration.
584
  
The fact that Eweida dealt with a private company and Ebrahimian with a public service can 
make a difference, given the particular roles of public officials and the place of neutrality in 
state’s policies. But the specificity of each context does not release the Court from the need to 
consider the socio-economic harm faced by the applicant and the wider context of exclusion 
at play in Ebrahimian. It remains to be seen, though, how the ECtHR will respond if 
confronted with a neutrality policy banning the wearing of visible religious symbols in the 
private workplace. In the light of Eweida, it is hard to imagine that the Court could take a 
similar stance to that adopted in Ebrahimian. After all, most of the abstract reasoning on 
neutrality, secularism and French laïcité advanced by the Court in this case does not hold for 
private companies.  
The question appears particularly interesting against the backdrop of the recent rulings of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the cases of Achbita and Bougnaoui, both concerning the 
manifestation of beliefs in the private workplace.
585
 In both cases Muslim women employees 
working in private companies had been dismissed on account of wearing a headscarf. While 
in Bougnaoui the ECJ finds discrimination and rejects the possibility that customers’ 
preferences could justify an encroachment of the employees’ right to manifest their religion 
and beliefs,
586
 in Achbita this position is accepted as long as it is grounded in a general policy 
of (corporate) neutrality. One of the disquieting issues about the ECJ’s reasoning in this last 
case – besides the narrow understanding of direct discrimination and the generous 
interpretation of the freedom to conduct a business – is the scant regard for the applicant’s 
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employability and the job market reality.
587
 In this respect, the ECJ limits itself to evaluating 
whether it had been possible to offer the applicant a post without visual contact with 
customers.
588
 However, no assessment is made of what this would mean in practice and what 
socio-economic opportunities were being curtailed for the applicant and others like her. 
Several concrete questions about what was at stake in Achbita and about what the private 
policy of neutrality was for were thus overlooked. It is yet to be seen whether, in the event of 
the ECtHR ruling on a similar case, questions of this kind are integrated into any 
considerations of religious difference and neutrality.  
 
1.2.  Indivisibility or invisibility in cases involving Roma and Travellers 
As regards Roma applicants in cases involving allegations of cultural difference, the Court 
has also addressed violations to the right to education enshrined in Protocol 1 to the ECHR. 
Notably, it has done so in the series of cases dealing with the school segregation of Roma 
children.
589
 Yet, a thorough review of allegations of violations of this right has not been the 
rule. And, as noted above, the same can be said about claims concerning the right to property. 
In several cases the Court conducted a rather superficial examination of Articles 1 and 2 
Protocol 1 ECHR (rights to property and education, respectively), despite being empowered 
to do otherwise. That was the case with regard to the right to education claim raised by a 
number of Roma and Travellers in ‘Gypsy lifestyle’ cases. One of their main concerns was 
that the school attendance of their children was disrupted every time the applicants were 
forced to move as the result of an eviction order. The Court, however, barely reacted to that 
argument and often concluded that such complaints were insufficiently substantiated.
590
 
Likewise, Roma applicants occupying land that was not their property denounced the removal 
and destruction of their belongings when evicted, in violation of their possession rights 
(Article 1 Protocol 1). However, the claim did not attract a thorough review from the Court.
591
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The Court has nonetheless fared better when assessing the impact of losing one’s home. This 
is reflected in a number of judgments concerning Roma and Travellers. The starting point was 
to recognise that caravans belonging to the Roma and Travellers are ‘homes’ within the scope 
of Article 8 ECHR.
592
 Initially, the Court was of the view that Article 8 ECHR does not 
comprise a right to be provided with a home or require the state to provide a number of 
suitable sites for Gypsies.
593
 In the context of the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the 
state in planning and housing matters, the Court furthermore adopted a formal approach to 
evaluating the availability of suitable sites for Gyspies and Travellers.
594
 Later, however, the 
stance progressively changed. The Court applied procedural safeguards against the (threats of) 
evictions faced by Roma and Travellers and even conceded that a duty to provide (suitable) 
housing for particularly vulnerable individuals could indeed flow from Article 8 ECHR.
595
  
Connors, the first successful judgment for Roma struggling with land planning regulations, 
was a pioneer in the application of procedural housing safeguards. Applying a procedural 
review, the Court challenged the summary eviction procedure that affected the applicants and 
examined the socio-economic policies in place.
596
 What is more, in this judgment the Court 
also weighed the risk of homelessness faced by the applicants. The case concerned the 
application of a summary eviction procedure justified by the state on the ground that 
accommodation of Roma and Travellers’ needs (consistent with their nomadic lifestyle) 
required authorities to be flexible in the management of site provision. As a result, the 
applicant had been deprived of guarantees enjoyed by tenants living in conventional housing 
and in other mobile homes. So it is noteworthy that the problem in this case was not so much 
the lack of accommodation of a nomadic Gypsy way of life, as in previous Roma/Traveller 
cases. The issue in Connors was rather that the state, in implementing such accommodation, 
had deprived the applicants of the security of tenure enjoyed by other tenants. This might 
suggest that it was easier for the Court to unpack the socio-economic dimension of Article 8 
when the culturally based claim for accommodation of a distinct minority lifestyle (the so-
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called Roma cultural identity) was not so salient. The subsequent case of Buckland, which 
was similar to Connors, was also decided on procedural housing rights.
597
  
The safeguards applied in this area were further expanded in cases such as Yordanova and 
Winterstein.
598
 These judgments, unlike most of the previous land planning cases, dealt with 
the eviction of Roma and Traveller communities of a hundred or more people who had 
resided for decades in de facto tolerated settlements in Bulgaria and France, respectively. In 
these judgments the Court held that any person facing the risk of losing her home has the right 
to have the reasonableness and proportionality of the measure reviewed by an independent 
tribunal. This involved a number of steps on the part of the state, including giving adequate 
reasons in response to arguments raised in opposition to the eviction and consideration to the 
risk of homelessness and the social disadvantage of the applicants.
599
 As further discussed 
below, this interpretation was backed by existing regional and international standards for 
socio-economic rights.
600
 By virtue of this socio-economic permeation of Article 8, stronger 
protection of tenure was provided to sedentary Roma and Travellers.  
Overall, however, the Court’s engagement with the indivisibility of human rights in the cases 
reviewed was limited, particularly where arguments over cultural and religious identity stood 
out. Integrating elements of socio-economic rights does not mean that a violation should be 
found. It does mean, however, that cases should not be decided as if they were mostly or only 
about cultural difference. It implies acknowledging that the cases studied are also about 
specific individuals facing concrete hurdles, including material ones. The importance of this 
point is reaffirmed by the patterns of socio-economic exclusion affecting ethno-cultural 
minorities. Well-known is the precarious situation of the Roma in Europe. The Council of 
Europe (CoE) has repeatedly invited member states to take steps to remedy their 
disadvantage.
601
 And while many concerns regarding Muslims may revolve around Islam, 
security threats associated with it and with ‘their’ cultural difference, there is much reason to 
worry about their socio-economic exclusion. Studies indicate that in several member States 
Muslims face particularly high rates of disadvantage in the labour market and in other areas of 
social life such as income, housing and health,
602
 not to mention the compounded 
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disadvantages experienced by Muslim women. Hence, the risk of rendering invisible the 
socio-economic stakes of culturally defined cases deserves to be taken seriously. 
 
2. Avoiding norm reductionism and promoting awareness of legal pluralism  
Working with notions of indivisibility and interdependence is one way of adopting a relational 
view of human rights norms. But it is not the only one. Human rights norms do not stand in 
isolation. This holds true within and outside the Convention. Looking from within the 
Convention, a first aspect that is startling about the judgments reviewed here is that despite 
the normative complexity posed by the cases, many rulings took one convention provision as 
the predominant legal framework. These are Articles 8 and 9 ECHR. This happened even 
though applicants often resorted to several other provisions, such as equality and non-
discrimination, freedom of expression, the right to education, property, due process, free 
elections and freedom of assembly. As already mentioned, when the Court did not decline the 
examination of these other provisions, it frequently conducted a rather superficial analysis of 
them. This may be attributed, at least partially, to the argumentation offered by litigants. At 
the same time, one convention provision may admittedly be at the core of a given case. And 
yet, for the reasons explained below, it is important to be careful not to incur too far into norm 
reductionism.  
 
2.1. A more comprehensive approach to Convention norms 
From the perspective of the Convention provisions, over-reliance on a single norm may be 
counter-productive. Notably, using a single normative lens may overstate one aspect of the 
case or of the applicant’s experience at the expense of other interlocked issues. One may 
wonder, for instance, to what extent an exclusive focus on Article 9 in cases concerning veil 
bans eclipses the applicants’ experiences as women, as well as their problems in terms of 
educational and employment opportunities. Reducing the normative analysis to that provision 
may also foster the view that headscarves are a matter of religion only. And this, in turn, 
facilitates the external attribution of one essentialised meaning to the practice. On the other 
hand, adding freedom of speech (Article 10 ECHR), for example, opens up other kinds of 
argument. Under Article 10, the premise is that the wider the tools and resources for enriching 
public debate the better and that the state should facilitate the participation of those who have 
fewer chances of engaging in it. Then, neither the content of the expression nor state 
neutrality (which in any case should be enabling instead of constraining) appear as strong as 
under the prevailing reading of Article 9.
603
 Similar considerations can be posited with regard 
to the centrality of Article 8 in Roma cases regarding planning regulations. Concerns may 
arise, particularly to the extent that much emphasis is put on a particular lifestyle to the 
neglect of property rights, education and equality. The problem is, in other words, that certain 
harms may be obscured and normative insights for addressing them may be lost. Cases may 
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thus end up very narrowly defined as a matter of ‘a gypsy way of life’, a ‘headscarf’, and so 
on. 
Looking from outside the Convention, a second aspect to consider in grasping the normative 
complexity posed by the cases studied is that the Convention’s provisions are part of a 
dynamic and multilayered system of laws, as pointed out in Chapters 1 and 2. Thus, a 
relational view of the applicable norms in the cases studied requires not losing sight of the 
range of norms involved domestically and internationally. I will start by examining the 
implications of this suggestion, which we may call ‘legal pluralism awareness’. This is not 
unfamiliar to the Court. Several of its judgments recount the ‘relevant international law and 
practice’ and incorporate domestic regulations when examining the ‘background of the case’. 
Moreover, these are relevant factors when the Court examines the existence of a ‘consensus’ 
among member States. Whether and how much of this normative plurality is integrated seems 
especially relevant for adjudicating cases dealing with cultural diversity. Why? Because these 
cases, more often than not, are inserted within a vast, complex and interacting legal landscape.  
 
2.2. Integrating domestic and international norms through evolutive interpretation 
and consensus  
The idea that the ECHR is a ‘living instrument’ to be interpreted and applied in ‘present day 
conditions’ emerged very early in the Court’s jurisprudence, and it came to stay.604 This 
principle not only entails that the Convention should be read with flexibility and with eyes 
open to change, in keeping with social and cultural transformations. It furthermore conveys 
the idea that the Court should be ‘influenced by the developments and commonly accepted 
standards in […] the member States of the Council of Europe’.605 It is thus not uncommon for 
the Court to bring into its judgments comparative law from the Council of Europe (and even 
beyond), as well as international instruments of many kinds. This dynamic interpretation, 
which takes into account international and domestic normative developments, including those 
reflecting a European consensus, is also present in the cases studied in this Chapter. It should 
be noted, though, that while in some judgments this normative review is relatively exhaustive, 
in others it is nearly absent.  
The European legal context referred to by the Court for the purposes of identifying a regional 
consensus comprises not only domestic legislation and case law. It also encompasses sources 
from a myriad of bodies within the Council of Europe. The degree to which one or another is 
to be considered seems variable, though. For example, in those religious difference cases 
studied here in which the Court addressed the issue of consensus (in many, it did not), the 
focus was largely on comparative law. However, in cases concerning Roma and Traveller 
caravans and informal occupation, as well as in those dealing with educational segregation, 
the Court reviewed more extensively the standards laid down in European instruments and in 
decisions from regional monitoring bodies. Among these were the European Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the European Social Charter, decisions 
from the European Committee of Social Rights and the European Commission against Racism 
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and Intolerance, as well as Resolutions and Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers 
and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. As many of these bodies and 
instruments are mainly concerned with the protection of human rights, it is not strange that 
their inclusion may yield a ‘common approach’ that is actually more rights-protective than the 
one provided by the laws of the respondent state or of several member states.  
What is more, such a set of regional standards has proven to be, in a number of respects, 
usefully tailored to the rights holders and the stakes of the cases at hand. In cases such as 
D.H., Sampanis, Oršuš, and Horváth and Kiss, for instance, the Court took into account 
standards on the situation of Roma children from the perspective of their right to education, 
the prohibition of racism and other forms of discrimination, and their social and economic 
integration within the respondent state.
606
 In cases such as Yordanova and Winterstein, the 
European normative review incorporated specific standards on housing rights (i.e. safeguards 
in case of eviction) and non-discrimination, among others. Moreover, it is to be noted that in 
all these cases the Court eventually echoed the findings of other European supervisory 
mechanisms which, in similar cases, had found a breach of human rights obligations. As 
discussed below, the impact of normative developments from other human rights instruments 
and bodies can be amplified by the inclusion of sources outside the regional system. In the 
cases of Yordanova and Winterstein, for example, the Court not only considered decisions 
from the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), but also General Comments of the 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN CommESCR). 
607
 Importantly, 
these sources provide specific standards on the right to housing and, particularly, on forced 
eviction.
  
These include consultation with the community or individual concerned, reasonable 
notice, provision of information, a guarantee that the eviction will be carried out in a 
reasonable manner and alternative housing measures. This might explain the Court’s 
emphasis, in both cases, on procedural guarantees for securing respect for the home. 
Now, irrespective of the norms that are brought into the European common ground, it is well 
known that whether there is or there is no consensus does matter. Notably, there is an inverse 
relationship between the consensus and the margin of appreciation granted to the state. In 
short: the less the consensus, the wider the state discretion. Yet, the cases studied do not show 
a consistent judicial analysis of this matter. In most cases dealing with Roma claims, the 
Court identified an ‘emerging international consensus amongst the Contracting States of the 
Council of Europe recognising the special needs of minorities and an obligation to protect 
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their security, identity and lifestyle’.608 However, while in some cases (notably, those dealing 
with the ‘gypsy way of life’) the Court found that such an emerging consensus was not clear 
enough to derive any concrete guidance, in others (notably, those concerning educational 
segregation) the Court was ready to follow that same consensus. But not only the conditions – 
regarding specificity or otherwise – under which a given consensus could be applied have 
turned out to be opaque. There has also been a lack of clarity in determining the existence of 
consensus, whether emerging or firmly established, particularly when the normative 
landscape was one of non-regulation. Some judgments concerning Muslims’ religious 
expressions attest to this difficulty.  
A case in point is S.A.S. v. France, in which the Court concluded that ‘there is no European 
consensus against a ban (on a full-face veil in public)’.609 At the same time, however, the 
Court admitted that France was ‘very much in a minority position in Europe: except for 
Belgium, no other member State of the Council of Europe has, to date, opted for such a 
measure’.610 How could there then not be a consensus against such a ban? The Court justified 
this paradox by referring to the fact that a number of member states had been debating the 
question of the wearing of the full-face veil. But can the consensus be more determined by 
public debate about norms than by norms themselves?
611
 In any event, this singular approach 
was not new. The Court reached a similar conclusion in Sahin, where no consensus was 
derived from an overwhelming lack of regulation across member States of the wearing of 
religious symbols in university education.
612
 The same line of reasoning resurfaced recently, 
though more implicitly, in Ebrahimian v. France. In this judgment the issue of consensus was 
additionally confusing because of the area of regulation examined by the Court. While the 
case concerned a ban intended for the entire public sector, the Court relied on its previous 
findings of non-consensus regarding religious attire in the field of education.
613
  
The above inconsistencies draw attention to the way the Court formulates the normative 
inquiry, which seems to predetermine the conclusion as to the existence and scope of 
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consensus.
614
 It does not seem the same to ask whether other member States have in place 
bans on religious attire in a given area, as to ask whether there are such bans or similar ones in 
any other area. Nor are these questions equivalent to asking (as the Court suggested in Sahin 
and Ebrahimian) whether there is a uniform conception of the significance of religion in 
society. Further, the existence of debate in and on itself (unlike the issue of its quality, which 
is quite important) does not say much either. After all, policies that substantially curtail 
fundamental rights are always likely to be debated. Moreover, rights claims from unpopular 
groups or minorities are likely to engender a great deal of debate and societal opposition. In 
this vein, and whenever a consensus argument may appear linked to public support, account 
should also be taken of the constitutive role of the law. This means that, for example, to the 
extent that a state’s law disapproves of characteristics or practices identified with certain 
ethno-cultural groups, public opposition will likely be reinforced. As such, courts such as the 
ECtHR should be careful not to evaluate society’s preferences and debates as if the state – and 
its laws – would play no role in shaping them. Finally, the Court should also avoid being 
selective in the identification of normative affairs. The decision to regulate something and the 
decision to leave it unregulated are both normatively relevant.  
But the review of relevant norms does not end there. As already mentioned, the Court’s 
account of its legal environment is not confined to Europe. It is also guided by several 
international human rights treaties and the standards set by different monitoring bodies. In the 
cases studied, this practice has been incremental and more notorious in the last decade. In the 
segregation cases mentioned above and in Yordanova and Winterstein,
615
 as well as in the 
full-face veil case of S.A.S. v. France,
616
 the Court referred to several UN instruments and 
bodies. These include, inter alia, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the Human Rights Committee; the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and its supervisory Committee; the Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and its respective Committee; and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). And, as was the case with European bodies 
previously mentioned, the Court took into account quite specific guidelines and 
interpretations (regarding housing rights, equality, child rights, etc.) adopted in the framework 
of general comments and individual complaints. Also, the Court referred to rulings adopted in 
similar cases, including those which significantly differed from those held by the Court. In the 
aforesaid S.A.S. case, for example, the Court recalled that the Human Rights Committee had 
decided a case against Uzbekistan which was very similar to Sahin. There, the Committee, in 
contrast to the Court, held that the expulsion of a female student from university for refusing 
to comply with a headscarf prohibition violated her freedom of religion.
617
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How did this divergence play out in S.A.S. and in subsequent similar cases? In S.A.S. the 
Grand Chamber appeared to disregard the interpretation adopted by the Committee as 
irrelevant. It pointed out that the Committee had ‘not yet ruled on the question of a blanket 
ban on the wearing of the full-face veil in public places’.618 Surprisingly, however, when a 
few years later the Court was again confronted – in Ebrahimian – with the wearing of the veil 
(not a full-face veil) in a public institution (not a university, but a public hospital), no 
reference was made to those views of the Human Rights Committee. To attribute the omission 
to the different field addressed in each case (Sahin, like Hudoyberganova, was about 
education institutions, while Ebrahimian concerned a hospital) is not convincing particularly 
since the judgment in Ebrahimian mostly relied on standards developed in the context of 
public education.  
Nevertheless, there are a number of grounds for suggesting that the Court cannot simply do 
away with the rulings of other international human rights bodies in similar cases, particularly 
if they enhance or increase protection. First, as pointed out by Brems, the state’s margin of 
discretion ‘remains circumscribed by its other human rights obligations, amongst others 
emanating from UN treaties’.619 Indeed, Article 53 ECHR explicitly requires states to 
prioritise the most right-protective interpretation of the Convention Rights.
620
 Second, the 
Court’s remark in S.A.S. and its eventual alignment with the approach adopted by the 
European Committee of Social Rights in Roma cases concerning housing lends some practical 
credence to that principle. Third, when it comes to specific UN human rights instruments and 
treaties, there is a place for the principle of lex specialis to play out.
621
 Finally, on a more 
substantive note it can be argued that cases involving ethno-cultural minorities may posit 
additional grounds for deviation from local solutions in favour of progressive international 
standards. Inasmuch as the interests of disenfranchised minorities are likely to be absent from 
domestic policy-making and even from judicial processes, there are greater reasons for seeing 
supranational control as a last avenue to compensate for that.  
It is interesting to observe that to the extent that the ‘living instrument’ doctrine and, more 
notably, the notion of consensus appeal to common normative developments, a strong imprint 
of homogeneity and status quo appear in them. This can be problematic from the perspective 
of the claims put forward by applicants in minority or non-dominant positions. However, the 
use of those tools is regarded as enabling both continuity and deviation vis à vis the common 
normative approach and the cultural and normative setting prevailing in the respondent 
state.
622
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2.3. Integration of informal and tradition-based laws  
As discussed above, diverse state laws have been considered by the Court with relative 
regularity. However, another form of domestic normativity should not be forgotten. This 
evolves within organisations and among communities through a myriad of formal and 
informal regulations, including tradition-based laws. This layer of normativity, present in 
several cases analysed here, comprises the religious and cultural commitments governing the 
lives of applicants with ethnic, religious and cultural affiliations.
623
 Drawing on Tamanaha’s 
categorisation, such commitments reflect customary normative orders as well as 
community/cultural normative systems.
624
 In the words of Malik, these are ‘minority legal 
orders’.625 Additionally, informal norms regulating dress, food and working habits, as well as 
modes of using lands and homes, exist – prior to or sometimes in parallel with state 
regulations – in municipalities, schools, hospitals, neighbourhoods, private business and so 
forth. 
Does the Court take this normativity into account and how does that matter for the cases 
reviewed here? While this is the layer of normativity that, compared to the ones addressed 
above, has attracted more limited attention from the Court, it has not been totally absent from 
its reasoning. Among the range of community or customary norms we could think of, we 
should bear in mind that those expressing religious prescriptions or practices enjoy specific 
protection under Article 9 ECHR. Their normative force is actually one of the reasons 
militating in favour of the accommodation of religious manifestations. As such, when 
confronted with cases involving Article 9 ECHR, such as the ones discussed previously, the 
Court has regularly recognised and accorded weight to what applicants claim as being 
required by their religion. Still, in the context of the Court’s case law involving Islamic veils, 
it is interesting to observe the critical view of some authors, for whom it is possible to note ‘a 
certain reluctance to acknowledge the value and religious importance of the wearing of a 
headscarf, as if the Court [were] not entirely convinced it is required by Islam’.626  
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The Court’s recognition of other, non-religious community norms, however, has been more 
uneven. For example, with regard to Roma’s cultural normativity, the Court has regarded the 
cultural commitments of applicants like Ms Chapman as the preferences of individuals.
627
 
Yet, the Court deployed a much more appropriate stance in Muñoz Díaz. Here, the Court 
emphasised ‘the importance of the beliefs that the applicant derives from belonging to the 
Roma community – a community which has its own values that are well established and 
deeply rooted in Spanish society’.628 The Court then even went to say that ‘the force of the 
collective beliefs of a community that is well-defined culturally cannot be ignored’.629 It is 
argued that this approach should be maintained and applied consistently across different 
cases.  
In fact, ignoring non-state norms, such as customary or community laws, can be problematic. 
As the aforementioned cases suggest, one of the difficulties of ignoring these norms is that the 
Court may end up mischaracterising what is at stake. This also holds true for decentralised 
layers of normativity.
630
 A good example of this can be found in cases concerning religious 
attire, such as bans on religious manifestation in public institutions. In fact, what it is at stake 
in such cases will be judged differently if the contested prohibitions are accompanied by, say, 
similar formal or informal bans operating in other fields of social life, for example in private 
organisations and recreational centres such as swimming pools, gyms and restaurants. What 
might in principle be viewed as limitations on the religious expressions of the staff working in 
one public institution might, once viewed within the whole normative context, start looking 
like sex and religious segregation.  
To be sure, going along with this normative plurality is a difficult endeavour. Judges and 
lawyers have neither the training nor the institutional capacity to adjudicate so many levels of 
normativity. Nevertheless, to differing degrees they can – and actually do – take into account 
diverse and even competing norms. Moreover, applicants and third-party interveners can play 
an important role in providing the Court with the material required to take into account a 
wider range of norms. As the discussion above demonstrates, something important about the 
cases studied will surely be missed if their normative spectrum is too reduced. As Baer puts it, 
at the very least ‘one simply misses the richness of legally-based arguments which are 
available’.631  
 
V. Concluding notes on Chapter 3 
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The cases reviewed in this study are all reflective of the challenges and difficulties posed by 
legal discourses of cultural difference. They include, among others, whether to accommodate 
and to whom; whether to intrude into social and economic policies; how to deal with 
competing religious and cultural views in the face of prevailing notions of neutrality and 
secularism; and how to ensure inclusion and equality for those culturally ‘different’. In the 
cases concerning caravans and the ‘Gypsy’ lifestyle, as well as in the cases involving Islamic 
veils, a discourse of cultural difference has been prevalent among the parties and in the 
ECtHR. In cases regarding the educational segregation of Roma children, in turn, the 
discourse of cultural difference has been more present in the parties’ arguments than in the 
Court’s analysis. Also more tenuous appears to be the issue of cultural difference in cases of 
eviction from informal settlements as well as in Islam-related cases concerning curricular 
exemptions and male religious dress style.  
In cases defined by cultural and religious difference, the Court’s approach places great 
emphasis on group identity and on culture or religion, particularly as expressed in symbols 
and practices. This has been accompanied by attempts to define the boundaries of the 
cultural/religious group or identity in question. In the light of scholarly criticism, it is not so 
surprising to note some ensuing difficulties, such as essentialism, stereotypes and a tendency 
to displace other aspects that are important for the adjudication of the case. While the group 
vulnerability framework used in some cases holds more potential for a more flexible, 
comprehensive analysis, in practice some of the difficulties associated with cultural and 
religious identity boundaries seem to have re-emerged in that context.     
As the application of an integrated approach to human rights law reveals, such a fragmented 
view of the cases has in fact overlooked several dimensions of the rights holders and the 
harms and norms at stake. Some concrete experiences of the applicants, especially in relation 
to gender, socio-economic status and migration background, have been sidelined. Since the 
Court’s approach to the prohibition of discrimination has been rather occasional, formal and 
based on a single-ground logic, even explicit claims of compounded discrimination have been 
dismissed. Likewise, in a number of cases the Court has adopted a divisive view of the rights 
holders’ agency whereby they are portrayed either as fully autonomous and endowed with 
choices or as passive and constrained. At the same time, its responses have varied depending 
on the meaning attributed to people’s choices. In addition, the Court has paid limited attention 
to some rights holders other than the applicants who are also affected by the measures 
contested. Futhermore, in most cases where the lens of cultural/religious difference or identity 
was salient, several interlocked harms and norms were displaced. This was especially so for 
socio-economic harms related to rights not enshrined in the Convention and for issues of 
structural inequality. An integrated perspective also shows that, especially in cases with a 
focus on cultural/religious difference, the analysis usually focuses on one convention 
provision, missing the opportunity to explore a larger array of legal arguments. While the 
Court’s stance towards regional and international norms has been richer, the lack of 
consistency in their incorporation has also added difficulties to the handling of contested cases 
of cultural difference. Further, although the Court had limited regard to informal and 
tradition-based norms, a more serious engagement with this layer of normativity could also 
have provided useful insights for dealing with the cases under study. In the light of all the 
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above, this chapter has highlighted a need to revise the use of compartmentalised legal 
thinking and to consider the use of an integrated approach to human rights law.  
The chapter that follows examines similar challenges and questions raised by cases dealing 
with cultural difference and inclusion, although in a very different context, namely that of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Who are indigenous and Afro-descendant applicants 
in the eyes of the Court and what place does it accord legal categories of identity, culture and 
group vulnerability? How does all this affect the resolution of complex cases about cultural 
distinctiveness, legal recognition, collective rights and access to resources? To what extent 
does the Inter-American Court of Human Rights adopt an integrated perspective on the rights 
holders and the norms involved in such cases? These are some of the questions discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4 - AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO CULTURAL DIFFERENCE IN THE INTER-AMERICAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
I. Introduction 
Despite the cultural and religious diversity of the Americas, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR or ‘the Court’) has so far been confronted with a relatively limited 
spectrum of cases explicitly dealing with issues of cultural difference. All of them concern 
indigenous and Afro-descendant communities and/or their members. Their complaints are 
inscribed within a history of struggles against multiple forms of political and social 
marginalisation, dispossession and cultural assimilation across the American region. This has 
given rise to significant mobilisation, mainly under the auspices of cultural-based arguments, 
at the domestic and international levels. The bulk of the cases that have thereby reached the 
Court involve indigenous or tribal communal claims of restitution of and control over lands 
and resources. The background to these cases is generally one of lack of recognition of their 
collective land rights, failure to delimit, title, and protect their territories and/or the 
authorisation of private exploitation of part of their lands and resources. These are the cases 
with the strongest emphasis on cultural difference and identity, a normative approach that is 
sustained by Article 21 ACHR (the right to property). In a few other cases, individuals and/or 
groups have raised issues of political participation, use of a minority language and 
discriminatory treatment in access to identity documents and services. As mentioned in the 
introduction to this second part of the study, another group of judgments relates to massacres 
and other acts of violence against indigenous and Afro-descendant populations. Most of them 
have not been thoroughly examined in this study, although some have been included and 
referenced when needed. It is nonetheless worth mentioning that most of these judgments 
have considered the cultural impact of those crimes in the reparations awards. 
Though the American Convention rights holder is the individual (or it was until recently),
632
 
the Court’s judgments in the aforementioned cases place great emphasis on the group. 
Obviously, this is even more so in community-based complaints. Now, as discussed in the 
context of the European Court’s case law, one may wonder how does the Inter-American 
Court conceive of the group and what place does it accord to this in its legal analysis? It is 
submitted that indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples are mainly portrayed as relatively 
bounded groups defined by a distinctive cultural identity. In a more limited fashion, they have 
also been seen through the prism of vulnerability. Both normative frames (group cultural 
identity and vulnerability) have shaped in significant ways the legal analysis and the 
resolution of the cases.  
 
II. Cultural difference as legal compartment: crossing group identity boundaries? 
That legal arguments on cultural identity hold a central place in the Court’s adjudication of 
indigenous rights claims should not come as a surprise. Group identity mobilisation has 
                                                          
632
 This remained so until the 2012 judgment in the Sarayaku case, when the Court appeared to accept for the 
first time that indigenous communities, as collectivities, were holders of Convention rights. This is further 
discussed infra III, section 3.2.   
150 
 
achieved a great deal in the legal protection of fundamental rights.
633
 And indigenous peoples 
have probably been the most successful in advancing their rights claims through a cultural 
identity approach.
634
 After all, the idea of the social group as a bounded entity with a certain 
identity or common experience,
635
 just like that of cultural belonging, is suited well to 
indigenous peoples. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, when arguments about collective 
culture or identity take too much prominence in legal discourse, it is likely that courts will 
focus on them, missing the chance of going down the road of a comprehensive approach to 
the case. The following discussion will thus explore the Court’s understanding of indigenous 
and Afro-descendant cultural distinctiveness, the importance attached to it and the 
relationship between this and an integrated model for adjudicating claims of difference and 
inclusion.  
 
1. Indigenous and Afro-descendant culture under Article 21 ACHR 
Questions of collective culture and group belonging have a long history in the Court’s 
jurisprudence on indigenous people’s rights. Even before the judgment in the famous Awas 
Tingni case,
636
 the Court had shown interest in a normative approach sensitive to the cultural 
particularities of ethnic groups.
637
 But it is certainly within the context of collective land 
claims that indigenous culture, anchored in an expanded right to property (Article 21 ACHR), 
translated into a set of practices and beliefs worth legal protection. The basis of this protection 
lies with the special and collective attachment of indigenous peoples to their ancestral 
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 IACtHR, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 31 August 2001. The 
case concerned an indigenous community of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua who had no ownership title to the 
ancestral territory it claimed. The state authorities had authorised, without the community’s consent, a private 
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 During the nineties, the reparation judgment in the Aloeboetoe case, brought on behalf of members of a tribal 
Afro-rural community in Suriname, had already signalled the importance the Court would attach to the culture of 
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territories. In the words of the Court, ‘the close ties of indigenous people with the land must 
be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, 
their integrity, and their economic survival’.638 For indigenous communities, ‘relations to the 
land are not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element 
which they must fully enjoy, so that it may preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to 
future generations’.639 Importantly, ‘the spiritual and material basis for indigenous identity is 
mainly supported by their unique relationship with their traditional lands. As long as said 
relationship exists, the right to claim lands is enforceable, otherwise, it will lapse.’640 The 
Court has stressed the importance of indigenous land rights for the ‘reproduction of their 
culture’641 and for ‘preserving cultural identities in a democratic and pluralist society’.642 The 
salience of this element also crystallised in a right to cultural identity not envisaged by the 
ACHR and which has nonetheless been enforced on the basis of Article 21 ACHR.
643
 But 
what is the indigenous culture whose preservation warrants specific rights and safeguards? 
The Court has attempted to define it as follows:  
The culture of the members of the indigenous communities directly relates to a 
specific way of being, seeing, and acting in the world, developed on the basis of their 
close relationship with their traditional territories and the resources therein, not only 
because they are their main means of subsistence, but also because they are part of 
their worldview, their religiosity, and therefore, of their cultural identity.
644
  
Along these lines, the Court has repeatedly emphasised indigenous traditions. Examples 
include ceremonial activities, languages, arts and rituals, practices in connection with nature, 
customary law, dress, seasonal or nomadic hunting, fishing or gathering, and use of natural 
resources associated with their customs or other elements characteristic of their culture.
645
 In 
this portrayal of traditional customs and uses, indigenous culture seems rather static or even 
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romanticised. Such a view has important consequences. Notably, it determines (in a narrow 
manner) who does or does not qualify as a member of the group, and what does or does not 
count as part of the protected identity. As discussed earlier (in the context of the previous 
chapter), the route of cultural essentialism (i.e. trying to fix the content of ‘Culture’ and the 
borders of group identity) is indeed problematic. This holds true even if the characterisation in 
question has a positive or idealised tone.  
On the basis of the cases analysed here, a number of potential and actual drawbacks to a 
normative approach marked by the protection of indigenous groups and their cultural identity 
deserve attention. The first is the risk of unnecessarily limiting the economic and political 
empowerment of indigenous communities and thus, the range of activities that may qualify 
for legal protection. In fact, the case law suggests that lands and natural resources are 
protected only to the extent that they have been used in accordance with those cultural 
traditions.
646
 As some scholars have argued, this depiction of indigenous identity/culture 
forecloses opportunities for communities who may wish to benefit from ‘non-traditional’ 
practices or techniques for managing or exploiting their natural resources.
647
 Think, for 
instance, of mining, hydrocarbon production or tourism, to mention some less ‘traditional’ 
and more market-oriented activities. Pushing indigenous peoples away from these kinds of 
activity may, at the same time, severely hamper their wellbeing, as traditional activities may 
no longer provide adequate sustenance.
648
 One recent judgment – Kaliña and Lokono Peoples 
v. Suriname – might nonetheless suggest that the Court is more aware of these problems. 
Underlining the full guarantees that indigenous peoples should enjoy over the lands and 
resources traditionally used to carry on their way of life, the Court also considered ‘other 
complementary or additional traditional areas to which they have had access for their 
traditional or subsistence activities (which may have other purposes)’.649 It is unclear whether 
this last remark could leave the door open to the protection of practices which do not 
necessarily fit a folk view of indigenous identity. In principle, it seems a first step in that 
direction, although it is yet something to be seen.  
A second drawback of an essentialist approach to indigenous and tribal culture is the 
upholding of rigid group boundaries regarding the beneficiaries of legal protection. It should 
be noted that while the Court’s interpretation of Article 21 ACHR has not really been 
controverted by states parties, they have contested the qualification of indigenous peoples. In 
Saramaka, for example, Suriname argued that the Saramaka people had lost their cultural 
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specificity as they had immersed themselves in ‘modern society’.650 In response, the Court 
reaffirmed the qualification of the Saramaka peoples as a tribal group and contended that the 
deviation of some individual members from Saramaka customs did not change the cultural 
distinctiveness of the group. Recently, Honduras claimed that the Garífuna Punta Piedra 
Community was not indigenous to the country or the region and that thus they had no more 
rights than any other resident in the area.
651
 The Court did not examine the merits of this 
allegation (made at the public hearing of the case) as it dismissed it for being extemporaneous 
and contrary to the principles of estoppel and good faith.
652
 Similarly, in Kaliña and Lokono 
the state invoked the community’s ‘acculturation’ to exclude them from the management of 
natural reserves established in their ancestral territory.
653
 It follows that the Court’s 
essentialist view of indigenous and tribal identity offers a space for strong contestation. This 
may result in denying protection to people claiming indigenous rights just because they do not 
fit the judicial cultural script of what it means to be indigenous.  
In cases where the ‘indigeneity’ of the applicants has not been straightforward, the Court has 
proceeded to verify whether they could fall under the broader category of ‘tribal’ people. The 
Court has so far taken this path with regard to members of Afro-descendant rural populations 
from Central America. This can be seen in the cases of Moiwana and Saramaka, both against 
Suriname, as well as the Operation Genesis case against Colombia. The applicants in these 
cases were descendants of African slaves forcibly taken to Suriname and Colombia, who 
settled in the areas concerned in the 17
th
 and 19
th
 centuries.
654
 They all claimed a right to 
communal property in land and other entitlements to the natural resources therein. The Court, 
having found that they constituted (Maroon) tribal peoples, granted them indigenous rights. 
The conclusion was based on the applicants’ distinctive cultural, social and economic 
characteristics as expressed in their connection with the land and their customary norms. 
Meeting a specific indigenous cultural code was therefore crucial for belonging and 
qualifying for protection under Article 21 ACHR. For example, in Moiwana the Court stated 
that while the applicants were not indigenous to the region, for around a century ‘the 
community members lived in the area in strict adherence to N’djuka custom’.655 A similar 
approach was taken in Saramaka, where the Court asserted the indigenous-like culture of the 
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applicants by referring to a set of customs and beliefs reflective of their ‘social, ancestral, and 
spiritual essence’.656  
Whereas the interpretation adopted by the Court has been progressive and beneficial for many 
Afro-descendant peoples, one may wonder whether it has somehow eclipsed part of their 
specific needs and concerns. In fact, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, a group identity 
normative approach often entails the danger of obscuring the situation of group members and 
varied forms of overlapping disadvantages. In the framework of its promotional and 
supervisory role, the Inter-American Commission has called upon states to bear in mind ‘that 
the needs of the Afro‐descendant population in the Americas cannot be completely subsumed 
within policies for indigenous peoples’.657 What is more, Afro-descendant civil society 
organisations themselves argue that ‘one of the invisibility mechanisms [obscuring the needs, 
culture and current obstacles of Afro-descendant people] has been precisely to subsume or 
compare their needs with those of other groups affected by discrimination’.658 
The benefits of the solution applied to Afro-descendant rural communities in the above cases 
are apparent. They were granted the broad set of rights that the Inter-American Court has so 
far recognised for indigenous and tribal peoples. Nevertheless, making these rights 
conditional to the extent that a certain cultural script is met implies that many (Afro-
descendants and others) will perhaps not be able to live up to the cultural tradition legally 
recognised. To avoid exclusion, they will have to overstate their cultural adherence. This can 
have serious consequences for many indigenous and tribal populations who, for a variety of 
reasons, may lead a life that differs from the indigenous way of life. But additionally, the 
normative use of such a cultural code poses difficulties for other populations who may 
understandably seek indigenous-like forms of legal protection. An example are precisely 
those Afro-communities who may not be able to mobilise the cultural identity discourse 
applied to indigenous peoples.  
Moreover, insofar as the Court extends collective rights to Afro-descendants on condition of 
fitting an indigenous/tribal way of life, it reinforces the exclusion of Afro-Latinos from state 
reforms enshrining collective right. In this vein, Hooker asked why Afro-Latinos have not 
been as successful in winning collective rights, at the domestic level,  as indigenous people, 
despite common experiences of racial discrimination and social exclusion? And she has found 
that the main reason is that ‘such rights are awarded based on the perceived possession of a 
distinct cultural group identity, not a history of political exclusion or racial discrimination.’659 
What is more, her study shows that this criterion, rather than being required by legal 
commitments, is the result of the distinct way in which ‘blacks and indians have historically 
been racialised in Latin America.’660 While the latter are perceived as having contributed to 
the mestizaje (hybridity) that forged the national political community, the place of the former 
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is far more ambiguous. It is against this backdrop that national elites have been more 
receptive to a narrative of distinctive cultural identity than to one based on racism and 
exclusion.
661
 For our purposes, this analysis illuminates how problematic is taking for granted 
these distinctions between groups and identities as well as assuming their normative 
legitimacy. As such, similar questions to those raised in regard to Afro-rural populations can 
be extended to others groups. Could peasants, pastoralists and landless communities in Latin 
America, for example, benefit from collective land rights and other safeguards granted to 
indigenous and tribal peoples? Many of those people also have communitarian ways of life 
and also suffer from discrimination, dispossession and insecurity in land tenure. And yet, they 
may not easily gain access to those rights if they have to fit the cultural characteristics that 
define indigenous peoples according to the Court’s case law.662  
Of course, one could argue that human rights law provided for a rights regime specifically 
envisaged for indigenous peoples only. And still, the Inter-American Court does not have 
direct material competence over a regime sufficiently specific to justify a normative response 
limited to indigenous peoples only. Moreover, upon interrogation of the reasons and aims 
underlying the indigenous legal framework, one may legitimately contest whether (the lack 
of) alignment with a certain cultural imprint suffices to justify the denial of relevant similar 
entitlements to other people. After all, human rights law’s primary concern is people’s equal 
enjoyment of rights, rather than the preservation of any cultural or identity code in itself.  
To be sure, though, the question of who is entitled to ‘special’ safeguards is not only relevant 
with a view to extending legal protection. The question holds equal importance for setting 
limits to the flexibility of human rights law. In other words, assuming that the Court could not 
accommodate all the demands of collective or otherwise ‘special’ rights, the following 
question arises: does the issue of group identity or cultural belonging constitute sufficient 
ground for the Court to justify the refusal of accommodation, resource redistribution or the 
non-imposition of specific duties upon states? So far the Court has been called upon to answer 
this question only with regard to indigenous and Afro-descendant rural individuals and 
communities. However, it is likely that in the future the Court will, like its European 
counterpart, be confronted with a much wider range of culturally-based claims. Unless the 
Court opts to make extensive value appraisals of cultures to decide which ones merit 
preservation, it should look for justifications beyond the issue of group identity. Admittedly, 
some degree of essentialism may be unavoidable in adjudication. Yet, a more careful stance in 
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this respect is nonetheless possible, as already discussed. One way of doing so is by adopting 
an integrated approach to the adjudication of cultural diversity cases and examining in an 
inclusive, non-selective and relational manner the elements discussed in the sections III and 
IV below.  
Moreover, a comprehensive view of the cases discussed here may also draw attention to two 
further dangers of the identity-based normative framework described above. One is the risk of 
confirming or promoting general assumptions about indigenous people which, by extension, 
may also affect Afro-descendant people. On account of the cultural identity that supposedly 
defines them, the group and its members are likely to be stereotyped as rural-oriented, 
anchored in traditional or ‘non-modern’ activities, guided by spiritual motivations and lacking 
in knowledge or abilities to manage ‘modern business’. The vicious cycle of reification may 
impact not only on the Court’s merits analysis of claims to, for example, land, resources, 
benefit sharing and access to services. It may also have an effect on the Court’s award of 
reparations, as further discussed infra III.2. In addition, implicit in the group identity focus 
adopted by the Court is the risk of leaving untouched the roots of the violations experienced 
by most indigenous and tribal peoples, that is, racism, economic inequality and political 
marginalisation.
663
  
But before turning to the application of the integrated framework followed in this study, I will 
conclude this section by exploring another criterion that has guided the Court’s normative 
approach to ethno-cultural diversity cases.  
 
2. Indigenous people and Afro-descendants as groups in vulnerable situations  
Alongside cultural identity, the collective experience of indigenous and Afro-descendant 
people is often characterised in terms of vulnerability. For the Court, the differences between 
indigenous and ethnic minorities, on the one hand, and majority populations, on the other, are 
given by, inter alia, cultural particularities and social difficulties which keep the former in a 
situation of vulnerability.
664
 In this context, the Court, unlike the Strasbourg Court, 
consistently speaks of a ‘situation’ or ‘condition’ of vulnerability, instead of ‘vulnerable 
groups’.665 Moreover, in doing so the Inter-American Court has frequently indicated that 
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those situations of vulnerability have been imposed on the group or individuals concerned, 
thus rendering them vulnerable. The difference in wording may seem minor, merely 
rhetorical. But it is not. Language is powerful and the words chosen make a difference. 
Denoting the situational character of vulnerability gives the concept more flexibility and 
contingency. Indeed, the term is mostly employed to pinpoint the ‘special’ or ‘extreme’ risks 
(threats to physical integrity and risks of suffering rights violations in general), as well as a 
history of discrimination or exclusion faced by certain ethno-cultural groups and individuals, 
rather than to signal an attribute of them.
666
 This use of vulnerability holds an interesting 
potential inasmuch as it seems to lessen the dangers of essentialism already discussed.  
From a normative point of view, categorising people as being in a situation of vulnerability 
entails relatively similar effects to those studied in the context of the European Court. 
Notably, for the Inter-American Court the condition of vulnerability of indigenous and Afro-
descendant people (and peoples) subjects the state to stricter obligations, which require it to 
have ‘special’ regard for their needs and concerns as well as to secure specific protection to 
make their rights effective. Additionally, the Court has taken into account in its reparations 
orders the vulnerability experienced by the applicants.
667
 As further explained below, the 
concept of vulnerability applied in this case law also appears as an alternative but closely 
related framework to that of equality and non-discrimination. Moreover, the Court has also 
drawn attention to overlapping forms of vulnerability related to the rights holder’s identity 
and socio-economic condition. In this sense, the notion of vulnerability seems to enable a 
relatively comprehensive view of the human rights situation of the groups and individuals 
concerned. On account of this, I will return to vulnerability in some of the sections below.  
Thus far, it has been argued that legal determinations of group boundaries, cultural identity, 
traditional practices and the like may yield a fragile ground upon which to found judicial 
rulings. The problem is not just the questionable appraisals that Courts undertake within that 
framework. A discourse too concerned with group identity and culture may also obscure the 
richness of normatively relevant elements for addressing the case. Crucial among them are the 
particular rights holders affected and their specific interests and needs. While ethno-cultural 
membership is itself the expression of an embodied and relational notion of human beings, it 
is but one part of the whole. The next section therefore enquires whether and how the Inter-
American Court recognises the complexity within and across categories of rights holders, as 
well as the normative consequences that follow from it.  
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III. Whole humans: looking through and across rights holders  
To explore this question, it is useful to distinguish between two kinds of ethno-cultural 
diversity cases submitted to the Court. On the one hand, there are the cases litigated from the 
perspective of indigenous and Afro-descendant communities, which mostly concern land-
related rights claims. The majority of the case law reviewed falls within this category, which 
is, as already explained, more noticeably based on cultural difference and identity arguments. 
On the other hand, there are a few cases that concern individuals’ rights claims, which do not 
relate to land and natural resources. In these cases, the Court’s normative approach has been 
attentive to group identity but not confined to cultural characteristics. The distinction between 
these cases holds special relevance for the analysis conducted in this section. Indeed, each set 
of cases poses different challenges for a legal framework inspired by intersectionality and 
hence interested in the specific positioning of rights holders.  
Collective land judgments largely focus on the situation of indigenous and Afro-descendant 
communities. As such, the specific concerns and grievances of individual members are often 
absent from the Court’s legal analysis in such cases. But this makes sense. The prioritisation 
of the collective over the individual has responded to the arguments put forward by the 
applicants and the Commission, which were usually grounded in collective values and needs. 
In fact, although until recently the bearer of rights under the ACHR as interpreted by the 
Court had been the individual or any group of individuals, indigenous rights claims have 
frequently sought some recognition of their collective personality and, as such, entitlement to 
collective rights. This group-oriented focus may explain the fact that many land-related 
judgments provide limited information on who the individual members of the affected 
communities were and how the alleged violations might have impacted differently upon them. 
This in itself changes the questions that an integrated approach to rights holders could ask. An 
intersectional perspective to collective indigenous land cases would thus be wary of passing 
over the situation of individual members whose circumstances might guide the resolution of 
the case and/or the remedies devised. This is one of the first issues discussed below. I will 
then move to the Court’s approach to the agency of rights holders, a matter that is also shaped 
in interesting ways by the collective orientation of many judgments. Finally, the situation of 
other rights holders who may be affected by the restrictions debated in the judgments, 
particularly those who advance claims that stand in tension with those of indigenous/tribal 
communities, needs to be examined. This broad view of rights holders will furthermore pay 
attention to the legal subjectivity accorded to indigenous peoples collectively, as this would 
represent an enlargement of the rights holders traditionally seen in the Inter-American 
adjudication.  
 
1. Enriching the collective and cultural identities of rights holders 
We should bear in mind that while the Court may consider it unnecessary to engage with the 
experience of the individual applicants in the merits analysis of collective cases, it may, 
however, need to do so in its analysis of reparations. This situation arises every time there are 
individualised violations and requests for individualised remedies. However, it is in this 
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sphere – in the Court’s awards of reparations – that one may notice that some community-
oriented judgments have overlooked, to differing degrees, the individual members. The most 
extreme expression of this problem consisted of displacing the individual altogether. Where 
the Court, in contrast, did not leave community members out of the assessment of reparations, 
issues arose as to the extent to which the Court could or should have considered their specific 
identities and social locations when devising its remedial orders. The discussion below will 
subsequently address the limited sample of collective cases in which the Court examined, in 
its merits analysis, the circumstances and overlapping identities of community members. It 
will be seen that it was in the context of an individual case not argued from the perspective of 
cultural difference that the Court took questions of intersectionality more into account.  
 
1.1. Integrating collective and individual remedies  
Individuals faded against the collectivity in cases in which, the Court having declared 
individualised violations and community members having requested individualised 
compensation, only the community was awarded reparations. The case of Yakye Axa is one 
example.
668
 During the nineties the Yakye Axa community started reclaiming its ancestral 
lands and, in the meantime, settled along a public road. But there they had no access to their 
means of subsistence or to basic services. Extreme destitution, harassment and disease 
followed. The Court found a violation of Articles 4, 8 and 25 and 21 ACHR – rights to life 
(interpreted as conditions enabling a dignified existence), access to justice and property, 
respectively. The applicants requested compensation for the moral damage suffered by the 
community and its members, who had endured inhuman living conditions, threats and 
diseases for years. Yet, only collective remedies for the community (monetary and non-
monetary) were awarded.
669
 The merits analysis of this case, however, did pay more attention 
to different circumstances and needs across community members. This is further discussed 
below.  
The case of Yatama v. Nicaragua provides another example of individual being erased from 
the reparations.
670
 Unlike most indigenous cases, this one concerned the state’s refusal to 
register and allow candidates from an indigenous regional political party (Yapti Tasba 
Masraka Nanih Asla Takanka – YATAMA) to run for municipal elections. The refusal was 
based on legislation according to which only candidates from political parties presenting 
candidatures in at least 80 per cent of the municipalities were entitled to stand for elections. 
The Court declared as discriminatory the character of the restriction, which imposed onerous 
requirements and a form of political organisation alien to indigenous peoples. It thus found 
violations of the rights to political participation, equality and access to justice of both the 
individuals who were prevented from standing for election and of the indigenous communities 
they represented.
671
 Nevertheless, the excluded candidates did not receive compensation, for 
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either the moral or the pecuniary damage they had claimed. Again, the Court only envisaged 
reparations for the collectivity.
672
 In his analysis of the Court’s reparations, Anthowiak notes 
further instances in which individual members of indigenous communities were ‘forgotten’. 
He also observes critically that in indigenous community cases, individuals received little 
economic compensation.
673
 
But, as mentioned above, there are collective-oriented judgments where the individual was 
not entirely left out of the picture. The overlapping identities and disadvantages faced by 
some community members then had a role to play. Consider, for example, the reparation 
judgment in the Aloeboetoe case. The case concerned the detention and killing of several 
male, unarmed Maroons (Afro-descendants who belonged to the Saramaka). They were 
detained and murdered by state agents on suspicion of belonging to a subversive group. In 
1991, Suriname acknowledged its responsibility for the violations, the Court issued a 
judgment taking note of the acknowledgement and deferred its ruling on reparations. The 
Commission requested that in defining the beneficiaries of reparations for pecuniary damages, 
the Court should ‘take into account the family structure of the Maroons’ – which was largely 
matrilineal and practised polygamy.
674
 Thus, in applying Article 63(1) ACHR on reparations 
awards,
675
 the Court had to consider the deceased victims, all adult men, and their heirs: 
‘relatives in the ascending line’, ‘spouses’ and ‘children’. To define which spouses and 
children were awarded compensation, the Court eventually decided to take into account 
Saramaka customs, including the reality of polygamy. This is a remarkable example of 
integration of customary norms, as further discussed below. But here I would like to draw 
attention to the reasons provided for the Court for doing so and to the added value of an 
intersectional approach.   
The Court decided this reparation issue on the basis of a single concern: ‘The only question of 
importance here is whether the laws of Suriname in the area of family law apply to the 
Saramaka tribe. […] The members of the tribe are unaware of it and adhere to their own 
rules.’676 While the cultural sensitivity of the Court in its approach to reparations is 
outstanding, it is interesting to observe that its language remained gender neutral. The Court 
simply did not mention how paramount was the issue of considering or ignoring the 
Saramaka cultural practices for Saramaka women in particular. Limiting compensation to 
only one wife for each victim would have rendered several Saramaka women, possibly along 
with their children, vulnerable and destitute. In reality, the entire issue of reparations was 
above all pivotal for Saramaka women, given their specific position within their community. 
As research indicates, in practice Saramaka women are mainly dependent on their spouse for 
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their material subsistence and not, as one might assume for a matrilineal system of descent, on 
their maternal brother.
677
  
In light of the foregoing, an intersectional approach to reparations would have been valuable. 
It would have assisted the Court in identifying the specific disadvantages and harms risked by 
Saramaka women and children as rights holders and relatives of the deceased victims. The 
gender inequality that would have resulted from a disregard for the cultural practices of the 
Saramaka provided not just an additional ground for the Court’s decision to consider it, but 
actually quite a strong one. As such, the reasoning holds relevance for states too. Indeed, state 
parties may question whether the mere ineffectiveness of their laws over certain populations 
authorises international courts to do away with them. Against that, due regard for the 
vulnerable position of ethnic minority women and their children adds an important argument 
to the question of what the law was in practice and even to the question of cultural difference 
in itself.  
A gendered view of the consequences of the violations experienced by tribal/Afro-descendant 
women was explicitly requested in the case of Operation Genesis v. Colombia. This case dealt 
with the forced displacement of Afro-descendant communities from the Cacarica River basin 
in Colombia and the killing of one community member. As a result of the displacement, many 
families split up. In this connection, the applicants requested a gender-differentiated measure 
of reparation.
678
 They asked for ‘financial subsidies to be granted to the women heads of 
household in recognition of the loss of their husbands or companions in Operation Genesis or, 
if they were already heads of household, owing to the difficulties suffered’.679 The Court 
emphasised that taking ‘into account the position of the women among the members of the 
family or other differentiated aspects, such as whether the land and other means of production 
are owned collectively’ was required for administrative reparations to be legitimate.680 
Eventually, however, the applicant’s request was not addressed by the Court. Owing to the 
administrative reparations put in place by the government within the framework of its 
transitional justice programme, the Court concluded that it was not for it to order additional 
measures.
681
  
Traces of an intersectional perspective have not been exclusively confined to the Court’s 
pronouncements on reparations, though. Relevant insights can be found in the merits analysis 
of a few collective cases. This is the next question examined.  
 
1.2. Integrating individuals’ multiple positioning into the merits analysis  
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Interestingly, the collective-oriented judgments that display a more comprehensive view of 
indigenous community members are those which did not rely as heavily as others on the 
cultural identity framework of Article 21 ACHR. These cases have the particularity of having 
been mainly addressed through an alternative framework, one based on Article 4 ACHR 
concerning the right to life. Within this framework, identity cultural arguments were present 
but were not as salient as in the other collective land cases.  
Illustrative are the judgments issued in the aforementioned Paraguayan cases of Yakye Axa, 
Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek. These are part of a series of cases concerning indigenous 
communities from the Paraguayan Chaco, a large region bordering Brazil and Bolivia whose 
occupation during the nineteenth century resulted in, for example, lands being sold on the 
London stock exchange and in an Anglican ‘pacification’ of the indigenous population.682 The 
first two communities seeking restitution ended up settling beside public routes, where they 
could not cater for their needs or access water, medical care, sanitation and other services. 
The case of Xákmok Kásek originated in the same occupation of the Paraguayan Chaco and 
the indigenous peoples affected also had their territorial claims pending for decades. In the 
meantime, their lands were also sold to private companies. In this case, however, instead of 
being forced to settle outside their ancestral territory, the community remained within a 
reduced part of it, where their activities, access to resources and mobility were severely 
restricted by the private owners of the land. As a result, the members of the Xákmok Kásek 
community faced appalling living conditions as well.  
Besides taking into account the extreme poverty experienced by all the community members 
who found themselves unable to practise their land-related subsistence activities and without 
access to basic services,
683
 the Court scrutinised the impact this had on the children, the 
elderly and the pregnant women of the community. With regard to both elderly people and 
pregnant women, the Court required additional steps from the state to secure their access to 
adequate medical care.
684
 Likewise, in Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek the Court examined 
the early death, lack of medical assistance and malnutrition of the boys and girls of the 
community.
685
 Also of note, in Xákmok Kásek the Court addressed the death of indigenous 
women who had no access to maternal care, a situation which the Court also connected to 
their experience of poverty.
686
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The Court in Yakye Axa also interpreted the right to life of indigenous children in light of 
Article 19 ACHR (rights of the child).
687
 In this vein, we should note that the very existence 
of this specific provision within the ACHR is remarkable from an intersectional perspective. 
It places the Court under the obligation to have due regard for the situation of children. On 
this basis (Article 4 and 19 ACHR), the Court in Yakye Axa held that the State had to ensure 
that indigenous children’s wellbeing and life project would not be disrupted as a result of the 
situation faced by their community.
688
 In Xákmok Kásek, a violation of children’s rights 
(Article 19 ACHR) was additionally found on account of ‘the loss of traditional practices, 
such as male and female initiation rites and the Community’s languages […]’, which affected 
more severely the identity and development of indigenous children.
689
 The consequences of 
children’s separation from their ancestral lands were also examined on the basis of Article 19 
ACHR and the existing international corpus juris on children’s rights when displacements 
were caused by internal armed conflict. The Operation Genesis v. Colombia case is 
illustrative.
690
  
Thus, while the Court mainly approached the situation of all those individuals from the 
perspective of indigenous membership, it did conceive of this as comprising other non-
privileged identities. In this vein, the Court’s efforts in acknowledging the different social 
positions of community members in the Paraguayan cases somewhat resemble the ‘capacious 
approach’ to intersectionality proposed by Fredman.691 In fact, their experience as indigenous 
persons was inclusive of indigenous children, indigenous women and the elderly living in 
poverty, an approach taken in the context of substantive provisions and not of discrimination 
grounds. It is worth noticing that more recently, in the case of the members of the village of 
Chichupac and neighbouring communities,
692
 the Court undertook a similar comprehensive 
analysis whereby it acknowledged the ‘differentiated impact’ that some violations had had on 
indigenous women and children. But this case is not so much about collective land rights and 
related cultural particularities. Rather, it concerns the effects of the massacres, extrajudicial 
executions, torture, forced disappearances and rapes perpetrated against Maya indigenous 
people in Guatemala, concretely, those of the village of Chichupac and neighbouring 
communities in the Municipality of Rabinal.
693
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The judgment nonetheless addresses the loss of lands and the impossibility of returning to 
ancestral territory, although in the context of the communities’ forced displacement and the 
ensuing violation of their freedom of movement and residence (Article 22 ACHR). Within the 
scope of this provision, the Court examined the differentiated impact of the forced 
displacement upon the women and children of the communities.
694
 Women had to become the 
heads of household while coping with the effects of the violence endured, including the 
killing of their family members. Further, many of them were raped and had become pregnant 
as a consequence, while also being stigmatised and excluded as a result. The Court 
additionally noted the particular vulnerability to which children were exposed, including those 
who were born out of rape.
695
  
From the few judgements litigated on behalf of Afro-descendant/indigenous individuals 
instead of collectivities, one – the case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic696 – took 
some steps towards intersectionality. In this case, two girls of Haitian descent who were born 
in the Dominican Republic were denied a late birth registration. Prevented from obtaining 
Dominican nationality, they risked expulsion from the country and could not enrol at school 
or access other social services. Thus, while the case was framed as a case of violations tied to 
the ethno-cultural identity of the applicants, the issue was not, as in most indigenous cases, 
one of cultural identity protection. In practice, the Court examined the case within the overall 
social context of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian origin in the Dominican Republic, who 
were in a ‘particularly vulnerable situation’ as a result of entrenched discrimination, poverty 
and residential isolation.
697
 Owing to these circumstances, which prompted most Dominicans 
of Haitian origin to use the late birth declaration procedure, they were systematically 
prevented from obtaining nationality.  
The interplay between ethnic origin, poverty and place of residence underpinned the Court’s 
account of why most Dominican mothers of Haitian origin resorted to such late birth 
registration procedures. As the Court noted, they did so because they usually gave birth at 
home, given the difficulty of traveling to the hospitals in the cities, their limited financial 
resources, and out of fear of making themselves known to state officials and being 
deported.
698
 The same compounded disadvantages also explained why most of those families 
could not provide the documents required to obtain nationality, as these included identity 
cards and marriage certificates that they did not have. The Court assessed the seriousness of 
the ensuing rights restrictions through the prism of the best interests of the child and of the 
special vulnerability of the applicants as girl children.
699
 It thus examined all the allegations in 
light of Article 19 ACHR (rights of the child) and drew attention to the seriousness of 
hindering the girls’ education.  
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While this emergent intersectional approach somewhat folded into a finding of direct 
discrimination, mainly on the basis of migration status,
700
 it resurfaced in the Court’s 
reference to the vulnerable situation of the applicants and in the reparation orders. In fact, the 
Court had described such vulnerability by virtue of the confluence of several disadvantages,
701
 
and not just on account of their ethnic origin or migration status. As to the reparations, the 
state was required to ‘take into consideration the particularly vulnerable situation of 
Dominican children of Haitian origin’ when regulating late birth registration.702 The Court 
spelled this requirement out. Basically, the applicants and other children like them were 
entitled to a much more flexible system of birth registration. The documents required should 
be only those essential for establishing that the birth occurred in the Dominican Republic; the 
identification of the parents could not be restricted to the presentation of identity cards; and 
the whole procedure should be standardised so as to limit the discretion of state officials.
703
 
Interestingly, this remedial formula seems to be best suited to a finding of indirect – instead of 
direct – discrimination, since the Court went beyond demanding adherence to the legal 
framework within which the situation of the girls fell. It actually required flexibility and the 
introduction of some ‘exceptions’ to the general regulations on birth certificates. In this way, 
the Court attempted to tackle the specific violations arising from the applicants’ intersecting 
identities and overlapping vulnerabilities.  
Although the other case concerning an individual applicant, Lopez Alvarez v. Honduras,
704
 
addressed violations related to his ethno-cultural identity only, we may nonetheless reflect 
upon the potential benefits of an intersectional perspective to cases like this. Mr Lopez 
Alvarez, who belonged to the Garifuna ethnic minority and was an activist for the rights of 
black and indigenous peoples, was charged with drug trafficking and remained deprived of his 
liberty for more than six years. While in prison, he was prevented from speaking in his mother 
tongue with other Garifuna inmates and visitors, for ‘security reasons’. The judgment, which 
underlined the applicant’s right to use a language constitutive of his identity, does not provide 
sufficient elements to explore the integration of an intersectional approach.
705
 However, it is 
interesting to note that intersectionality is useful for illuminating the harsher law enforcement 
treatment encountered by men from ethnic minorities, like the applicant. This treatment, as 
well as their higher rates of detention, is very often expression of what scholars have called 
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‘gendered racism’.706 To put it simply, this makes it possible to account for the fact that men 
from minority backgrounds may face interference with their rights not only by virtue of their 
ethnic origin, but also on account of gender insofar as it is their 'maleness’ that is seen as, for 
example, dangerous and in need of restraint. In the case of Mr Lopez Alvarez, this was 
compounded by his position as a community leader and human rights defender, in retaliation 
for which he had been imprisoned.  
Overall, the analysis made thus far provides us with a number of useful indications about the 
actual and potential implications of a more comprehensive approach to applicants in cultural 
diversity cases before the Inter-American Court. First, in indigenous community cases such a 
perspective draws attention to the situation of individual members who are likely to be 
sidelined by a collective and cultural identity approach to the case. Second, for both collective 
and individual cases, an intersectional perspective could offer (a) a more accurate account of 
the causes of the rights interferences (as seen in Yean and Bosico); and (b) a normative 
ground for applying differentiated standards dictated by specific norms (such as children’s 
rights and socio-economic rights in Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa, or customary norms in 
Aloeboetoe) or by giving additional weight to certain harms and risks in the proportionality 
analysis (as happened with the lack of education, name and nationality in the case of girls 
Yean and Bosico). Finally, a more integrated view of rights holders would also facilitate (c) 
the devising of appropriate remedies for individual members and intra-group segments (as 
discussed in relation to Aloeboetoe and Operation Genesis v. Colombia).  
Finally, it is interesting to observe that several of the aforementioned attempts to capture the 
multiple positioning of some indigenous/Afro-descendant community members take the form 
of an emphasis on sub-groups (e.g. indigenous children and indigenous women). Considering 
that the Court’s case law on indigenous/tribal people also emphasises their group 
distinctiveness and ‘special’ characteristics, one may wonder whether the attention paid to 
subgroups in need of heightened protection reinforces an analysis too concerned with their 
own particularities. Such a view may fall short of challenging structural barriers and 
underlying inequalities, as propounded by intersectionality theory. In this vein, we may note, 
on the one hand, that the way the Court applies the notion of vulnerability to indigenous 
people, and to some members in particular, seems to lessen that risk. As discussed below, the 
Court has often associated the condition of vulnerability of indigenous communities and its 
members with exclusion, violence and institutional deficits. Moreover, it has addressed the 
specific or differentiated forms of violation encountered by some community members rather 
than simply pointing at their characteristics. One the other hand, however, it is puzzling that 
questions of structural discrimination have been little discussed in collective indigenous cases. 
Subsection IV. 1.2 infra further explores this issue.  
 
1.3. An intersectional approach beyond the anti-discrimination review  
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Having discussed the Court’s overtures and closures in regard to the multiple identities and 
social locations of indigenous and Afro-descendant applicants, it is time to ask: what about 
the relationship between an intersectional approach and anti-discrimination law? As discussed 
in the context of the European Court, allegations pointing at multiple axes of disadvantage are 
likely to bring about issues of intersectional and indirect discrimination. However, in the 
ethno-cultural diversity cases examined by the Inter-American Court, that link has taken a 
singular fashion, that is, an analysis along the lines of vulnerability. It should be noted, to start 
with, that in cases concerning collective land claims, the role of equality and non-
discrimination analysis has been rather limited. The restricted application of non-
discrimination clauses, further discussed infra IV. 1.2, also holds true for the judgments in 
which the Court engaged with some intersectional reasoning. It was in individual cases that 
the Court elaborated more on equality and discrimination. And yet, only in Yean and Bosico 
was there an emergent intersectional approach, which nonetheless was addressed through 
single-ground discrimination. Overall, the move towards a more comprehensive 
understanding of the applicants’ experience in both this case and in the few collective 
judgments examined above appears to be connected more to the notion of vulnerability than 
to equality and non-discrimination.  
In fact, several of the Court’s considerations on vulnerability situated applicants as facing 
heightened risks as a result of ‘special’ or ‘extreme’ vulnerability as well as overlapping 
sources of vulnerability. For this reason, the Court raised the standard of diligence required 
from the state, applied norms tailored to the specific identities and situations of the applicants 
and imposed special measures to redress those deemed most vulnerable. To differing degrees, 
all this resonates with intersectionality thinking in law. The decision to use the concept of 
vulnerability rather than non-discrimination as a vehicle for intersectionality considerations 
may have to do with the perception that vulnerability represents a closely related yet ‘more 
comprehensive approach with respect to the prevalent discrimination theory’.707 If the Court 
effectively resorts to vulnerability as a way to be freed from the constraints of group-identity 
grounds of discrimination and its difficulties in accounting for relations of privilege and 
disempowerment,
708
 then it makes perfect sense to find intersectionality concerns clothed in 
the language of vulnerability. The move is surprising, though, since the Inter-American Court 
has distanced itself from the dominant formal paradigm of equality and non-discrimination to 
endorse a substantive/structural conception of this principle.
709
 So long as such a conception 
is preoccupied with the actual subordination of some parts of the population, as well as with 
the social institutions and structural barriers that sustain it, it is well suited to engaging in 
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intersectionality analysis. Nevertheless, as will be seen below, it is the equality and non-
discrimination framework that is generally underused in the community-oriented cases 
studied here. 
I will now turn to a further dimension of individual rights holders which is often reduced in 
adjudication: their agency. As we have seen already, human complexity flows not only from 
their multiple identities and social locations, but also from the way their agency and social 
embeddedness unfolds in real life. Put simply, viewing rights holders as fully autonomous in 
certain areas and as devoid of agency in others does not do justice to their lived experience. 
Most of the time, individuals’ autonomy is somewhere in between, unfolding according to 
time and context. Ignoring this complexity could lead judges to paternalism, to attributing 
meanings to individual’s choices, to reinforcing stereotypes or to taking misplaced normative 
stances. How much of this can be found in the Inter-American Court’s case law regarding 
ethno-cultural difference?  
 
2. Problematising the ‘either/or’ view of individuals’ agency and choice 
Unlike some of the ECtHR’s rulings previously examined, the general discourse of the Inter-
American Court has not portrayed applicants or other rights holders as unencumbered subjects 
with regard to socio-economic or cultural matters. It has generally remained distant from the 
rhetoric of available choices for applicants to avoid or mitigate the rights interferences they 
have complained of. Its reasoning in cases such as Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa is illustrative 
of this.
710
 Yet, as explained earlier, acknowledging that individuals’ autonomy is shaped or 
limited by social relations and structures should not lead to denial of their agency. Both 
conditions can, and actually do, often coexist within our human complexity. This is, however, 
an issue which the Inter-American Court has seemingly struggled with, particularly when it 
comes to economic matters.  
In the context of its culturally sensitive interpretation of Article 21 ACHR, the Court has 
strongly defended the autonomy of indigenous communities. Throughout the cases studied, it 
has recognised their right to decide on matters that may affect them. Indigenous peoples 
should be given timely information and consulted and in some circumstances their consent is 
even required.
711
 The Court has furthermore condemned the state’s failure to recognise the 
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collective legal personality of indigenous and tribal peoples (Article 3 ACHR).
712
 Though it is 
argued that the Court, like many other international bodies, has fallen short of fully 
recognising indigenous peoples’ right to (collective) self-determination,713 it has certainly 
made significant steps in that direction. This is particularly apparent in the Saramaka 
judgment, in which it interpreted Article 21 as ‘calling for the right of members of indigenous 
and tribal communities to freely determine and enjoy their own social, cultural and economic 
development’.714 A similar reading along the lines of self-determination also features in most 
recent judgments, further discussed below, which elaborate on indigenous peoples’ right to 
effective participation under Article 23 (‘Right to Participate in Government’).715  
But against this backdrop, a sort of paradox can be discerned: the Court, at the same time, has 
found that indigenous applicants somehow lack the agency required to manage by themselves 
the reparations granted by the Court. In the Court’s early jurisprudence on indigenous rights, 
the problem arose specifically with regard to one modality of reparation. This is the creation 
of a trust fund (as a remedy for collective moral damage or as a means of redressing both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage) for developing educational, housing and other 
programmes for the benefit of the victims and their communities. In doing so, the Court 
provided a detailed scheme for its operation. Notably, it set up its managing committee while 
defining the exact fate of the resources.  
The aforementioned reparation judgment in Aloeboetoe provides the most worrisome example 
of the tension between such a practice and recognition of the applicants’ agency. In this case, 
the Court ordered the state to deposit its economic compensation in a trust fund composed of 
members appointed by the Court itself. Then, it instructed: ‘the adult beneficiaries may 
withdraw up to 25% (twenty-five percent) of the sum due to them at the time that the 
Government of Suriname makes the deposit. The trust fund for the adults shall be set up with 
the remaining funds […] semiannual withdrawals shall be permitted.’716 How is this remedial 
scheme to be reconciled with the individual autonomy of indigenous people? The Court’s 
paternalist approach seems to convey a stereotyped view of indigenous adults, who are, under 
assumptions of inability or incapability, stripped of autonomy.
717
 While this paternalism was 
certainly lessened in subsequent cases, for a while difficulties persisted.  
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In cases such as Awas Tingni, Moiwana, Yakye Axa and Saramaka, to mention just some, the 
Court again ordered similar community development funds. This time, the appointment of the 
fund’s administrative committee was left to the parties.718 Although the new system assured 
the victims of some degree of involvement, it fell short of the applicants’ demands for 
intervention. They pledged to be informed, to cooperate with and to consent to the design and 
execution of the development programmes.
719
 Yet, the Court only got close to that in 
Saramaka, where it held that the implementation committee ‘shall consult with the Saramaka 
people before decisions are taken and implemented’.720 This case aside, the fund scheme only 
recognised a limited legal capacity for the applicants to make decisions about their own 
reparations. Coupled with the Court’s protection of ‘traditional’ activities, the Court’s 
approach risked fostering stereotypes and differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ as economic 
agents. Scholars have noted that before indigenous cases the fund mechanism had only been 
used for the compensation of children;
721
 that in indigenous cases ‘the Court's monetary 
reparations frequently disappoint’;722 and that individuals get little economic compensation.723 
Put together, this means that indigenous/Afro-descendant individuals have rarely had the 
option to dispose of their reparations as other victims of human rights violations do.  
In this context, the Court’s radical change of approach in the 2012 case of Sarayaku cannot 
but be welcome. The Court, remarkably, held that the sum awarded for non-pecuniary damage 
‘may be invested as the People see fit, in accordance with its own decision-making 
mechanisms and institutions’.724 This position has since been maintained.725  
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3. A broad view of other rights holders  
Up to this point, most of the discussion has revolved around applicants. But we know that 
they do not stand alone and that what they claim for themselves usually affects others. Most 
of the cases discussed here are no exception to this rule. As such, we may ask: which rights 
holders are seen by the Inter-American Court? Does it integrate in its analysis the situation of 
rights holders other than the applicants for the purposes of deciding the cases studied? And 
what would be gained by doing so? 
 
3.1. Other communities and individuals affected 
The judgements dealing with individual allegations of ethno-cultural based violations show a 
Court ready to see and consider other rights holders, in particular, those who are like the 
applicants. This is aptly demonstrated by the allusions to other children and adults of Haitian 
descent in the case of Yean and Bosico; and to the rights of other members of the Garifuna 
community who were imprisoned in Lopez Alvarez. In both cases, the seriousness of the 
interference was viewed in the light of the prejudicial effects it had on the dignity and 
inclusion of those other individuals. By contrast, the situation of rights holders whose 
interests stand in opposition to the interests of the applicants and others like them was not 
discussed. This made sense, though. There were no claims or evidence suggesting that 
granting nationality or allowing the use of a minority language would have severed the rights 
of other individuals or groups.  
In judgments concerning collective rights claims, however, the rights of other rights holders 
have virtually always been at issue. But in these cases, where the applicants are the 
indigenous community and its individual members, the attention given to a larger array of 
rights holders has been incremental. In particular, there are two types of rights holder whose 
visibility has been progressively increased. In the first place, there are indigenous or rural and 
collective-oriented communities who have similar and yet competing rights claims to those of 
the applicants. Whether the Court has taken into account the way in which its interpretation or 
solution in a case would affect them is not always clear. By the time of Awas Tingni, this was 
already an issue. The state argued that finding for the applicants would set aside the interests 
of other indigenous communities living in the territories reclaimed. The Court succinctly 
responded to this argument by holding that the communal rights recognised to the Awas 
Tingni community were ‘without detriment to the rights of other indigenous communities’.726 
The statement fell short of explaining what that meant in practice. And eventually, conflicting 
rights claims from neighbouring communities proved to be a major challenge for the 
implementation of the Court’s judgment.727  
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Greater consideration for those other rights holders, and even an attempt to anticipate conflict, 
would nonetheless be shown in subsequent cases. In Moiwana, the Court ordered the state, by 
way of reparation, to demarcate and title the applicant’s ancestral lands with the full 
participation not only of the Moiwana community, but also of the neighbouring communities 
and villages.
728
 In more recent cases, such as Kaliña and Lokono and Garífuna Punta Piedra 
Community, the Court elaborated further on this concern. It required the state to respect the 
rights of other indigenous and tribal communities living in the same area claimed by the 
applicants and to develop, in agreement with the communities concerned, rules for their 
peaceful coexistence in the territory.
729
 Overall, when other indigenous communities are 
considered by the Court, this seems to impact on the implementation of the judgment rather 
than on the interpretation and findings of the Court.  
In the second place, the rights of other individuals have often been at stake. These are private 
owners or users of the disputed ancestral lands. Typically, these rights holders would come 
into play when the Court analysed whether the interferences with ancestral lands were aimed 
at achieving a legitimate aim, such as protecting ‘the rights of others’. But the threefold test of 
legality, legitimate aim and necessity has not featured strongly in indigenous land 
judgments.
730
 In fact, attention to balancing was lacking in many of the judgment studied. 
Since Yakie Axa, however, the necessity test seems to have gradually gained application.
731
 
Over time, the Court has thereby taken into account the competing rights claims from third 
parties, who are normally non-indigenous. According to the Court, their private property 
deserves equal protection under Article 21 ACHR. Therefore, the land claims of indigenous 
communities have no priority per se. It is the state and not the Court that is called on to decide 
whose property rights are to prevail.
732
 The Court has nonetheless pointed out that existing 
private property is not a sufficient reason to deny restitution to indigenous peoples. At the 
same time, it has accepted the provision of alternative lands under certain circumstances, 
which include evidence that expropriation options have been seriously evaluated.
733
 Still, the 
ultimate fate of the lands does not change the conclusion that when a state grants private titles 
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to disputed lands while knowing of existing indigenous territorial claims, it will likely engage 
its international responsibility.
734
  
Irrespective of the concrete standpoint taken by the judgments in dealing with the above 
questions, the examples reviewed demonstrate that regard for the situation of other affected 
rights holders provides a number of relevant insights for the resolution of the cases. For 
example, the fact that other indigenous or tribal communities could be prejudiced in the 
enjoyment of their land rights is a factor that may influence not only the reparations orders, 
but also the scope of the rights to be accorded. It may reshape the rights to delimitation and 
titling recognised for indigenous peoples (e.g. favouring flexible boundaries and usages, 
resembling customary practices). It may also lead the Court to apply participatory rights to 
these or other contested areas so as to secure a fair balance between the rights of the different 
indigenous communities; or it may provide a reason to defer to local solutions.  
At the same time, making these other rights holders (members of other indigenous 
neighbouring communities) visible also means that their position will be distinguished from 
that of individual private owners or users. For the rights of the latter are not supplemented by 
any specific regime of rights, nor do they have ties or needs similar to those that indigenous 
peoples have with their ancestral lands. Nevertheless, the specific characteristics and situation 
of these third parties may also be a matter for consideration. One such example is whether 
they are families whose homes and livelihoods are located in the ancestral lands, as in the case 
of the Garífuna Punta Piedra Community.
735
 Another is whether the occupation consists 
instead of holiday homes or hotels owned by those private actors, as in Kaliña and Lokono,
736
 
or whether they are national or transnational corporations which have obtained rights to 
exploit indigenous territories, as in several of the cases reviewed. These are all circumstances 
that change what is at stake for those actors and thus, the norms that may assist them vary 
accordingly. In the first example, the families would be protected by, for instance, the right to 
a home and guarantees against eviction, which would not assist the other third parties. As it 
transpires from this analysis, regard for rights holders other than the applicant is consistent 
with an inclusive view of human rights and is helpful for resolving the cases at hand. While 
the Court has progressively taken heed of those rights holders, it is yet to fully unpack the 
insights that their integration brings to the adjudication task. 
 
3.2. Seeing collective rights holders 
Finally, it is important to mention one last category of rights holders considered by the Court. 
This is the inclusion of indigenous peoples, collectively, among the bearers of Convention 
rights. Although this is something quite recent whose effects are yet to be clarified, its 
significance should not be understated. Until the Sarayaku case the Court had systematically 
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confined the status of rights holders just to the individual members of indigenous 
communities. This followed from the wording of Article 1.2 ACHR (Obligation to Respect 
Rights): ‘for the purposes of this Convention, “person” means every human being’, which has 
been traditionally interpreted as referring to individuals. Although Judge Vio Grossi had 
argued otherwise in his separate opinion in Xákmok Kásek,
737
 for the majority of the Court the 
legal subjectivity remained with the community members. With Sarayaku and subsequent 
judgments, however, the Court appears to have extended legal subjectivity to indigenous 
communities as groups. The shift features in the context of the interpretation not of Article 1 
ACHR, though, but of the notion of ‘injured party’ contained in Article 63(1) regarding 
reparations.
738
 With a view to awarding reparations, the Court has since affirmed that the 
indigenous peoples concerned and their members are both to be considered the injured 
party.
739
 Since an injured party is anyone who has been declared a victim of the violation of 
any right recognised in the Convention, it follows that only those who are holders of 
convention rights can be an injured party.  
If there was any doubt as to whether the above remarks actually amount to recognition of 
indigenous communities as collective bearers of Convention rights, this was recently clarified 
in an Advisory Opinion issued at the request of Panama.
740
 This state asked the Court whether 
legal persons or non-governmental entities legally recognised could be considered persons 
under Article 1.2 ACHR for the purposes of submitting allegations of violations and 
exhausting domestic remedies. One of the issues of special interest in this regard was the 
situation of indigenous communities. In its response, the Court ‘reiterates that it has already 
recognised indigenous and tribal communities as rights holders by virtue of the current 
evolution of international law on the matter’.741 These communities, ‘because of the particular 
situation in which they find themselves’, must be regarded as holders of certain human rights, 
that is, those whose enjoyment is necessarily collective.
742
 They can therefore directly resort 
to the Inter-American system without it being necessary to individualise each of their 
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members.
743
 According this status to collective subjects such as indigenous communities 
represents an outstanding enlargement of the range of rights holders thus far acknowledged by 
the Court. This is one of the most remarkable aspects of the integrated perspective to rights 
holders developed by the Court in the case law studied here.  
But an integrated view of human rights law is not only about rights holders, as already noted 
in the previous chapters. It is also about the way we think of the harms and norms involved in 
any given case. For present purposes, it is submitted that approaching these in an 
interconnected – or more holistic – fashion may provide valuable insights for the handling of 
cases dealing with issues of cultural difference and inclusion. This is analysed below. 
 
IV.  Integrated rights: cross-thinking about harms and norms 
1. Integrating redistribution and structural issues to recognition wrongs 
Since culture has been the main catalyser of the Court’s adjudication in indigenous and Afro-
descendant cases, it is not surprising that cultural harms hold special salience in its normative 
analyses. The Court has identified a broad range of ‘recognition’ issues: from injuries 
resulting from discriminatory treatment based on ethnic identity and national origin or 
migration status,
744
 to a lack of recognition of legal personality,
745
 and threats to the 
preservation of cultural practices, rituals and other elements.
746
 While the Court’s analysis of 
identity-related harms has striven to cater for the concerns of the applicants, it is clear that 
they did not exhaust the range of relevant grievances. Economic suffering was explicitly 
denounced by reference to public and private instances of land dispossession and 
exploitation.
747
 Likewise, where investment projects on ancestral lands were accepted without 
the meaningful participation of the communities concerned, political marginalisation was 
involved. As previously explained in the context of the European Court, the aim of this 
section is to explore whether and how the Inter-American Court integrated those harms into 
its analysis. Thereafter, the discussion will turn to the way this integration (or lack thereof) 
shaped the Court’s normative assessment of the cases.  
 
1.1. Indivisibility or invisibility in cases of ethno-cultural difference 
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Faced with a jurisprudence marked by questions of cultural recognition, to what extent has the 
Court accounted for what we have called ‘redistribution’ harms? In cases dealing with land 
claims, the Court has generally shown awareness of these harms. It has done so through two 
main avenues: its reparations awards and its merit analysis of violations of Article 4 ACHR 
(right to life). In terms of reparations, the Court has repeatedly ordered the state to return land, 
to grant titles and to ensure the communities’ effective enjoyment of the land and its 
resources. The Court has also requested the implementation of development funds and, in 
cases of economic exploitation of indigenous territories, a reasonable sharing of benefits has 
been imposed. All of these measures certainly cater for the redistribution harms experienced 
by the applicants.  
But while the socio-economic drive of reparations has been a constant, the socio-economic 
import of the Court’s analysis on the merits has been uneven. For the case law prior to 2009, a 
likely explanation for this is that the Court found itself lacking contentious jurisdiction over 
socio-economic rights others than those for which the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereinafter, ‘the Protocol of San Salvador’) explicitly granted it competence. These are 
Articles 8.1(a) and 13, which protect, respectively, the right to unionise and the right to 
education.
748
 In this reading, Article 26 ACHR (on the progressive development of economic, 
social and cultural rights) was supposedly not justiciable before the Court.
749
  
Thus, in the 2005 case of Yean and Bosico, a core part of the case was that the girls were 
denied their right to education as a result of discriminatory practices that prevented them from 
obtaining the birth certificates required for their school enrolment. The applicants invoked 
Article 26 ACHR in their petition
750
 (since the Dominican Republic was not a party to the 
Protocol of San Salvador). For the purposes of awarding compensation, the Court noted the 
harm caused to the girls by depriving them of the opportunity to access education.
751
 In the 
merits analysis, however, the impairment of the girls’ education was a side consideration in 
the context of the right to juridical personality (Article 3) and the right to a name (Article 18) 
ACHR. In this regard, Article 26 was taken in conjunction with Article 19 on children’s rights 
for hermeneutic purposes only. Melish criticises the Court’s decision in this case not to 
examine the violation of the right to education under Article 26 ACHR. She argues that this 
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stance has a concrete adverse effect, namely, that while the Court required the reform of the 
procedures for the granting of birth certificates, ‘it was silent on the necessary reforms to the 
regulatory norms governing public school registration’.752 Similarly, when ruling on the 
indigenous land cases of Yakye Axa and Xákmok Kásek, the Court made an interpretative 
reference to a number of socio-economic rights enshrined in the Protocol of San Salvador 
(which are further analysed below).  
However, in 2009 the Court issued a first judgment (unrelated to indigenous peoples) 
affirming its jurisdiction over all provisions in the ACHR, including Article 26.
753
 This 
arguably placed the Court in a position to examine allegations of violations of socio-economic 
rights on the basis of Article 26. Still, the Court has been rather reluctant to take this path in 
post-2009 land cases brought by indigenous peoples. In the case of Sarayaku, the applicants 
alleged a violation of Article 26 as well as of Article 23 (political rights) ACHR. The Court, 
however, refused to rule on those provisions and held that the alleged violations had been 
sufficiently analysed under the rights to communal property, consultation and cultural identity 
under Article 21 ACHR.
754
 As will be seen in Chapter 6, the scope of application of Article 26 
ACHR continues to be debated within the Court.  
Thus, in the context of its merits analysis, Article 4 ACHR (right to life) emerged as the 
clearest pathway for indirectly capturing the socio-economic grievances complained of by 
indigenous and tribal communities and their members. But this route has only been taken in 
three collective land cases. These are Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek, all of 
them involving indigenous communities from the Paraguayan Chaco. These cases were 
already introduced supra (III.1) and their factual circumstances were quite similar. Basically, 
indigenous communities of hundreds of people were either living on public roads or confined 
in a small part of their territory while awaiting the outcome of the proceedings they had 
initiated to reclaim their ancestral lands. Deprived of their lands and of their traditional means 
of subsistence, they all lived in extreme destitution and without access to the most basic 
services. The applicants alleged that members of the community had even died as a result. 
Besides the right to property, the Court examined the three cases under the right to life 
(Article 4 ACHR) reinterpreted as a right to dignified life or vida digna.
755
  
In Yakye Axa, the Court argued that states were bound to ‘generating minimum living 
conditions that are compatible with the dignity of the human person […] [avoiding] creating 
conditions that hinder or impede it’.756 Positive and concrete measures were required to fulfil 
this obligation, giving priority to those most vulnerable and at risk. Within this framework, 
the Court examined the applicant’s lack of access to food, health, housing, water, sanitation 
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and education.
757
 Further, it connected these deprivations with a threat to the applicant’s 
worldview and cultural identity.
758
 The Court implied the unsuitability of the alternatives for 
relocation offered by the state and concluded that the latter had failed to undertake measures 
to correct the conditions preventing the community members from having a decent life.
759
 In 
Sawhoyamaxa, the Court not only addressed the poor living conditions of the applicants 
(malnutrition, lack of medical care and of drinking water, etc.), but also accorded 
responsibility to the state for not preventing or avoiding the death of some community 
members, despite having been aware of the risks they were facing.
760
  
The Court returned to the dignified life analysis in Xákmok Kásek. Here, the Court even 
provided a detailed account of minimum standards regarding water, food, health and 
education. These it translated as well into reparation measures consisting of the provision of 
goods and basic services.
761
 The Court stressed that the lack of access to the community’s 
traditional lands ‘has led them to depend almost exclusively on State actions and be forced to 
live not only in a way that is different from their cultural patterns, but in squalor’.762 The 
IACtHR also referred to the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights’ view on 
how poverty restricts the ability of individuals and groups to access and contribute to cultural 
life and enjoy their own culture.
763
 Thus, even if only by focusing on minimum deliverables, 
the notion of vida digna proved to be a valuable avenue for capturing the socio-economic 
stakes of the cases. Also interesting about this approach is that it seems to integrate economic 
considerations without displacing cultural identity concerns. This is consistent with the 
premise that what a dignified existence requires necessarily varies across people, place and 
time.  
Overall then, the Court has engaged with the socio-economic rights and structural issues 
involved in the cases more through its remedial orders than through its merits analysis. 
Moreover, while the Court has aptly used Article 4 ACHR – in a few cases – as a vehicle to 
reinforce the indivisibility of rights, the underutilisation of Article 26 ACHR, a normative 
basis which supposedly enables the Court to enforce socio-economic rights directly, could 
bring more invisibility than indivisibility. As will be seen in the subsections below, other 
kinds of wrong have also found limited visibility in the Court’s case law on indigenous 
communities.  
 
1.2. Structural inequalities and non-discrimination clauses  
Another potential avenue for tackling structural inequalities affecting indigenous and other 
communities regarded as culturally different, as argued for the cases studied, is the use of 
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Articles 1.1 and 24 ACHR. These contain, respectively, a prohibition of discrimination in the 
enjoyment of convention rights and a right to equal protection of the law that extends beyond 
Convention provisions.
764
 The relevance of these provisions for the cases discussed is aptly 
reflected in the words of Anaya. As he explains, ‘the right of indigenous peoples to maintain 
the integrity of their cultures is a simple matter of equality, of being free from historical and 
ongoing practices that have treated indigenous cultures as inferior to the dominant 
cultures’.765 While the Court has viewed the experience of indigenous/Afro-descendant people 
from the perspective of patterns of discrimination and social inequality in individual cases,
766
 
that has been rare in its collective-oriented judgments. Nor have applicants in such cases, at 
least until recently, frequently articulated their claims in terms of racial or other forms of 
discrimination. 
Back in Awas Tingni, the Commission claimed, among other things, that ‘non-recognition of 
the equality of property rights based on indigenous tradition is contrary to the principle of 
non-discrimination set forth in article 1(1) of the Convention’.767 The Court, however, did not 
follow this road. Instead, as already mentioned, it elaborated on the need to protect the special 
cultural ties between indigenous communities and their ancestral lands. The communitarian 
tradition sustaining that relationship was recognised by the Court within the framework of 
Article 21 alone, a conclusion supported by reference to the Nicaraguan Constitution and 
indigenous customary laws.
768
 The equality concern nonetheless resurfaced in the concurring 
vote of Judge García Ramírez. In his view, denying other ways of using and enjoying property 
would create inequality for millions of people, who would be left unprotected by the 
Convention.
769
 A few years later, the Court did endorse an egalitarian approach to the 
indigenous claims raised in Yakye Axa, albeit only as a matter of ‘prior considerations’.770 In 
this context, the Court held that states must ensure, on an equal basis, full exercise and 
enjoyment of the rights of indigenous people. To do so, states ‘must take into account the 
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specific characteristics that differentiate the members of the indigenous peoples from the 
general population and that constitute their cultural identity’.771 The Court furthermore bound 
itself to the same commitment for the purposes of interpreting and applying the 
Convention.
772
  
The equality dimension was eventually incorporated into the analysis of the merits in the 
Sawhoyamaxa case, where the Court followed Judge García Ramírez’s opinion in Awas 
Tingni. The Court, acknowledging that the communal property of indigenous peoples ‘does 
not necessarily conform to the classic concept of property’, asserted that this deserved equal 
protection under Article 21 ACHR.
773
 Why? The Court not only pointed to the cultural 
protection grounds advanced in previous cases. This time, it added egalitarian reasons to the 
equation: ‘Disregard for specific versions of use and enjoyment of property, springing from 
the culture, uses, customs, and beliefs of each people, would be tantamount to holding that 
there is only one way of using and disposing of property, which, in turn, would render 
protection under Article 21 of the Convention illusory for millions of persons.’774 In other 
words, if the protection afforded by the ACHR was to be equally effective and meaningful to 
everyone, a collective reading of the right to property needed to be accepted. Doing otherwise 
would make indigenous peoples – and potentially other persons and communities – less equal 
in rights. This is reinforced by the fact that it is hard to decouple the struggles of indigenous 
and Afro-descendant individuals and groups from longstanding forms of racial discrimination 
in the Americas.
775
   
But equality and discrimination arguments have not travelled one way only. They have given 
rise to competing claims from states. Typically, the argument posits that securing the 
communal property rights of indigenous and tribal peoples would raise issues of 
discrimination for the rest of the population.
776
 The Court has found this claim to be without 
merit. In Saramaka, referring to, for example, the ECtHR case of Connors v. United Kingdom 
discussed in Chapter 3, the Court held that ‘unequal treatment towards persons in unequal 
situations does not necessarily amount to impermissible discrimination. Legislation that 
recognises said differences is therefore not necessarily discriminatory.’777 The Court went 
further and asserted that equality sometimes requires differentiated treatment. It then recalled 
that ‘special measures are necessary … in order to ensure [for indigenous and tribal peoples] 
their survival in accordance with their traditions and customs’.778 The Court’s use of the term 
‘special measures’ within the framework of equality reasoning, however, does not seem to 
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mean temporary measures aimed at achieving de facto equality for structurally discriminated 
groups, in a way similar to affirmative action.
779
 The reference appears, rather, to point to the 
positive steps that states should adopt to ensure that all human rights are effectively enjoyed 
by indigenous people, for which their particularities need to be taken into account.
780
  
In spite of its egalitarian reflections, the Court has rarely examined a violation of equality and 
non-discrimination provisions in indigenous land cases. Only in the aforementioned case of 
Xákmok Kásek did the Court find such a violation, partly echoing the pleadings of the 
Commission and the representatives in that case. The Court emphasised that states must 
refrain from creating, even if indirectly, situations of de jure or de facto discrimination. 
Furthermore, they are under an obligation to ‘adopt positive measures to reverse or change 
discriminatory situations that exist in their societies and that prejudice a specific group of 
people’.781 For the Court, the situation of extreme vulnerability experienced by the 
community and the lack of institutional support and of socio-economic services in the area, 
alongside a system of ownership which privileged the rights of private owners over those of 
indigenous communities, revealed de facto discrimination (although no discrimination ground 
was specified).
782
 Nevertheless, the interpretation did not last. In the 2014 case of the Kuna 
and Emberá Indigenous People, in a style reminiscent of its European counterpart, the 
IACtHR declined to pronounce on a similar allegation of violation of the right to equality 
under the law (Article 24 ACHR) and referred instead to its findings under the right to 
property and judicial protection.
783
 It should be noted that the Commission has also asserted 
racial discrimination in collective-oriented indigenous cases related to widespread acts of 
persecution and violence. However, the Court has not found itself in a position to agree with 
that (either because of material competence or because of lack of substantiation).
784
   
Could collective complaints of land destitution and marginalisation that are currently 
discussed under the cultural frame of property be instead or in addition addressed through the 
equality and non-discrimination clauses? If Articles 1.1 and 24 ACHR were read from a 
classical formal comparator perspective, those rights claims could barely be translated into the 
language of discrimination. A normative approach along the lines of substantive equality, 
however, could be suited to the task. Recall that substantive equality, inasmuch as it is 
concerned with social context and with challenging subordination, may require difference to 
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be accommodated, disadvantage to be redressed and institutions to be transformed.
785
 This 
makes the underutilisation of equality arguments more intriguing in this context since, as 
noted earlier, the Inter-American Court has enthusiastically embraced a structural conception 
of equality.
786
  
To the extent that this analysis is left underexplored, some opportunities could be missed. 
Notably, the equality prism might serve to capture an important part of the harm experienced 
by indigenous communities and their members which is not necessarily reflected in the 
protection of their culture or in the reparations awards, that is, harm related to structural 
inequality and racism. From another perspective, this line of reasoning could further clarify 
the reasons for and the limits of cultural accommodation within and beyond indigenous 
people’s cases. The idea that some cultural practices should be respected and protected 
because doing otherwise would lead to exclusion and to further discrimination enriches 
significantly the legal discourse on cultural identity. It also decreases the risk of attributing 
both the problems and the solutions debated in these cases to any group or culture. The 
jurisprudence examined thus far suggests that the Court has been in a position to moving in 
that direction, and has actually done so to some extent. Yet, the integration of this normative 
approach remains elusive for land-related cases.  
This attests to the importance of reviewing the comprehensiveness of the normative spectrum 
used by the Court to rule in ethno-cultural diversity cases. The following section aims at 
further problematising this matter.  
 
2. Avoiding norm reductionism and promoting awareness of legal pluralism 
How rich was the Court’s normative repertoire in the cases studied? As with the European 
Court, this question will be approached from the perspective of Convention and extra-
convention norms. From the perspective of the ACHR, it is convenient to distinguish again 
between cases brought by individuals and those litigated mainly on behalf of 
indigenous/Afro-descendant communities. In the latter, the range of Convention norms 
addressed by the Court appears to have been more limited. 
 
2.1. A more comprehensive approach to Convention norms 
It is clear by now that the entry point for litigating cases dealing with the collective territorial 
claims of indigenous and Afro-descendant people has been Article 21 ACHR (right to 
property reconceptualised in the light of indigenous cultural identity). What is more, this is 
the normative umbrella under which the Court has addressed manifold rights allegations. This 
does not mean downplaying the examination frequently conducted by the Court from the 
viewpoint of Articles 8 and 25 ACHR (the rights to a fair trial and to an effective remedy, 
respectively).
787
 Through these procedural provisions the Court has grappled with the general 
absence or inefficacy of domestic avenues for indigenous people to seek land restitution and 
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redress. Yet, the bulk of the substantive claims put forward by indigenous and Afro-
descendant people have fallen under Article 21 ACHR. Thus, similarly to the European case 
law discussed earlier, here too one Convention provision has become the protagonist of 
normatively complex cases.  
The difficulties associated with a cultural frame have already been explored in the previous 
sections, so there is no need to restate them here. The centrality of the right to property, 
however, deserves a few words. Antkowiak draws attention to the pitfalls of a normative 
analysis reduced to property rights. In his view, in the current state of affairs this is a weak 
basis for protecting indigenous peoples.
788
 He points to three main weaknesses. The first is the 
structure of the right itself: Article 21 ACHR authorises property deprivation and interference 
under a wide variety of circumstances. Secondly, other property-related cases (not concerning 
indigenous peoples) reveal a loose interpretation of the legitimate conditions for restricting 
the right.
789
 Finally, the author views the right to property as a framework that favours a 
‘minimalist’ approach to the safeguards owed to indigenous peoples, one limited to ensuring 
their cultural and physical survival.
790
   
What about other Convention provisions, then? In the subsection above I reviewed the 
normative roads not yet taken, or timidly explored, by the Court in indigenous collective 
cases. One is Article 26 ACHR on the progressive development of economic, social and 
cultural rights. The other is Article 1.1 and Article 24 on the right to equality and the 
prohibition of discrimination. It should be recalled, though, that the Court has tried out other 
normative frameworks in indigenous land cases.  
One outstanding example, not least because of its multidimensional character, is the right to 
life (Article 4 ACHR), cast as dignified life (vida digna). As previously discussed, this 
normative construction enabled the Court to integrate both cultural and socio-economic harms 
and look beyond issues of traditional practices.
791
 In addition, one may note the recent 
integration of the right to political participation (Article 23) into the Court’s analysis,792 a 
development that was preceded by the assertion of the indigenous communities’ right to have 
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In its judgment the Court focuses on Article 23.1(a).  
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their collective juridical personality recognised (under Article 3 ACHR).
793
 In Kaliña and 
Lokono v. Surinam, the Court incorporated Article 23 by virtue of the iura novit curia 
principle to examine the exclusion of the applicants from the management of the nature 
reserves located in their ancestral territories.
794
 The Court not only noted Suriname’s 
continued failure to recognise indigenous collective land rights. It also found that the state had 
granted land titles to non-indigenous people, established three nature reserves and allowed 
mining on the Kaliña and Lokono ancestral territory. The Court justified the application of 
Article 23 in the following terms: ‘the participation of the indigenous communities in the 
conservation of the environment is not only a matter of public interest, but also part of the 
exercise of their right as indigenous peoples “to participate in decision-making in matters 
which would affect their rights, […] in accordance with their own procedures and […] 
institutions”.’795  
Article 23 thereby seems to come closer to the vindications of political autonomy usually 
made under the still contested right to self-determination,
796
 albeit not without opposition.
797
 
The Court did not go as far, though. The violation finding was a procedural one. For the 
Court, ‘no violation has been constituted by the lack of exclusive management and monitoring 
of the nature reserves by the indigenous peoples’.798 A violation arose, however, from ‘the 
absence of explicit mechanisms that guarantee the access, use and effective participation of 
the Kaliña and Lokono indigenous peoples in the conservation of the said nature reserves and 
the benefits these reserves yield’.799 Still, this represents an interesting enlargement of the 
Court’s normative sight. In fact, when indigenous peoples were concerned, the participation 
rights enshrined in Article 23 had been either absent or narrowly applied. At first, they had 
only been applied to restrictions on political participation sensu stricto, i.e. the impossibility 
of running for election in Yatama v. Nicaragua. And later, in Sarayaku, the Court refused to 
examine separately an allegation of violation of Article 23 in relation to their lack of 
participation in matters that affected the indigenous community.
800
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The participation mechanisms protected on the basis of Article 23, as applied in Kaliña and 
Lokono, were directly linked with the right of indigenous people to prior informed 
consultation,
801
 until then recognised on the grounds of the right to property (Article 21). The 
relevance of this normative move goes beyond legal technicalities. Grounding the right to 
consultation in the right to political participation enshrined in Article 23 may have important 
practical effects for indigenous communities and for other people. For indigenous 
communities and their members, such interpretation could provide a stronger basis for 
participation rights (including prior informed consultation or even consent) in the face of the 
weaknesses of Article 21 identified by Antkowiak. Of note, the effective participation of 
indigenous communities would no longer be confined to development projects affecting their 
(cultural) way of life within their ancestral territories. For groups and individuals other than 
indigenous people, in turn, the above reading of Article 23 could actually allow them to 
benefit from a right to consultation on matters that may affect them. This would mean, in 
other words, opening up consultation-like rights to potentially all kinds of people whose rights 
could be undermined by intrusive public or private projects, at least under certain conditions.  
But if the Court’s normative repertoire has been, at least for a while, relatively limited when it 
comes to the Convention rights applied in ethno-cultural difference cases, the opposite occurs 
with extra-Convention norms. The readiness of the Inter-American Court to resort to and use 
a wide range of ‘external’ norms to respond to ethno-cultural claims is perhaps one of the 
best-known features of this line of case law. Now it is time to elaborate on this point. How the 
Court justifies this practice, which weight it accords to extra-Convention laws and what 
problems and opportunities arise along the way are some of the questions explored below.  
 
2.2. Integrating domestic and international norms through the living instrument and 
the pro-personae principles 
The Awas Tingni judgment, the first to address indigenous culturally motivated claims on the 
merits, yielded the basis of the Court’s innovative interpretation of Article 21 ACHR. These 
are the living instrument doctrine and the pro-personae principle.
802
 In Awas Tingni v. 
Nicaragua, the Court started by recalling that the drafters of the Convention decided to refer 
to the ‘use and enjoyment of his property’ instead of ‘private property’.803 Then it went on to 
hold that ‘human rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the 
evolution of the times and, specifically, to current living conditions’.804 Importantly, the Court 
relied on Article 29(b) of the Convention. Pursuant to this, ‘no provision may be interpreted 
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as restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the 
laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a 
party’.805 That is, the interpretation of human rights provisions had to be pro-personae. 
Nicaragua was not a party to ILO Convention No. 169 at the time and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples had not yet been adopted. The Court 
referred, however, to the Constitution of Nicaragua, which explicitly recognised the 
communal property of Atlantic Coastal Communities.
806
 On this basis, the Court concluded 
that the right to property protected by Article 21 ACHR included the collective property of 
members of indigenous communities. 
This interpretation of Article 21 was further developed and upheld regardless of whether 
national legislation enshrined the right of indigenous peoples to collective property. This was 
the case in Moiwana v. Suriname,
807
 the judgment on tribal land rights that came after Awas 
Tingni. In finding for the applicants, the Court appeared to support its interpretation, on the 
one hand, by drawing on the idea that Article 21 ACHR had an autonomous meaning which 
included, since Awas Tingni, collective forms of use and ownership. On the other, and 
perhaps more notably, the Court relied on indigenous and tribal customary norms and 
traditional practices.
808
 Later, in deciding the cases of Saramaka
809
 and Kaliña and Lokono 
Peoples,
810
 both against Suriname, the Court took an additional path to support its conclusion 
that Suriname was under an obligation to recognise and secure the tribal peoples’ collective 
land rights. It applied the pro-personae principle and resorted to general treaties ratified by 
Suriname, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
811
 The Court read 
Article 21 ACHR in the light of Article 1 common to both Covenants (right to self-
determination) as well as of Article 27 ICCPR (minorities’ rights).812 By virtue of Article 
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29(b) ACHR, the Court found itself ‘unable to interpret the provisions of Article 21 [ACHR] 
in a sense that would limit the enjoyment and exercise of the rights recognized by Suriname in 
these covenants’.813  
 
Throughout the Court’s case law, Article 29(b) ACHR and the living instrument doctrine have 
become general principles of interpretation.
814
 Moreover, as Medina notes, ‘dynamism and 
the pro persona rule provide judges with ample scope for a very creative interpretation’.815 
And indeed, both principles combined, often identified with an ‘evolutionary interpretation’, 
enabled the Court to take on board not just the indigenous ‘rights-protective’ laws of state 
parties, but also international human rights instruments outside the Inter-American System. 
Among these are general treaties such as those mentioned above but also specific treaties such 
as ILO Convention No. 169, which the Court has used in several cases since Yakye Axa.
816
 
However, it is noteworthy that the Court does not limit its normative exploration to binding 
instruments ratified by the respondent state. The Court has additionally considered soft law, 
such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, to mention just two.
817
  
Naturally, the integration of international sources has extended to the rulings and observations 
issued by the monitoring bodies overseeing the treaties in question.
818
 The views of, for 
example, the Human Rights Committee, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people and the CERD Committee were 
particularly influential in the Court’s approach to investment projects in indigenous lands, 
such as those discussed in Saramaka v. Suriname.
819
 The three safeguards required by the 
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Court to ensure that private concessions within indigenous ancestral territories do not 
undermine their subsistence (effective participation, benefit-sharing and impact assessment), 
as well as the obligation to ensure the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous 
communities to major development projects, were both attributed to the standards developed 
by those and other international bodies.
820
 The numerous instruments, principles and decisions 
invoked by the Court have certainly been an important driving force for the recognition of 
specific rights and safeguards not provided for by the text of the ACHR. The most recent 
example of the normative impact of international sources upon the interpretation adopted by 
the Court is the extension of legal subjectivity to indigenous communities themselves. As 
already noted, for a long time the Court had only recognised individual community members 
as holders of Convention rights, although it frequently addressed the situation of the collective 
through its reparations.
821
 The Sarayaku case, however, marked a turning point. Relying on 
Article 1 of the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 
3.1 of ILO Convention No. 169 and General Comments of the Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights,
822
 the Court held:  
On previous occasions […] the Court has declared violations to the detriment of the members of 
indigenous or tribal communities and peoples. However, international law on indigenous or tribal 
communities and peoples recognizes rights to the peoples as collective subjects of international law and 
not only as members of such communities or peoples. In view of the fact that indigenous or tribal 
communities and peoples, united by their particular ways of life and identity, exercise some rights 
recognized by the Convention on a collective basis, the Court points out that the legal considerations 
expressed or indicated in this Judgment should be understood from that collective perspective.
823
 
It is submitted that the principle vested in 29(b) ACHR provides the Court with a strong 
ground for dismissing interpretations or solutions that are less rights-protective than those 
provided by other treaties ratified by the respondent state, and by the monitoring bodies 
supervising those treaties. However, its use with regard to soft law instruments or decisions 
that are not binding upon the respondent state appears less convincing, especially when major 
normative consequences follow from it. Neuman, for example, is quite critical of the Court’s 
general practice of considering an ‘ever-expanding “corpus juris” of binding and non-binding 
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norms’ (beyond the case law on indigenous rights).824 The reasons for his criticism are varied. 
One of them is the equal value the Court seems to attribute to all those norms for the purpose 
of defining the states’ obligations under the ACHR. Another relevant problem he identifies is 
the way this practice has been accompanied by a disregard for the consent expressed by the 
regional community of states.
825
 In his view, ‘ignoring the role of the states raises issues both 
of legitimation and of effectiveness’.826 
 
2.3. Disregarding Consensus? 
To be sure, international standards are not the only extra-Convention norms considered by the 
Court. The normative systems of the American states have also had a place in the Court’s case 
law on indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples, albeit in a more modest fashion. Besides 
examining the domestic laws of the respondent state, as the Court has done since Awas 
Tingni, the Court has incrementally looked at the laws of other states too. It did so, for 
instance, when examining the question of the obligation to consult indigenous peoples in 
Sarayaku. Note that this was one of the main issues debated in this case. The Kichwa of 
Sarayaku were recognised by Ecuador as indigenous peoples and granted collective land 
rights accordingly. Nevertheless, the state authorised oil concessions over part of their 
ancestral territories without, as argued by the applicants, their consent or consultation. 
Asserting that several OAS States had incorporated the ILO standards on consultation rights 
via legislation and high court rulings,
827
 the Court referred to Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.
828
 The Court added that 
similar developments had taken place in countries which had not ratified ILO Convention No. 
169, such as Canada, the United States and New Zealand. This indicated, so argued the Court, 
that ‘the obligation to consult, in addition to being a treaty-based provision, is also a general 
principle of international law’.829  
A similar approach was taken in Kuna and Emberá. Restitution of the communities’ ancestral 
lands was not possible in this case as a result of the flooding caused by a hydroelectric dam 
constructed in their territory. Although Panama had undertaken to provide the applicants with 
alternative lands, the claimants argued that the state had failed to demarcate, title and protect 
such lands from occupation and illegal logging, which was confirmed by the Court. In this 
context, the Court referred to the laws of several OAS states under the jurisdiction of the 
Court that had, in some way, incorporated a state obligation to delimit, demarcate and title 
indigenous lands.
830
 This, according to the Court, evidenced recognition of said obligations. 
Furthermore, this was in line with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
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which had been approved, the Court pointed out, by Panama.
831
 Later in the same judgment, 
the Court resorted again to the laws of several countries of the region (save for one, the same 
states it had mentioned earlier), which included, in some way, the inalienability and 
imprescriptibility of indigenous lands.
832
 Similar reasoning was adopted by the Court in the 
case of Garífuna Punta Piedra Community and its members v. Honduras. Observing the lack 
of clear title of the indigenous community following the occupation of their lands by third 
parties, the Court even held that it had ‘verified an international consensus’ with respect to 
the inalienability and imprescriptibility of indigenous territories. The Court noted that 
regulations in that vein existed in a number of American states.
833
 The norms and judicial 
decisions of these and other American states (most but not all of which were parties to the 
Convention) were once more considered by the Court to reaffirm the binding character of the 
obligation to consult indigenous peoples.
834
  
The appeal to existing relevant norms in countries from the American region and the recent 
use of the term ‘consensus’ might remind us of the regional consensus inquiry applied by the 
European Court. Yet, on a closer look there is not so much resemblance. Although the Court’s 
recent judgments show an increased interest in supporting its interpretations on the basis of 
domestic norms, the use of the term ‘consensus’ may still be far from a consistent attempt to 
embed Inter-American judgments in domestic legal systems.
835
  
To start with, the concept of ‘regional consensus’ has so far remained alien to the Court’s 
lexicon (at least in the cases reviewed). Secondly, there has been no indication as to whether 
and how the Court ascertains the varied scope and content of the cited regulations. In 
Sarayaku, for example, the laws and decisions referenced were quite varied in character. 
Some recognised a right of indigenous peoples to be consulted; others conferred a relatively 
vague right to participate or to have their views heard and considered, while they also differed 
in their ambit of application.
836
 The Court simply summarised the normative diversity by 
saying that those laws and decisions ‘refer to the importance of consultation or of communal 
property’.837 The unaddressed variety among the regulations invoked in other cases is implied 
in the Court’s assertion that such norms recognise or incorporate ‘in some way’ the standards 
in question. Thirdly, the comparative law review conducted by the Court appears rather 
unsystematic and selective. As the judgments discussed above demonstrate, the Court has 
brought together domestic norms from member states (most Latin American countries), from 
non-member states (the United States and Canada) and even from countries as distant as New 
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Zealand.
838
 And despite the differences, it is not clear what weight is accorded to each of 
them. More importantly, all of the Court’s allusions to domestic laws and judicial decisions 
were aligned with the interpretation asserted by the Court. In other words, only those rulings 
and laws supporting a right to, for example, consultation and communal property in the terms 
defined by the Court were invoked. As Dulitzky critically shows, no account was taken of any 
domestic decision or law militating against the Court’s position. And the omission is not due 
to the absence of competing normative postulates at the domestic level.
839
  
Finally, another element in assessing the Court’s references to states’ normative orders is that 
this Court, in contrast to the ECtHR, rarely displays any deference towards respondent 
states.
840
 Instead of granting national actors any margin of discretion for being, in principle, 
better placed to assess the local implementation of human rights, the Court has developed the 
opposite doctrine, that is, the so-called ‘Conventionality Control’. According to the latter, all 
public authorities in a state, especially judges, have a duty to verify ex officio the 
compatibility between domestic norms or practices and the American Convention. That 
exercise should result in the non-application or invalidation of norms and interpretations that 
deviate from the ACHR and the Court’s interpretation thereof.841 This is not an uncontested 
device. It has been both prised and criticised. 
842
 For present purposes, however, it has been 
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of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the Inter-American Court. See Antonio Cançado Trindade, 
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Méndez and Francisco Cox (eds.), El Futuro del Sistema Interamericano de Protección a los Derechos Humanos 
(IIDH, 1998), at 582-583, 593.   
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used in just a few indigenous land cases and mainly for requesting, by way of reparations, 
changes in the content and application of domestic regulations on land and consultation 
rights.
843
  
A thorough exploration of the Conventionality Control is beyond the scope of this study. Nor 
is this the place to discuss the desirability of importing a European-like consensus or margin 
of appreciation into the Inter-American system. Actually, several factors could explain the 
Court’s vision of its virtual constitutional role and its caution or even scepticism about those 
devices.
844
 Obviously, the history of the system and the context in which it operates have been 
decisive.
845
 Also, to some degree the singular stance taken by the Court might be sustained by 
a mitigated sense of its own distance, as a supranational tribunal, from local reality. In fact, 
the Court’s practice of conducting in-situ visits, its extensive fact-finding work and its 
reliance on numerous expert opinions, all very much present in indigenous and Afro-
descendant cases, seem to contribute to the Court’s inclination to dispense with normative 
insights from the regional community of states. What nonetheless calls for reflection here is 
the extent to which the Court’s practices of normative integration might aim more at 
achieving uniformity under its lead than at at openly engaging with the network of domestic 
norms governing the human rights matters decided in San José. More importantly, the 
question arises as to whether such a stance would be the most fitting and effective for dealing 
with complex cases such as the ones discussed here.  
Having said this, I will now turn to the last layer of normativity frequently integrated by the 
Court into cases concerning indigenous/Afro-descendant communities.  
 
2.4. Integration of informal and tradition-based laws  
Another remarkable feature of the cross-fertilisation practice of the Inter-American Court in 
the cases studied is its deference towards customary law. As the previous sections 
demonstrate, indigenous peoples’ communal way of life, their specific modes of organisation, 
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religious rites and social norms have been considered by the Court since the earliest cases. 
Recall how the Court determined the beneficiaries of remedies in its reparation judgment in 
Aloeboetoe. Applying Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the 
Court noted that according to the rules generally accepted by most legal systems, a person’s 
successors are her ‘children’, ‘spouse’ and ‘relatives in the ascending line’.846 These terms, 
the Court argued, should be interpreted according to local law. But since in practice 
Surinamese law was not effective in the locality of the victims, whose family relations were 
instead governed by Saramaka law, the Court decided to use the latter for its interpretation of 
the terms referred to above.
847
 It thereby provided for the equal pecuniary compensation of 
more than one wife (in accordance with polygamy customs), regardless of the – lack of – 
marriage registration. In doing so, the Court also asserted limits to its accommodation. It 
stated that the Saramaka custom would be considered ‘to the degree that it does not contradict 
the American Convention. Hence, in referring to ‘relatives in the ascending line’ the Court 
shall make no distinction as to sex, even if that might be contrary to Saramaka custom.’848  
The references to customary law expanded in subsequent judgments. They were further used 
for defining the beneficiaries and modes of reparation under Article 63 of the Convention.
849
 
Later, customary law was also employed for interpreting Convention provisions in the merits 
analysis. Article 21 ACHR has been, as we have seen, the main ‘receptor’ of indigenous and 
tribal customary norms. The outcome of this line of reasoning is already known: the 
reconceptualisation of the right to property, now cast in collective terms, and its expansion 
through a set of sub-rights inspired by indigenous customary practices.
850
 In this vein, we 
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194 
 
should also note that the state obligation to consult indigenous and tribal peoples or to obtain 
their consent is particularly instrumental for the continuing actualisation and incorporation of 
customary norms.  
While the Court has referred abundantly to indigenous customary norms and has required 
states to accommodate it in the implementation of domestic and international law, it has not 
gone as far as to apply customary law as such. Giving legal force to unrecognised and non-
titled indigenous property based exclusively on indigenous customs and uses is perhaps one of 
the few examples of a direct import of indigenous customs. In fact, as it transpires from the 
previous sections, the Court has not applied customary rules of succession in the context of 
reparations, or community rules regulating the possession and use of the land and its 
resources. Nonetheless, the Court’s efforts to integrate indigenous normativity for 
interpretative purposes cannot be overstated.  
The way this layer of normativity has been integrated offers relevant insights into the reasons 
for and the consequences of incorporating customary norms in these cases. The why and how 
of the practice should first be placed in a regional context in which several American states 
formally recognise, in one way or another, indigenous customary laws. Actually, in many 
cases the Court’s regard for indigenous customs has been grounded in the state recognition of 
customary norms and collective land rights. In the few cases in which this was not so, as 
happened in Aloeboetoe and in other cases against Suriname (which does not recognise 
Saramaka customary law in its domestic order), the Court contented itself with noting that the 
state did not deny the existence of indigenous customary norms.
851
 Additionally, the Court’s 
extensive reliance on expert evidence from anthropologists, sociologists and other 
professionals has certainly played a crucial role in facilitating the incorporation of tradition-
based laws.
852
 The consideration of the cultural norms and traditions of indigenous people has 
also been justified by reference to egalitarian considerations, namely, a reading of Article 21 
that would not leave those people unprotected.
853
  
As to the consequences, to the extent that cultural practices and claims were recognised as 
expressions of customary laws, these carried additional weight in the normative analysis. In 
other words, the customary law character of land-related modes of living constituted a 
relevant ground for their accommodation. The same goes for the finding of indirect 
discrimination in the Yatama case. The Court did not hesitate in rejecting the indirect 
imposition of modes of political organisation unfamiliar to those dictated by indigenous 
customs. Consideration of these norms also enabled the Court to make the Convention 
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relevant to indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples. And as customary law was crucial for 
understanding the rights restrictions complained of and the implementation hurdles for the 
Court’s rulings, regard for customary norms may assist in these respects too. But it has yet to 
be seen how the Court will deal with other kinds of community norms and informal 
regulations in other types of claims of ethno-cultural difference.   
 
V. Concluding notes on Chapter 4 
From the set of judgments studied in this chapter, those involving collective land claims from 
indigenous and Afro-descendant rural communities are those most notably marked by 
discourses of ethno-cultural difference and identity. This has led to a normative approach that 
places emphasis on the traditional beliefs and practices of indigenous communities. While the 
Court has, on this basis, granted specific and even ‘novel’ rights that strive to cater for the 
needs and concerns of the people involved, this essentialism has also raised problems. Some 
of them are the potential socio-economic disempowerment of indigenous and tribal people 
and others who may want to benefit from the indigenous-rights framework; the potential 
exclusion, without sufficient justification, of other persons and groups who may seek similar 
legal protection; the risk of stereotyping those who are identified as indigenous or tribal; the 
glossing over of the specific concerns and disadvantages of some individuals and sub-groups; 
and the potential future difficulty of discerning which other cultural difference claims will be 
accommodated. Also of note is the fact that this cultural identity line of case law has at its 
core the right to property (Article 21 ACHR), which has operated as an umbrella norm. 
Within a rather limited normative range of Convention norms guided by Article 21 ACHR, 
the socio-economic and discrimination dimensions of the cases have often been 
underexplored in the merits analysis. This tends to support the view that a fragmented 
approach focused on group identity and culture usually risks obscuring other important 
aspects of the cases under review. Yet, the recent incorporation of the rights to political 
participation into the Court’s analysis of indigenous/tribal cases has come to enrich the 
normative repertoire typically used by the Court.   
Looking at cases dealing with issues of ethno-cultural difference from an integrated 
perspective adds some other interesting insights. With regard to rights holders, it is possible to 
note that while the Court has taken significant steps towards redressing collective harm, 
individuals should not be forgotten when individualised harm has been claimed and proven. 
Nevertheless, the Court has adopted a more comprehensive view of people belonging to 
indigenous/tribal communities, especially in judgments that are not so reliant on Article 21 
ACHR. Differentiated violations experienced by some indigenous members – notably women, 
children and the elderly – have occasionally been identified. A richer analysis of the 
positioning of indigenous and Afro-descendant applicants has also been facilitated by the 
notion of vulnerability, especially when applied in a compounded manner. As argued earlier, 
acknowledging the multiple positioning of applicants provides useful elements for, amongst 
others, the contextualisation of the violations, the proportionality analysis and the assessment 
of reparations. As regards the Court’s appreciation of the applicants’ agency, its case law 
shows an interesting evolution. At first, the autonomy of indigenous communities was 
accompanied by a disregard for the agency of its members for the purpose of reparations. This 
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has been amended in more recent cases. For its part, the range of rights holders considered by 
the Court in the cases examined is varied. The Court has only incrementally incorporated into 
its analysis the situation of communities and individuals with competing claims. Whether 
these claims and the position of those groups and persons are taken into account or not holds 
relevance not only for the implementation of the judgment but also for the interpretations and 
solutions advanced therein. The Court has nonetheless radically widened the range of rights 
holders traditionally ‘seen’ by recognising indigenous/tribal communities as collective rights 
holders.  
But where the Court’s affinity with a comprehensive perspective to human rights is perhaps 
most evident is at the level of normative integration of international and customary norms. 
Several international sources, of varied nature, have been integrated in the ethno-cultural 
cases reviewed here. Indigenous customary law has likewise attained weight in the merits and 
reparations analysis. For this, an evolutionary and dynamic interpretation (identified with the 
living instrument doctrine and the pro-personae principle) has been material. As to domestic 
law and normative regional consensus, however, the assessment is more mixed. On the one 
hand, domestic legislation and judicial decisions have been progressively considered by the 
Court. On the other, though, the Court has not fully engaged with the normative reality of the 
region. Notably, its approach has been rather selective and not fully inclusive, which may not 
be instrumental for addressing the complexities and controversies underlying the cases. Many 
of the opportunities and limitations derived from the Court’s discourse on ethno-cultural 
difference will probably be visible only once it gets to decide on claims concerning cultural 
identities and practices that are not as valued as those of indigenous people.  
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PART III 
*** 
EMBRACING COMPLEXITY: RETHINKING ECONOMIC DIFFERENCE FROM AN INTEGRATED 
PERSPECTIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
Introduction to Part III 
The third part of this study (Part III) is devoted to questions of socio-economic difference or, 
to be more precise, to rights claims associated with an experience of socio-economic 
disadvantage or poverty. As noted in the introductory chapter, the ability of human rights law 
to account for socio-economic difference has often been examined from the perspective of 
states, with a particular focus on those countries which struggle to achieve economic 
development. In this study, however, the attention is placed on rights holders. The focus is 
nonetheless on those who struggle more, those who are commonly regarded as ‘different’ 
from a class or socio-economic perspective. This does not imply acceptance of such 
discourses of deviance. On the contrary, by examining them the study also aspires to 
contribute to challenging them.  
Before going into the details of the case law studied in the next two chapters, it is convenient 
to recall the types of legal argument and problem addressed in the previous part (Part II). Part 
II discussed the European and Inter-American courts’ case law regarding claims of cultural 
difference. In many of the cases examined, applicants sought to oppose burdens or 
disadvantages either grounded in cultural reasons or which impaired their cultural/religious 
rights. Many applicants also asserted a right to have their ethno-cultural identity and practices 
respected and protected. To that end, they usually relied on substantive convention rights 
(such as the right to family and private life, freedom of religion, the right to education, the 
right to life, and the right to property) and on the prohibition of discrimination. When 
examining how the European and Inter-American courts dealt with these complaints, we saw 
that questions of group relations and issues of identity often took a central place in the judicial 
analysis. Against this background, a number of challenges were identified and I explored how 
an integrated approach to human rights law could do better justice to the experience of rights 
holders and to the complexity involved in claims of cultural difference. Along the way, I 
attempted to illuminate those aspects of the cases that were unnecessarily displaced by the 
courts.  
Recapitulating this here is important because in this part I will discuss a line of case law that 
offers a picture that is both similar and dissimilar to that examined in Part II. Similarly to the 
cases on ethno-cultural difference studied in Part II, one set of legal claims can be framed as a 
legal right to be protected against disadvantages unfairly accorded to a perceived or actual 
(socio-economic) difference. In some cases, this is formulated as protection against 
restrictions of substantive rights and/or as protection against discrimination on socio-
economic grounds. Nevertheless, unlike cultural diversity cases, arguments about social 
relations among groups and about identity tend to be much more absent in poverty-related 
cases. When arguments about disadvantage are advanced, poverty or socio-economic 
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difference usually does not translate into a group-identity assertion.
854
 Yet, as it will be seen 
later, this holds more true for the European than the Inter-American Court. The implications 
that follow from this are one of the aspects explored in the following chapters.  
A related effect of the lack of identity mobilisation concerns the limits of the protection 
afforded by human rights law as applied by supranational courts. So long as people living in 
poverty do not assert a positive right to live in accordance with a (poor?) lifestyle, and 
because assertions of socio-economic disadvantage generally have little legal traction, it 
seems that human rights courts do not face the pressure, which they confront in culturally-
based claims, to set limits to a potentially ‘endless’ list of claims for accommodation or 
special treatment. In other words, courts do not have the ‘pluralism anxiety’ about which 
modes of living and ‘special protections’ should be accepted under human rights law. 
Nevertheless, these courts face another challenge that runs along somewhat parallel lines. 
This is the question of how far they should go in adjudicating issues of socio-economic 
assistance. There is a problem of limits here as well, but this takes the shape of a floodgate 
concern.
855
 Basically, courts should be careful, so goes the argument, not to open a door into 
the state’s budget by setting general duties of assistance or engaging in social policy-
making.
856
 The concern arises even in cases in which the main issue is not really, or not only 
one of access to economic resources.
857
 As will be seen below, an important way to mitigate 
this concern is by appreciating the cases and the rights claims in a more integrated 
perspective.  
Finally, it is worth noting that today it is widely accepted that poverty is best understood as 
something multidimensional, which seems to introduce a particularly fertile ground for an 
integrated view of human rights, including in the adjudication setting. Further, since poverty 
and socio-economic class are not always seen as legally cognisable, nor do they always 
appear as a relevant feature of applicants, their consideration will often require attention to 
their interplay with other categories, such as gender, ethnic origin and nationality. Because 
economic disadvantage is not randomly distributed in society, there are certain persons – e.g. 
indigenous and ethnic minorities, asylum seekers, women, single parents, persons with 
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disabilities and children – who are more likely to experience rights violations for reasons of 
poverty. As Brodsky and Day note with regard to poverty-related litigation, failure to take 
into account these links ‘results in an impoverished analysis of the nature and extent of the 
harms’ produced by the contested regulations.858 Interestingly, though, the jurisprudence 
examined in the following chapters indicates that the above drivers for an integrated approach 
to rights holders only sometimes crystallise.  
In this context, the following two chapters – which concern, respectively, the European 
(ECtHR) and Inter-American (IACtHR) courts of human rights – deal with two main 
questions. The first is whether and how they account for people’s socio-economic differences 
and in particular, for the needs and interests of those most disadvantaged. In fact, it has been 
said that legal systems ‘often do not recognize and estimate the issues that negatively affect 
persons living in poverty as serious and in need of active remedy’.859 Second, the chapters 
discuss the extent and the ways in which the regional courts take an integrated or a rather 
fragmentary view of rights claims of socio-economic disadvantage. An important premise for 
this prism is that the multiplicity and multidimensionality of actors, norms and inequalities 
involved in this type of case, as well as the way they are interrelated, merit comprehensive 
examination. However, because of the way that human rights law and the regional courts tend 
to operate in this field, those interactions are often disaggregated. The following chapters 
seek, similarly to those in Part II, to shed light on what can be gained from addressing the 
rights holders, as well as the harms and norms involved in poverty-related cases, in a more 
holistic fashion. Chapter 5 and 6 together review 63 judgements and decisions from the 
ECtHR and the IACtHR.
860
 In addition, and as in previous chapters, the discussion takes heed 
of complaints of economic disadvantage from other jurisdiction as well as of other types of 
case when doing so proves useful for the analysis.
861
   
It should be clarified, though, that it is not the aim of this study to revisit conceptual debates 
about poverty or socio-economic disadvantage vis-à- vis human rights, which is a typical 
concern in the literature. A number of scholars have indeed explored what is poverty and 
whether this constitutes a human rights violation in itself, a denial of rights in general, or 
rather the cause and consequence of violations.
862
 While it is this last notion that finds most 
application in the present study, I will not deal with these definitional issues. Nor is this 
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discussion intended to undertake the usual examination of case law and legal frameworks 
potentially relevant to questions of poverty.
863
 Instead, this part of the study is mainly 
concerned with cases where socio-economic disadvantage is directly invoked by applicants 
and/or addressed by the court as a way to justify a specific legal response.  
Finally, assuming that poverty is both a cause and a consequence of human rights violations, 
it is fair to say that this study mostly concentrates on legal claims that present socio-economic 
disadvantage as a cause (rather than as a consequence) of human rights violations,
864
 provided 
that this has a significant role in the legal arguments of the applicants and/or the courts. 
Nevertheless, it will be seen that the specific types of complaint brought before the European 
and Inter-American courts of human rights are very different.  
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CHAPTER 5 - AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE IN THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
I. Introduction 
The question of how the European Court of Human Rights can deal with rights claims of 
poverty and socio-economic disadvantage has gained growing attention in the last decade. 
Following the most recent economic crisis, people living in European countries have seen an 
increase not just in the proportion of the population in and at risk of poverty, but also in 
income inequality, insecure living conditions and regressive social policies.
865
 It is therefore 
not surprising that scholars and practitioners alike had shown renewed interest in what the 
ECtHR can offer to the protection of the human rights of those experiencing poverty and 
social service cuts.
866
 The present chapter can be seen as contributing to these efforts, but 
from a quite distinctive point of view. The chapter enquires into the flexibility of the 
European law of human rights, as applied by the ECtHR, for dealing with rights claims of 
economic disadvantage. But for this purpose the chapter departs from general and partial 
notions of poverty and human rights to examine instead the complex ways in which people’s 
experiences of socio-economic deprivation are interrelated with a range of rights, interests, 
harms, inequalities and social positions. In other words, the chapter analyses claims of socio-
economic disadvantage from an integrated perspective.  
As noted in Chapter 3 and recalled above, it is usually easier for a court like the ECtHR to 
embrace a categorical and fragmentary than a comprehensive and relational line of thought. 
As such, this chapter relies on the same integrated framework applied in Part II, that is, one 
that conceives of rights holders as internally diverse and immersed in a network of social 
relations and institutions. Starting with rights holders, the analysis also moves to the harms 
and norms involved in the cases, which are also seen as compounded and interdependent. 
Within this framework, the chapter examines different types of claim. Some are framed as 
protection against destitution (violations resulting from extreme poverty); others contest the 
detrimental effect imposed by certain regulations or practices which are insensitive to 
people’s socio-economic situation (fees for courts and other services, housing regulations, 
denial of medical attention); others complain of excessive policing or interference with their 
rights because of poverty (family separation, prohibition of begging); while there are also 
claims of discrimination on poverty-related grounds. 
Given that the ECHR does not contain a right to be free from poverty or other specific 
references to socio-economic disadvantage (save for Article 14’s prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of ‘social origin’ or ‘other social status’), a relatively wide range of rights is 
mobilised in the cases examined. These include, inter alia, the right to life (Article 2); the 
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prohibition of torture and degrading treatment (Article 3); the right to private and family life 
(Article 8); the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14); and the right to property (Article 1 
Protocol no. 1) ECHR.  
The discussion proceeds as in previous chapters. Following an introduction (section I), section 
II starts by discussing the use of identity group arguments, which, as we have seen, usually 
lead to a fragmentary legal analysis. Here, I mainly explore whether the ECtHR and/or the 
applicants regard people living in poverty as a group, including as a vulnerable group, or as 
being entitled to protection on the basis of identity or arguments about difference. In doing so, 
I discuss the normative implications of a (lack of) focus on group, difference and identity. At 
the same time, the discussion takes note of alternative forms of legal compartmentalisation 
that are relevant for the cases studied. Section III embarks on an examination of who are the 
rights holders in the cases studied, viewed from an integrated perspective. This comprises, in 
the first place, the question of whether and how their different social positions and identities 
are considered (1). In the second place, account is taken of the complexity of rights holders in 
terms of their agency and choices (2). This notably implies questioning narratives that present 
people living in poverty as either fully responsible for their destitution or as dependent on 
others who define what is best for them. Finally, section III examines the Court’s approach to 
rights holders other than the applicants and the insights that such a broad view of rights 
holders provides to the cases studied (3). Having explored the added value and challenges 
involved in an integrated and relational understanding of rights holders in these cases, the 
analysis moves to cross-thinking about the harms and norms at stake (IV). Recall that cross-
thinking is similar to intersectionality but applied more broadly. As regards the norms and 
harms involved in a case, it implies that cases associated with one kind of harms and norms 
will be analysed from the perspective of another. The analysis here looks at harms that are not 
always immediately identified in poverty-related cases, such as stereotyping, invisibility and 
humiliation, in addition to issues of structural inequality, participation deficits and socio-
economic precariousness. As in previous chapters, section IV attempts to bring to light 
relations of indivisibility and interdependence among rights within and outside the ECHR (1), 
as well as the normative inputs of a reality of legal pluralism (2). The chapter closes with 
concluding notes (section V).  
 
II. Economic difference and the group identity compartment: searching for 
boundaries? 
1. Disadvantage without group or identity 
A first interesting aspect of the case law examined in this chapter is that rights claims to be 
free from burdens or exclusions based on socio-economic disadvantage are not usually based 
on arguments about group and identity. This contrasts with an important part of the case law 
discussed in Part II. The difference seems understandable, though. As Fraser argues, ‘the last 
thing [the proletariat] needs is recognition of its difference’.867 Poverty is, rather, viewed as 
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something to overcome and with which people would rarely identify themselves. Further, 
people living in poverty are not, so it appears, one of those groups that attract the protection of 
the law. There may be several reasons for this. One common explanation points to the 
significant heterogeneity among the socio-economically disadvantaged
868
 – a reason that is in 
itself problematic, since it presupposes that other social groups are homogeneous and 
coherent. Another factor preventing an identity approach may be the social stigma attached to 
poverty.
869
 This stigma gives people little incentive to identify themselves as ‘poor’. Of 
course, one may argue that legal visibility and responsiveness could equally be attained by 
addressing their situation from a group-based perspective, without having to deal with identity 
assertions. This could be done by, for example, regarding people living in poverty as a 
‘vulnerable group’, whereby special attention is drawn to their needs and concerns. However, 
as further explained below, the ECtHR has so far been reluctant to do so.  
But beyond the reasons we could think of for explaining that claims of socio-economic 
difference do not fall within a group or identity framework, attention will be focused on the 
normative implications of this position. One such implication is that it makes it easier for the 
Court to accept that the rights deficits involved in an experience of poverty are an individual 
matter only. This may downplay important relational aspects of the violations complained of. 
One such aspect concerns possible inequalities among groups. For example, advancing ethno-
cultural claims from a group inequality perspective may draw attention to the way a certain 
regulation or norm disadvantages a minority while simultaneously privileging a cultural or 
religious majority. Although socio-economic disadvantage has to do with a reality of 
economic difference between the haves and have-nots, this element of social group difference 
is often absent from the ECtHR’s case law.870Another, related consequence of thinking that 
poverty is not about relations between groups is that socio-economic deprivation appears to be 
an individual fault. In this regard, it will be noticed that the Court acknowledges the 
vulnerability of asylum seekers living in extreme poverty and other persons whose rights are 
restricted as a result of a situation of poverty over which they have little or no control. Yet, 
the Court does not seem to recognise people living in poverty, such as single parents living on 
welfare or persons on a low income, as a vulnerable group. What is more, the Court has not 
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always challenged the idea, usually advanced by domestic authorities, that individuals’ 
economic deprivation is simply the result of their own conduct.
871
  
An additional, practical implication of the lack of a group or identity framework is that legal 
mobilisation around socio-economic disadvantage, unlike ethno-cultural and gender identity, 
is likely to be more limited.
872
 In the case law examined here, this is suggested by the fact that 
applicants only occasionally invoke their economic deprivation or poverty as a basis for their 
normative claims. Sometimes they posit it just as a contextual circumstance to be additionally 
considered by the Court. On the part of the Court, the legal invisibility of socio-economic 
disadvantage also has to do, as will be seen below, with its careful stance on socio-economic 
matters and the particular normative approach that has developed in this field. Before turning 
to these questions, it is interesting to note that the avoidance or the erasing of people’s socio-
economic condition stands in contrast to the visibility of the socio-economic circumstances of 
respondent states, which are usually considered by the Court.  
 
2. Avoiding socio-economic disadvantage and ensuing legal compartments 
Whereas it may be difficult, at least in the ECHR context, to present complaints related to 
poverty as a matter of identity or group difference, it is relatively easy to put them into the 
‘box’ of welfare policies and socio-economic rights. As such, a question arises: what does this 
framing entail? 
It was noted above that long ago, in the Airey case, the Court rejected watertight divisions 
separating social and economic rights from the civil and political rights covered by the 
Convention.
873
 However, challenges to the divide between the two categories of rights have 
been met with resistance. In Airey, the Irish government advanced two kinds of concern that 
resurface time and again. First, it argued that it was not the role of the Court to intrude into 
matters of socio-economic policy. These belonged to the state’s political bodies, which had 
the capacity and legitimacy to seek progressive social development.
874
 Second, the 
government advanced a ‘floodgate’ concern. Accepting Mrs. Airey’s claim would amount, so 
went the argument, to imposing an obligation to provide free legal aid in all cases concerning 
the determination of a ‘civil right’ under Article 6 ECHR. This line of objection was further 
elaborated by the Greek government and the separate opinion of Judge Sajó in M.S.S, a case 
involving an asylum seeker living in extreme destitution. For the former, ruling in favour of 
the applicant ‘would open the doors to countless similar applications from homeless persons 
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and place an undue positive obligation on the States in terms of welfare policy’.875 Similarly, 
Judge Sajó posited that ‘there seems to be only a small step between the Court’s present 
position and that of a general and unconditional positive obligation of the State to provide 
shelter and other material services to satisfy the basic needs of the “vulnerable”’.876    
Against this hesitation about intruding into socio-economic terrain, the Court’s attempt to 
‘contain’ cases regarded as being about socio-economic policies or welfare issues appears 
understandable. This categorisation, however, often means adopting a rationale that promotes 
a partial or compartmentalised view of the case at hand.
877
 Indeed, the Court frequently 
emphasises the wide margin of appreciation granted to states in crafting socio-economic 
policies and in balancing individual rights against the general interest.
878
 In such cases, the 
Court’s discourse also tends to say more about what rights do not provide for than about what 
they do.
879
 A common consequence of using this framework of analysis is that a quite 
deferential review is applied. While this may not be perceived as per se problematic, here it is 
relevant to note one problematic implication namely, that the case analysis would mainly 
focus on the justification given for the general social policy underlying the case, while 
overlooking its concrete application to the applicant and the actual interests at stake.  
A good example of this can be found in Garib v. the Netherlands, a case dealing with the 
refusal of a permit to a single mother living on social welfare to take up residence in a 
neighbouring area.
880
 This followed from the application of legislation preventing 
‘newcomers’ living on social welfare or below a certain level of income from settling in 
certain socioeconomically distressed areas. Both the Chamber and the Grand Chamber started 
from the broad discretion enjoyed by the state on issues of housing policy. On this basis, they 
applied an abstract review that accepted the legitimacy of virtually whatever the legislature 
deemed to best serve the public interest.
881
 As discussed later in this chapter, the applicant’s 
vulnerability as a single mother of two children, the level of interference with her autonomy 
under the right to choose one’s residence (Article 2 Protocol 4), the fact that she was already 
living in the area and other crucial aspects of the specific case were not considered. The case 
could have been framed as discrimination based on poverty or on grounds of gender and race, 
or as a restriction to an autonomy right. But it was not. For the Court, the predominant 
                                                          
875
 ECtHR, (GC) M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. no. 30696/09, Judgment of 21 January 2011, para. 243.  
876
 Ibid., Partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Sajó, at 103.  
877
 In this vein, see Janneke Gerards, ‘The ECtHR’s Response to Fundamental Rights Issue related to Financial 
and Economic Difficulties. The Problem of Compartmentalisation’, 33(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights (2015) 274, at 277 (but referring to cases dealing with measures adopted in the context of the economic 
crisis). 
878
 See e.g. ECtHR, Wells v. the United Kingdom, App. no. 37794/05, Decision of 16 January 2007, at 9; Bah v. 
The United Kingdom, Judgment of 27 September 2011, para. 47; Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, App. no. 5335/05, 
Judgment of 21 June 2011, para. 52; Garib v. the Netherlands, App. no. 43494/09, Judgment of 23 February 
2016, para. 116 (a); Bagdonavicius and Others v Russia, App. no. 19841/06, Judgment of 11 October 2016, para. 
97.   
879
 It would say, for example, that the right to private life and respect for the home does not comprise a right to 
be provided with a home; while the right to property does not provide a right to obtain social benefits or similar 
socio-economic entitlements. See e.g. ECtHR, Wells v. the United Kingdom, App. no. 37794/05, Decision of 16 
January 2007, at 9; Bah v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 27 September 2011, para. 40.   
880
 ECtHR, Garib v. the Netherlands, App. no. 43494/09, Judgment of 23 February 2016 and (GC) Judgment of 
6 November 2017.  
881
 Ibid., paras. 113 and 137, respectively.  
207 
 
framework was that of the state latitude when it comes to complex socio-economic policies 
and this, importantly, limited the comprehensiveness of the analysis.
882
 In that sense, this 
framing operated as a normative compartment. Hence, while a judicial approach that is not 
too concerned with identity or groups seems to open up opportunities for a more 
comprehensive analysis, this does not mean that alternative forms of fragmentation may not 
be in play. In the types of case studied here, insulating the socio-economic realm in the way 
described above and erasing people’s socio-economic disadvantage both take us back to 
fragmentary thinking.  
Socio-economic disadvantage has often been sidelined by the Court and by litigants. 
Economic deprivation may be one of the most significant elements defining the applicants 
experience and yet they may decide to leave this out of their allegations. It is likely, then, that 
the Court will respond accordingly, analysing the case in rather economically neutral terms. 
Consider Lacatus v. Switzerland, which has yet to be decided.
883
 A criminal prohibition on 
begging was set up in Geneva, on the basis of which the applicant had been convicted and 
fined several times. One could barely imagine a measure more openly aimed at specifically 
regulating people living in poverty than a ban on begging. And yet the applicant frames her 
rights allegations, particularly those on discrimination, only by reference to her Roma origin. 
Her situation of poverty is an invisible aspect of her claims. From the questions the Court has 
posed to the parties in examining the case, it appears that, correspondingly, the Court is 
following an ethnic-only approach.  
It is a fortiori less surprising that applicants do not highlight their economic situation in cases 
in which this aspect may be perceived as less central to their complaint. This is all the more so 
when other social locations, such as ethnic origin, nationality, gender and religion, may 
absorb the class component. Consider Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria.
884
 In this case, which 
concerned the imposition of fees for secondary education on certain categories of foreign 
nationals, the applicants – two brothers of Russian nationality – did not mobilise arguments 
about their inability to afford those fees. The whole problem was framed exclusively from the 
perspective of nationality. From the facts recounted in the judgment, however, it appears that 
they had no property or income and their mother had been out of work for many years, while 
her husband’s small business had been shut down. The brothers actually had to take out a 
bank loan to raise money to pay for their residence permits.
885
 Nevertheless, none of these 
aspects seem to have been incorporated into the presentation of their plight. And as one would 
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expect, the Court did not take them into account either. The case was examined against the 
state’s budgetary constraints, but without regard for the economic deprivation of the 
applicants, even though the Court had decided to focus explicitly on the applicants’ personal 
circumstances.
886
 
Another example is Moser v. Austria.
887
 The applicant in this case lived in precarious 
conditions and since she did not have legal residence in Austria, she was not entitled to 
financial aid. In this context, her newborn baby was taken into care on account of her poverty 
and unclear residence status, while placement in a child-mother home was not offered. The 
applicant attributed the treatment she and her child received mainly to her Serbian nationality 
rather than to her destitution, and thus she claimed discrimination on the basis of nationality 
only. While the Court dismissed this allegation, it did note, in the framework of the right to 
family life (article 8 ECHR), that child removal was based on both her poverty and her 
residential status, which in fact was explicitly acknowledged by the state.
888
 In a similar case, 
where the applicant had also lost her daughter on account of her deprived socio-economic 
situation, she alleged discrimination on the basis of her culture, race and colour of skin.
889
 The 
closest she got to depicting her economic status was a reference to her physical appearance 
and lifestyle. Her socio-economic position was, however, brought up and considered in the 
framework of her complaint under the right to family life.  
At times, though, even when applicants position their socio-economic disadvantage as a 
significant element of their allegations, the Court may nonetheless set it aside in its legal 
assessment. This is particularly so when the applicant’s destitution is not considered extreme. 
The oversight operates either by erasing the main ground of perceived disadvantage or by 
subsuming socio-economic status under another aspect of social difference. What losses may 
result from displacing the applicants’ economic circumstances? Some case law suggests that 
ignoring this aspect may have at least two notable effects. First, it may distort the extent and 
type of harm experienced. Second, it may render invisible the element of difference and 
potential inequality involved in the case. Beyond the specifics of the cases at hand, 
economically neutral readings also perpetuate middle-class biases in legal and policy 
responses to rights violations and inequalities. The cases below attest to these problems.  
In Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, the applicant sought to appeal an award of 
damages in a defamation case.
890 
To do so, he was required to pay £124,900 as security for the 
respondent’s costs. Unable to afford this, he claimed a denial of access to a court (in violation 
of Article 6.1 ECHR). His economic difficulties, however, were not really discussed in the 
judgment. In an abstract reasoning, the Court emphasised that it was legitimate to protect the 
other party from the respondent’s legal costs and that overall, the applicant’s case had been 
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heard in the previous stages of the proceeding. The Court admitted that the sum requested was 
substantial, particularly as it had to be paid within 14 days. Strikingly, though, the only 
reference to the applicant’s financial possibilities was the following: ‘nothing indicated that 
he would have been able to raise the money had he been given more time’.891 His right to 
access the courts had not been violated.
892
 In other words, since the applicant’s financial 
difficulties were unsurmountable, nothing could have been done. The problem began and 
ended with the applicant. Questioning the system of fees for appeals given its impact upon the 
least privileged litigants was not even imagined by the Court.  
Subsequently, however, the Court reached the opposite conclusion in Aït-Mouhoub v. 
France,
893
 a somewhat similar case to Tolstoy Miloslavsky. Contesting the refusal of legal aid 
and the imposition of FRF 80,000 as security costs in the context of a criminal proceeding and 
a civil-party application, the Court found the amount ‘disproportionate seeing that Mr Aït-
Mouhoub […] had no financial resources whatsoever’.894 It is plausible to think that the 
different approach adopted in these two judgments had to do with the applicants’ different 
degrees of economic hardship, which in Aït-Mouhoub was extreme: he had no income at all. 
But as the Court did not take on board the socio-economic position of the applicant in 
examining the proportionality of the court fees in Tolstoy Miloslavsky, the question remains 
open.  
An economically abstract approach resurfaces in Gnahoré v. France.
895
 This time, the claim 
of access to court concerned an appeal against the placement of the applicant’s child. Care 
orders had been taken on grounds of abuse but after these charges had been dropped, they 
were renewed on account of the applicant’s poverty and problems in the relationship with his 
child. Under Article 6 ECHR (right to a fair trial), the applicant, a Côte d’Ivoire national, 
complained against the refusal of legal aid, a decision founded on the lack of prospect of 
success for his appeal. For the Court, however, the refusal of legal aid only denied the 
applicant free assistance from a lawyer; it did not prevent him from pursuing his appeal.
896
 
Further, the Court noted that the procedure without compulsory representation was simpler 
and that legal aid mechanisms needed to select the cases on which public money was spent.
897
 
The assessment remained detached from what this design actually entailed for impoverished 
litigants with a migrant background like the applicant, who faced disadvantages not 
encountered by well-off litigants.  
In the cases above we can appreciate, in the first place, how certain grievances are simply not 
seen and thus not assessed in the proportionality analysis. These consist in, for example, not 
being able to have one’s case heard before a higher court, while others do; or having to pursue 
one’s case under an unfavourable presumption that makes a loss in court more likely. And 
there is, of course, the feeling of being a second-class citizen whose interests are less worthy 
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of protection. In the second place, and closely linked to the latter, to the extent that the 
applicant’s socio-economic deprivation – her main ground of disadvantage – is left 
unexplored, so is the relative advantage of better-off rights holders. This is to say that the 
issue of difference and potential inequality escapes judicial review. The issue complained of 
is then more likely to be seen as an unfortunate situation, not as a human rights issue.  
Some of these drawbacks were pointed out by the dissenting judges in Gnahoré. Looking 
from the perspective of the applicant, the dissenters argued that ‘the system may be perceived 
as being inherently unfair by the least well-off appellants, as they are the only ones who have 
to show that they have a prima facie case on appeal’.898 And even if they had managed to 
appeal after being refused legal aid, they ‘will be disadvantaged in comparison to appellants 
who have not applied for legal aid’ (since refusal of legal aid is based on a lack of strong 
grounds of appeal). In the eyes of the dissenters, ‘the least well-off members of society should 
not thereby be denied access to justice […] as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention’.899 
Also of note, these judges called into question the unavoidability of the burdens imposed on 
impoverished litigants by pointing to feasible alternatives for arranging the legal aid system. 
They asked why not, instead of spending money in a thorough examination of the prospects of 
appeal for deciding on the granting of legal aid, conduct that examination when the appeal on 
points of law was being considered. A line of reasoning like this has the value of casting 
doubt on the reasonableness of measures that may be perceived as ‘normal’ from a ‘middle-
class’ perspective. This is an important move because if unveiling dominant biases based on 
culture, gender or other factors is already challenging, those based on socio-economic 
background are likely to remain even more hidden.    
Encouraging the Court to be more attentive to economic hardship requires litigants to 
elaborate more on this aspect of their claim. This includes providing evidence regarding their 
socio-economic position, the link between this and their rights deprivations and the relative 
advantage of others. Perhaps this could explain the different stance taken in Kreuz v. 
Poland.
900
 Unlike the aforementioned judgments, here the Court did engage with the 
applicant’s financial limitations. It criticised the domestic courts for adopting a hypothetical 
view of the applicant’s economic situation based on the idea that, as a businessman, he should 
have secured funds for the court fees required to pursue civil proceedings. The Court’s 
conclusion that the fee was excessive for the applicant rested on his actual economic 
circumstances (he had invested all his savings, had losses and no income from his venture) 
and on the principle that access to court must be ‘effective’. The Court further acknowledged 
the detrimental consequences faced by the applicant. Notably, he had to desist from his claim, 
‘his case never being heard by a court’.901 Interestingly, though, the material distress faced by 
the applicant in this case was arguably somewhat less acute than what the Court had 
overlooked in previous cases.  
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There are some cases, however, where the applicants’ socio-economic disadvantage is 
eclipsed (rather than totally erased) by other grounds of difference. Illustrative of this are 
complaints involving Roma and Travellers. Most judgments and decisions in these cases, at 
least those examined in this study, approached the applicants from the perspective of their 
race or ethnic origin only. This emphasis appears justified. Racial discrimination is at the core 
of the exclusion and rights deprivations experienced by Roma and Travellers in many 
fields;
902
 although, to be clear, the judgments studied here rarely speak of racial 
discrimination.
903
 The judgments nonetheless address the applicants’ membership of a group 
defined by ethno-cultural characteristics, as seen in Chapter 3, which holds a prominent place 
in their legal analysis. At the same time, though, many inequalities ascribed to Roma and 
Travellers’ ethnic origin are very much intertwined with their socio-economic disadvantage. 
Yet, this dimension was often overshadowed when not simply missing in the judicial 
reasoning. As discussed in the framework of Part II, the applicants’ destitution – like their 
gender – has often been ignored in rulings dealing with the stationing of caravans and eviction 
procedures against Roma and Travellers.
904
 The Court held, for instance, that Roma/Traveller 
applicants facing evictions could simply camp on any caravan site which had planning 
permission.
905
 No account was taken of the fact that stationing their mobile homes on public 
pitches or on their own land was the only real alternative for those applicants who could not 
afford private sites.  
In other cases, economic constraints have been downplayed or left out from the inquiry into 
how domestic authorities took heed of the ‘special needs’ of ‘Gypsy’ applicants. The case of 
Wells is an example.
906
 The applicant, who lived with his family in a caravan, opposed 
eviction on the basis of a statutory defence of incapacity because of personal 
circumstances.
907
 He referred, inter alia, to his economic limitations and the fact that he and 
his family had nowhere else to go, as there was a shortfall of sites and he did not qualify for 
social housing. As the owner of a caravan, he was not deemed to be homeless and if he had 
sold it, he would have been deemed intentionally homeless. In both cases, local authority 
accommodation would not be made available for him. The domestic courts were eventually of 
the opinion that destitution and homelessness were irrelevant. Incapacity was simply about 
being physically able to leave the site. The applicant was convicted, fined GBP 1,500 and 
ordered to pay costs. The Court upheld the domestic courts’ assessment, recalling that Article 
8 ECHR did not give a right to home or provide for accommodation preferences. It noted 
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further that ‘gypsies must be regarded as in the same unfortunate position as many others who 
are not able to afford to continue to reside on sites or in houses attractive to them’.908 In 
discarding the need to examine the applicant’s discrimination complaint, the Court observed 
that ‘his status as a gypsy was taken into account […] and was reasonably regarded as not of 
decisive relevance’.909 Nothing was said about the consideration (not) given to his situation of 
poverty.  
The case law reviewed thus far provides a fair indication of how challenging it may be to 
conceive of class or economic disadvantage as something legally relevant, even in human 
rights law. The limited visibility of this aspect of people’s lives in the rights discourse 
supports the view advanced by scholars that normative discussions about diversity and 
inclusion rarely include class or economic difference.
910
 This is at odds with the fact that a 
range of measures and practices impinging upon human rights are grounded on economic 
hierarchies or have a disproportionate impact on those more at risk of socio-economic 
exclusion. The above examples also suggest that litigants themselves may overlook their 
socio-economic hardship, probably because this is not perceived as a source of strength for 
winning their cases. Because the litigants and/or the Court overlook questions of socio-
economic difference, the result is a fragmentary account of the case (and of rights holders, in 
particular), which, as seen above, leads to normative and practical problems. Considering that 
poverty is frequently discarded as a group characteristic or as an aspect of identity holding 
legal relevance, we may still ask whether it is considered as a source of vulnerability that 
triggers specific normative responses. Or, to follow the Court’s nomenclature, the question is 
whether people living in poverty are considered to belong to a ‘vulnerable group’. To this I 
turn in what follows. 
 
3. The socio-economically disadvantaged as (in)vulnerable 
As noted in Chapter 3, the Court’s judgment in Yordanova, a case concerning a Roma 
community living in an informal settlement and which is further discussed below, seems to 
link the applicant’s vulnerability to their socio-economic precariousness. In view of their 
status as a socially disadvantaged group, and regardless of their ethnic origin, their needs 
deserved particular attention.
911
 The Court similarly stressed the special protection owed to 
persons in vulnerable situations when examining the situation of the applicant in Soares de 
Melo, an impoverished mother who lost her children on account of poverty.
912
 These 
judgments may suggest that the Court is heading towards the recognition of people living in 
poverty as a vulnerable group. However, this is far from being settled. Judges López Guerra 
and Keller, dissenting in the recent case of Garib v. The Netherlands, precisely argued, inter 
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alia, that ‘the poor are a vulnerable group in and of themselves’.913 A similar position appears 
advanced by Judge Pinto’s dissenting opinion in the Grand Chamber judgment adopted in the 
same case.
914
 Considering that people living in poverty have been and continue to be subject 
to prejudice, stereotyping and social exclusion, the argument is certainly tenable. Problems 
nonetheless arise once we think of the Court’s ambivalences when determining who belongs 
to vulnerable groups.  
While in principle the concept of vulnerability has the advantage of being flexible and 
sensitive to context, the second part of this study has shown that at times the Court takes it as 
something closer to an attribute of certain bounded, a priori disadvantaged groups. Roma and 
Travellers have it, for instance; Muslims (and Muslim women in particular) do not. Consider 
as well the dissenting opinion of Judge Sajó in M.S.S. In his view, asylum seekers ‘cannot be 
unconditionally considered as a particularly vulnerable group, in the sense in which the 
jurisprudence of the Court uses the term’.915 In support of this claim, he advances two main 
arguments. One is that asylum seekers are not a group as such. They are ‘far from 
homogeneous’ and ‘not socially classified’. The other is that even if some asylum seekers are 
vulnerable, this does not hold for all the members of the ‘class’.916  
Read this way, the notion of vulnerable groups would only apply to relatively homogeneous 
social groups affected by long-lasting prejudice and exclusion provided that its consequences 
were suffered by all the members of the group. I do not need to elaborate why in this light 
people living in poverty are not suitable candidates for qualifying as a vulnerable group. 
Poverty and socio-economic disadvantage are contested concepts, as is the identification of 
those to whom they apply. One of the arguments posited by the government at the Grand 
Chamber hearing in Garib v. Netherlands goes precisely along these lines. It contended that 
the concept of poverty was relative and that the fact that the applicant was living on social 
welfare did not allow the case to be framed as one about poverty and vulnerability.
917
 As 
explained earlier in this study, conceiving of any social groups as bounded homogeneous 
entities is more an illusion than a reality. But for those who keep the illusion alive in law, 
diversity is particularly evident across people living in poverty. 
This last point underscores the fact that while the law naturally aims at simplifying and 
categorising, appropriate legal responses sometimes require a comprehensive analysis. As the 
above reflections suggest, this is no less true for rights claims grounded in socio-economic 
disadvantage. Looking at the social institutions and relations in which individuals and their 
rights are embedded is a helpful way to appreciate the need for an integrated approach to 
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human rights law in poverty-related cases. The following subsection thus attempts to examine 
what an integrated and relational normative analysis could reveal about these cases.  
 
III. Whole humans: looking through and across rights holders  
In the previous chapter, when discussing what it means to approach rights holders as whole 
individuals in the adjudication of cases concerning ethno-cultural difference, I started by 
identifying the single aspect of individuals that had most salience in the judicial setting, that 
is, the ethnic or cultural affiliation of applicants. I then explained that, without downplaying 
the relevance of this aspect, the individuals concerned were more than that. Other facets of 
their identity and social position should not be displaced, if judges (and of course, litigants as 
well) wanted to avoid mischaracterising the stakes of the case. In this chapter, however, the 
present discussion about the complexity of rights holders takes a different starting point. We 
cannot simply start by asking which facets of applicants other than their socio-economic 
position were considered by the Court, for this very aspect of the applicants’ lives – economic 
disadvantage – was often missing, let alone salient, as seen above.  
 
1. An enriched view of applicants in poverty 
Against this backdrop, the discussion below examines those cases in which the economic 
hardship of rights holders was in some way taken into account by the Court. Subsection 1 
analyses the indirect integration of the applicants’ socio-economic disadvantage through other 
grounds of difference, such as ethnic origin or migration status. Subsection 2, for its part, 
discusses the integration of different experiences of poverty. Here, the main question will 
point to the extent to which the cases were framed (by the litigants and/or by the Court) as 
gender-neutral, disability-neutral and neutral from the perspective of the individuals’ 
nationality, ethnicity/race, cultural background and other social locations. Importantly, the 
enquiry aims at elucidating whether and how such framings and understandings of the cases 
impoverish their legal analysis.  
 
1.1. Socio-economic disadvantage through other grounds of difference? 
It was seen above that in some cases concerning Roma and Travellers the applicants’ 
experience of socio-economic disadvantage was obscured by a concern with their ethno-
cultural identity. Yet, there were cases in which questions of socio-economic disadvantage, 
rather than being absorbed by other grounds of difference, were advanced through them. 
Cases dealing with the educational segregation of Roma children, which the Court has 
qualified as indirect discrimination on the ground of ethnic origin, are illustrative. Separate 
placement had not only to do with the children’s ethnic origin, but also with their socio-
economic disadvantage. As explained in Chapter 3, it was notably in Horváth and Kiss that 
the Court acknowledged the correlation between material deprivation and the misdiagnosis of 
Roma children.
918
 The reference to social deprivation allowed the Court to explain how the 
educational misplacement of children worked and how their social exclusion was worsened. 
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But this element was not reflected the Court’s finding of discrimination in relation to the right 
to education.  
All in all, the Roma and Traveller cases reviewed illustrate some of the normative 
consequences of sidelining the applicants’ socio-economic disadvantage. Among others, the 
Court mischaracterised what was at stake for the applicants in some cases, as the intensity of 
the rights interference they faced was minimised. The scrutiny in terms of proportionality and 
non-discrimination has therefore been partial. What is more, the different ways in which 
material deprivation affected the enjoyment of human rights tended to be obfuscated. For 
example, it is clear that destitution imposes excessive burdens or aggravates the impact of 
land planning regulations affecting Roma and Travellers generally. But experiencing poverty 
may also be one of the root causes of violations. This was the case with Roma children’s 
misdiagnosis, which seems to have rested on the stereotype according to which ‘being a poor 
Romani child equals to having a mild mental disability’.919  
The material deprivation of Roma applicants has not been totally out of the picture, though. In 
Part II, mention was also made of the judgment in Yordanova.
920
 This stands out for, among 
other things, taking into account the socio-economic disadvantage of the Roma community 
concerned. The applicants, who lived in an informal settlement, in single-storey houses 
without basic sanitation services, were ordered to leave, as their houses were to be 
demolished. Having remained there for decades, they argued that ‘for people as desperately 
poor and outcast as them the expectation that the inactivity would last was a basis to build 
lives on’.921 The eviction order was, in their view, taken in disregard of those circumstances 
and of their risk of homelessness, being actually motivated by racist prejudices. On this basis, 
they alleged a violation of Articles 8 and 14 ECHR. The Court agreed that the applicants were 
part of an ‘outcast community and one of the socially disadvantaged groups’.922 Such a social 
group, ‘regardless of the ethnic origin of its members may need assistance in order to be able 
effectively to enjoy the same rights as the majority population’.923 The conclusion was that 
‘the disadvantaged position of the social group to which the applicants belong could and 
should have been taken into consideration’.924 A similar approach was taken in Winterstein, in 
which the Court also elaborated on the applicants’ socio-economic deprivation and risks of 
homelessness, albeit only within the framework of Article 8 ECHR.
925
  
Important implications may follow from this interpretation. One is the potential recognition of 
impoverished and socially excluded people as a ‘social group’ to be considered in decision-
making affecting them. Secondly, to the extent that the Court acknowledges that those persons 
may need assistance not available to the majority, poverty-related claims could also give rise 
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to duties of accommodation. In a case like Yordanova, these could consist of exemptions from 
planning regulations, participation in the devising of solutions to their housing needs and even 
socio-economic assistance. It remains to be seen whether the Court will further develop this 
interpretation in somewhat similar cases communicated last year to Slovenia.
926
 They also 
involve a community of Roma residents in an informal settlement, although the issue there is 
not eviction. Instead, the applicants, relying on Articles 3, 8 and 14 ECHR, seek access to 
basic infrastructure such as water, sanitation and electricity. The domestic authorities had 
refused, noting that the legislation does not allow for infrastructure to be provided to illegally 
constructed buildings. For the applicants, however, ‘their disadvantaged position should have 
prompted the authorities to adjust their approach and ensure that they are able effectively to 
enjoy the same fundamental rights as the majority population’.927 Notwithstanding this, it is 
interesting to note that while the Roma/Traveller cases of eviction with a focus on ethno-
cultural identity (the so-called ‘caravan cases’ discussed earlier) have tended to downplay the 
issue of socio-economic disadvantage, the last Roma/Traveller eviction judgments that rely on 
a more socio-economic narrative (such as Yordanova and Winterstein) have for their part 
displaced the issue of racial discrimination.
928
  
But the above are not the only sets of cases in which the applicants’ economic position has 
been brought under other identities or social positions. The Court also partially subsumed 
their socio-economic hardship under another ground of difference in the 2010 case of 
Odonoghue and Others v. United Kingdom.
929
 Here, the Court had to examine the imposition 
of fees restricting immigrants’ right to marry through a scheme aimed at preventing sham 
marriages. Persons subject to immigration control who wanted to marry in the United 
Kingdom at the time needed either entry clearance or a certificate of approval. At first, 
approval was denied to all those who had no leave to remain, including asylum seekers such 
as Mr. Iwu, a Nigerian national and Ms. Odonoghue’s partner. Under this scheme the couple 
could not even apply for approval. A third version of the scheme opened up that possibility to 
them, but upon payment of a GBP 295 fee. None of these requirements applied to EEA 
nationals (nationals of countries of the European Economic Area) and to persons seeking to 
marry under the rites of the Church of England. As the couple was Catholic, had no resources 
to pay the fee (the first applicant was on social benefits and the second applicant was not 
allowed to work) and did not obtain an exemption, they could not marry until friends raised 
funds for them. The applicants alleged a violation of their rights to marry and found a family 
(Article 12), freedom of religion (Article 9) and to family life (Article 8), both severally and 
in conjunction with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination). As further discussed below, the 
applicants’ claims included arguments based on their socio-economic disadvantage, alongside 
disadvantage on the basis of nationality and other traits. In particular, they alleged 
                                                          
926
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discrimination on the grounds of ‘religion, nationality and poverty’.930 The Court, however, 
found discrimination only in respect of the right to marry on the basis of religion.
931
 It 
condemned direct discrimination against persons who professed no religion or a non-Anglican 
faith and wanted to marry. Their economic situation, like their migration status, was, 
however, displaced.  
The above conclusion reached in Odonoghue and Others is sound and yet incomplete. In fact, 
out of all those who did not wish to marry in accordance with Anglicanism, only those under 
immigration control were negatively affected by the scheme.
932
 Moreover, within this pool 
those who could not afford the permission fee were the most disadvantaged. By declining to 
examine whether the scheme was discriminatory on account of nationality (or migration 
status, as the Court pointed out) and poverty, the Court left unexplored the issue of 
compounded discrimination against a subgroup of immigrants.
933
 It should be noted that it 
was a certain category of immigrants – those who were from a non-European background and 
poor – who were regarded with suspicion and deterred or prevented from freely marrying and 
leading their family life in the receiving country. Leaving this question out of the picture 
therefore failed to interrogate the incidence of possible compounded assumptions or 
stereotypes, something that section III. 2.1 infra addresses in more depth. The Article 14 
reasoning in this case also suggests that only a disadvantage on the basis of religion raises an 
issue of inequality, while the unfavourable treatment accorded to migration and socio-
economic status does not.  
By contrast, while the right to marry (Article 12 ECHR alone) was mostly examined from the 
perspective of migration status and nationality, the Court incorporated therein the question of 
economic disadvantage. According to the applicants, the scheme ‘failed to take account of the 
different personal circumstances which could affect different individuals’.934 The fee was too 
high and admitted no exemption. It was ‘beyond the means of most of the immigrant 
population’ and not just of ‘the poorest of the poor’.935 Considering that ‘many persons who 
are subject to immigration control will either be unable to work’ or ‘will fall into the lower 
income bracket’, the Court concluded that the fee impaired their right to marry (article 12 
ECHR).
936
 It thereby acknowledged the applicants’ socio-economic precariousness and its 
close link with their immigration status. The Court did not further examine the disparate effect 
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that such an economic requirement had, as a matter of equality, on the non-European 
immigrant population. Nevertheless, its analysis under article 12 ECHR put into question a 
migratory regulation that only allowed for the legal admission and entitlement of better-off, 
usually highly skilled non-Europeans. This reveals that from a social policy perspective, 
concealing the socio-economic dimension of legal claims may help to perpetuate the use of 
institutions and rules that, whether in the field of migration or ethno-cultural integration, tend 
to serve only the better-off segments of migrants and minorities.  
While tackling the claims reviewed above from the viewpoint of ethno-cultural disadvantage, 
migration status, gender or other axes of exclusion is worthwhile, obscuring the class 
component may perpetuate laws and policies that are not responsive to minorities, foreigners 
and women who live in poverty. The cases discussed above are not isolated examples. 
Scholars have noted, for example, how issues that are primarily defined as gender issues, such 
as childcare or more flexible, part-time work, continue to overlook the experience of poor 
women. They cannot afford childcare services that are regulated from a distinctly middle-
class perspective. Nor can they benefit from part-time work when they cannot live on a part-
time salary.
937
  
Still, there are other ways in which rights holders tend to be disaggregated in poverty-related 
complaints. The following section explores the fragmentation resulting from the disentangling 
of class or poverty from other social locations.   
  
1.2. Integrating the different faces of poverty  
People who experience socio-economic disadvantage are not an undifferentiated collection of 
individuals. And whether this is acknowledged or obscured in law holds significance. To 
explain why it is relevant to approach the situation of people living in poverty from the 
perspective of other positions and identities, I will take an old and famous case: Airey v. 
Ireland.
938
 Mrs Airey claimed that she was unable to access the High Court to obtain a decree 
of judicial separation from her husband, as she could not afford the costs involved in legal 
representation and in the judicial proceedings. At the time, a separation decree was the only 
legal means of being relieved from a duty of cohabitation. The applicant had sought this 
remedy for years on the grounds of physical and psychological cruelty against her and their 
children. Although the parties could appear in person, in practice petitioners acted through 
legal representation because of the complexity of the proceedings. The Court found ‘most 
improbable that a person in Mrs Airey’s position can effectively present his or her own 
case’.939 The Court described the applicant as a mother of four children, coming ‘from a 
humble family background’. She had a low wage at the time of the judgment and before that 
she had been in receipt of unemployment benefit, while her husband had ceased paying 
maintenance.
940
 In view of this, and considering the high costs involved, the complexity of the 
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proceedings and the lack of legal aid, the Court found a violation of Article 6 ECHR (access 
to a court). The Court’s context-sensitive approach is remarkable. In fact, this is a landmark 
judgment for many reasons relevant to this study. I will therefore come back to this case time 
and again. But for now, it suffices to highlight the Court’s regard for the applicant’s socio-
economic situation. 
Admittedly, lacking financial means was, in Ireland at the time, hindrance enough for any 
person seeking access to the High Court. But the fact that Mrs Airey was a woman suffering 
domestic violence allows us to raise some additional questions. How many victims of 
domestic violence could afford to petition for judicial separation? How many of those persons 
were women? Women are more likely to be both economically worse off and victims of 
domestic violence.
941
 Hence, it is reasonable to think that among all persons who wished to 
separate and could not afford it women like Mrs Airey were particularly burdened. No 
statistics on this point were submitted to the Court in Airey. And luckily, the applicant did not 
need them to win her case. However, for the purpose of this analysis it is useful to reflect on 
how this gendered view of the applicant would have changed the arguments available to the 
parties and to the Court.  
For instance, could that element have made it harder for the government to argue (as it did) 
that the problem at issue was a matter of personal circumstances for which the state had no 
responsibility? Could the integration of gender into the analysis have changed the Court’s 
appreciation of the harm involved, or led it to examine the merits of the dismissed 
discrimination claim? Would those considerations have, at the same time, provided guidance 
to the state as to the kinds of civil proceeding for which legal aid could be required? I think at 
least some of these questions should be answered in the affirmative. Alternatively, to make 
the point clearer, we may also assume that a woman like Mrs Airey who lacks financial means 
and wants to escape violence is complaining about the state’s failure to ensure her effective 
access to temporary shelter or affordable housing. Would not the case miss a lot if such an 
applicant were characterised only in terms of her socio-economic needs? No doubt, it would. 
The risks of overlooking the intersections between poverty and other social locations are 
further analysed below. 
There are cases in which the need to take a compounded view of the applicant’s socio-
economic situation appears evident from the manner in which their rights are restricted by a 
given measure. Think, for instance, of statutory limitations imposed on account of people’s 
migration status or nationality and which explicitly lead to economic hardship and/or 
adversely affect the worst off among foreign residents. Several regulations in the field of 
nationality and migration are accompanied by restrictions on working, moving or accessing 
social benefits. In such cases, it seems obvious that poverty cannot be detached from 
nationality or migration status. Examples are Odonoghue and Others v. United Kingdom, 
mentioned above, or M.S.S. v. Greece and Belgium and similar cases involving migrants and 
asylum seekers. In these judgments the Court has been keen to recognise, albeit to differing 
degrees and in different ways, the relationship between the applicants’ socio-economic 
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disadvantage and their migration/asylum status. In M.S.S. the Court attributed the applicant’s 
extreme destitution to the deliberate omissions of the authorities in the reception of asylum 
seekers.
942
 Under the right to marry (article 12 ECHR), the Court in Odonoghue and Others 
examined the financial limitations of the applicants in being able to afford the fee required to 
marry in view of the fact that persons subjected to migratory control were either not allowed 
to work or were likely to occupy the lowest economic positions.
943
  
In many other cases, however, the links between the applicant’s socio-economic 
circumstances and other identities or social locations were unstated aspects of the restrictions 
in question. Adopting a comprehensive approach then appears more challenging. Think, for 
instance, of cases dealing with the taking of children into care on account of their parents’ 
poverty and with a view to protecting their wellbeing. As explained below, in examining these 
complaints the Court has tended to focus on the parents’ destitution, while the interplay 
between poverty and power relations around gender, disability and/or ethno-cultural 
background has often been overlooked. Exceptions to this arose where the domestic 
authorities had explicitly relied on those other personal circumstances to justify the 
restrictions on family life.   
A number of such cases concerning family separation have been brought to the Court. These 
cases have in common (1) that the taking into care of children was motivated by the parents’ 
situation of poverty; (2) that placement was ordered in the absence of evidence of abuse or 
mistreatment; (3) that none or little material support was provided to the families; and (4) that 
usually parents were additionally deprived of parental responsibility and denied all contact 
with their children. (5) Finally, in all these cases, family separation affected parents, notably 
mothers, and children, whose experience was marked by their socio-economic deprivation and 
their ethnic origin, gender and/or disability.
944
 This case law reflects a broader problem, about 
which the European Council’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) expressed concern in 2015. 
According to PACE, although statistics are lacking evidence suggests that ‘children from 
vulnerable groups are disproportionally represented in the care population of member states, 
whereas no evidence suggests that parents who are poor, less educated, belong to minorities 
or have a migration background are more likely to abuse or neglect their children’.945 This 
problematic picture has furthermore unfolded in a context of economic crisis which may 
exacerbate the vulnerability of disadvantaged families to forcible separation. In fact, 
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liberalisation trends may reinforce the ‘privatisation’ of childcare responsibilities while 
diluting the societal dimension involved in caregiving.
946
 
Faced with these complaints, the Court has invariably found a violation of the right to family 
life (article 8 ECHR) and recalled that unsatisfactory living conditions alone do not constitute 
sufficient justification for separating families. Cases in which poverty is easily conflated with 
neglect, in turn leading to child removal, can fairly be described as cases about parents and 
children living in poverty. Nevertheless, this poverty-centred account needs to be gendered. In 
the first place, women are overwhelmingly responsible for child upbringing and are also more 
frequently at risk of poverty.
947
 In the second place, such economic insecurity is significantly 
produced by the fact that care work enjoys little social support and recognition. This is 
reflected, inter alia, in a shortage of state-sponsored childcare institutions and in a job market 
that disapproves of and penalises flexible work schedules, as well as in the absence of public 
policies to pay for care work. It follows that a gendered approach to parents living in poverty 
does not only apply to women. It also covers the situation of men who may take the 
(gendered) role of caring for their children while also struggling to ensure material wellbeing, 
as in the case of Havelka.
948
  
The situation of impoverished single mothers nonetheless merits special mention. Firstly, 
single mothers face greater obstacles in combining care and paid work, being more frequently 
in need of social welfare. Secondly, and related to the latter, since these women are mostly in 
charge of child-raising and more at risk of poverty, they may also be more exposed to forcible 
child removal on poverty grounds. In fact, cases such as Moser v. Austria, A.K. and L. v. 
Croatia, R.M.S. v Spain and Soares de Melo v Portugal all concerned child-mother 
separation.
949
 Thirdly, it is not uncommon that underlying childcare orders against single poor 
mothers is a process of ‘othering’ that casts them as deviant. While their poverty is a major 
factor around which their ‘otherness’ is constructed, often that is intertwined with 
assumptions and value judgments concerning motherhood and sexuality.
950
 As seen below, 
these assumptions are likely to be shaped by and combined with preconceptions related to 
disability and ethnic background. 
In the aforementioned case of Moser v. Austria, the Court found a violation of the right to 
family life mainly on account of the state’s failure to take positive actions to explore 
alternatives to child removal, including placement in a mother-child centre and regularisation 
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of the applicant’s residence status.951 Aside from her migration status, the Court also 
approached her situation from the perspective of economic hardship and nationality, but in a 
quite limited fashion. When examining the discrimination claim on account of the fact that 
Austrian nationals and nationals from other EU member states would have been supported 
and placed in a mother-child home, the Court contented itself with noting that the legislation 
in question did not formally distinguish on the basis of nationality.
952
 The question of how 
effective this was in practice was not addressed. The opportunities that were actually available 
to the applicant and her child could hardly be uncoupled from her position as a single mother 
of foreign origin without access to socio-economic aid or to a support network.
953
  
Take as well the case of R.M.S. v. Spain,
954
 which is in several respects representative of the 
way impoverished single women, and particularly those who belong to minorities or to other 
excluded groups, are portrayed as incapable of caring. In this case, the three-year-old daughter 
of a Spanish single mother of Guinean origin was taken into care after the mother had visited 
the social services, along with her daughter, seeking socio-economic support (‘work, food and 
housing’). When the administrative and judicial authorities assessed her case, the fact that the 
applicant’s two eldest children were looked after by her great-uncle while she was away 
working as a temporary worker was read simply as an act of child abandonment.
955
 The 
applicant was depicted as a disinterested mother who, instead of staying close to her children, 
emigrated or moved around to work. In addition, she and her extended family were viewed as 
providing an inappropriate environment, and her sexual irresponsibility was pointed out (the 
father of her child was unknown and she was ‘once again pregnant’).956 Further, the Spanish 
authorities blamed her for her own destitution, as they found that she had not made sufficient 
efforts despite her skills.
957
 Finally, the fact that she complained against the taking of her child 
made her violent, maniac or mentally ill in the eyes of the authorities. These images about 
impoverished single mothers are not infrequent and have been documented elsewhere.
958
 Yet, 
as further explained below, they remained unchallenged by the Strasbourg Court. 
The interplay between gender, ethnic origin and poverty is likewise present in Soares de Melo 
v. Portugal, a case brought by a Muslim woman from Cape Verde.
959
 Six of her ten children, 
aged between seven months and six years, were taken into care with a view to their adoption. 
The reason was, again, that she did not provide them with adequate material living conditions 
and neglected them. The domestic authorities considered that the applicant was incapable of 
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performing her role as a mother and took into account that she persistently refused to undergo 
sterilisation, a condition stipulated in an ‘agreement’ reached with the social services. This 
aspect of the case shows that women living in poverty, especially when they belong to 
minorities, are more at risk of being victims of discrimination and violence, including that 
consisting of forced sterilisation.
960
 Moreover, this and other affronts to the sexual and 
reproductive freedom of women in poverty usually rest on the assumption that poverty is 
caused by their sexual irresponsibility and that poor women are unfit to care for children.
961
  
The maternal death case of Şentürk v. Turkey,962 where the victims’ socio-economic 
disadvantage was determinant, could similarly be engendered. In this case an eight-months-
pregnant woman in great pain was not examined by doctors and was subsequently denied 
urgent medical attention because not able to pay the sum requested by the hospital. After 
wandering from one hospital to another in search of medical assistance, Ms Şentürk 
eventually died. According to the applicants, medical attention had been denied because they 
lacked financial means.
963
 And this arguably also had an impact on the lack of response by the 
judicial system, although neither the applicants nor the Court said so. The Court notably 
found a substantive violation of the right to life (Article 2 ECHR) because medical care was 
subordinated to prior payment, despite the medical staff being aware of the risks involved, 
and because the legal framework in place was not capable of preventing this type of situation 
when a patient could not afford the fee.
964
 A procedural violation, in turn, flowed from the 
excessive delays in the examination of the applicants’ case and the failure to prosecute those 
who had endangered Ms Şentürk’s life. Interestingly, however, none of these elements were 
linked to the victim’s position as a woman and the fact that the healthcare denied is needed 
only by women. This contrasts with the perspective endorsed by the applicants and the 
CEDAW Committee in the case of Pimentel v. Brazil. Rejecting the government’s argument 
that the case was about medical negligence and had no link with gender equality, the 
Committee held that the victim’s maternal death was compounded by her status as a woman 
of African descent and her socio-economic hardship.
965
  
The importance of avoiding gender- and ethnicity-neutral assessment of welfare policies is 
further reaffirmed by Garib v. The Netherlands, a recent chamber judgment just confirmed by 
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the Grand Chamber.
966
 It concerned the refusal of a housing permit to a single mother living 
on social welfare on account of legislation imposing income requirements (in terms of level 
and source of income) on persons wishing to reside in a number of inner-city areas of 
Rotterdam. By virtue of this regulation, the applicant, who was already residing in a 
designated area, could not move to the new, more suitable accommodation she had found a 
few blocks away. The policy aimed at improving the quality of life of impoverished inner-city 
areas affected by ‘unemployment, poverty, exclusion […] antisocial behaviour, the influx of 
illegal immigrants and crime’.967 The concentration of socio-economically disadvantaged 
groups placed ‘greater demand on social security structures, reduced support for economic 
activities and services, hampered integration, threatened public safety and security, and led to 
increased crime’.968  
Although primarily concerned with the applicant’s source and level of income within the 
framework of a welfare policy, the case should not be examined in gender- and racially-
neutral terms. As the applicant noted, the Dutch Council of State had expressed its concern 
not only about the burdens imposed on low-income groups, but also about ‘the implicit 
distinction based on income, which might lead to indirect distinctions on grounds of race, 
colour or national or ethnic origin’.969 Arguing along similar lines, the Equal Treatment 
Commission had posited that ‘persons with non-Western European immigrant roots, such as 
persons of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Netherlands Antilles descent (afkomst) and 
single-parent families (i.e. working mothers and mothers on social welfare) were 
overrepresented among the unemployed and among those earning less than 120 per cent of the 
statutory minimum wage’.970 The Court, however, failed to consider these aspects as well as 
the applicant’s specific circumstances.971 Instead, it applied a lenient standard of review that 
validated any general social policy that the legislature judges to be in the ‘public’ or ‘general’ 
interest ‘unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation’.972 In doing so, the 
Court did not examine the proportionality of the measure in view of its application to a single 
mother on social benefits who resided in the designated area and had no criminal record. Nor 
did it consider the specific impact the refusal of housing permit had on her and her family, 
who were already in a vulnerable situation. The Court simply concluded that this fact and her 
‘good behaviour’ ‘cannot by itself suffice to outweigh the public interest which is served by 
the consistent application of legitimate public policy’.973 At the same time, existing material 
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casting doubt on the ability of the policy to accomplish its stated aims was overlooked.
974
 This 
line of reasoning was fully endorsed by the Grand Chamber in 2017.
975
 
Further cases demonstrate the importance of being sensitive to the interplay between poverty, 
gender and other non-privileged traits and positions, such as having a disability or a non-
dominant ethno-cultural background. Take, for example, Havelka and Others,
976
 Savigny v 
Ukraine,
977
 A.K. and L. v. Croatia
978
 and Barnea and Caldararu v. Italy.
979
 As in the family 
separation cases mentioned above, the children were also taken into care because of their 
parents’ poverty. But their deprivations and the way the domestic authorities evaluated the 
applicants’ parenting abilities were also closely linked to disadvantages attached to their 
disability, age or minority background. Contesting the authorities’ assertion that he had not 
made enough effort to find a job, the applicant in Havelka argued that he was in a highly 
disadvantaged position in the labour market due to his age, partial disability, lack of education 
and the fact that he was the sole caretaker of his three minor children.
980
 Likewise, the 
applicants in Savigny claimed that they could not provide their children with better conditions 
due to their blindness and the discrimination they encountered.
981
 In their view, ‘their family 
was unique among blind couples due to the number of their children. Furthermore, none of the 
families registered with the USB [Ukrainian Society of the Blind] had such an unsuitable 
housing situation.’982 For the applicants, ‘their very special situation required more efforts 
from the State authorities to ensure their dignity and equality with healthy people’.983  
Considering these applicants in their complexity, that is, beyond their situation of poverty, is 
not just about the outcome of the case. In fact, in the child removal cases discussed above a 
violation of their right to family life was found. Approaching rights holders as a whole helps 
to bring to light the specific barriers and harms encountered by women, minorities or people 
with disability who live in poverty, whether they are considered from the perspective of 
substantive convention rights (particularly in terms of proportionality) and/or equality (Article 
14 ECHR). Such a comprehensive approach also draws attention to the possible roots of 
violations, including entrenched inequalities and the use of compounded stereotypes. The next 
subsection turns to this.  
 
1.3. Addressing intersecting stereotypes and indirect discrimination 
As discussed in the previous chapter, stereotypes are generalised views or preconceptions 
about the attributes of members of a particular group or about the roles they should perform in 
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society.
984
 Similarly to CEDAW’s condemnation of gender stereotypes, such as those that 
depict women as the home and child carer, the UN Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty 
and Human Rights and other mechanisms underscore the need to protect persons living in 
poverty from stigmas attached to conditions of poverty.
985
 Typical preconceptions about 
people living in poverty portray them as lazy, irresponsible, indifferent to their children’s 
health and education, dishonest and undeserving.
986 
The fact that in some cases socio-
economic disadvantage is not recognised as a legally relevant aspect of rights holders, as 
discussed earlier, makes it all the more difficult to tackle the incidence of poverty-related 
stereotypes in human rights violations. A first step in that direction is therefore to make socio-
economic disadvantage visible in the way litigants and the Court approach the rights holders’ 
situation. Once this is done and the door is open to scrutinising the state’s reliance on poverty-
based stereotypes, it is important to bear in mind that often different harmful stereotypes 
intersect. In so doing, they assign characteristics to members of subgroups of people.
987
 As 
seen above, young mothers living in poverty are, for example, often perceived as incarnating a 
combination of the characteristics accorded to their gender roles and to their socio-economic 
disadvantage.  
When care orders are implemented without evidence of child neglect or harm and certain 
caregivers (those who live in poverty, who have a migrant background, single-parent families, 
and parents with disabilities) are simply regarded as unfit for child-rearing, judges should 
closely scrutinise whether harmful stereotypes or other informal ways of disciplining social 
deviance are at stake. For this, an integrated rather than a unidimensional view of rights 
holders is needed.  
The Court has adopted reasoning conducive to challenging the specific violations of family 
life suffered by parents living in poverty, including the use of unfounded assumptions about 
them. In both R.M.S. and Soares de Melo, as in virtually all other similar cases, the Court has 
noted that the domestic authorities lacked evidence supporting the social services’ assertions 
regarding parents’ irresponsibility or inability.988 In R.M.S., the Court also considered that the 
applicant was forced to prove that she was a good mother, while no evidence submitted to that 
effect could overcome the judicial authorities’ assumptions.989 In Soares de Melo, it found 
unacceptable that parental rights were made conditional upon sterilisation. Failure to undergo 
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sterilisation, even if informed and voluntarily accepted, should not have been held against the 
applicant.
990
 Moreover, the Court approached her situation in a most comprehensive manner. 
In finding a violation of article 8 ECHR, it ascertained the lack of response from the social 
services to the material distress of the applicant, the mother of a large family who was 
parenting practically alone. The Court also took into account that the domestic courts had 
failed to consider the cultural differences involved in her case while adding to the pressure 
exerted on the applicant to undergo sterilisation.
991
  
While conducive to the exposition and scrutiny of stereotypes, this line of reasoning has not 
fully unfolded. In the aforementioned cases, the Court could have pinpointed the state’s use of 
negative compounded stereotypes and social expectations concerning the applicants’ gendered 
roles, ethnic background and socio-economic status. And the same goes for the integration of 
other markers of difference, such as disability. As noted in previous chapters, one way in 
which stereotypes could be tackled is through the prohibition of discrimination. Of note, the 
EU Parliamentary Assembly has acknowledged the link between discrimination, the over-
representation of vulnerable groups in the care population and the incidence of stereotypes 
and prejudice.
992
 When it comes to intersecting stereotypes, in particular, usually the question 
will be one of indirect discrimination. However, this has not been scrutinised by the Court.  
As seen above, people often perceive their situation as discrimination because of their 
experience as women, as a person with a disability and/or as having a migrant background 
rather than because of their socio-economic precariousness. This may be a strong indication 
that poverty-related disadvantage is a precondition or even a proxy for other socially devalued 
and subordinated social positions. Such an indication should lead the Court to examine more 
closely the links between these social identities or locations and poverty-related claims. Doing 
so is all the more important insofar as distinctions and disadvantages imposed by policies, 
regulations or practices relying on economic factors are likely to be regarded as reasonable.  
As happens with the cultural expressions discussed in Part II, such as dress, modes of living 
and language, it is easy for socio-economic considerations to be functionally connected to a 
legitimate social aim. This may take the form of a presumption of legitimacy or of the 
dismissal of any causal link between the contested measure and the resulting harm or 
exclusion. The consequence is that economic measures or criteria receive less scrutiny than 
they deserve. Take the Court’s decision in Haydarie and Others v. The Netherlands.993 The 
applicant, an Afghan woman who lived in the Netherlands with one of her children and her 
disabled sister, was denied family reunion with her three other children, who stayed behind 
when their mother fled the country. The reason for denial was that the applicant did not meet 
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a minimum income requirement set by the law. Instead, she relied on social benefits. 
Upholding the government’s argument, the Court did ‘not consider unreasonable a 
requirement that an alien who seeks family reunion must demonstrate that he/she has 
sufficient independent and lasting income, not being welfare benefits […].’994 The Court 
subsequently turned to the applicant’s efforts to find a paid job (which were regarded as 
insufficient) and evaluated her supposed choices (which were seen as wrong). At no point was 
there any examination of the justification for subjecting the applicant’s family reunification to 
such an income requirement. The state did not explain it and the Court did not miss this 
information. The reasonability of the measure is just a given, especially in migration law. 
Against this, the principle that family separation cannot be justified solely on economic 
grounds and the best interest of children had no role to play. Cases such as Haydarie as well 
as O'Donoghue and Others (discussed earlier) nonetheless demonstrate how socio-economic 
requirements affect with particular intensity immigrants with non-European backgrounds, 
which raises an issue of indirect discrimination.
995
     
The Garib case also provides an interesting example of the disparate effects of policy 
regulations based on supposedly general and rational economic criteria, such as level or 
source of income. The Dutch Inner City Problems Act restricted the right of welfare recipients 
to take up residence in some deprived areas with the aim of reducing the concentration of 
socio-economically disadvantaged people in those neighbourhoods. The level or source of 
income is thereby revealed as a criterion functionally related to the aim sought by the Act. 
Moreover, according to the Court, ‘the restriction complained of […] does not target any 
particular individual or individuals but is of general application in discrete areas (namely, 
circumscribed areas within the city of Rotterdam)’.996 The abstraction of the account is 
remarkable, though. For one thing, the contention that the restriction did not target any 
particular individuals is at best artificial. The measure actually targeted persons relying on 
unemployment social benefits and households with an income under 120 percent of the 
statutory minimum wage.
997
A similar pretence of neutrality is conveyed by the assertion that 
the application of such a housing policy was limited to discrete areas. These discrete areas 
actually happened to be rather deprived neighbourhoods, populated by socio-economically 
disadvantaged residents, mostly immigrants.
998
  
For these reasons, the housing policy in question was problematic from the perspective of 
both direct discrimination against socio-economically disadvantaged people and indirect 
discrimination against the women and migrants among them. Nevertheless, these issues were 
not part of the analysis carried out under the right to choose one’s residence, while the 
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prohibition of discrimination was not examined.
999
 Against this, the argumentation offered by 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque (joined by Judge Vehabović) when dissenting from the majority 
in the Grand Chamber judgment in Garib is particularly remarkable. On the basis of extensive 
reasoning, they contend that the case gave rise to both an issue of direct discrimination on the 
basis of the applicant’s ‘social and economic situation’, and of ‘indirect’ and ‘intersectional 
discrimination’ on account of her status as a woman in socio-economic precariousness.1000 
Related concerns may apply to cases involving the imposition of fees and other forms of 
economic requirement. Consider cases such as Airey, Gnahore, Şentürk, O'Donoghue and 
Ponomaryovi. The conventional thinking is that service providers may set prices according to 
the market and other objective considerations. Claiming that these measures amount to direct 
discrimination on the basis of social condition or, alternatively, indirect discrimination against 
socio-economically disadvantaged people would therefore lead the Court into dealing with 
those economic justifications which, by their very nature, seem beyond the scrutiny of the 
law. These examples suggest that socio-economic grounds, similarly to cultural requirements, 
are likely to be perceived as reasonably connected to a legitimate policy goal. This means that 
it is usually easier for states to defend, and for judges to accept, that the measure or conduct 
under scrutiny has not been based on any questionable ground or aimed at any particular 
category of people.
1001
 As seen in Chapter 3, the restriction of rights encountered by Muslim 
women was not, so goes the argument, because of being Muslim or because of religion. Nor 
were they based on the sex of the applicants. Rather, the Court stated, the restrictions 
stemmed from their failure to comply with an organisation’s dress code. Similarly, in the 
cases discussed in the present chapter, the lack of access to courts, to marriage or to choose 
one’s place of residence were not because of being poor and a single mother and/or a non-EU 
immigrant. Rather, those restrictions are said to have resulted from the fact that the person 
concerned did not pay, did not institute the required proceeding or did not comply with the 
income requirement set by law. 
Ironically, though, there is nothing – legally speaking – preventing judges from closely 
scrutinising the above measures. In fact, human rights law and its mechanisms already deal 
with economic justifications. Take for example, the monitoring of the progressive realisation 
of socio-economic rights or the standard of reasonable accommodation. What is more, the 
prevailing principle on the matter says that economic considerations are not acceptable as 
justification for the restriction of human rights, at least for those that qualify as civil and 
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political.
1002
 Irrespective of this, an argument of indirect discrimination that draws attention to 
the impact that such measures have on (single) women, migrants and people with disabilities, 
to mention some, introduces an additional and strong normative insight. When the complaint 
is examined from an intersectional perspective and the question turns, for example, to the 
specific risks and burdens faced by some minority and poor women, it is easier to have the 
claim of economic difference more seriously examined.  
 
1.4. Addressing intersecting disadvantages and privileges  
Not everything is about stereotypes, though. Intersectionality, like discrimination, is not just 
about stereotyping. Taking seriously the specific harms and disadvantages that are placed on 
certain persons is crucial. For example, in Garib, the problem that intersectionality illuminates 
is that the income requirement exacerbated the subordination already experienced by the 
applicant on account of social precariousness and gender inequalities,
1003
 that is, those 
inequalities which are likely to explain that most single mothers like her had to rely on social 
benefits and had difficulty in finding a paid job while also securing the care of their children. 
In the case of Ms Garib, the heightened disadvantages were substantial. She was not just 
unjustly associated with criminality and antisocial behaviour. She also lost autonomy, was 
prevented from improving her and her children’s life conditions and experienced further 
socio-economic deprivation.
1004
 The child removal cases, as well as the lack of access to 
judicial separation of Ms Airey and the maternal death of Ms Şentürk, similarly show the 
particular ways in which socio-economic disadvantage puts at risk and harms women, even 
more so when they belong to minorities or have a disability. In any event, in order to truly 
grasp the specific forms of subordination that socio-economic disadvantage places on 
differently situated individuals, it is important to appreciate that the issue is not merely one of 
overlapping identities or subgroups. Rather, it is about how those who occupy a racialised or 
gendered position are accorded disadvantages resulting from hierarchies that privilege those 
who do not.
1005
  
Conversely, seeing the individual as a whole may also enable the Court to recognise that the 
fact that a person is economically better off does not preclude the possibility of being 
discriminated against or illegitimately deprived of her rights as a result of inequalities 
attached to gender, ethnicity or other differences. As explained in Chapter 2, an intersectional 
perspective is attentive to the individual’s multiple social locations, which may 
simultaneously signal both disadvantage and privilege. Consider, for example, complaints 
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such as that of de la Cierva Osorio de Moscoso and Others v. Spain, which concerned male 
primacy in the lines of succession of the nobility.
1006
 While the Court did not address the 
applicant’s claim of discrimination against women (because it does not deal with the merits of 
the case),
1007
 the state’s arguments and the decisions adopted by other monitoring bodies in 
similar cases disclose difficulties in ascertaining the allegations of rights holders who are 
socio-economically powerful and nonetheless disadvantaged by gender relations. The Spanish 
government raised the inequality involved in the institution of peerages as a reason to dismiss 
the claims of those noblewomen.
1008
 Similarly, the UN Human Rights Committee has asserted 
that ‘article 26 [ICCPR] cannot be invoked in support of claiming a hereditary title of 
nobility, an institution that […] lies outside the underlying values behind the principles of 
equality before the law and non-discrimination protected by article 26’.1009  
Although such a system of social hierarchy is indeed objectionable from a human rights 
perspective, the above decisions failed to examine the applicants’ experience as a whole. They 
were defined solely from the viewpoint of their socio-economic status, which was in fact one 
of power and privilege. A more comprehensive view, however, would problematise that 
account by integrating their experience as women. This requires acknowledging, as a 
dissenting member of the CEDAW Committee puts it, ‘the element of discrimination against 
women that takes place in the distribution of social privileges using the law and legal 
processes’.1010 In so doing, the applicants’ cultural affiliation (as members of Western 
customary elites) and contestations of nobility traditions would also be exposed. Neither these 
nor the underlying inferiority that nobility laws ascribe to women should be eclipsed by the 
applicants’ socio-economic advantage.  
Having said this, I will now turn to another aspect of rights holders that is too often addressed 
through an either/or approach in cases concerning socio-economic disadvantage, namely their 
agency.   As in cases regarding cultural difference, when it comes to economic difference 
individual agency and choices are crucial, contested features of rights holders. Questions 
about individual autonomy are in fact particularly strong in legal discourses concerning socio-
economic disadvantage. On account of this, and in line with previous chapters, the next 
section explores the extent to which the litigants and the Court fall into the trap of a 
dichotomist view of individual autonomy. 
 
2. Problematising the ‘either/or’ view of individuals’ agency and choice 
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An either/or view of autonomy in the cases examined here is the kind of view that portrays 
impoverished individuals as having at one extreme little or no agency, while fully endowed 
with free choices at the other. Though in a different context, Fredman explores this paradox in 
terms of what she calls ‘the relationship between agency and structure’ in normative debates 
about poverty. She argues that ‘the agency approach to poverty is based on the central 
assumption that, on the whole, people can be regarded as responsible for their own 
poverty’.1011 At the other extreme, ‘the structural approach recognises that poverty is based on 
forces beyond the control of any one individual. However, there is a risk that such an 
approach leads to policy prescriptions which denude individuals of any agency.’1012 In what 
follows, it will be seen that this fragmentary understanding of autonomy has played out in the 
Strasbourg case law involving claims of socio-economic difference. I will start by exploring 
the reductionism that posits destitute individuals as fully free, autonomous and thus 
responsible for their grief. Then I will turn to the other pole, that of impoverished individuals 
lacking agency and needing guidance or supervision.  
 
2.1. The autonomous, unconstrained fragment of impoverished rights holders 
The idea that socio-economic disadvantage and its accompanying rights interferences are the 
result of the individual’s choice and personal responsibility is an old one.1013 Arguably, this is 
fed by the belief that one’s socio-economic position, unlike one’s ethnic origin, colour of skin 
and sex, is changeable. One notable consequence of this narrative is that when confronted 
with rights claims related to poverty, judges may be more reluctant to afford protection for a 
circumstance that – supposedly – could have been avoided. Thus, in Airey the government 
argued that the applicant was ‘free to go before [the High Court] without the assistance of a 
lawyer’.1014 Moreover, ‘the alleged lack of access to court stems not from any act on the part 
of the authorities but solely from Mrs Airey’s personal circumstances, a matter for which 
Ireland cannot be held responsible under the Convention’.1015 The Court’s response in Airey, 
however, conveyed the message that even if states assume that individuals are responsible for 
their own economic fate, this does not authorise them to adopt a hands-off conduct when that 
situation encroaches upon human rights. In fact, in this case the Court recalled that factual 
hindrances to the enjoyment of rights could equally contravene the Convention, regarding 
which states needed to take positive action. They ‘cannot simply remain passive.’1016  
Still, the idea of poverty as self-inflicted continues to be common among states. In Wallova 
and Walla, for instance, the applicants were regarded as responsible for their situation. 
According to the authorities, they had not made enough effort to overcome their 
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destitution.
1017
 The same goes for virtually all cases of poverty-based child removal examined 
by the Court. The applicants in Havelka and Others, Savigny and R.M.S., for example, were 
depicted at the domestic level and/or before the Strasbourg Court as simply having failed to 
accomplish better socio-economic conditions.
1018
 This view of impoverished rights holders 
furthermore seems to stand in every context. Even in M.S.S., ‘the applicant had chosen to 
invest his resources in fleeing the country rather than in accommodation’.1019 For the Greek 
government, ‘it was up to the applicant to come forward and show an interest in improving his 
lot..
1020
 The logical consequence of this narrative is that any interference with the rights of 
those rights holders becomes a matter of choices beyond the reach of the law. 
While the above rhetoric is more common in states’ arguments than in the reasoning of the 
Strasbourg Court, the latter has not always remained distant from it. Reductive accounts of 
individual autonomy and the conditions in which this unfolds have sometimes been left 
unchallenged, when not actually upheld by the Court. The case of Haydarie, mentioned 
above, is illustrative. In declaring the complaint inadmissible, the Court, like the domestic 
authorities, found that the applicant did not have the minimum income required to support her 
family because she had not made ‘serious efforts’ to find ‘gainful employment’. Instead, she 
had ‘preferred to care for her wheel-chair bound sister’.1021 The Court did not respond to the 
applicant’s claim that the authorities had ‘given insufficient weight to her […] unpaid care 
work’.1022 Nor did it consider any other difficulties or limitations confronting the applicant’s 
choices. Although her attempts to improve her chances in the labour market were noted (she 
successfully followed Dutch and sewing courses), these do not seem to have carried weight in 
the Court’s analysis. Finally, the meaning assigned to her presumed choices was decisive. The 
fact that she ‘preferred’ to care for her sister instead of entrusting that to an aid-providing 
agency signified that she was not willing to undertake a ‘real’ job whereby she could improve 
her socio-economic situation. Her claim under article 8 ECHR was therefore manifestly ill-
founded.   
Another problematic account of agency is offered by Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria.
1023
 The Court 
found that requiring the applicants to pay fees for their secondary education on account of 
their nationality and immigration status was discriminatory, mainly because no provision for 
requesting exemptions was envisaged and no regard had been had for the applicants’ specific 
circumstances. But the circumstances considered by the Court were all indications of the 
exceptionality of the applicants’ situation in terms of their ‘innocence’ and lack of choice as 
immigrants. They were not like those ‘individuals arriving in the country unlawfully and then 
laying claim to the use of its public services’.1024 And while they found themselves 
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‘inadvertently’ lacking residence permits, the authorities had no objection to their 
remaining.
1025
 They did not try to abuse the state education system, nor was it their choice to 
settle in Bulgaria, as they arrived very young.
1026
 Admittedly, the Court’s assessment of 
autonomy in this case refers more to the applicants’ choices as immigrants rather than to their 
socio-economic position. Nevertheless, both aspects were closely related and many of the 
remarks on their autonomy as immigrants could easily be transposed to social precariousness.  
 
2.2. The constrained, passive fragment of impoverished rights holders 
At the other side of the spectrum, rights holders in an underprivileged economic situation 
appear deprived of agency. They are depicted as unable to make ‘right’ choices, being in need 
of supervision and guidance. Put simply, others know better what is good for them. This 
discourse has resonance in the case law studied. In Airey, for instance, the government argued 
that ‘the applicant has nothing to gain from a judicial separation’,1027 challenging her 
entitlement to exercise her rights the way she deemed best. The Court, however, did not 
accept this approach and showed respect for the applicant’s agency. ‘The Court rejects this 
line of reasoning. Judicial separation is a remedy provided for by Irish law […] It is for the 
individual to select which legal remedy to pursue; consequently, even if it were correct that 
Mrs. Airey’s choice has fallen on a remedy less suited than others to her particular 
circumstances, this would be of no moment.’1028 Regrettably, this remarkable perspective 
went missing when a similar issue of agency was considered in Garib v. The Netherlands, 
referred to above.
1029
  
As a result of the gentrification policy applied in this case, the applicant, who had managed to 
obtain more suitable accommodation than what she had in the designated area, was prevented 
from improving her family situation in the way she saw fit. In spite of this, no violation of 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (right to choose one’s residence) was found by the Chamber. Nor 
did the latter acknowledge this curtailment of autonomy. In fact, the denial of agency was 
reinforced at Strasbourg. Both the government and the Chamber were of the view that the 
applicant had to justify why she wanted to move. For the government, it had not been shown 
‘that the applicant’s dwelling in A. Street was in especially poor condition’.1030 And the 
Court, for its part, held that the applicant had ‘stated no reason, cogent or otherwise, for 
wishing to live in Tarwewijk’.1031 The dissenting judges rightly pinpoint the paternalism 
underlying this approach. They reminded the majority that ‘the applicant has the right to 
choose her residence, and she is not obliged to justify this choice’.1032   
The Court’s reasoning appears even more striking given that the measure hinged on what was 
mainly an autonomy right, namely the freedom to decide where to take up residence. Of 
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course restricting this freedom does not make the regulation per se incompatible with the 
ECHR. Nevertheless, one cannot but note that the intervention was addressed to one specific 
segment of the population only, that is, those who were socio-economically disadvantaged, 
such as the unemployed and recipients of social benefits. The selectivity of the policy matters 
because these persons are particularly at risk of having their agency severed, as recognised by 
the UN Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights. These explicitly call for 
people living in poverty to be treated as autonomous agents, entitled to have their decisions 
respected.
1033
  
The Grand Chamber judgment in Garib ultimately confirmed the Chamber’s view on this 
matter by holding: ‘The corollary of the applicant’s position that she is not required to justify 
her preference for a particular residential area, if accepted, would be that both the Court itself 
and the domestic authorities (…) would be deprived of the possibility of weighing the interest 
of the individual (…) an unspecified personal preference for which no justification is offered 
cannot override public decision-making(…).’1034 The Grand Chamber seems, however, to 
have conflated the autonomy protected by Article 2 Protocol 4 with the account that the 
applicant could have provided as to the harm caused by the restriction. To appreciate this, take 
another autonomy right, such as freedom of assembly and association (Article 11 ECHR). It 
would go against the essence of this right to require an individual to justify why she or he 
wanted to join an assembly or association at any particular place and time in order to 
determine the degree of protection afforded. A different matter is what this person could 
submit as regards the prejudice or disadvantage experienced as a result of being prevented 
from freely engaging in a peaceful assembly or association. The same goes for this case. The 
degree of protection afforded by the Convention cannot be made conditional upon the content 
of Ms Garib’s choice to accept her landlord’s offer to move to a dwelling a few blocks away.   
Against this background one may wonder: why is the agency of people in a precarious socio-
economic situation so commonly denied? It is submitted that this may have to do, at least in 
part, with stigmatising views about the supposed inability, irresponsibility or incapacity of 
people living in poverty, which is further discussed infra IV 2.1. In this vein, it is convenient 
to bear in mind that being patronised, like being stereotyped or discriminated against, is a 
harm in and of itself. 
The above examples demonstrate the importance of embracing the complexity of individuals’ 
autonomy and its relational character, which, also with regard to the question of socio-
economic resources, does not stand as an either/or issue. Poverty may affect the exercise of 
autonomy but does not take it away. And while individuals are in many ways ‘self-made’, this 
does not mean that they have control over their destitution. Nor does this remove the state’s 
responsibility for rights violations associated with their poverty. By the same token, it is a 
sterile task to try to resolve the cases examined by distinguishing poverty from unchangeable 
traits or from valued identities. Even if being on social benefits is something that should be 
changed or ended as soon as possible, as the government argued in the Grand Chamber 
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hearing in Garib, the question will remain whether the state’s aim of putting an end to a 
situation of disadvantage is a reason to deny legal protection.
1035
 Thus, while it is possible to 
argue that poverty is rather immutable (given the little social mobility that actually takes place 
in many societies), the point is rather why any fixed view of individuals’ social positions 
should be seen as providing a conclusive legal basis for human rights protection. In what 
follows, another aspect of the relational self is explored, namely that of interaction and 
interdependence among rights holders.  
 
3. A broad view of rights holders 
In real life, the applicants of the cases studied are in constant interaction with other people. As 
a consequence, some of these other persons will usually be affected, for good or for bad, by 
the exercise or restriction of the applicant’s rights. There is nothing revolutionary about this 
idea. This is basically what judges and policy-makers have in mind when setting conditions 
and limitations to rights. They normally care about ‘the rights of others’. But while in this 
context the discourse of judges and policy-makers often focuses on the normative entities 
themselves (i.e. rights restrictions, obligations and regulatory frameworks), our discussion 
here focuses on the rights holders exercising them.  
As explained in previous chapters, the fact that the Strasbourg Court operates on the basis of 
an individual justice model makes it difficult for it to look beyond the parties to the case. It 
was also explained, however, that the Court itself has demonstrated that doing so is possible 
and useful. Even when the Court cannot declare violations with respect to individuals other 
than the applicant, it can and does consider who else is being affected by the measure in 
question. One evident way in which the Court does this is, as we have seen, by examining 
whether the rights restriction aims at the ‘protection of the rights of others’. Here, the Court 
normally needs to analyse who these others are and how their rights are secured or 
undermined. To recall this is relevant because while in cases about cultural difference 
interferences are frequently justified on the grounds of protecting the rights of others (e.g. 
women, children, users of public services, private owners, other users of land, etc.), that is not 
so common in cases dealing with socio-economic disadvantage. In fact, many measures 
interfering with the rights of destitute people are based on public interest grounds, rather than 
on the need to protect others.  
Still, protection of the rights of others is at the core of some poverty-related cases. Those 
concerning the taking into care of children on account of the parents’ poverty are a 
paradigmatic example. State authorities claim that they take these children away to protect 
them. In addition, these cases attest to the need to have regard for the interests of rights 
holders other than the applicants who are nonetheless similarly prejudiced by the family 
                                                          
1035
 In this vein, see Valeska David, Improving neighborhoods by preventing welfare recipients to take up 
residence: The Gran Chamber hearing in Garib v. the Netherlands, Strasbourg Observers, 2 February 2017, 
<strasbourgobservers.com/2017/02/02/improving-neighborhoods-by-preventing-welfare-recipients-to-take-up-
residence-the-grand-chamber-hearing-in-garib-v-the-netherlands/>  (last accessed 20 June 2017). 
The hearing on the case is available at 
<www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=hearings&w=4349409_25012017&language=en&c=&py=2017> (last 
accessed 20 June 2017).  
237 
 
separation. This is why this section primarily deals with child removal cases. Although most 
of these cases were submitted by the parent(s) who lost the care of their child(ren), the Court 
has routinely examined the interests of the child concerned, irrespective of the child’s 
procedural standing before the Court. In this way the Court has rightly recognised that the 
rights of both parent(s) and child are involved. Moreover, in most of the cases studied, it has 
endorsed the principle (enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child) according to 
which the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in all decisions and 
actions concerning children, which obviously extends to family separation.
1036
 Yet, it is 
interesting to note that the judicial regard for children affected by family separation for 
reasons of poverty seems to fade when it comes to refusals of family reunification for 
economic reasons. In fact, the inadmissibility decision in Haydarie upheld the state’s refusal 
to reunite a single mother with her children merely for lack of gainful income and without any 
reference to the children’s interests. One may then wonder why the lack of financial means 
that is considered insufficient to justify the forcible separation of families with a deprived 
economic background is, on the other hand, enough justification to deny family reunification. 
And further, whether the framing of the case as being solely about family reunification allows 
the principles developed in cases of family separation to be done away with.  
Nevertheless, it is also worth mentioning that the Court has not always taken its analysis of 
the children’s interests to its fullest potential in cases of family separation, in particular by 
applying an interpretation attuned to the existing child rights framework. This is noticeable, 
for example, in cases in which the Court has overlooked the question of child participation in 
the decision-making process leading to family separation.
1037
 As further discussed below, the 
judgments in R.M.S. and in Soares de Melo attest to this oversight.  
But we should also bear in mind that often the children and parent(s) concerned are not the 
only family members affected, which is particularly evident in the context of an extended 
family. This means that other rights holders, such as other next of kin or putative relatives, 
whose rights are prejudiced in a similar way as those of the applicant, may need to be 
considered. People living in poverty are actually more prone to live in and rely on an extended 
family than those who are better off.
1038
 The broadness of caregiving relations finds some 
normative recognition in the international corpus of children’s rights. Reflective of this is the 
standard according to which effective judicial review of child removal requires that all 
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interested parties be heard in the proceedings.
1039
 In R.M.S. v. Spain, however, the applicants’ 
extended family was not allowed to take part in the judicial proceedings. The Court did 
observe that the applicant’s great-uncle, who also opposed the child’s removal, had not had an 
opportunity to express his views in the judicial proceedings. Nevertheless, this was not 
explicitly framed as a flaw in the decision-making process. In this vein, one may also note 
that references to the family ties between siblings do not abound in the judgments studied. 
Consequently, the siblings of the children who are taken away often disappear from sight. In 
Gnahore v. France, the examination of the right to family life simply did not include the ties 
between the children. Meanwhile, in Wallová and Walla the Court remained silent on the 
applicants’ claim that the authorities had not considered the need to keep the children 
together, as they had been placed in two different institutions.
1040
  
But what difference, if any, would it make to consider the situation of those other children? 
After all, the judgment in Wallová and Walla, for example, nonetheless found a violation of 
the right to private and family life on account of the disproportionality of the measure. 
Against first impressions, the question does hold relevance. For instance, by ignoring the 
issue of separation between siblings, the Court missed the opportunity to oversee and give 
guidelines on the implementation of care orders. Siblings’ separation runs against existing 
standards on the rights of children that most member states have subscribed to. Moreover, 
leaving this question out of the discussion does not do justice to the lived experience of the 
whole family and especially of children, who also suffer because of their separation from 
brothers and sisters. This also affects the possibility of satisfaction awards for non-pecuniary 
damage. If the harm resulting from splitting the children between themselves is not seen, it 
will not be repaired by the Court.  
Against this background, the Court’s approach in Savigny and Soares de Melo is 
praiseworthy. In both cases, the Court explicitly took into account the breaking of family ties 
between siblings. In Savigny the Court noted that ‘not only were the children separated from 
their family of origin, they were also placed in different institutions. Two of them live in 
another city, away from Romny where their parents and siblings reside, which renders it 
difficult to maintain regular contact.’1041 Of note, the Court took this approach in spite of the 
fact that none of the children were applicants in the case. In Soares de Melo, where the 
applicant’s children were placed in three different homes, the Court also assessed the harm 
they experienced because of their separation and found, on this basis, that ‘the measure went 
against the best interest of the children’.1042  
Finally, the Court has also adopted a broad view of rights holders to the extent that it has 
distinguished among applicants to bring into light those who are most likely to remain 
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invisible, or those whose interests can easily be diluted among others’ interests. This is 
usually the case with children. Thus, in Tarakhel v. Switzerland,
1043
 a case concerning the 
expulsion from Switzerland to Italy of a family of asylum seekers, including six minors, who 
had left Italy due to the poor living conditions of reception, the Court was willing to recognise 
the risk of violation of Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment) resulting from destitution, mostly because of the threshold of suffering that it 
applied to children.
1044
  
As will be seen below, the attention to the children affected by the measures discussed in 
poverty-related cases has frequently led the Court to apply stringent standards as well as to 
integrate socio-economic rights. This and other aspects of normative integration are analysed 
below.     
 
IV. Integrated rights: cross-thinking about harms and norms 
Irrespective of the definitional troubles around the notion of poverty, and admitting the 
multidimensionality of the concept, it is safe to say that poverty is heavily determined by 
resource deprivation. Questions of redistribution and socio-economic rights are therefore 
frequently at issue in poverty-related complaints. The ECHR was, however, primarily 
conceived to secure civil and political rights, which undoubtedly feeds the adoption of a 
fragmentary approach to the rights contained therein.  
 
1. A preliminary note on the indivisibility of rights  
Though the idea of indivisibility, as a theoretical and normative device, may still be contested, 
its practical implications are manifest in people’s lives. In the case of those living in poverty, 
in particular, rights regarded as socio-economic and as civil and political are in practice all too 
interconnected. What follows from this is, as noted by Brodsky and Day, ‘that it does not 
serve the interests of justice or logic to take a categorical approach to the protections that 
people living in poverty need’.1045 
Cases concerning child removal provide a clear example of the unsuitability of a categorical 
approach. Without aspects of socio-economic protection, the right to family life has little 
relevance for those parents and children forcibly separated. And rejecting family separation 
on account of poverty alone necessarily invokes states’ positive obligations, with resource 
implications. According to the vast majority of applicants, the domestic authorities failed to 
help them to improve their living conditions effectively in terms of, for example, housing, 
jobs and child care. They mostly limited themselves to monitoring the family situation, 
eventually taking the children away.
1046
 In most of these cases, the Court has been inclined to 
affirm the indivisibility of rights, although in a very careful manner. For example, when the 
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Court has concluded that the state should have supported families to overcome material 
hurdles instead of adopting the most drastic measure envisaged to protect children,
1047
 it has 
been very cautious in characterising that endeavour. The Court has generally used the verbs 
‘to help’, ‘to inform’, ‘to guide’ and ‘to advise’ with respect to options for obtaining social 
housing, benefits and other means of overcoming the family’s difficulties. So, instead of 
requiring the provision of socio-economic support, the Court has adopted a procedural review 
in the framework of the less restrictive means test. The issue is whether the authorities 
explored alternatives for keeping the family together, such as informing, advising and guiding 
the parents on the social assistance available to them.1048 By contrast, ‘it is not the Court’s role 
to determine whether the promotion of family unity in the case entitled the applicants’ family 
to a particular standard of living at public expense’.1049  
In Havelka, however, the Court appears to go a step further. Although it used a careful and 
procedurally-oriented language, it regarded the financial assistance provided by the state as 
insufficient. What it is more, it suggested that more concrete and focused socio-economic 
steps should have been taken. Interestingly, the Court referred, ‘for information purposes, to 
the Committee of Ministers' Recommendation (2006) 19 on policies to support positive 
parenthood, according to which families in difficult socio-economic situations should be 
granted attention, more specific support and a more focused approach’.1050 But a real shift 
came with Soares de Melo. Here, the Court not only took a more substantive perspective, it 
also engaged more with the applicant’s experience. She survived on a family allowance of 
393 euros per month and obtained food and clothing for her large family by relying on 
donations and food stamps. The authorities were well aware of the family’s deprivation. Yet, 
the Court states, they failed to alleviate its hardship through ‘additional financial assistance to 
cover the basic needs of the family (e.g. in food, electricity and running water) and the daily 
care of the younger children to allow the applicant to exercise a paid job’.1051 Unlike previous 
judgments, the Court in Soares de Melo did not shy away from specifying the state’s duty to 
support families instead of splitting them apart. In this reading, the right to family life 
enshrined in Article 8 ECHR got remarkably close to its socio-economic counterpart. It is 
interesting to note that these cases, where the Court has also adopted a relatively broad view 
of rights holders and of the relevant norms, have been defined as being about interferences 
with the right to family life and not about welfare or social policy, as have other cases studied 
here.  
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As will be further seen below, socio-economic provision or claims of assistance underlie 
several other cases studied here. But more often than not the Court is very cautious (more than 
in the cases discussed above) or even reluctant to derive socio-economic entitlements from 
Convention rights. Without downplaying this question of indivisibility, the following 
discussion will not elaborate further on the socio-economic rights dimension of poverty-
related cases. Since this study is interested in what can be gained from looking at cases in a 
cross-thinking manner, the subsections below concentrate on harms and rights not 
immediately connected to socio-economic rights, which are the usual focus of attention in 
normative discourses about poverty and rights.     
 
2. Integrating recognition and structural issues into redistribution wrongs 
As mentioned at the outset, the experience of poverty usually involves a recognition 
dimension that cannot be underestimated. In the theoretical chapter of this study, it was seen 
that Fraser describes recognition harms as those rooted in cultural patterns and which impede 
equal participation in social life. These take different forms, such as being subjected to 
cultural values that are alien and/or hostile to one’s own, being rendered invisible and being 
routinely disrespected, maligned or stereotyped.
1052
 While often these harms are mostly 
associated with claims concerning, for example, ethno-cultural, gender and sexual differences, 
they are also at issue in cases marked by poverty or socio-economic disadvantage.  
The recurring link between recognition harms and rights claims related to poverty is well 
reflected in the Guiding Principles on Human Rights and Poverty and in the views of the 
several stakeholders that were involved in their drafting. Explicit reference is made, for 
example, to the need to recognise the human rights claims of people living in poverty, as well 
as address their stigmatisation, stereotyping, discrimination and lack of legal recognition.
1053
 
The good news is that, in principle, for a human rights court like the Strasbourg Court, it is 
easier to deal with these harms than with those more connected to maldistribution. As scholars 
have noted, courts in general feel more comfortable in addressing issues of discrimination, 
humiliation and stigmatisation, than in touching socio-economic concerns.
1054
 Despite this, it 
will be seen that the Court has only partially, and at times timidly, dealt with recognition 
harms linked to socio-economic difference. In the cases examined, at least three types of 
recognition harm are discernible, namely (1) stereotyping, (2) humiliation and (2) invisibility. 
The following sub-sections explore the way the Court has (not) taken them aboard. 
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2.1. Addressing the stereotypes and humiliation involved in the experience of 
poverty 
As discussed earlier, stereotyping is a key aspect in most cases dealing with the taking of 
children for reasons of poverty. Many administrative and judicial decisions leading to family 
separation relied explicitly or implicitly on negative preconceptions about parents, especially 
mothers, living in poverty.
1055
 Portrayed as unable or unfit for parenting, lazy, uninterested in 
their children or irresponsible, they saw the care orders enforced despite the lack of evidence 
of abuse or neglect. We have seen that in all of these cases, one or more violations were 
found. However, as explained above the Court did not name or scrutinise those stereotypes 
and stigmas. Most of them were compounded, intersecting assumptions regarding not only 
economic status, but also gender and body-ability. But none of them was integrated into the 
analysis of the right to private and family life (Article 8) or of equality and non-discrimination 
(Article 14). These forms of misrecognition were thus sidelined.  
True, the Court’s assessment of the applicants’ procedural rights (framed as a matter of 
Article 8 and/or Article 6 ECHR) might appear to have taken heed of the aforesaid 
preconceptions to the extent that the absence of supporting evidence was criticised. Yet, this 
falls short of taking stereotyping and stigma seriously. Leaving them unnamed and 
unweighted, the Court failed to challenge them and foster transformation of the cultural 
patterns that were at the root of the violations. The lack of engagement with the stereotypes 
accorded to poverty is also apparent in the case of Garib v. the Netherlands. It is not 
uncommon that welfare measures, while aiming at alleviating poverty, rely on harmful 
assumptions about people living in poverty. However, the need or urgency of socio-economic 
intervention must not lead to further stereotyping or stigmatisation.
1056
 This also holds true for 
migration policies which appear primarily concerned with restricting the rights of a subset of 
immigrants, such as those with a precarious economic background and with non-European 
roots, as the case of O'Donoghue and Others demonstrates.     
Overall, misrecognition associated with the experience of poverty has yet to be challenged by 
courts such as the ECHR.
1057
 The relevance of remedying this should not be underestimated. 
The implications of failing to identify and condemn this type of injury go beyond the 
applicant and the case at hand. Since law is performative, as noted in Chapters 1 and 2, 
whatever meaning or assumption attached to words used by law to capture the experience of 
poverty will remain ‘unstated but everpresent’1058 That is, those stereotypes will be 
internalised, reproduced and eventually used to justify socio-economic difference and its 
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consequences. Ultimately they will also frustrate efforts aimed at redistribution.
1059
 This 
confirms the idea that ‘struggles for recognition can aid the redistribution of power and 
wealth’.1060 For example, addressing poverty-related stereotypes in cases of child removal is 
necessary not only to overcome status subordination – and ensure recognition – but also to 
challenge the social structures that personalise – ‘privatise’ – both individual or family 
material well-being and the ‘failure’ to accomplish it.1061  
Many instances of stigmatisation or stereotyping like the ones discussed above carry 
humiliation. But humiliation in connection with an experience of poverty may also arise 
independently and lead to a violation in itself. This is aptly demonstrated by M.S.S. v. Greece 
and Belgium. Noting that the applicant was living on the street, prevented from having a 
livelihood and had no resources and access to basic services, the Court weighed up the 
humiliation suffered by the applicant. His experience of severe poverty was thereby framed as 
a denial of dignity. In the words of the Court, ‘the applicant has been the victim of humiliating 
treatment showing a lack of respect for his dignity (…) this situation has, without doubt, 
aroused in him feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of inducing desperation.’1062 On 
account of this and of the prolonged uncertainty in which the applicant remained, a violation 
of the prohibition of degrading treatment (Article 3 ECHR) was found. This line of reasoning 
was, notably, confirmed in the case of V.M. and Others v. Belgium, concerning a family of 
asylum seekers of Roma origin who endured extreme destitution while staying for three 
weeks in a railway station in Brussels, after being expelled from reception facilities and 
denied permission to stay.
1063
 In the Court’s view, the Belgian authorities failed to satisfy 
their obligation not to expose the applicants to conditions of extreme poverty that breached 
their dignity and aroused in them feelings of fear or inferiority capable of inducing 
desperation, which amounts to degrading treatment.
1064
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There is no reason to think that only humiliation can lead to suffering and degradation capable 
of breaching Article 3 ECHR. The physical suffering resulting from lacking food or medical 
assistance, for instance, could also amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.
1065
 But given 
the caution with which the Court normally deals with questions of socio-economic assistance, 
tackling the humiliation resulting from dehumanising living conditions seems to facilitate 
responsiveness towards the applicant’s destitution while avoiding entering into contested 
socio-economic terrain. In fact, proscribing the humiliation resulting from severe poverty as 
contrary to Article 3 ECHR is not totally free from material implications. If states are to 
comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment as applied in M.S.S. and 
V.M., they should assure some socio-economic conditions allowing a dignified life, such as 
shelter and food, at least for asylum seekers.
1066
 For this, however, the threshold of suffering 
and denigration is very high. This, as well as the very specific circumstances underlined by 
the Court in cases such as M.S.S and V.M, make it difficult to extend this line of reasoning to 
the severe destitution and vulnerability faced by other persons (who are not under the state 
custody).
1067
 The Court’s decision in Hunde v. the Netherlands also supports this 
interpretation. Confronted with the same kinds of issue raised by the cases discussed above, 
but with regard to an undocumented migrant, the Court in Hunde departed from M.S.S. Key 
among the considerations for doing so was that the applicant in the former case was a ‘failed 
asylum seeker’.1068 On this basis, the Court also deviated from the normative weight that in 
V.M. and Others it had accorded to decisions issued by the European Committee of Social 
Rights in similar cases against the respondent state.
1069
 This indicates that only in exceptional 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
was not linked to the Netherlands authorities’ assessment of his asylum request; and that the Netherlands 
authorities had not shown ignorance or inaction towards the applicant’s situation because they had given a four-
week grace period with state-sponsored entitlements, after which the applicant could have applied for reception 
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circumstances, so far mostly limited to asylum seekers, can the humiliation and degradation 
associated with extreme poverty be covered by Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment) and convey some duty of socio-economic support. It is yet 
to be seen whether a different conclusion might be reached under Article 8 ECHR (right to 
private and family life). Having said this, it is time to turn to the third kind of recognition 
injury referred to above. This is invisibility, which basically translates into exclusion from 
legal protection. 
 
2.2. Addressing invisibility: indifference and discrimination on account of poverty  
A person is invisible to the legal order, for our purposes to human rights law, insofar as the 
latter does not recognise or react to his or her grief.
1070
 In domestic legal orders this is 
typically reflected in those cases where the harm perpetrated on some people, such as women, 
ethnic minorities and the destitute, does not trigger a response, or at least not a serious one, 
from the justice system. Claims against this sort of indifference can be seen in the maternal 
death case of Şentürk v. Turkey, mentioned earlier, insofar as the grief of the applicants and 
the deceased victim were invisible to both the health and the justice personnel.
1071
 Another 
example is provided by cases in which people living in poverty had obtained judicial orders to 
be re-housed or provided with basic services, which nonetheless remained unenforced by the 
local authorities.
1072
  In these cases, the Court has notably rejected arguments of economic 
limitations and found violations for the failure to enforce final judgments.
1073
 It has also 
acknowledged applicants’ heightened distress and frustration for the authorities’ indifference 
and awarded compensation accordingly.
1074
   
But invisibility also manifests itself at the international level. The cases studied show, for 
example, how claims of discrimination on poverty-related grounds are left without legal 
response, not only by domestic systems but also by the Strasbourg Court. This amounts to 
another form of invisibility. So long as the Court does not react to the claims, the applicants in 
these cases undergo two instances of misrecognition: one before the domestic authorities and 
another before the Court. The problem is not that they risk losing their cases at Strasbourg. 
Rather, the point is that their discrimination claims are legally invisible, for the Court 
regularly declines even to examine them, irrespective of how well applicants articulate them 
on the basis of Article 14 ECHR.  
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To approach this matter, it is relevant to start by pointing out that a large proportion of the 
cases involving claims related to socio-economic disadvantage posited allegations of 
discrimination based on Article 14 ECHR in conjunction with substantive provisions, such as 
Articles 6 and 8 ECHR (right of access to a court and right to private and family life, 
respectively).
1075
 Within this universe, however, only some complaints were explicitly framed 
as discrimination on grounds of poverty, ‘social origin’ or ‘property’.1076 Socio-economic 
disadvantage may not have been the primary driver of the discrimination complained of in 
some cases, despite being a relevant aspect of the rights restrictions in question. Yet, socio-
economic difference was missing in a number of allegations of discrimination that actually 
had much to do with the applicants’ financial resources. Perhaps anticipating the lack of legal 
cognisance of such claims before the Strasbourg Court, these discrimination complaints, 
instead of referring to social origin or property, were based on other categories, such as 
nationality, disability and race.
1077
 As the Court declined to examine poverty-based 
allegations of discrimination, it naturally made no attempt to explore this possibility in cases 
in which discrimination was not litigated in those terms. 
As early as in the Airey case, the applicant argued that it was discriminatory to make judicial 
separation more easily available to those with the financial resources to pay for a lawyer than 
to those who, like her, could not afford to do so. This amounted, in her view, to discrimination 
in the exercise of the right to access to a court on account of property (Article 14 taken jointly 
with Article 6.1 ECHR).
1078
 In response, the Court held that there was no need to examine this 
claim. This followed from the fact that in its opinion – for some inexplicable reason– 
inequality in the enjoyment of article 6 was not a fundamental aspect of the case.
1079
 The 
conclusion was not unanimous, though. Among the dissenters, Judge Evrigenis, notably, 
explained why discrimination on the basis of property should have been examined. First, 
‘there can be no doubt that in making the claim in question the applicant was complaining of a 
“clear inequality” of treatment which is based on property and is a “fundamental aspect” of 
the case’. Second, ‘the fact that the Court had found a violation of Article 6 para. 1 taken 
alone did not dispense it from examining the case under Article 14’.1080 It is noteworthy that 
by the end of the seventies part of the Court was already eager to tackle discrimination on 
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economic grounds. Equally notable is however that up to date the Court has not come back to 
that reasoning. 
The Court reached the same conclusion in Loncke v. Belgium, another case concerning court 
fees.
1081
 The applicant argued, to no avail, that the inadmissibility of his appeal as a result of 
his inability to pay the requested fee constituted discrimination on the basis of property and 
financial resources.
1082
 For the Court, however, the issue had been settled in its analysis of the 
right of access to a court (Article 6 ECHR).
1083
 The same approach was taken in child removal 
cases. The applicants in Wallová and Walla alleged that the attitude of the authorities 
reflected ‘a discriminatory approach to them, motivated by their social origin and poverty’.1084 
A similar, although more implicit, complaint was raised in R.M.S. v. Spain, where the 
applicant alleged discrimination in the enjoyment of family life on the grounds of, inter alia, 
her physical appearance and lifestyle.
1085
 In both family separation cases, the Court’s answer 
was the same. Given its findings under Article 8 ECHR, there was no need to go into Article 
14 ECHR.  
More recently, an analogous claim resurfaced in the applicant’s pleadings in Garib before the 
Grand Chamber,
1086
 a legal complaint not formally raised in the Chamber’s proceedings. The 
Grand Chamber acknowledged that it was the master of the legal characterisation to be given 
to the facts of the case; that it could apply the juria novit curia principle limited to the 
Chamber’s decision on admissibility of a complaint, understanding that such a complaint ‘is 
characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied 
on’.1087 The Grand Chamber also took note of the fact that the complainant had advanced the 
discrimination claim at the domestic level.
1088
 Eventually, however, the Grand Chamber 
declined to examine her Article 14 allegation. The main reason advanced for this was that ‘it 
was not open to the applicant (especially after having been legally represented throughout) to 
change her legal characterisation of the facts before the Grand Chamber’.1089 This ‘new’ 
criterion appears to be somewhat in contradiction with the Court’s own principle that a 
complaint is characterised by the facts and not by the legal characterisation given to them, 
regarding which the last word is with the Court and not with the parties.  
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What reasons could explain the Court’s reluctance to scrutinise, through the prohibition of 
discrimination, those regulations and practices which are allegedly directed at or adversely 
impact on the socio-economically disadvantaged? Clearly we need to look beyond the 
Convention, since Article 14 ECHR provides the normative basis for doing so. The grounds 
of social origin, property and even ‘any other status’ are, at least on paper, perfectly suited to 
the task. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that Article 14 ECHR still remains 
undeveloped in the Court’s general case law. As noted by O’Cinneide, the Court has the 
tendency ‘to shy away from the complexities of Article 14 preferring instead to base its 
decisions on other articles of the Convention’.1090 Cases involving alleged discrimination on 
the basis of socio-economic disadvantage would thus be exemplary of such a practice of 
deferring to substantive provisions.  
Yet there are good reasons to think that, over and above this tendency, there are obstacles 
quite specific to the subject matter. It is likely that the Court, like other supranational and 
domestic courts, encounters particular difficulties in addressing discrimination questions 
related to class, poverty or similar grounds.
1091
 A first reason for this lies with the strong 
identity group ascendancy in discrimination grounds.
1092
 Fineman, for example, explains that 
‘poverty, denial of dignity, and deprivation of basic social goods are “lack-of-opportunity 
categories” that the current framework of identity groups does not recognize’.1093 Indeed, this 
chapter started by underscoring how issues of socio-economic disadvantage do not lend 
themselves to legal discourses on identity and group difference. And here we see one of the 
consequences of that disconnection. A second but related complication concerns the 
understanding of the unfairness targeted by anti-discrimination law. Unfair discrimination is 
too often associated with situations which the person affected has not contributed to creating 
and for which, therefore, he or she cannot be ‘blamed’. As discussed supra III 2.2, poverty is 
usually seen through the opposite prism. Destitution is avoidable, as it is the result of personal 
conduct and choice. Therefore, those who experience it are responsible for it and the law has 
little or nothing to do about it.  
This line of argument is likely to affect the standard of review and the width of the margin of 
appreciation applicable to poverty-related discrimination claims, whether advanced on 
grounds of ‘social origin’, ‘property’ or ‘other status’. One may think of a number of 
scenarios where poverty-based discrimination could be presented as discrimination on the 
basis of ‘other status’. In fact, it is unlikely that policies or regulations that negatively affect 
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people living in poverty will be explicitly addressed to the poor or the socio-economically 
disadvantaged. Nor will they normally rely on ‘social origin’ or people’s possessions as such. 
Rather, they will usually refer to related factors, such as income and being on social 
assistance, or will simply subject the enjoyment of rights to compliance with financial 
obligations. In Garib v. The Netherlands, for example, the government argued that ‘source of 
income’ does not qualify as a status prohibited under article 14 ECHR.1094 This leads to two 
important observations. First, so long as economically oriented criteria are assumed to be 
rational, objective or legitimate in themselves (as already discussed supra III.1.3), the scrutiny 
of allegations of direct discrimination on poverty-related grounds will tend to be lenient. As 
such, litigants need to reinforce the substantiation of these claims by, for example, 
underscoring the interplay between financial criteria, such as type or source of income, and 
the disparate harms inflicted on women, ethnic minorities and other persons who are already 
subjected to exclusion and misrecognition. Second, it is important that when considering the 
application of the prohibition of discrimination on account of ‘social origin’, ‘property’ or 
‘other status’, the Court embraces a flexible understanding of what this means. Or, in other 
words, an understanding that encompasses grounds closely related to poverty or economic 
precariousness, such as being in receipt of social assistance, unemployment and the like.
1095
 
An otherwise essentialist and static view of poverty or of people in socio-economic 
disadvantage would be of little practical assistance.  
While in a number of cases the Court has adopted a flexible approach to the question of what 
falls within ‘other status’, in others it has required that these be based on personal or objective 
characteristics ‘by which persons or groups are distinguishable from one another’.1096 The 
restrictive interpretation applied to discrimination based on immigration status in Bah v. The 
United Kingdom is quite illustrative of the hurdles that poverty-related allegations may face if 
so examined by the Court: 
Given the element of choice involved in immigration status, therefore, while 
differential treatment based on this ground must still be objectively and reasonably 
justifiable, the justification required will not be as weighty as in the case of a 
distinction based, for example, on nationality. Furthermore, given that the subject 
matter of this case – the provision of housing to those in need – is predominantly 
socio-economic in nature, the margin of appreciation accorded to the Government will 
be relatively wide.
1097
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Against this backdrop, even if addressed as a matter of ‘social origin’ or ‘property’, the 
elements of choice, objectivity, personal characteristics and the link to socio-economic 
policies may, at the very least, expose the discrimination claim to a lenient review.  
Another route towards tackling the discrimination experienced on account of poverty is to 
recognise people living in poverty as a vulnerable group. According to the Court, very 
weighty reasons (as required by ‘suspect categories’) are needed to justify a restriction of the 
rights of a vulnerable group. These are groups which have suffered a history of prejudice and 
social exclusion or stigmatisation.
1098
 However, as noted at the outset, it is far from clear 
whether the Court will in the near future endorse the view that socio-economically 
disadvantaged people are a vulnerable group.  
Assuming that the Court eventually agrees to examine the recognition injury involved in 
alleged acts of discrimination for reasons of poverty, a finding of violation does not seem 
easy. In addition to the challenges exposed above, there are further indications of the 
hesitance with which the Court approaches the role of socio-economic disadvantage in rights 
restrictions. For example, though the Court has regularly found that taking children into care 
because of the family’s material circumstances alone violates Article 8 ECHR, it has not 
always taken a categorical stance on the matter. The standard, in keeping with the rights of 
children, should be clear-cut: poverty can never be the sole ground for separating children 
from their families,1099 just as the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities 
prohibits separation on the sole ground of children’s or their parents’ disability.1100 
Nevertheless, the Court has at times called into question the seriousness, duration or other 
aspects of the applicants’ economic circumstances, rather than the legitimacy of separating 
families because of poverty.  
In Havelka, for instance, while the Court held that separating the family on account of 
financial deprivation was contrary to the best interests of the child,
1101
 it is interesting to note 
the main factors leading to that conclusion. These were that eviction was not imminent and 
that according to the national courts the applicants should have been provided with shelter as 
a precondition for proceeding with eviction.
1102
 In other words, instead of directly challenging 
the forcible separation for reasons of poverty, the Court disputed whether the material 
difficulties had been as extreme as the government claimed. The judgment in R.M.S. discloses 
a similar ambiguity, inasmuch as the Court emphasised the improvement of the economic 
situation of the applicant. It pointed out that the applicant had simply been faced with a 
shortage of funds and that the authorities had refused to take into account subsequent changes 
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in her financial circumstances.1103 Having to prove a change in the circumstances from which 
the childcare order originated implies that the decision in question was sufficient to justify the 
separation, which could then be reversed when such sufficient reasons no longer existed. But 
the point is that the sole socio-economic situation of the applicant could not be considered 
sufficient justification. The conclusion therefore had to stand irrespective of whether the 
applicant’s financial conditions had improved or not.    
All in all, the Court does not seem to deal comfortably with rights claims grounded in 
poverty. Whether because the identity group paradigm and the liberal creed of individual 
autonomy are too embedded in the Court’s legal culture, or because of the idea that anything 
related to socio-economic conditions pertains to politics and not to law,
1104
 the result is that 
even recognition harms related to poverty are often overlooked. Reversing this certainly 
requires legal mobilisation on the part of litigants and third-party interveners. Still, more 
could be done by the Court. As concerns stereotypes and stigma, for example, just naming 
them would be a step forward. Moreover, while the lack of substantiation of poverty-based 
discrimination makes it difficult for the Court to examine such allegations, it does not seem to 
completely preclude their examination. The Court has repeatedly stated that it is the master of 
the legal characterisation to be given to the facts of a case. And recently it had no problem in 
applying Article 14 ECHR motu proprio in a judgment involving gender-based 
discrimination.
1105
  
 
2.3. Integrating social structure into the legal analysis of socio-economic 
disadvantage? 
It is relevant to point out that, in some cases, the applicants’ demands for socio-economic 
support are framed as being necessary to cope with structural barriers. Challenging the 
governments’ charges of passivity or negligence, the Court has been invited to examine the 
role of social structures and institutions in producing their destitution. In Havelka, for 
example, the applicant – a lone father caring for six children – alleged that he was in a highly 
disadvantaged position in the labour market due to his age, partial disability, lack of education 
and caring responsibilities.
1106
 He had in fact managed to find temporary jobs only. As 
regards his accommodation (which was municipal property), he explained that his rent debt 
had increased dramatically as a result of the very high default interest (around 91% per year). 
For him, all these institutional deficits meant that the state was in a position to do more.
1107
 In 
its judgment, the Court took note of the relevance of these arguments. Notably, it discarded 
the argument that the problem lay with the applicant’s lack of effort, as the government 
claimed. R.M.S., for its part, discloses the harm that may result from an institutional design or 
practice that denies parents, children and other family members living in poverty participation 
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in decision-making processes affecting them. In this case, domestic regulations did not 
guarantee a prompt judicial review,
1108
 and the domestic authorities allowed neither the 
applicant’s extended family nor her child to intervene in the judicial proceedings. The Court 
noted only the lack of participation of the applicant’s great-uncle, but still did not explicitly 
treat this as a flaw in the decision-making. The question was all the more important, though, 
since persons living in poverty face systemic obstacles in claiming their rights and accessing 
justice in both administrative and judicial settings.
1109
 
The applicant and third-party interveners in M.S.S. similarly brought to light the link between 
the violations denounced and the institutional arrangements for asylum seekers in Greece. 
And this time the Court examined more closely the structural problems explaining the 
applicant’s destitution. It held:  
The reports consulted reveal that in practice access to the job market is so riddled with 
administrative obstacles that this cannot be considered a realistic alternative […]. In 
addition, the applicant had personal difficulties due to his lack of command of the 
Greek language, the lack of any support network and the generally unfavourable 
economic climate.
1110
  
These factors were among those that led the Court to conclude that the applicant’s 
vulnerability had not been considered and that the Greek authorities had to be held 
accountable for their inaction.
1111
  
An approach more attentive to structural issues does not require the Court to pronounce on 
substantive provision, as the above examples demonstrate. However, taking that path holds 
potential from an integrated perspective on human rights. In the first place, a greater concern 
for the relationship between social structures and rights violations helps in accounting for 
real-life complexity. As seen above, it places individuals’ options and choices within a 
specific social context, taking the analysis beyond people’s characteristics and personal 
circumstances. In the second place, looking at social structures may reveal how policies and 
institutions produce or aggravate inequality and socio-economic disadvantage. This is not 
trivial. By pinpointing those structures, the Court would, at the very least, signal the need for 
social reform. This might facilitate mobilisation around strategies that aim at transforming the 
situation of many rights holders affected by the problems discussed in these judgments. 
 
3. Avoiding norm reductionism and promoting awareness of legal pluralism  
As seen in Chapters 3 and 4, a comprehensive approach to the norms that are relevant to 
dealing with the cases may be useful in a number of respects. In this vein, and with respect to 
the conventional norms, several provisions of the Convention have been employed in the 
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cases studied. Among them are the right to access justice (Article 6), the prohibition of torture 
and inhuman treatment (Article 3) and the right to private and family life (Article 8). 
Although the Court’s case law discussed in this chapter is not anchored in one Convention 
provision, as seen in Chapter 3, a few provisions have been too easily discarded. One is the 
prohibition of discrimination (Article 14), whose use, as already explained, is almost non-
existent. I think the subsections above have proven that the latter is an unfortunate normative 
reductionism. But it is not the only one, and this is what I shall discuss now. The case law on 
Roma and Travellers living in irregular settlements and facing eviction discloses, as already 
noted in Chapter 3, the scant attention paid to the rights to property and education (Articles 1 
and 2 Protocol No. 1). In what follows, I shall concentrate on the displacement of the right to 
property, given its particular implications for accounting for the needs and interests of people 
living in poverty.  
 
3.1 A more comprehensive approach to convention norms: what does the right to 
property offer to those with fewer possessions? 
Impoverished Roma and Travellers who have been deprived of the few possessions they had 
have frequently invoked a violation of their right to property (Article 1 Protocol No. 1 
ECHR).
1112
 The Court, however, has systematically declined to examine the application of 
this norm to their plight. The consequence is not just that a range of legally sound arguments 
may be unnecessarily overlooked, that is, the economic losses and proprietary interests vested 
in one’s home and belongings, which are different from the interests protected under the right 
to respect for the home (Article 8 ECHR). The question also arises as to the extent to which 
the right to property is being defined and applied in a way that is not inclusive of diverse 
proprietary interests, particularly of those with fewer possessions.  
Noting that the question of compensation for the loss of houses and belongings following 
eviction has been left unanswered in these cases, Gerds argues that ‘the Court should consider 
the importance of the home – however poor it may be – as being often the only possession of 
people in extreme poverty and the only safeguard against homelessness’.1113 To be fair, 
though, the Court has not been wholly unresponsive to the protection of impoverished 
dwellers’ possessions. The Grand Chamber judgment in Öneryildiz v Turkey, a case that does 
not involve Roma people, is proof of that. The applicants’ home, placed in an illegal slum, 
had been destroyed by a landslide caused by a methane explosion that also killed their 
relatives. In spite of the irregularity of their tenure, the Court confirmed the Chamber’s 
finding that the applicant’s proprietary interests in his dwelling and movable goods 
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constituted ‘possessions’.1114 What is more, a violation of the right to property was found. The 
authorities had acted negligently, failing ‘to do everything within their power to protect the 
applicant’s proprietary interests’.1115     
In the light of Öneryildiz, the Court’s reluctance to recognise Roma’s and Travellers’ 
proprietary interests in their mobile or makeshift homes and in their household effects appears 
puzzling. The divergence is addressed by the Court in its most recent judgment (at the time of 
writing) on the forced eviction and demolition of irregular Roma dwellings: Bagdonavicius 
and Others v Russia.
1116
 There were three main elements that, according to the Court, justified 
the difference in the approach to Article 1 Protocol No. 1 regarding the applicants’ interests in 
their dwellings. First, in Öneryildiz the state authorities had failed to act in good time on the 
serious risks arising from a dangerous economic activity. Second, the applicants in 
Bagdonavicius and Others had not paid taxes, nor had they been connected to public services, 
as had the applicants in Öneryildiz. Third, in Bagdonavicius and Others there had not been 
legal uncertainty, in a way similar to Öneryildiz, about the application of the law on illegal 
settlements that would have given the applicants hope that their houses would not fall under 
its scope.
1117
 The Court thus clarified that without one or more of those elements, the length 
of tolerated possession was not enough to constitute a ‘sufficiently recognised and important’ 
patrimonial interest.
1118
 As a result, the proprietary complaint in Bagdonavicius and Others 
was inadmissible ratione materiae.  
The line-drawing appears unconvincing. Leaving aside the fact that the Court seemed to 
enlarge the number of factors that actually informed its approach to Article 1 Protocol No. 1 
in Öneryildiz,
1119
 the reasoning in Bagdonavicius and Others is too casuistic and does not 
shed much light from a normative perspective. Taking into account the wide set of economic 
interests and goods protected by Article 1 Protocol No. 1, it seems quite artificial to affirm 
that the actual loss of economically valuable materials such as homes, furniture and other 
items does not even qualify as loss of ‘possessions’. Read this way, the right to property 
would hardly cover the very few possessions of those who live in poverty. As to the 
destruction of movable property in Bagdonavicius and Others, the Court declared the 
applicants’ claim inadmissible because they had neither submitted a complaint nor applied to 
the domestic courts for compensation. Hence, there may be greater chances for people in 
similar situations to obtain recognition of their possession over their movable goods. But for 
that to be a real prospect and not illusory, applicants would need support from legal aid 
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agencies or non-governmental organisations to access the justice system of their countries in 
order to bring their claims for compensation.  
Having said this, it is now time to enquire: how do international and regional norms play out 
in the cases studied?  
 
3.2 Integrating international and regional norms  
The Court’s practice of resorting to extra-Convention norms in the cases reviewed here is 
varied. While some judgments, such as those on child placement and the forced eviction of 
Roma and Travellers living in informal settlements, refer to several international and 
European instruments, others do not. Cases concerning fees and costs are among those 
disclosing little use of comparative and international legal material. Judges Tulkens and 
Loucaides actually regretted the lack of this material in Gnahore v. France. Departing from 
the majority, they criticised the scheme of legal aid envisaged for appeals on points of law for 
its detrimental effects on the least well-off members of society. They even suggested, as 
pointed out earlier, less restrictive alternatives for organising appeals and legal aid that could 
have equally ensured cost-saving. Noting that legal aid was an issue in all member states, with 
different proposals being under discussion at the time, the dissenters went on to hold that ‘a 
detailed comparative-law examination could prove particularly helpful’.1120  
This remark discloses the utility of considering comparative and international law for the 
purposes of evaluating the proportionality of a restriction, particularly from the viewpoint of 
less restrictive means. The laws and practices from other states help in illuminating the 
alternatives that are, in fact, out there. While such analysis may be needed in a wide range of 
scenarios, it may have specific added value when the restrictions largely fall on socio-
economically disadvantaged people or on others in non-dominant positions. Economic 
hardship and class bias are too often neglected in a legal discourse that, at the same time, 
easily takes for granted the reasonability and effectiveness of policies that rely on socio-
economic criteria or aims. The logic of less restrictive alternatives, similar to that behind 
reasonable accommodation in disability rights, forces public power to justify why things 
could not have been arranged differently, thus contrasting dominant views of what is normal 
or acceptable with reasonable alternatives. Exposure to different regulations and policies may 
then reveal that the criteria or policies in question (e.g. fees and legal aid systems) are not 
necessary, effective or based on accurate premises, as other states may have accomplished the 
same legitimate goals through less restrictive means.  
From this perspective, the reasoning of the Grand Chamber in its recent judgment in Garib is 
puzzling. For one thing, the Court included a section on ‘Practice elsewhere’ where it referred 
to the law of one member state (Denmark),
1121
 whose regulation actually happened to be 
substantially different from the one contested in Garib. But the Grand Chamber did nothing 
with this information; it drew no conclusion. Importantly, it failed to acknowledge that the 
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Dutch gentrification measure was rather isolated within the Council of Europe, which was a 
reason to narrow the state’s margin of appreciation. The Grand Chamber, however, remained 
silent about the lack of common practice or consensus. Furthermore, the Court completely 
ruled out the relevance of ‘less restrictive means’ for the purpose of assessing the necessity of 
the Act.
1122
  
In Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, which dealt with the imposition of fees for secondary education 
on non-European nationals, the Court undertook a comprehensive normative review. It 
examined laws and judicial decisions from other member states and even from the United 
States on the use of fees in education. It observed that out of 26 member States, ‘it appears 
that in seventeen States primary and secondary education is free of charge and accessible to 
all persons living or residing in the country regardless of their immigration status or that of 
their parents’.1123 Only in a few countries were certain categories of aliens required to pay 
fees for upper secondary schooling. The judicial decisions cited by the Court also opposed the 
exclusion of foreigners (regardless of their residential status) from post-compulsory 
education.
1124
 In addition, the Court referred to international treaties other than the ECHR that 
had been ratified by Bulgaria, namely, the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, and the European Social 
Charter.
1125
 Nevertheless, these insights were not used in the judgment, which ultimately 
relied on a number of exceptional circumstances. More concretely, as noted previously, the 
finding of violation was based on the applicants’ exceptionally blameless situation. In light of 
the previous account of comparative and international norms, however, one may wonder why 
the Court did not consider those norms from the perspective of a regional or international 
consensus and/or from the viewpoint of existing less restrictive measures to achieve the 
state’s goals. These considerations would have provided a much stronger normative basis for 
its decision, being mindful of the margin accorded to states in both socio-economic policy and 
migration law.  
When it comes to child removal cases, in turn, the Court has been particularly attentive to 
external instruments and decisions. Among those more frequently cited are the CRC, the 
concluding observations of its monitoring Committee (the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child – CRC Committee) and resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe. Many of these sources are not explicitly incorporated into the merits 
analysis. Yet, to different degrees they appear relevant in three particular ambits: 1) in the 
contextualisation of the case; 2) in determining what the principle of the best interests of the 
child requires (including child participation); and 3) in interpreting the scope of the state’s 
positive duties to support families.  
In referring to the CRC Committee’s concluding observations, the Court has taken note of the 
concerns and findings of that body as to the extent and nature of the problems denounced by 
the applicants. Most observations point to the disproportionate use of child placement by 
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social services dealing with families in social and economic difficulty and to the lack of social 
support available to them.
1126
 This allows the case to be contextualised while also benefiting 
from the appreciation of a specialised body. Moreover, viewing the best interests of the child 
in light of Article 9 CRC, the Court has consistently upheld the exceptionality of child 
removal. Sometimes it has also considered, under Article 12 CRC, the right of the child to be 
heard in judicial and administrative decisions affecting her/him.
1127
 Finally within this child 
rights framework the Court has integrated, as mentioned earlier, a number of regional sources 
concerning social rights and positive measures to enable child-rearing and family life.
1128
 It is 
interesting to observe, however, that neither the case of A.K. and L. v. Croatia nor that of 
Savigny contain any reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD), which enshrines an express provision prohibiting child separation on 
account of the child’s or parents’ disability and other norms of relevance to those cases.1129 
The review made thus far nonetheless confirms the view, already advanced in previous 
chapters, that considering rights holders in their different identities and social positions may 
have a direct impact on the range of norms through which the case is examined.  
 
3.3 Reflecting on the integration of non-state-generated norms  
As we may expect rights claims of cultural difference to involve tradition-based or 
community norms, in cases concerning economic difference we may also find non-state-
generated norms playing a relevant role. One particular type of non-state-sanctioned norm that 
is of particular interest for this chapter is that generated by international financial institutions. 
In a complaint against Greece on austerity measures affecting public servants and which was 
declared inadmissible, the Court noted (as a matter of fact) that the contested salary cuts were 
introduced as a result of the commitments to which the government had subscribed with 
European financial institutions.
1130
 The Court eventually found the measure to be 
proportional, mostly because it did not apply to low-income persons and the applicants had 
not been exposed to difficulties of subsistence.
1131
 Aside from that reference to international 
financial agreements, however, this type of normativity has been rather absent from the case 
law studied here.  
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Yet, one might expect international financial commitments to feature more often in the future, 
including in cases like those discussed in this chapter. For one thing, economic commitments 
of the sort and their problematic human rights implications (which were once typical of 
developing countries) are now a reality in Europe.
1132
 For another, economic crises and 
structural reforms promoted by international financial institutions risk impacting more 
adversely on low-income households and others in socio-economic vulnerability. In fact, 
some specific policy choices that run to their detriment are often dictated by international 
financial commitments. A notable example is the imposition of user fees to access social 
services, upon which loans from international institutions that advocate the application of 
market-oriented rules are sometimes made conditional.
1133
 Therefore, though international 
financial agreements do not seem to have been at play in the cases reviewed, the issue merits 
some reflection. From a normative perspective, it is worth considering, for example, the 
desirability of going beyond the usual arguments about state budgetary constraints to 
incorporate the role of international financial and debt-relief rules in the adjudication process 
when they are in fact at stake.  
Making the impact of international financial norms visible in the judicial setting may be seen 
as something mostly useful to states wishing the Court to either exclude the matter from its 
competence or temper their liability under the Convention. But this is not the only aspect for 
which it could be useful to consider these norms. To appreciate this, we will take an example 
from another human rights jurisdiction. Consider Federation of employed pensioners of 
Greece (IKA-ETAM) v. Greece, a complaint brought to the European Committee of Social 
Rights (ECSR).
1134
 Against allegations of violations of the European Social Charter resulting 
from austerity measures, the Greek government argued, inter alia, that changes to the social 
protection afforded to pensioners were required by other international obligations, namely 
‘those deriving from a financial support mechanism agreed upon by the Government together 
with the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (“the Troika”)’.1135 Yet, as the reasoning of the ECSR in that case shows, the argument 
may not so easily discharge states from compliance with human rights conventions. The 
ECSR took the view that the fact that the policy in question was part of Greece’s financial 
legal obligations did not, in the first place, remove the matter from the ambit of the 
Charter.
1136
 Secondly, it held that when preparing and implementing the adoption of binding 
economic measures, states should ‘take full account’ of their human rights commitments.1137 
Thirdly, and admitting the difficulties created by the economic crisis, states must ensure a 
certain level of effective satisfaction of human rights. In this connection, the criteria applied 
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by the ECSR to oversee compliance with the Charter included the adequacy of the reforms in 
that ‘care had been taken to ensure that the burden of these reforms did not weigh too heavily 
on the economically most vulnerable households’.1138 Finally, the ECSR stated that even 
taking heed of the particular economic and normative constraints faced by Greece, ‘the 
government has not conducted the minimum level of research and analysis into the effects of 
such far-reaching measures that is necessary to assess in a meaningful manner their full 
impact on vulnerable groups in society’.1139  
The reasoning followed by the ECSR allows us to reflect on the importance and utility of 
according more attention to a wide range of norms potentially relevant to dealing with cases 
concerning, for example, fees and social cuts affecting the worst off, including normative 
commitments laid down in international economic agreements. Of course, if the European 
Court of Human Rights were to consider member states’ financial obligations, the review 
would obviously have a very different scope to that undertaken by the ECSR, for the two 
bodies have substantially different subject-matter jurisdictions. However, the above case 
illustrates that the consideration of norms generated by financial institutions or other non-state 
actors may provide useful insights. In the first place, it may allow ‘a holistic approach to 
human rights focusing on both the causes and context within which human rights violations 
occur’.1140 A holistic approach also means that the Court would not only take into account the 
Convention alongside the relevant financial international obligations, but also by virtue of 
article 53 ECHR, regard would be had to existing human rights obligations under other 
treaties, with a view to ensuring that any interpretation of the Convention did not derogate 
from such obligations. Against this background and in giving precedence to human rights 
obligations, the UN expert Alfred Maurice de Zayas has specifically referred to the European 
Court’s case law. He has advanced the view that ‘as the European Court of Human Rights 
decided in its 1989 judgment in the case of Soering v. the United Kingdom, the obligations 
under the European Convention on Human Rights prevail over those under extradition 
treaties, mutatis mutandis over bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements’.1141  
                                                          
1138
 Ibid., para. 73.  
1139
 Ibid., para. 79.  
1140
 UN Human Rights Council; Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related 
international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, 
social and cultural rights - Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights, Cephas Lumina, 
A/HRC/20/23, 10 April 2011, para. 7 (referring to the divide between the states that were in favour of addressing 
the issue of foreign debt from a human rights perspective and those which believed that human rights bodies 
should not deal with this matter. Those in favour called for a ‘holistic approach to human rights’.) It is to be 
noted, however, that the vast majority of European states that participated in the discussion of Resolution 20/10, 
through which the Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles referred to above, voted against it.  
1141
 UN Human Rights Council; Report of the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and 
equitable international order, Alfred Maurice de Zayas, A/HRC/30/44, 14 July 2015, para. 40. This case 
concerned the potential extradition to the USA by the UK of a German national charged with murder. He alleged 
that if extradited and sentenced to death, he would experience the ‘death row’, which was contrary to article 3 
ECHR. The judgment did not explicitly affirm the supremacy of the human rights obligations enshrined in the 
ECHR over the extradition treaties in question. But the Court did provide support for such a conclusion in the 
concrete case. It held, for example, that what other international treaties stipulated ‘cannot, however, absolve the 
Contracting Parties from responsibility under Article 3 (art. 3) for all and any foreseeable consequences of 
extradition suffered outside their jurisdiction. In interpreting the Convention regard must be had to its special 
character as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ The Convention 
provisions must ‘be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective’ and such 
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A second reason for highlighting the role of the norms dictated by international financial 
institutions in the restriction of human rights is that doing so brings to the surface a real-life 
dimension that remains downplayed under a state-centred view of international law. In this 
context, just naming financial agreements and their interplay with human rights norms may 
contribute to (1) bringing to the surface structural barriers and root causes of violations, while 
also (2) bolstering normative developments in the field of human rights obligations for non-
state actors and state extraterritorial responsibility for human rights violations. One path that 
could evolve in this context is, for example, that of the responsibility of member states which 
act as lenders or as supervisors of private actors imposing conditions that lead to violations in 
the subscribing country.
1142
 Thirdly, a broad and inclusive normative spectrum like the one 
suggested here may help in refining states’ human rights obligations vis à vis international 
financial commitments by way of specific substantive or procedural standards. Governments 
and rights holders may benefit from, for example, the application of an impact assessment-
like requirement similar to that applied by the ECSR and to be carried out prior to subscribing 
to binding economic measures.
1143
 Finally, from the point of view of states’ multiple 
international commitments, explicit references in the Strasbourg case law to the overlaps 
between states’ human rights obligations and their international financial undertakings may 
provide normative grounds for governments seeking to prioritise their human rights 
obligations and having to defend doing so in other forums of dispute resolution. Thus, if the 
Court is to adjudicate on restrictions directed at or mostly affecting people in socio-economic 
disadvantage and which are driven by international financial commitments, it may be 
worthwhile integrating this layer of normativity into the judicial analysis. To that end, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
interpretation ‘has to be consistent with “the general spirit of the Convention, an instrument designed to maintain 
and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society”’. Likewise, the Court took into account the absolute 
nature of article 3 ECHR. Further, it pointed out that ‘the fact that a specialised treaty should spell out in detail a 
specific obligation attaching to the prohibition of torture does not mean that an essentially similar obligation is 
not already inherent in the general terms of Article 3 (art. 3) of the European Convention. It would hardly be 
compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that “common heritage of political traditions, ideals, 
freedom and the rule of law” to which the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a 
fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed.’ See ECtHR, Soering v. The United 
Kingdom, Plenary, App. no. 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989, paras. 86-89.    
According priority to human rights norms in the balancing of states’ legal commitments appears to the solution 
generally advocated by UN mechanisms. A key consideration is the fact that virtually all states subscribing to 
financial bilateral or multilateral obligations are already bound by major international instruments of human 
rights. See e.g. UN Human Rights Council; Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and 
other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly 
economic, social and cultural rights - Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights, Cephas Lumina, 
A/HRC/20/23, 10 April 2011, para. 6 (Foundational principles: ‘Ensuring the primacy of human rights’).  
1142
 In this vein, see for example the analysis of legal avenues for holding Euro Area Member States accountable 
for the debt situation in Greece as explained by Olivier De Schutter and Margot E. Salomon, Legal Brief 
Prepared for the Special Committee of the Hellenic Parliament on the Audit of the Greek Debt (Debt Truth 
Committee) - Economic Policy Conditionality, Socio-economic Rights and International Legal Responsibility: 
The Case of Greece 2010-2015, 15 June 2015, at 6-8. (Although the arguments advanced by the authors are 
mainly grounded in UN-based human rights provisions, similar or other arguments might well be articulated in 
the framework of the European Convention system).  
1143
 The use of impact assessment in this field is already a practice. However, its consideration in the context of a 
procedural judicial review may provide more concrete guidelines on what such analysis should entail from the 
perspective of human rights.  
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first and foremost for the parties and interveners in the case to bring those norms to the 
Court’s attention. 
 
V. Concluding notes on Chapter 5 
The range of cases studied in this chapter confirms the premise that although poverty and 
questions of socio-economic disadvantage can easily be isolated or sidelined in legal 
discourses, in reality they are better addressed from a relational and integrated perspective. 
Take the cases in which applicants could not afford fees to access justice, secondary education 
or health services or to marry; or those concerning child removal and restrictions on the right 
to choose one’s residence and to security in tenure. Or consider the complaint against a 
criminal ban on begging in public places. In most of these cases, the various rights holders 
affected found themselves at the intersection of several identities and hierarchies. Equally, 
their grievances involved different categories of rights, touching upon maldistribution and 
misrecognition. Moreover, in most of them the applicants’ position was depicted as arising 
out of individual choice or personal circumstances, while in reality this had a lot to do with 
broader social relations and institutions. More often than not, the idea that they deserved less 
or no legal protection was rooted in compounded stereotypes or social values that made them 
responsible for the rights interference complained of. Hence, in practice, these experiences 
speak of interdependence and complexity between rights holders and norms.  
This chapter has provided an overview of different ways in which the above complexity has, 
however, been disaggregated in the Court’s judgments and decisions, while also highlighting 
where and how the Court has engaged in a more integrated analysis of poverty-related cases. 
This has been done with regard more often to the applicable norms than to rights holders. In 
this connection, it is relevant to observe that the Court’s restrictive accounts of rights holders 
are not marked by an emphasis on an identity or group defined by socio-economic 
disadvantage. While some judges of the Court are advocating for recognition of people living 
in poverty as a vulnerable group, this is still resisted. One could nonetheless argue that the 
lack of identity/group frames of analysis even offers an advantage. It could be an opportunity 
to shift the Court’s attention towards social structures and relations and thus towards a 
comprehensive analysis, a shift largely missed in the resolution of cultural identity cases. 
However, things do not appear to be working in that direction. Paradoxical as it may be, it 
seems that while too much of a concern with groups or identity is problematic, so is the total 
absence of a group or identity frame of analysis. It appears that without recourse to this, the 
Court does not have some of the reasons or means to examine relations of inequality and the 
socio-economic experience of rights holders. When this happens, the analysis of the case is 
partial or fragmented. But this is not the only way in which the examination of claims of 
economic difference may become fragmentary. In this chapter it was also noted that defining 
the case as one about complex socio-economic policy may also lead to an abstract review and 
to an emphasis on the latitude of domestic authorities that loses sight of the specific rights 
holders and interests at stake.  
Even when the Court has taken into account the applicants’ socio-economic disadvantage, it 
has rarely examined this from an intersectional approach so as to recognise the different faces 
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of poverty. This has a number of normative consequences that include, but are not limited to, 
the analysis of proportionality and discrimination. Another problematic area of the Court’s 
approach to rights holders in the cases studied is that concerning their autonomy and choices. 
The Court has only occasionally challenged assumptions that posit poverty as the result of 
individuals’ exercise of free will, while at times upholding actions that impinge on their 
agency. The Court’s appreciation of the range of rights holders affected in the cases is, 
however, more comprehensive, notably when it comes to children. Especially in some cases, 
such as those on family separation, the Court has taken a broad view that is more aligned with 
people’s lived experience. On this basis, the Court has, for example, reinforced the socio-
economic dimension of rights, specified certain obligations in a way more attuned to the 
persons involved and placed the issue of poverty and the ensuing rights restrictions within a 
concrete social context.  
Similar insights have been gained through normative integration. Although still cautious 
about intruding into the socio-economic field, the Court has nonetheless affirmed the 
indivisibility of rights in certain cases. This has been particularly so in cases of exceptionally 
acute destitution and in cases which have not been framed as being mainly about social 
policy. With regard to harms that are not typically socio-economic, the Court has recognised, 
in limited circumstances, the humiliation and debasement endured as a result of extreme 
destitution. However, ‘recognition’ harms of stereotyping, stigma and general discrimination 
have yet to be integrated into the Court’s legal analysis of poverty-related claims. As regards 
the range of Convention and extra-Convention norms that illuminate the resolution of cases, a 
variety of Convention provisions have been mobilised in relation to socio-economic 
disadvantage. Yet, the application of the prohibition of discrimination and the right to 
property, despite their relevance to the cases, has been too easily discarded. As to regional and 
international norms, the examination of comparative material and the idea of consensus has 
only occasionally been adopted, and not necessarily with a clear end. Cases of family 
separation for reasons of poverty notably expand more in the use of regional and international 
sources, deriving specialised guidelines regarding children’s rights and socio-economic 
support for families. Finally, we have seen that it might be worth exploring the role played by 
other international norms, such as those concerning financial agreements by states and private 
actors. The Court has already taken some steps in that direction, but more could be done in the 
future by just making this additional layer of norms and actors more visible. 
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CHAPTER 6 - AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
I. Introduction 
The Inter-American Court and the Commission are familiar with issues of poverty and 
inequality. They work in a region well known for its stark socio-economic contradictions. 
Poverty levels are alarmingly high and the region features as the most unequal in terms of 
income distribution.
1144
 Even though a big part of the Court’s case law consists of cases 
involving gross and systematic violations perpetrated by dictatorships or authoritarian 
regimes, over the years an increasing number of cases have been brought about claims of 
inequality, some of them for reasons related to socio-economic disadvantage. The importance 
that the issue has attained in the region today is aptly reflected by the process of consultation 
that the Commission recently concluded on the topic of poverty and human rights.
1145
 It is 
therefore not surprising that the Court, following in many respects the Commission’s drive, 
has been rather sensitive to questions of poverty and socio-economic difference. Nevertheless, 
while poverty is in the background of a number of cases, it should be pointed out that very 
few of them involve rights claims directly grounded in socio-economic disadvantage.  
It is against this backdrop that the present chapter aims, as the previous one did with regard to 
the Strasbourg Court, to explore first whether and how the Court accounts for claims of 
economic difference. By this I mainly mean rights assertions that reflect the needs and 
concerns of those who are regarded as different and deviant from a socio-economic point of 
view. These are mostly people living in poverty or otherwise socio-economically 
disadvantaged. Secondly, this chapter explores how the Court accounts for those claims from 
a particular point of view, namely from an integrated and relational approach to human rights. 
In this way, the discussion that follows seeks to offer a complex understanding of the cases, 
one that better reflects the lived reality of rights holders and contemporary forms of normative 
interaction. Since prevailing approaches to issues of social difference and equality are often 
quite compartmentalised or narrowly framed, a comprehensive perspective may provide 
relevant insights for dealing with claims of socio-economic disadvantage, which, as seen in 
the first part of this study, pose a number of interesting challenges to human rights courts.  
To undertake this analysis, I have reviewed all contentious cases in which the Court has so far 
issued judgments. Within this pool, however, I have concentrated only on those where the 
Court accords some normative significance to claims of socio-economic disadvantage. This 
also means that, as in the previous chapter, I have been more concerned with cases in which 
socio-economic disadvantage is seen as leading to or facilitating violations, rather than those 
                                                          
1144
 See e.g. United Nations, ECLAC, Inclusive social development: The next generation of policies for 
overcoming poverty and reducing inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2015), at. 18-20 
(‘Estimates for 19 Latin American countries indicate that in 2014, there were 167 million people living in 
conditions of poverty, of whom 71 million were facing extreme poverty’… ‘Latin America and the Caribbean 
represent the world’s most unequal region in terms of income distribution. That structural feature has remained 
largely unchanged over a lengthy time, even at times of high economic growth.’). 
1145
 A Preliminary Report on Poverty and Extreme Poverty and Human Rights in the Americas was published by 
the Inter-American Commission in 2016 on the basis of a consultation process among different stakeholders. 
During 2017 a platform was opened for receiving comments. See 
<www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2016/193.asp> (last accessed 5 February 2017). 
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in which poverty appears to be one of the consequences of any kind of violation. It must be 
noted, though, that because of the types of case brought to the Court and the scarcity of 
complaints centred on poverty-related claims as such, I have included cases that concern not 
only issues of social inclusion and recognition, but also protection from acts of violence. This 
makes the sample of cases analysed here broader than that considered in previous chapters.  
The discussion is divided into three main parts. Following the introduction (I), the first part 
(section II) briefly examines how individuals’ socio-economic disadvantage has come to be 
considered something normatively relevant in the Court’s case law. This section also 
examines the role played by group identity and group vulnerability frameworks, as well that 
by other frames leading to compartmentalised thinking. Building upon this analysis, the 
second part of the discussion (section III) examines who are, according to the Court, those 
persons raising claims of socio-economic disadvantage, taken from the perspective of their 
identities and social locations as well as their agency. In examining how an integrated view of 
rights holders is helpful in poverty-related cases, the situation of individuals other than the 
applicants is also examined. The third and last part of the discussion (section IV) focuses on 
the harms and norms taken into account when dealing with claims of socio-economic 
disadvantage. This part explores, inter alia, whether the Court has addressed, in addition to 
questions of socio-economic rights, the stereotypes and invisibility associated with an 
experience of poverty, as well as the incidence of structural inequalities. Further, the chapter 
revises the conventional and extra-conventional norms which are or could be used by the 
Court to address some of the challenges posed by the cases studied. 
 
II. Economic difference, group identity questions and legal compartments  
1. Facing socio-economic disadvantage  
As in the European Court’s case law, rights claims grounded in people’s economic reality, 
especially in socio-economic disadvantage, were first raised with regard to legal aid and 
access to justice.
1146
 It was in this context that the need to consider the material deprivation of 
rights holders was brought to the Inter-American Court almost three decades ago. But unlike 
the trajectory followed in Strasbourg, the issue was not introduced in an individual case. 
Rather, it arose out of a Commission request for an advisory opinion concerning the 
obligation to exhaust domestic remedies in order to access the Inter-American system.
1147
 The 
Commission had received petitions in which complainants alleged that they had not been able 
to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of remedies because they could not afford legal 
representation or court fees.
1148
 Against this background, the Commission asked the Court (1) 
whether the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies should nonetheless be applied to those 
                                                          
1146
 ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, App. no. 6289/73, Judgment of 9 October 1979. See supra Chapter 5, sections III. 2 
and IV.1.  
1147
 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 on the Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 
46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Adopted on 10 August 1990. 
1148
 Ibid., para. 3. The Commission also pointed out that it was ‘aware that some States provide free legal 
assistance to persons who qualify because of their economic status. However, this practice does not obtain in all 
of the countries and even in those countries where it exists, it often covers only highly urbanised areas.’ 
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indigent applicants; and (2) whether refusing to exempt them from that obligation would not 
raise an issue of discrimination based on ‘social condition’ under Article 1.1 ACHR.1149  
Of course, the Convention provision governing the matter, Article 46 ACHR, makes no 
reference to indigence. The exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of remedies only provide for 
being ‘denied access’ to the remedies or being ‘prevented from exhausting them’.1150 
Nevertheless, these exceptions, according to the Court, covered impediments flowing from 
both legal and factual circumstances.
1151
 Hence, ‘if it can be shown that an indigent needs 
legal counsel to effectively protect a right which the Convention guarantees and his indigence 
prevents him from obtaining such counsel, he does not have to exhaust the relevant domestic 
remedies’.1152 The same held for the payment of court fees. Additionally, the Court stated that 
if a person was prevented from seeking the protection of the law to assert her or his 
convention rights because she or he, as a result of indigence, could not afford legal 
representation or the costs of the proceedings, then ‘that person is being discriminated against 
by reason of his economic status’.1153 In that case, he or she ‘is not receiving equal protection 
before the law’.1154 Both interpretations – on legal aid and court fees, on the one hand, and on 
economic discrimination, on the other – were later transposed to contentious cases. 
Nevertheless, as will be seen below it took much longer for the prohibition of discrimination 
for reasons of poverty to be applied in a case.  
It is worth mentioning that the Commission has, through reports and decisions on individual 
petitions, further addressed domestic problems of access to justice on account of poverty.
1155
 
Meanwhile, the Court has dealt with the provision of free legal aid to people without means 
(notably, irregular migrants), although more in advisory opinions than in contentious 
cases.
1156
 In Cantos v. Argentina, however, the Court examined a related issue: the imposition 
                                                          
1149
 Idem.  
1150
 Article 46 ACHR, in its relevant parts, reads as follows:  
1.  Admission by the Commission of a petition or communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 
shall be subject to the following requirements:  
a. that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally 
recognized principles of international law; […] 
2. The provisions of paragraphs 1.a and 1.b of this article shall not be applicable when: 
a. the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right 
or rights that have allegedly been violated; 
b. the party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has 
been prevented from exhausting them; or 
c. there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies. 
1151
 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 on the Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 
46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Adopted on 10 August 1990, paras. 17, 
20.  
1152
 Ibid., paras. 30-31.  
1153
 Ibid., para. 22.  
1154
 Idem.  
1155
 See the reports and individuals petitions summarised in IACommHR, Access to Justice as a Guarantee of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Review of the standards adopted by the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.129 Doc. 4, 7 September 2007, paras. 48-80. See also, Ariel E. Dulitzky, 
‘Pobreza y derechos humanos en el sistema interamericano. Algunas aproximaciones preliminares’, 48 Revista 
Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (2008) 107, at 128-132.  
1156
 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 on the The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the 
Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law, Adopted on 1 October 1999, para. 119 (holdings that “the 
judicial process must recognize and correct any real disadvantages that those brought before the bar might have 
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of court fees and its impact on the right to access courts.
1157
 Interestingly enough, however, 
the applicant in this case was far from facing socio-economic difficulties. He was the owner 
of an important holding, the principal shareholder of two companies and the owner of urban 
and rural lands. Following a series of searches carried out on his premises and the seizure of 
several important items, he initiated legal actions for the ensuing damages and losses. He had 
paid the filing fees and had requested litigation without incurring costs, which the domestic 
courts refused. Eventually the applicant was required to pay more than 83 million US dollars, 
which corresponded to a fixed fee of 3 per cent of the total amount of damages claimed. On 
top of that, a fine of 41 million US dollars was imposed for failure to pay the said fee.  
The Commission argued that these amounts, coupled with other charges, were a 
disproportionate burden and thus incompatible with the right to access justice.
1158
 The Court 
agreed. It found that even though the sum was arithmetically proportional to the amount 
claimed by the applicant, it was ‘unreasonable’ and ‘disproportional’.1159 As such, it 
amounted to a violation of the applicant’s right of access to justice (Article 8.1 ACHR) 
regardless of the fact that he had not paid it and the proceedings had concluded with a final 
judgment. This was so because ‘those participating in the proceeding must be able to do so 
without fear of being forced to pay disproportionate or excessive sums because they turned to 
the courts’.1160 Surprisingly, at no point did the Court (or the Commission) discuss the 
applicant’s financial resources, which played no role in the proportionality analysis.1161 This 
strong procedural protection suggests that extremely high fees or economic requirements for 
the purpose of exercising fundamental rights such as access to justice would not be acceptable 
no matter the economic capacity of the person in question. But this is not self-evident, 
especially in a time when human rights are tending to expand and cover an increasing number 
of fields. A more concrete analysis of proportionality would therefore have been helpful. 
The above rulings and judgments, alongside others such as Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela,
1162
 
show that the applicants’ socio-economic disadvantage is identified as something legally 
relevant. It can at the very least, and regardless of other identities and disadvantages, affect 
the proportionality analysis. Unlike the judgment in Cantos, the assessment in Uzcátegui is 
considerably less abstract. This case concerned the extrajudicial execution, by police officers, 
of a young man from a humble family who had been seeking justice for the death of his 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
[…] [which] necessitates countervailing measures that help to reduce or eliminate the obstacles and deficiencies 
that impair or diminish an effective defense of one’s interests”); Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 on the Juridical 
Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Adopted on 17 September 2003, para. 126 (referring 
specifically to free legal aid); Rights and guarantees of children in the context of migration and/or in need of 
international protection; Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 on the Rights and guarantees of children in the context of 
migration and/or in need of international protection, Adopted on 19 August 2014, paras. 124, 130-132, 204, 248-
251 (referring to free legal assistance of an interpreter and of a legal representative throughout the proceedings). 
The Court has nonetheless briefly addressed the right of migrants to free legal aid in contentious cases. See, for 
example, IACtHR, Vélez Loor v. Panama, Judgment of 23 November 2010, paras. 136-139.   
1157
 IACtHR, Cantos v. Argentina, Judgment of 28 November 2002. 
1158
 IACommHR, Written arguments submitted to the IACtHR in the case of Cantos v. Argentina, 9 March 1999, 
at 36-37. 
1159
 IACtHR, Cantos v. Argentina, Judgment of 28 November 2002, para. 54. 
1160
 Ibid., para. 55.  
1161
 It appears that the Court attached importance to the amounts involved and possibly as well to the authorities’ 
alleged acts of persecution and hostility towards the applicant. See ibid., paras. 7(e) and 35.  
1162
 IACtHR, Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela, Judgment of 3 September 2012. 
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brother. As usual in this type of case, several violations were found, including the prohibition 
of torture and inhuman treatment (Article 5) and the rights to life (Article 4), to liberty 
(Article 7), privacy (Article 11) and freedom of expression (Article 12) ACHR. Additionally, 
and in view of the way the police broke into the victim’s home, damaging its structure and 
household items, the victims’ representative asked the Court to declare a violation of their 
right to property (Article 21 ACHR). In doing so, the Court held: 
Given the circumstances in which the action took place and, in particular, the 
socioeconomic status and vulnerability of the Uzcátegui family, the damage to their 
property during the raid had a far greater impact than it would have had for other 
family groups with other means. In this regard, the Court considers that States must 
take into account that groups of people living in adverse circumstances and with fewer 
resources, such as those living in poverty, experience an increase in the extent to 
which their rights are affected, precisely because of their more vulnerable situation.
1163
  
Although the Court did not say it, the question appears to be one of proportionality. The right 
to property may be restricted and some interference may be inherent in police raids. In the 
case at hand, though, the arbitrary nature of the operation had compromised the legality and 
legitimate aim of any ensuing restriction of the applicants’ right to property. The Court could 
have focused on that and, by the same token, it could also have opted to subsume this wrong 
under a violation of the rights to privacy and liberty, for example. But it did not. The Court 
thus seems interested, as will be seen later (Section IV 2.1), in recognising as a distinctive 
harm the excessive impact that the inflicted material losses had on a family living in poverty. 
The same words on the greater harm that damage to property causes to people living in 
poverty were restated shortly after, in the Massacre of Santo Domingo case.
1164
 The remark, 
however, hardly found application in this judgment, since the vast majority of interferences 
with the applicants’ possessions (looting and damage to homes, crops and animals) could not 
be attributed to the state.
1165
 
Following a similar logic, the applicants’ economic hardship has additionally been identified 
as normatively relevant for the purpose of granting reparations. We have seen that reparation 
orders geared to the victims’ socio-economic needs are not uncommon in the Court’s case 
law. These typically include measures of a social and redistributive character. Several of these 
were examined in Chapter 3 when discussing some reparation awards in indigenous land 
cases. Among them are the restitution of land, the creation of development funds, the 
construction of public facilities and the provision of social services. But in addition, the Court 
has also considered the victims’ situation of poverty for the purpose of determining the 
damage and the extent of the remedies. The underlying rationale resembles that of poverty as 
a factor that intensifies or aggravates the rights interferences. Just as this weighs in the 
proportionality analysis, the heightened harm would also affect the extent of the reparations 
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for the ensuing violations. Judgments such as those in ‘the Juvenile Reeducation Institute’ and 
Yakye Axa, both against Paraguay, attest to that.
1166
  
Having clarified that the Court has generally been sensitive to questions of economic 
disadvantage, which has been regarded as something legally relevant, it is time to enquire 
about the place of the identity group framework and the vulnerability of people living in 
poverty. Questions of identity, group and vulnerability usually hold great significance in the 
way litigants and courts frame and address complaints of social difference and inclusion, as 
explained in the Chapter 2. It was seen that this also holds true for claims grounded in cultural 
difference. When it comes to socio-economic disadvantage, however, the previous chapter 
demonstrated that such a framework does not seem to apply easily, at least in the context of 
the ECtHR. And while the lack of that sort of compartmentalisation may offer some 
opportunities, the total lack of reference to group identity or vulnerability may give rise to 
further difficulties, some of which were analysed in Chapter 5. That is why it is worth 
exploring, as does the following subsection, the questions whether people living in poverty 
are regarded as a vulnerable or otherwise protected ‘group’; and whether their experience is 
evaluated through the frames of ‘identity’ and ‘difference’ or through other categories that 
foster compartmentalisation.  
 
2. The socio-economically disadvantaged as vulnerable  
While it is not possible to assert that poverty in the Inter-American system, and more 
particularly in the Court, is regarded and mobilised in the same way as any other group 
identity claim, the difference is not as sharp as one would expect. This can be appreciated, in 
the first place, in the relative visibility of people’s socio-economic disadvantage in the 
arguments of the applicants and the Commission, as well as in the Court’s judgments. In the 
second place, and perhaps more crucially, it should be noted that because of the attention that 
the Inter-American system has devoted to group identity discrimination and to substantive or 
structural equality, poverty has been addressed in close connection with all of these elements 
namely, groups, vulnerability and discrimination.  
The Court has not explicitly stated that people living in poverty as such constitute a 
vulnerable group requiring special protection. But it should be recalled that the Court, rather 
than talking about ‘vulnerable groups’, usually refers to groups in a vulnerable situation or in 
aggravated vulnerability. In this sense, the Court has indeed moved towards the recognition of 
people living in economic precariousness as being in a condition of vulnerability entitled, as 
such, to special measures of protection. Already in the Paraguayan cases dealing with 
indigenous communities living in deplorable socio-economic conditions, the Court, in 
keeping with the applicants’ allegations, explicitly linked the concept of vulnerability with 
destitution.
1167
 Thus, in Sawhoyamaxa it notably held: 
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From these general [state] obligations [enshrined in Articles 1.1 and 2 ACHR] special 
duties are derived that can be determined according to the particular needs of 
protection of the legal persons, whether due to their personal conditions or because of 
the specific situation they have to face, such as extreme poverty, exclusion or 
childhood.
1168
  
The above standard was recently reiterated in the case of Hacienda Brasil Verde, which is so 
far the judgment that most directly and extensively deals with rights claims of poverty.
1169
 In 
this case, the Court characterised the victimisation of the applicants (85 workers rescued from 
slave-like work) mostly in terms of poverty.
1170
 What is more, on this basis, and in view of the 
passivity of the state authorities, the Court found that the state ‘did not consider the 
vulnerability of the 85 rescued workers (…) by virtue of the discrimination on account of 
economic status they were subjected to’.1171 A similar analysis of group vulnerability on the 
basis of poverty can be seen in the case of Gonzales Lluy and Others v Ecuador, concerning 
the discrimination and social exclusion faced by a girl with HIV.
1172
 Besides asserting that 
people with HIV, and children in particular, are groups in greater vulnerability, the Court 
explicitly situated the vulnerability of the applicant and her family in their socio-economic 
precariousness.
1173
 In its view, given the girl’s particular situation of vulnerability, the state 
was under an ‘exceptional duty of due diligence’.1174 
 So, as will be further seen below, the Court has conceived poverty as a factor of vulnerability 
or risk to human rights violations that may reinforce state obligations.
1175
 Further, the Court, 
in line with the Commission, has developed a frame of analysis that is particularly attentive to 
the situation of groups historically subject to exclusion and discrimination which, as a matter 
of fact, are also disproportionally affected by poverty.1176 Thus, where applicants are identified 
as belonging to one of these groups or the case is mainly defined as dealing with the rights of 
children, indigenous people, Afro-descendants or others, the Court views their socio-
economic disadvantage mostly as a side effect of their ethnic origin, age vulnerability or other 
status group discrimination. In these cases, poverty appears as an element that exacerbates 
their disadvantage as members of those groups or subgroups.
1177
 Finally, in the case of 
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Hacienda Brasil Verde cited above the Court was willing to apply the prohibition of 
discrimination for reasons of poverty (on grounds of ‘economic status’), as provided by 
Article 1.1 ACHR. This last move has allowed the Court and litigants to place questions of 
socio-economic disadvantage as an issue of difference, that is, as something that can be seen 
as relational to the privilege and wealth of others. 
The openness to considering people living in poverty as a group in need of heightened 
protection seems to reflect the increasingly flexible way in which groups who are 
discriminated against or placed in vulnerability are envisaged by the Inter-American system. 
The Commission’s position appears to be quite influential in this respect. In its recent report 
on Poverty and Human Rights, the Commission points out:  
Groups in a vulnerable situation’ or ‘groups that historically suffer discrimination’ will 
vary from one society to the next and from one point in history to another. Therefore, 
every State has a duty to determine who those groups are in order to devise 
appropriate inclusive policies that ensure them the free and full exercise of their 
rights.
1178
  
Viewed from this perspective, it is understandable why people living in poverty have come to 
be considered a social group in need of protection. Yet, the question will arise as to whether 
the legal approach to the group will remain flexible and contingent enough to avoid some of 
the difficulties with identity/group frameworks studied in the previous chapters. Part of this 
question is addressed in the second part below, which discusses how much complexity is 
acknowledged in the experience of rights claimants living in poverty. Before turning to this, 
though, a final clarification is required as to the role played by other possible forms of 
fragmentary thinking.  
 
3. A word on other compartments 
Unlike what was seen in the ECtHR’s case law studied in Chapter 5, the IACtHR has not 
devised any specific set of principles for cases defined as concerning socio-economic policy. 
To understand this, it is necessary to recall an important difference between the two regional 
courts that was mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4: so far the Inter-American Court does not apply 
the doctrine of the state’s margin of appreciation. True, the IACtHR has taken care not to 
adjudicate directly socio-economic rights whose enforcement is not explicitly authorised by 
the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘Protocol of San Salvador’). But in general the Court 
does not seem to avoid questions of socio-economic disadvantage or insulate cases that touch 
upon socio-economic policies by means of a particularly lenient review. This means that, in 
principle, the IACtHR’s approach to claims of economic difference is relatively free from 
some important drivers of fragmentary thinking. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how 
integrated the Court’s approach is to the rights holders as well as to the norms involved in 
cases of economic disadvantage, and with what consequences. Sections III and IV below deal, 
respectively, with these questions.    
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III. Whole humans: looking through and across rights holders 
In discussing the case law of the European Court, I explained that on several occasions the 
applicants’ socio-economic circumstances were overlooked by litigants and the Court alike. It 
was also seen that when applicants claim socio-economic deprivation as a relevant factor of 
disadvantage compromising their rights, a two-fold difficulty arises. First, it may be that this 
aspect is not regarded as legally relevant by the Court or if considered, is subsumed under 
another marker of diversity. Second, it is also possible that when people’s socio-economic 
circumstances are taken into account, other relevant social positions and identities get 
displaced. In the context of the Inter-American Court, however, both scenarios need revision.  
 
1. An enriched view of applicants in poverty 
To start with, it is important to reiterate that the Commission – which for a long time has 
acted as a litigant before the Court – and the victims’ representatives usually give some 
visibility to the applicants’ experience of poverty. The Court, for its part, has proceeded 
similarly. In paying attention to the applicants’ economic precariousness, it has mostly 
conceived of this as a relevant contextual element that facilitates, results from or reinforces 
the violations discussed in a case. In other words, the Inter-American Court generally does 
take into account, albeit often briefly, the economic hardship of rights holders. The question 
of economically-neutral readings is therefore not as much an issue as it is in the European 
Court’s case law. As discussed below, the Inter-American Court has for the most part tended 
to examine applicants’ situation of poverty through other grounds of difference. By this I 
mean, more specifically, integrating the applicants’ socio-economic disadvantage as one of 
the elements characterising their experience as members of a discriminated or otherwise 
vulnerable group. This is the first dimension of integration to be discussed in this section.  
The next question explored in the following lines concerns the reverse question, in other 
words, the extent to which the litigants and the Court have been keen to transcend a poverty-
based reading of cases to integrate other dimensions of the life of rights holders. As explained 
in the previous chapter, thinking of people’s poverty alone and detached from gender, ethnic 
origin, age or from other social locations ignores how these positions substantially change the 
experience of poverty and the rights deprivations associated with it. This also means 
overlooking the different responses and justifications available in each case. To explore 
whether the Court adopts an integrated perspective to the experience of poverty, however, a 
further clarification is in order. The Inter-American Court has hardly examined cases whose 
main discourse goes to socio-economic disadvantage as such. As mentioned above, the large 
majority of cases incorporate issues of economic status as an aspect related to other traits of 
difference and disadvantage. The most notable exception so far is the 2016 case The Hacienda 
Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil, which led the Court to focus on poverty as the sole and main 
ground of the applicants’ disadvantage.1179 Therefore, this case is the main object of analysis 
in the second part of the present section.  
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1.1. Socio-economic disadvantage through other grounds of difference?  
Many of the cases decided by the Court are framed as cases concerning identity groups 
discriminated against or otherwise people in vulnerable situations. In these cases, the main 
narrative is that of being prejudiced in the enjoyment of rights mainly because of the 
applicants’ position as, for example, children, indigenous, disabled, migrant and/or Afro-
descendant. Within this discourse, the question arises: do the litigants and the Court integrate 
the socio-economic location of these persons? And if so, what does their socio-economic 
disadvantage add to the identity group rights claims? What advantages and risks does this 
form of integration entail? These are some of the questions discussed hereunder.  
The Court started to develop an approach to applicants’ poverty through the lens of other 
differences in the so-called ‘street children’ case.1180 This concerned the police arrest, ill-
treatment and execution of five adolescents aged between 15 and 20, who lived in the streets 
of deprived areas in the City of Guatemala. Their murders were part of a larger pattern of 
police violence against children living on the streets, as a measure to counter juvenile 
delinquency and vagrancy.
1181
 The Commission alleged violations of the rights to personal 
liberty, life, the prohibition of torture and the right to measures of protection as children. It 
was within the framework of this last right (enshrined in Article 19 ACHR) that ‘the 
Commission described the three child victims of the facts of this case as persons who lived in 
extremely precarious socio-economic conditions and who fought to survive alone and fearful 
of a society that did not include them’.1182 The Commission’s arguments then pointed not only 
to the state’s failure to protect the children against violence, and to investigate and prosecute 
the crimes perpetrated against them, but also to the steps that the state should have adopted to 
prevent or alleviate the deprivation and social exclusion of ‘street children’, given the risks 
that this condition entailed for their development and life and which were known to the 
state.
1183
  
The state’s obligation of protection under Article 19 ACHR also encompassed, according to 
the Commission, the protection of social and economic rights.
1184
 This suggests that the 
poverty experienced by the victims, to the extent that it was not remedied by the state and fell 
on children, contravened Article 19. The Court adopted a similar stance. It found that the 
children suffered a double aggression. Besides the violations to their lives and physical 
integrity, they were victimised because the state did ‘not prevent them from living in misery, 
thus depriving them of the minimum conditions for a dignified life’.1185 In taking this view, 
the Court interpreted Article 19 ACHR in light of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
particularly the provisions that bind states to secure children’s socio-economic well-being.1186  
This line of reasoning was further developed in Servellón García v. Honduras, where the 
Court returned to the encounter between juveniles living in poverty and state policies of crime 
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prevention.
1187
 Similarly to the ‘street children’ case, the victims in Servellón García, 
including two minors, had been arbitrarily detained, tortured and killed by police agents. The 
crimes took place in the course of collective detention operations targeting youth in poverty 
who were presumed to be linked with the so-called Maras or gangs in Honduras. The 
judgment elaborated on the destitution and social risk faced by juveniles like the victims.
1188
 
And against this background, it reiterated the state’s duty to address the socio-economic 
deprivation of children at risk, which was identified as the main reason for the harm inflicted 
on them.
1189
 Moreover, this time the Court also considered, with regard to equality and non-
discrimination, the stigmatisation of children and youth living in poverty who are portrayed as 
criminals.
1190
 This is discussed in subsection IV. 1.1 below.  
The socio-economic disadvantage of rights holders has likewise been considered to be a 
contextual element associated with their ethnic origin. Underpinning this view is what the 
Commission has explained thus: ‘being indigenous seems of itself to be a cause of poverty 
and extreme poverty.’1191 The correlation has to do with the historical discrimination against 
indigenous peoples and their lack of self-determination and access to their ancestral lands and 
natural resources.
1192
 Examples are cases brought by indigenous communities of the 
Paraguayan Chaco, which were previously examined in Chapter 4; here, the Court observed 
that mostly as a result of land destitution, the members of the indigenous communities of 
Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek lived in appalling conditions.
1193
 Under the 
right to life (Article 4 ACHR), read as entitlement to a dignified life, their lives were 
characterised, inter alia, by unemployment, malnutrition, lack of access to basic services and 
infrastructure and high rates of preventable diseases. 
Also mentioned earlier in this study, the situation of these community members has been 
further distinguished by the Court. The experience of children, pregnant women and the 
elderly among the communities was examined as regards their lack of access to adequate 
nutrition and to appropriate and timely medical care, which resulted in their premature death. 
In the case of Sawhoyamaxa, for example, the Court examined the lack of access to health 
care and the ensuing death of mostly children of the indigenous community whose mothers 
could not afford the medicines prescribed. In the words of the victims: ‘there are no medicines 
for the poor’.1194 The applicants had argued that the state was partly responsible for the death 
of children and other ill members of the community who contracted preventable diseases 
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while living in deplorable conditions at the side of a road. The state, by contrast, argued that 
public health services had been made available to them and it was their own responsibility to 
approach the health centres and make use of medical assistance.
1195
 The Court noted that 
while the children were entitled to free medical care in public health centres and had been 
treated there, they could not obtain the prescribed medicines. Shortly after, they had died 
because their families could not pay for them. In view of these economic impediments, the 
judgment concluded that the health care provided to those children was insufficient and 
untimely for securing their right to life (Article 4 ACHR).  
Since the state had been aware of the extremely precarious situation of these persons, the 
Court attributed the children’s death to the state’s lack of diligence. It had failed to adopt the 
positive measures that were reasonable to expect to prevent or mitigate the life-threatening 
situation of those indigenous children.
1196
 Similar analyses were applied to the destitution of 
the elderly, women and children of the other indigenous communities who brought cases 
against Paraguay. With regard to all of them the Court applied heightened state obligations 
aimed at alleviating their destitution and providing them with assistance, food and access to 
basic services. While in the case of indigenous children those duties were grounded in Article 
19 (Children Rights), in the case of pregnant women and the elderly, the Court simply 
concluded that ensuring their right to life (Article 4 ACHR) required ‘special measures of 
protection’.1197 
In other cases, however, the socio-economic disadvantage associated with membership of a 
discriminated group is mostly included as part of the general context of the case. The 
judgment in Yean and Bosico is an example.
1198
 This case, already examined in Chapter 4, 
concerned two Dominican girls of Haitian descent who were denied birth registration. As a 
consequence, they could not enrol in school and access other services, nor could they have 
their names formally recognised. The Commission linked the violations at stake mostly to the 
applicants’ origin (Haitian descent) and the migration status of their parents.1199 And so did 
the Court. The applicants’ poverty, which was substantial, formed part of the general context 
within which the Court situated the case. Poverty was one of the features that marked the 
living conditions of most Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian origin in the Dominican 
Republic.
1200
 Likewise, lack of financial resources was one of the factors explaining why most 
mothers of Haitian origin gave birth at home and resorted to late birth registration.
1201
 It was 
also suggested that poverty was one of the effects of denying birth registration to children of 
Haitian origin, as this compromised their education and prospects of employment.
1202
 The 
Court’s attention to a life context of poverty has also featured, albeit with varying levels of 
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thoroughness, in other cases involving gender and racial violence against Afro-descendants 
and women.
1203
   
It is interesting to note that the judgment in Yean and Bosico ultimately did not go into the 
specific socio-economic deprivations encountered by the applicants and their families. The 
Court did not really address the human rights impact of the costs of administrative 
proceedings imposed on impoverished migrant children and their families. Addressing this 
aspect might seem unnecessary, though, particularly in the face of what their racialised and 
migratory positions already entailed for them. Yet, looking into the applicants’ economic 
hardship might have been useful in responding to the claim that the state should have set 
limits to the cost of birth registration proceedings. In fact, the Commission had pointed out the 
expenses involved in complying with the requirements imposed on the applicants (including 
obtaining abundant documentation) as one of the elements hindering the exercise of their 
rights.
1204
 What is more, the victims’ representatives asked the Court to order the state, as a 
reparation measure of satisfaction and non-repetition, ‘to reduce the birth registration 
costs’.1205 But this was left answered. The Court did not make any finding either on the merits 
or in the reparations awards regarding the costs of administrative proceedings. The omission 
is not trivial. Even if the state sets out clear criteria for birth registration and ensures their 
non-arbitrary application, the exclusion of children of Haitian origin like the applicants will 
continue if the costs of the proceedings are beyond their means.
1206
 To tackle this, either on 
the merits or in the reparations, it would have been necessary to explore the applicants’ 
economic difficulties vis-à-vis their access to birth registration.  
Finally, applicants’ socio-economic disadvantage has been briefly considered from the 
perspective of disability. First, this was taken as part of the background to cases where 
disability appeared to be one of the consequences of poverty. Thus, in Ximenes Lopes v Brazil 
the Court emphasised that those who lived in poverty and social exclusion faced greater risks 
of becoming disabled.
1207
 It was thereby implied that since states should take steps to prevent 
disability, they should also address people’s poverty. Later, the disability approach to poverty 
received a more concrete application in the case of Furlan and Family v. Argentina, where the 
linkage was incorporated into the assessment of the harm faced by the alleged victims. The 
case concerned an excessive delay in resolving a civil action to ensure medical treatment for a 
child who became disabled at the age of 14, following an accident on army property. The 
Court examined the procedural guarantees that assisted him in light of a vulnerability that it 
defined in terms of the ‘negative effects produced by the combination of his disability and his 
and his family’s very limited financial resources’.1208 This, according to the Court, ‘meant that 
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his impoverished circumstances had a disproportionate impact on his condition as a person 
with disabilities’.1209  
A similar view of socio-economic disadvantage from the perspective of disability was 
advanced in a more recent case against Costa Rica involving a general ban on in vitro 
fertilisation techniques.
1210
 In this judgment, however, the issue of socio-economic 
disadvantage was not really subsumed within the disadvantages accorded to disability. As 
further discussed below, here the issue of the ‘greater impact’ resulting from lacking 
resources took the form of indirect discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights to humane 
treatment (Article 5), personal liberty (Article 7) and private and family life (Articles 11 and 
17) ACHR. The argument basically posited that preventing people with a reproductive 
disability from accessing medically available in vitro fertilisation treatment in the respondent 
country put an excessive burden on those who did not have the economic resources to seek 
treatment elsewhere.
1211
 The reasoning resonates with some of the arguments usually put 
forward with regard to the disparate impact that abortion bans place upon poor women.
1212
 
They, unlike women of means, are overwhelmingly driven into unsafe abortion. In the 
alternative, they are forced to bear the heightened risks and hardships of unviable or unwanted 
pregnancies.  
Now, what are the advantages and drawbacks of viewing applicants’ socio-economic 
disadvantage through the lens of discriminated against or vulnerable identity groups? 
While the Court’s limited analysis of poverty-related claims from the perspective of the 
different identities discussed above makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions, some 
preliminary inferences are possible. First, in most cases where the applicant’s poverty is 
incorporated as part of his or her already disadvantaged group, the insight plays out as a factor 
that magnifies the rights interferences, whether considered as a matter of general context or as 
something concretely experienced by the applicant. In some cases, this translates into more 
specific or heightened state obligations. A second important advantage of incorporating 
poverty within the group context in which the case takes place is that by doing so the Court 
avoids reducing the experience of socio-economic disadvantage to an isolated and individual 
matter. Besides the significance of this at the discursive level, it may also alleviate the burden 
of proof for applicants and facilitate the prospect, depending on the case, of allegations of 
discrimination in connection with poverty.  
It is also possible, however, to discern some risks in this approach. A first potential drawback 
is that by defining socio-economic disadvantage as a contextual characteristic of certain 
groups, the Court may end up overlooking an individualised evaluation of how the specific 
rights holders in question experience this. Another danger of viewing poverty through other 
identity groups is conveying the message that poverty stems from certain personal/group 
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characteristics or that these by themselves put people at risk of poverty. This may lead to a 
reduced understanding of poverty, one in which the group identity framework obscures the 
role of social structures. Finally, the Court should be careful not to bypass claims of socio-
economic disadvantage from those who in principle would not seem to fall into one of those 
groups historically discriminated against. Think of the rights of urban white men living in 
poverty, for example. Their plight also deserves attention and should not be dismissed simply 
because their other identities or social locations are relatively privileged.   
Up to here the analysis provides a fair account of what could be gained or illuminated by 
examining people’s disadvantaged identities and positions in a manner that is sensitive to their 
socio-economic differences. Now, the reverse question arises. What if the Court were also 
mindful of enriching its account of people’s poverty and its relationship with the enjoyment of 
human rights?  
 
1.2. Integrating the different faces of poverty  
As mentioned earlier, so far the Court has placed the experience of poverty at the core of only 
one case: Hacienda Brasil Verde v. Brazil.
1213
 This concerned the lack of state prevention and 
response regarding the slave labour conditions of 85 workers, some of them children, in the 
privately owned estate ‘Hacienda Brasil Verde’.1214 In its fact-finding considerations, the 
Court identified poverty, alongside the concentration of property and deregulation, as one of 
the structural causes that made possible the continuation of slave labour in Brazil after its 
legal abolition. In this context, the Court also characterised the problem in terms of the 
features shared by the people affected by it. The persons recruited to work in slavery-like 
conditions were mostly workers from the poorest regions of the country and with the highest 
rates of illiteracy. Moreover, the majority were young, poor, Afro-descendant men.
1215
 This 
also held true for the 85 rescued workers from Hacienda Brasil Verde, where they were held 
in deplorable conditions.
1216
 
In its merit analysis the Court focused on poverty. It noted that the main characteristics of 
victimisation shared by the 85 rescued workers related to destitution. They lived in poverty, 
came from the poorest regions of the country, lacked education and were illiterate, which 
made them prone to recruitment into slavery by fraud and deceit. This was constitutive of ‘a 
situation of imminent risk for a determinate group of persons with identical characteristics and 
who came from the same regions of the country’.1217 Such a risk had historical roots and had 
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been known to the state for years. Stressing that poverty was the main factor leading to the 
workers’ recruitment into slavery and forced labour, the Court concluded that the rescued 
workers were discriminated against in their right to be free from slavery (Article 6 ACHR in 
conjunction with the prohibition of discrimination enshrined in Article 1.1 ACHR). And the 
same went for their rights to access justice (Articles 8 and 25 ACHR, also in combination 
with the prohibition of discrimination). With regard to both sets of rights, the Court found that 
they were discriminated against on account of their (low) economic status.
1218
 The Court’s 
reasoning on economic-based discrimination will be closely examined infra IV. 1.2. For now, 
I am interested in the following questions. Does this poverty-centred analysis account for 
what had happened to the recruited workers? And is this single aspect – poverty – the one 
most relevant to their experience? How would a more situated view of poverty change this 
and other similar cases?  
The victims’ representatives had argued that most victims in this case were Afro-descendants 
or morenos men aged between 17 and 40 and living in extreme poverty and vulnerability; this, 
in their view, disclosed an issue of ‘structural discrimination’. Further, the representatives 
claimed that the state had failed to remove the obstacles to accessing justice on the basis of 
their ethnic, race and socio-economic position.
1219
 The Commission, for its part, alleged de 
facto discrimination against a ‘determinate group of persons’ without grounding this in their 
poverty.
1220
 But importantly, the Commission’s report on the case had recommended that 
Brazil adopt measures to combat racism, which was reiterated in its reparations request before 
the Court.
1221
 The same concern about racial discrimination appeared in the Commission’s 
claim of structural discrimination in the applicants’ inability to access to justice. In support of 
this claim, the Commission recalled that the conciliation agreement between the domestic 
authorities and the owner of Hacienda Brasil Verde stipulated a fine for each worker found in 
slavery-like conditions ‘whether they were white or black’.1222 Even the Court admitted, as a 
matter of fact, that the workers who were more exposed to forced labour and slavery in Brazil 
were not only poor, but also men of African descent.
1223
 And yet the Court, strikingly, 
addressed the applicants’ economically-based discrimination on its own, as something 
unrelated to other grounds.  
In fact, an intersectional approach is missing in the legal analysis, which is unfortunate. For 
one thing, the element of racial discrimination was overlooked, despite being at the root of the 
commodification and hence, slavery, of Afro-descendant people. For another, the fact that 
most victims were men also merited recognition. Some men and boys experience greater risks 
of specific forms of trafficking and slavery aimed at rural labour exploitation. Yet, their 
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grievances are too often neglected.
1224
 The way in which economic structures and racial 
hierarchies in Brazil oppressed mostly young, rural, Afro-descendant men living in poverty 
was therefore obscured. An intersectional approach to the applicants’ poverty and slave labour 
would have done justice to their real-life experience, exposing the specific risks and harms 
they encountered. This, in turn, would have allowed adequate responses to be devised, 
guiding state action in terms of prevention and remedies. If the specificities of the victims’ 
experience are obfuscated and collapsed into poverty, the message could in fact be 
misleading. Legal and policy interventions that aim at improving the material conditions of 
the poor, for example, but do not really tackle racism and the concentration of property are 
likely to fall short of redressing the situation. There is, furthermore, added value in tackling 
the interplay between poverty and not just their identity as men of African descent, but 
racism.  
First, by connecting poverty to racial discrimination, that is, by regarding poverty as 
something mostly experienced by people of African descent, the recognition and 
redistribution injustices at play are integrated. This is important as it allows a distancing from 
widely held discourses that posit that all the problems of those communities arise from 
poverty and not racism.
1225
 Secondly, intersectionality provides stronger and more precise 
grounds for the Court’s interpretation of pervasive poverty as discrimination affecting the 
right to be free from slave labour. In fact, this part of the judgment is exposed to important 
challenges, which Judge Sierra Porto’s dissenting opinion represents well. He pointed out that 
although in general the workers subjected to slavery-like conditions had some common 
(poverty-related) characteristics, ‘these characteristics are also shared by a large number of 
people in Brazil who live in poverty and are uneducated’.1226 He noted that the Court did not 
have sufficient evidentiary elements to conclude that the whole population of Piauí (the 
victims’ region of origin) suffered historical structural discrimination on the basis of poverty. 
Nor did the Court have the elements to declare the existence of such historical discrimination 
against the workers rescued from Hacienda Brasil Verde.
1227
  
In other words, the issue is that not all or not even most illiterate people living in poverty in 
the poorest regions of Brazil were victims of trafficking, forced labour or slavery. Nor does it 
seem plausible to say that all or most of them, solely by their material circumstances or place 
of residence, were victims of discrimination. By the same token, we could add that not all 
Afro-descendant people were poor, nor were all of them subject to forced labour. All this 
reminds us of the difficulties typically faced by litigants ‘falling between the cracks’ of 
discrimination grounds, as Crenshaw put it when criticising the same line of reasoning in the 
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case of the black women who brought a lawsuit against General Motors.
1228
 An intersectional 
approach, however, underscores the fact that nearly all the poorest people in Brazil are black 
and nearly all those working in slavery-like conditions are black. And this does say 
something. The Court’s finding of structural discrimination would therefore have stood on 
firmer ground if it had relied on intersectionality.  
An additional and related objection posited by the dissenter in Hacienda Brasil Verde 
concerns the socio-economic context of the country and the limitations on its ability to deal 
with poverty. Indeed, locating poverty as the sole and central ground of historical structural 
discrimination in a country like Brazil raises legitimate questions about the state’s capacity to 
comply with what may be perceived as unrealistic human rights standards. But holding the 
state accountable for widespread poverty is not quite the same thing as doing so for creating 
or sustaining, through its institutions and norms, the historical racial discrimination that has 
kept Afro-descendants overrepresented among the poor and, in the case of rural men, poor 
and exposed to forced labour and other forms of labour exploitation. This nuances the idea of 
state responsibility for poverty. Due to the way racism and concentration of property put 
young Afro-descendant men from rural areas in extreme poverty and at the mercy of slavery 
and trafficking, and because this was known to the state, the latter had specific duties of 
prevention and protection. Failure to do so would have revealed discrimination in a similar 
way as the failure to prevent and respond to violence against women amounts to 
discrimination. While this may have entailed some socio-economic steps, the state’s 
obligation was not one of general socio-economic provision and poverty alleviation, but one 
that was much more targeted.  
The subsections above show that a more holistic view of rights holders that incorporates their 
socio-economic position and links it to other dimensions of their lives entails important 
normative consequences. As already noted, many but not all of them concern equality and 
non-discrimination. Consideration should therefore first be given to what an intersectional 
view has meant or could mean for the application of equality and non-discrimination. 
Thereafter, I will turn to what an intersectional approach to rights holders, lato sensu, has or 
could add in other areas of adjudication.  
 
1.3. An intersectional approach within the antidiscrimination review: intersectional, 
indirect and de facto discrimination 
The case law examined thus far provides a fair sample of the possible connections between an 
integrated approach to people’s socio-economic differences and the prohibition of 
discrimination. The most notorious and extended linkage in the Court’s jurisprudence is that 
of poverty as an expression and consequence of entrenched forms of group identity 
discrimination. This understanding builds upon a conception of ‘structural’ or substantive 
equality that transcends a formal notion of discrimination centred on individual wrongs 
                                                          
1228
 Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics’, 140 University of Chicago Legal Forum 
(1989) 139, at 41 (the issue was that black women were not hired by the company prior to 1964 and later, when 
they were hired, all of them lost their jobs as a result of a seniority layoff). 
282 
 
arising from arbitrary treatment.
1229
 The paradigm of equality embraced by the Court (and by 
the Commission before it) – already introduced here and in chapter 4 – is sensitive to social 
context and the different forms of exclusion and disadvantage that persist among certain 
groups. In order to redress their subordination, this structural equality fosters an active state 
and the adoption of a wide range of positive measures.  
This conception of equality underpins the framing and handling of most of the cases 
examined above, albeit not necessarily leading to the application of anti-discrimination 
provisions. Observing that one of the entrenched disadvantages that women, indigenous 
peoples, children, people with disabilities and others encounter in most countries of the 
American region is poverty and social exclusion, the Court has taken this as one of the 
harmful effects of a history of discrimination. While in several judgments this translates into 
an emphasis on the applicants’ vulnerability and exclusion in the context of substantive 
provisions, in others that normative conception leads the Court to scrutinise issues of socio-
economic disadvantage as a matter of indirect and de facto discrimination as well as 
intersectional discrimination. I will start by examining the latter.  
People’s economic disadvantage has been integrated as a matter of multiple and intersectional 
discrimination in recent cases concerning access to health care and education. A significant 
step in this direction was taken in Artavia Murillo et al (‘In vitro fertilization’) v. Costa Rica 
(hereinafter, ‘IVF case’), which was introduced above.1230 A number of couples with fertility 
problems complained against a blanket ban imposed on all in vitro fertilisation (IVF) practices 
with the aim of protecting the right to life of embryos in Costa Rica. The Commission argued 
that the ban raised equality issues, among which were the specific and disproportionate 
impact it had on women.
1231
 The victims’ representative, in turn, framed the problem in 
compounded terms. He argued that the ban discriminated against the applicants on the basis of 
their reproductive incapacity – which amounted to a disability – and on the basis of their 
financial resources, since better-off couples could access IVF techniques abroad.
1232
 Having 
found several violations of the applicants’ rights, including their rights to private and family 
life, the Court, remarkably, examined whether the ban had ‘a disproportionate impact in 
relation to disability, gender and socio-economic situation’.1233 It found that it had. The ban 
amounted to indirect discrimination against the applicants due to disability (encompassing 
reproductive incapacity), gender and, for some couples, their financial situation.
1234
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The Court discussed each of these grounds. Building upon the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and the ‘social model’ it propounds, the Court posited that the 
applicants’ infertility, in the context of the case, constituted a disability regarding which the 
ban further limited their autonomy and social inclusion.
1235
 With regard to gender, the 
judgment stated that prohibiting techniques which are mostly performed on women’s bodies 
had a distinctive negative impact on them. Yet, men were harmed too. The Court stressed that 
a significant part of the harm and suffering endured by both infertile women and men flowed 
from being unable to conform to gender stereotypes and social expectations regarding 
motherhood, fertility and maleness.
1236
 Finally, the judgment addressed the applicants’ 
experience from the perspective of the limitations associated with their lack of financial 
means. The ban had a disparate effect on those who could not afford seeking treatment 
abroad, like many couples with means had done.
1237
   
To some extent, the approach in this case is more representative of multiple than 
intersectional discrimination. Distinguishing between these two concepts is not always easy. 
Nevertheless, the dividing line could be explained as follows: multiple discrimination does 
not involve much of a qualitative change in the experience of discrimination, but rather ‘a 
double burden and additive discrimination’.1238 The ban on IVF techniques had a disparate 
impact on persons with fertility problems – which the Court regarded as disability – 
irrespective of their financial situation. Its impact, however, was further aggravated in the 
case of those who had fewer resources. In other words, the latter experienced essentially the 
same discrimination as better-off victims but in a more acute way.  
The second judgment of relevance here is the 2016 case of Gonzales Lluy et. al v. Ecuador, 
where the Court explicitly applied for the first time the concept of intersectional 
discrimination.
1239
 Talía Gonzales Lluy, a three-year-old girl, was infected with HIV in the 
course of blood transfusion from the Ecuadorian Red Cross. Aside the damage to her health, 
she was barred from the kindergarten she attended because of her health status. By then the 
family were already in a modest economic situation. They had to be granted a waiver of court 
fees in order to file civil actions for damages. Following the girl’s infection, they faced 
repeated loss of employment and were forced to move every time the girl’s condition was 
discovered, which aggravated their economic hardship. All this was accounted for in the 
judgment, which even contained a section entitled ‘situation of poverty faced by the Lluy 
family’.1240 Normatively, this aspect played out in the analysis of the right to personal 
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integrity of the girl’s family, which is further discussed infra IV.1.1, and in the examination of 
the girl’s right not to be discriminated against in her access to education. It is in this last 
context that the applicant’s poverty seems to have given rise to a violation in itself, although 
in combination with other grounds.    
The Court examined the allegations of discrimination in the light of the social model of 
disability, since persons with HIV have historically encountered ‘social and attitudinal 
barriers’ preventing their equal access to rights.1241 Several violations were found in this case, 
including, for the first time, the right to education (Article 13 Protocol of San Salvador),
1242
 
alone and in combination with intersectional discrimination. In this regard, the Court held that 
‘numerous factors of vulnerability and risk of discrimination intersected that were associated 
with [the girl’s] condition as a minor, a female, a person living in poverty, and a person living 
with HIV’.1243 The Court explained why it regarded this as ‘a specific form of discrimination 
that resulted from the intersection of those factors’. As regards poverty, it contended that this 
had an impact on the low quality of health that was accessible to the girl (which resulted in 
her HIV infection). Moreover, ‘the situation of poverty also had an impact on the difficulties 
to gain access to the education system and to lead a decent life’.1244 The Court then addressed 
discrimination from the perspective of being a child with HIV and found that she faced 
obstacles to accessing education that ‘had a negative impact on her overall development’.1245 
As a child with HIV, she also required greater support from the state. Finally, as a woman she 
faced specific dilemmas and difficulties related to intimate relationships and future 
maternity.
1246
 According to the Court, the case illustrated that the impact of HIV 
stigmatisation ‘is more severe on members of vulnerable groups’.1247 The application of 
intersectional discrimination thus allowed the Court to account for the specific and qualitative 
experience of discrimination encountered by the girl in her position as a female minor, living 
in poverty and with HIV.  
In addition, being open to scrutinising poverty-related rights allegations through the 
prohibition of indirect discrimination is quite significant if one considers the reasonability that 
usually clothes economic criteria. As pointed out in the previous chapter, one of the reasons 
why measures and policies that rely on economic considerations and which undermine the 
rights of destitute people often go unchallenged is that their neutrality and functionality is 
generally accepted. They are not aimed at any group in particular and are reasonably related 
to the achievement of a legitimate aim. The notion of indirect discrimination, however, is one 
of the mechanisms whereby the prejudicial effect of policies and practices that are apparently 
neutral can be scrutinised. This is precisely what the judgment in IVF v. Costa Rica does – 
similarly to the Court’s advisory opinions on questions of access to domestic and international 
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justice.
1248
 These rulings show that setting economic requirements, such as fees, or precluding 
the provision of social services, such as certain medical treatment, can have a disparate 
prejudicial effect on people with fewer economic resources in general and therefore, also on 
those specific groups that are overrepresented among the poor.  
The Court has, moreover, relied on the concept of de facto discrimination to examine rights 
claims associated with an experience of poverty which are not dictated by specific 
regulations, but appear to be the result of social, institutional and cultural practices. In the 
sections above and in the previous chapter, I discussed the Court’s finding of de facto 
discrimination against the members of the Xákmok Kásek indigenous community. While the 
Court did not specify any discrimination ground, nor did it refer to poverty as such, it 
implicitly seems to have conceived the dire living conditions of the applicants as constitutive 
of de facto discrimination against indigenous peoples. That would be to say that poverty 
amounts to de facto discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin. This follows from 
the elements upon which the Court concluded that there had been de facto discrimination 
against the members of the Xákmok Kásek community. These notably included the situation 
of extreme vulnerability they experienced, the lack of institutional support and the absence of 
socio-economic services in the area, alongside a system of ownership which privileged the 
rights of private owners over those of indigenous communities.
1249
 The judgment in Hacienda 
Brasil Verde gives the impression of heading in a similar direction, albeit here the legal 
categorisation is one of structural and not de facto discrimination. In practice, though, it is not 
clear what scope of application these two forms of discrimination have and in fact both 
notions seem to have been conflated by the Court.
1250
 Nonetheless, as already mentioned, the 
discrimination analysis in Hacienda Brasil Verde focused on the workers’ poverty, while 
neglecting an intersectional approach. Consequently, this judgment is further discussed infra 
IV. 1.2, where I examine the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of economic status.  
Still, as mentioned above the effects of an intersectional approach to rights holders alleging 
socio-economic disadvantage as a matter of human rights need not to be restricted to equality 
and non-discrimination.   
 
1.4. An intersectional approach beyond the antidiscrimination review 
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A more holistic view of rights holders and their socio-economic circumstances entails various 
normative consequences beyond the question of discrimination. At the very least, it holds 
relevance for the analysis of proportionality and the award of reparations, insofar as it 
calibrates the type and extent of the harm at stake. Moreover, when the Court addresses 
economic disadvantage as an aspect of belonging to an excluded or otherwise vulnerable 
group, the normative effect is mostly one of reinforcing and specifying state obligations under 
the ACHR. These obligations, further discussed infra IV 2.2, are generally interpreted in the 
light of other instruments with a specific focus on those groups and on their socio-economic 
needs. Some of these instruments contain substantive and procedural guarantees that are quite 
closely tailored to the people concerned. As such, those standards may provide more concrete 
guidance to the Court.  
Interestingly, a significant part of the rationale according to which state obligations are 
enhanced or specified in the face of poverty seems to rest on a view of international 
responsibility based on the risks of human rights violations created by poverty when they 
have been known or should have been known to the state. These are, in other words, risks 
created, aggravated or otherwise tolerated by the state. According to Abramovich, the Inter-
American Court has adopted a doctrine of risks to deal with the state’s responsibility for 
imminent and particular risks created by non-state actors and which were known or ought to 
have been known by the state, provided that the state could reasonably prevent or mitigate 
their materialisation.
1251
 A variant of this doctrine is that of ‘created risks’, which is conceived 
for cases where the state has not just failed in its duties of protection but has rather 
contributed to the objective creation of risks of violation.
1252
 This situation gives rise to 
stringent state obligations.  
So, once poverty is conceived as a factor of risk of and vulnerability to rights violations 
known to the state, the Court could inquire into what the latter has done to prevent and protect 
people from the materialisation of those risks. As some authors have observed, a key question 
for that purpose is what can be reasonably demanded of the state.
1253
 While an intersectional 
perspective on rights holders may not by itself answer that question, it may at least indicate 
when different risks or vulnerabilities accumulate. For example, besides the vulnerability to 
violations resulting from poverty, an applicant may also face risks associated with gender and 
racial hierarchies. From this perspective, it follows that the more that factors of risks or 
disadvantage occur alongside poverty (such as disadvantages associated with age, disability, 
gender, racial hierarchies), the stronger will be the response expected from the state. This 
could therefore have an impact on what the Court finds to be reasonable to demand from 
states in poverty-related violations.  
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In what follows, another dimension of rights holders is examined, namely autonomy. It is 
worth exploring what place this element has had in the Court’s case law; whether the Court 
and/or litigants conceive of autonomy as a process or as something dichotomistic; and the 
implications that result from this.   
 
2. Problematising the ‘either/or’ view of individuals’ agency and choice 
In previous chapters, I have stressed that normative recognition of individual autonomy and 
choice should not lead to these becoming detached from the network of social relations in 
which they take place; nor should the law assume the meaning of one’s choices. In other 
words, it is important to acknowledge that ‘people often adapt their choices to their 
circumstances’ and the fact that certain choices are made ‘should not imply that there is no 
further need for legal intervention’.1254 This is particularly relevant in cases involving claims 
of economic disadvantage, since the accompanying rights interferences are prone to be 
attributed to people’s choices.  
Along these lines, scholars have noted that ‘economic deprivation is coercive and that it is 
difficult to be self-sufficient and to implement individual choice when one does not have the 
resources to do so’.1255 This suggests, in keeping with the capability approach propounded by 
Sen,
1256
 that for individuals to exercise their autonomy and pursue what they value, some 
socio-economic security is needed. The Inter-American Court has explicitly endorsed this 
view in the street children cases, where a direct correlation was established between the 
destitution experienced by those children and the encroachment on their project of life and 
opportunity for self-development.
1257
 At the same time, though, not everything is about 
coercion. The agency of those living in poverty should not be reduced to victimhood or 
passivity.  
Unlike what was seen in several cases ruled on by the Strasbourg Court, in the Inter-American 
Court’s case law the agency of impoverished rights holders is something seldom discussed. 
While in the IVF case, for example, the Court elaborated on the autonomy of the applicants, 
this analysis was not so much connected to their socio-economic disadvantage. In that 
judgment, the connection between this and autonomy was that lacking financial means 
reinforced the limitations imposed on the applicants’ reproductive autonomy and life 
choices.
1258
 Yet, a few other cases provide some insights into how the Court has approached 
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the autonomy of impoverished rights holders, and whether or not this is seen in a 
dichotomistic way. As will be seen below, in the few instances where a discussion of 
autonomy has arisen, the Court has generally tended to consider the coercive effects of 
poverty without denying the agency of the individuals affected by it.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the idea that the cause and remediation of destitution 
lies with individuals’ autonomy was taken up by Paraguay in cases such as the Yakye Axa and 
Sawhoyamaxa communities. The state argued that these indigenous communities, guided by 
their leaders, had freely decided to undergo the harsh living conditions they complained of. It 
was their choice to place themselves at the side of a road where they could not cater to their 
needs or have access to health services, education, water and sanitation.
1259
 The Court rejected 
this line of reasoning in both cases. In Sawhoyamaxa, this was done in a particularly direct 
way. Here, the Court considered that ‘there were powerful reasons for the members of the 
Community to abandon the estates where they lived and worked, due to the extremely hard 
physical and labor conditions they had to endure […] Likewise, this argument is not enough 
for the State to disregard its duty to protect and guarantee the right to life of the alleged 
victims.’1260 The Court conceded that the state had not placed the indigenous community at 
the side of the road to endure poor living conditions, but finds it true that the state ‘did not 
adopt the adequate measures, through a quick and efficient administrative proceeding, to take 
them away and relocate them within their ancestral lands, where they could have used and 
enjoyed their natural resources’.1261 The Court thereby seemed to uphold the autonomy of the 
applicants without making them responsible for the ensuing material difficulties. To that end, 
the Court firstly took into account the concrete circumstances of the applicants, the social 
imbalances that shaped their choices and, somewhat implicitly, their limited opportunities to 
make their demands heard. Secondly, the Court also considered that compliance with human 
rights obligations was not conditional upon the behaviour or decisions attributed to rights 
holders, an argument that was reinforced by the normative framework used in the case 
namely, the right to life. 
The Court’s approach in Yakye Axa was slightly different, since the agency argument was 
challenged more indirectly. The Court first observed that ‘the members of the Community 
decided to settle alongside a national road […] as part of the struggle to claim their 
territory’1262 and that the alternatives of relocation offered by the State were declined because 
‘they were not duly consulted, bearing in mind the significance for them of remaining on 
those lands, or because there could be conflicts with other indigenous communities’.1263 
Following these remarks, the Court immediately turned to ‘highlight the special gravity of the 
situation of the children and the elderly members of the Yakye Axa Community’.1264 This 
sequence of arguments has an interesting effect. It appears as if instead of directly challenging 
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the relevance of the applicants’ choices to freeing the state from responsibility for their 
deprivation, the Court drew attention to the situation of those who arguably did not have 
much of a say on the decision to settle next to a highway, that is, children. In other words, no 
matter what the community leaders or adult members had opted for, the fact was that many 
children had no food and no water and had lost the school year because they were ill. In the 
face of this, the Court recalled that the state had the obligation, based on Article 19 ACHR 
(Rights of the Child), to adopt special measures of protection to ensure children’s 
development, in accordance with the principle of the best interests of the child.
1265
 Thereafter, 
the Court referred to ‘the special consideration required by the elderly’.1266 Particularly 
worrying was the impact of the lack of access to food and basic services on their health, 
which was already life-threatening in some cases.  
To some extent, this emphasis on the needs of children and the elderly resonates with the 
tendency of laws and policies to focus on ‘innocent’ victims who are worthy of assistance in 
situations of poverty.
1267
 Evoking the image of ‘innocent victims’ as a way to counter the 
argument that rights do not assist those who have allegedly contributed to their own 
destitution has its downsides, though. Notably, (1) it may obscure the role of social structures 
and policies which have shaped and limited the choices of all the persons affected; (2) it may 
convey the idea that human rights and the corresponding state obligations are reserved for 
individuals with a certain degree of moral stature; (3) it may unnecessarily associate certain 
rights holders – such as children and the elderly– with notions of disempowerment, 
vulnerability and passivity; and finally, (4) focusing on the blameless rights holder may also 
legitimise the lack of state intervention in cases where the persons affected do not fit that 
image. However, it must be noted that these drawbacks were considerably mitigated in the 
aforementioned judgment. The Court did contextualise the community’s decision to settle at 
the side of the road by pointing to the struggles and difficulties resulting from, inter alia, land 
regulations and the length of restitution proceedings.
1268
 Additionally, by directing attention to 
the situation of indigenous children and elderly people, the Court was in a better position to 
distinguish the reinforced or particular duties that the state owed some rights holders, in this 
case some members of the indigenous community. This brings us to the normative relevance 
of seeing and weighting the situation of a broad range of rights holders, which is further 
analysed in the next subsection.  
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Before turning to that, a final remark is in order. It is possible that the generally limited 
attention devoted to questions of autonomy in the cases studied could be due, at least in part, 
to a judicial review that is often too concerned with excluded groups and their contextual 
situation, sometimes at the expense of individualised assessments. Still, the absence of a 
narrative of poverty that conceives of this as the result of people’s free will may change the 
imaginable spectrum of normative responses to socio-economic difference. Conceiving socio-
economic difference and poverty as something created that needs to be tackled not simply by 
intervening in the lives of those affected by it redirects attention to social institutions and 
inequalities. This, in turn, underscores the role of the state and other actors in addressing 
poverty and the violations associated with it. It opens the door to the setting of standards and 
frameworks of state responsibility for poverty-related violations (which in the future could 
perhaps extend to other actors).
1269
 In this vein, taking distance from autonomy-based 
explanations for restricting the rights of people living in poverty also challenges the idea that 
‘chosen’ characteristics or circumstances attain less or no legal protection. This promotes the 
recognition of people living in poverty as worthy of legal attention, irrespective of the 
‘mutability’ of their condition.  
So far, the discussion has focused mostly on whether applicants are considered as whole 
individuals, in terms of their identities and social positions as well as in their exercise of 
autonomy. But, as mentioned in previous chapters, individuals do not stand in isolation. 
Accordingly, an integrated view of human rights is also attentive to other rights holders 
potentially affected by the measures disputed in the cases. This is the next question explored 
in this chapter.  
 
3. A broad view of rights holders  
I have already explained in this study that one of the main reasons for human rights courts to 
consider the situation of rights holders other than the applicant is the fact that some 
restrictions are made for the protection of the rights of others. In such cases, courts need to 
pay attention to the effects that the measure discussed in the case has on those persons, even if 
they are not a party to the case. From this perspective, it is important to point out that, 
probably as a result of the types of poverty-related case brought to the Inter-American Court, 
the issue of the protection of the rights of others has not had much salience. In some cases, 
states have not substantiated the rights interferences at all, have not considered the rights of 
others to that effect, or have acknowledged their responsibility for the violations. Moreover, at 
times the restrictions discussed in the cases barely allow justification in the light of the rights 
of others (e.g. summary executions of children and slavery and forced labour). There are, 
however, some judgments in which this element of analysis does feature. Among these are 
indigenous cases in which the deprivations experienced by the applicants were attributed to 
the need to ensure the rights of private owners. Likewise, in Gonzales Lluy the state claimed 
that the restrictions of the applicant’s right to education sought to protect other children from 
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the risks of HIV infection. A similar line of argument featured in the IVF v. Costa Rica case, 
where the state claimed that the blanket ban on IVF techniques aimed at protecting the life of 
embryos. But the analysis conducted in relation to these other rights holders does not seem to 
have been connected to the claims of socio-economic disadvantage involved in the cases.  
So here I will discuss another, although more implicit way in which the protection of other 
rights holders appears at issue in the cases studied, namely through arguments of budgetary 
limitation. In Sawhoyamaxa, for example, the state posited that it had done what it could 
within the limitations of its financial resources.
1270
 Usually, the Court has not analysed these 
arguments in depth, nor have states developed their claims of economic capacity from the 
perspective of the rights of other rights holders. Yet, the situation faced by persons other than 
the applicants is frequently in the background of resource scarcity justifications. For instance, 
in order to satisfy the needs and rights of the whole population, certain economic 
disadvantage may be imposed on some to the benefit of others. A regulation that causes or 
aggravates the applicants’ socio-economic disadvantage may thus do so with the aim of 
attending to the needs of others who are worse off. An argument like this would obviously 
need careful examination in the context of the concrete case, but it is certainly a relevant 
normative ground. Importantly, as will be seen below, it may lead the Court and litigants to 
consider the situation of other rights holders whose interests are likely to remain invisible, 
namely those with fewer resources.  
 
3.1. Protecting impoverished others as a counterbalance to non-retrogression 
 Social policies and legal reforms aimed at restricting social rights are particularly prone to 
raise issues of non-retrogression and redistribution. The case of Five Pensioners v. Peru is 
illustrative of this.
1271
 The case concerned the modification and reduction of the pension 
regime of five former public servants, a measure that for the state was justified by legal 
reforms seeking to adjust pensions in light of the cost of living and the economic resources of 
the country.
1272
 According to the Commission, however, the cuts amounted to a violation of 
the applicants’ right to property (Article 21 ACHR). The victims’ representative additionally 
contested what they regarded as a ‘regressive measure’ in violation of the ‘progressive 
development’ of social rights, as protected by Article 26 ACHR.1273 Eventually, the Court 
found a violation of the right to property (Article 21 ACHR) and ruled out the question of 
Article 26. Leaving aside the debate on the justiciability of social rights through Article 26 
(which was introduced in Chapter 4 and is further discussed below), I am interested in how 
the argument of retrogression could have played out for the integration of rights holders other 
than applicants.
1274
 How would this standard of non-retrogression be balanced with an 
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arguable claim of redistribution? This question implies an examination of whether the 
measure in question affected the pensions of the better-off with a view to improving the 
situation of the poor, while elucidating the normative weight this carries. Bringing these other 
rights holders, those potentially benefiting from the pension reform, could thus have changed 
the understanding of what was at stake in the Five Pensioners case. It could have led the 
Court to consider, inter alia, the extent to which or the conditions under which redistributive 
measures could be frustrated by the obligation of progressive realisation and its correlative 
prohibition of retrogression. This is an important question for a human rights approach 
sensitive to the interests of people living in poverty. In fact, according to Landau (who relies 
on a comparative study of several constitutional courts), negative injunctions like those 
grounded in the prohibition of non-retrogression tend to favour more affluent groups instead 
of the poorest.
1275
 
The Inter-American Commission has, in the meantime, addressed claims of retrogression and 
redistributive policies aimed at low-income people. In doing so, it has accorded the protection 
of these persons significant normative weight. Reviewing a similar case against Peru and 
within the scope of Article 26 ACHR, the Commission took into account, for example, the 
fact that ‘the majority of pensioners in the public sector did not enjoy the benefit’; that the 
pensioners affected were ‘not representative of the development stage of the right to social 
security’ in the country; and that the suppressed equalisation of the pensions ‘constituted a 
privilege’ that made ‘difficult the progressive improvement of the conditions of pensioners 
who were not beneficiaries of the equalization’.1276 On this basis, the Commission found that 
the pension reform was not retrogressive and therefore not incompatible with Article 26 
ACHR.
1277
 As already noted, the Court’s judgment in Five Pensioners, which relies on the 
rights to property and to judicial guarantees, did not deal with these issues.
1278
 However, these 
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might at some point come before the Court, since the justiciability of Article 26 ACHR 
(Progressive Development) remains open. Moreover, even if the right to property would 
appear inadequate for holding that discussion, framing the problem as one of consideration for 
other affected rights holders could arguably facilitate this. 
 
3.2. Impoverished rights holders among or on the same side as applicants 
A comprehensive approach to rights holders also has another side. This is, as explained in 
previous chapters, the side of those who are affected in a similar way as the applicants. 
Thinking of these rights holders in a broad perspective means, in the context of this study, 
looking beyond the applicants or, at least distinguishing among them so as to bring to light 
those who may be less visible. This is especially relevant for people living in poverty, for 
reasons similar to those discussed above. People living in poverty have more difficulty in 
accessing justice. Litigants, therefore, often do not represent the experience of those of lower 
socio-economic status. Consequently, courts may end up delivering a rather middle-class-
oriented justice. Against this backdrop, the judgment in IVF v. Costa Rica shows us how 
looking at rights holders comprehensively and distinguishing among them helps to counteract 
that risk. Out of the nine plaintiff couples in this case, four were not socio-economically 
disadvantaged, while five had been unable to undergo treatment abroad for lack of economic 
resources.
1279
 Despite a middle- or upper-class perspective being a dominant point of 
reference, the Court was able to differentiate the situation of those applicants who had less 
means. What is more, this motivated a more attuned finding that grasped their specific 
experience vis à vis the rest of the applicants, namely, indirect discrimination on account of 
their financial situation. By doing so, the Court avoided issuing a ruling that would have been 
responsive to a very limited segment of rights holders potentially affected by the ban. 
A similar kind of awareness is particularly needed when the applicants are a collectivity, such 
as an indigenous community. Chapter 4 showed that although the Court has, until recently, 
repeatedly stated that the applicants in indigenous cases are the individual members of the 
community, their specific position could easily be diluted in the concern for the community. 
In addition, although these indigenous communities are internally diverse, they are likely to 
be represented by those members who hold relatively dominant positions, as happens with 
most collectivities. Nevertheless, in Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek, the Court 
was willing to examine the alleged violations not only from the perspective of the 
communities’ leaders, or the adult males of the communities concerned. In those cases the 
Court also accounted for the way less visible community members, such as children, women 
and the elderly, were affected by land destitution and poor living conditions. In so doing, it 
made it clear that specific, more stringent standards were at play. In fact, children and other 
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individuals are entitled, by virtue of specialised provisions or rights regimes, to differentiated 
protection.
1280
 Moreover, a significant part of this differentiated protection includes duties of 
socio-economic assistance, as further explained below. This therefore confirms that taking 
into consideration social locations other than economic conditions, such as age and gender, 
may nonetheless provide useful insights for dealing with claims of socio-economic 
disadvantage. At the same time, the aforesaid judgments show that a comprehensive view of 
rights holders helps in identifying different normative frameworks that may be applicable to 
different applicants in a single case. 
In the aforementioned indigenous cases, those less visible rights holders (children, women 
and the elderly) were formally applicants. Yet, it may well be possible that in other cases only 
some amongst an indigenous community, or any other group of people, act as plaintiffs. We 
may furthermore think of other communities who endure similar deprivations on account of 
measures being examined in a Court case in which they are not a party. In all these cases, it 
would be equally counterproductive to adjudicate in disregard of those other persons and the 
specific rights and obligations that could potentially apply to them.  
Having explored whether and how the litigants and the Court address people’s socio-
economic disadvantage in a manner sensitive to their complexity as persons with multiple 
social positions, who stand alongside other individuals and try to make choices while 
embedded in social relations and institutions, it is time to discuss how all these affect the 
normative assessment of poverty-related cases. To this the remainder of the chapter now 
turns. 
 
IV.  Integrated rights: cross-thinking about harms and norms 
As in the previous chapter, this section aims at thinking comprehensively about the harms and 
norms involved in cases of socio-economic disadvantage. This means, in particular, paying 
attention to those harms and norms that are usually sidelined by the way certain claims are 
framed. In the case of rights claims related to poverty or socio-economic disadvantage, it is 
likely for the adjudicator and other actors to put the emphasis on material distress and 
marginalisation. Against this backdrop, the first section below (1) explores whether other 
types of harm and wrong, such as disrespect and stigma, as well as structural inequalities, 
have been considered. This analysis not only seeks to provide a more complex understanding 
of what is at stake in the cases studied, but also to identify what can be gained from such an 
understanding.  
The second section below (2) is devoted, as in previous chapters, to the Court’s practice of 
normative integration as regards Convention and extra-Convention provisions. The premise 
underlining this discussion is that avoiding norm reductionism and promoting awareness of 
legal pluralism are helpful. The analysis will examine why this is so. It should be pointed out, 
however, that while in principle cross-thinking about the norms involved in cases of economic 
disadvantage would not lead to much emphasis on socio-economic rights (since the socio-
economic dimension of rights is usually underlined in this type of case), this category of 
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rights will nonetheless be discussed. The reason for this is that in the particular case of the 
Inter-American Court’s case law, the Court’s awareness of legal pluralism and its ensuing 
practice of normative integration in the cases studied here has been closely linked to the 
indivisibility of rights. In fact, the litigants and the Court have generally endeavoured to 
integrate extra-Convention norms and standards while also using several Convention 
provisions with a view to dealing with the socio-economic rights dimensions of the cases. 
That is why section 2 below discusses the Court’s awareness of legal pluralism in relation to 
indivisibility.  
But before exploring this, I will first analyse cases of socio-economic disadvantage from the 
perspective of harms and norms that are not so easily seen and weighted, such as stereotype, 
stigma and the prohibition of discrimination on account of poverty.  
 
1. Integrating recognition and structural issues into redistribution wrongs 
1.1  Addressing poverty-related stigma and stereotypes 
It is not contested that people living in poverty or who are identified with a low socio-
economic status are all too often rendered invisible. The Commission itself has underlined the 
seriousness of this problem.
1281
 And, as seen in the previous chapter, stereotypes and stigmas 
are very often at the root of the problem. As early as in the 1999 case of Villagrán Morales 
(Street children), it was clear that the violence and murders perpetrated by state agents against 
adolescents living on the street, as well as the lack of institutional response, were the result of 
a generalised view that portrayed those children as criminals and undeserving. The Court 
hinted at the incidence of these stereotypes when it held that if the state had evidence for 
believing that the children were involved in criminal acts, it should have taken measures of 
prevention and rehabilitation.
1282
 However, the Court did not acknowledge this harm as such 
and no normative consequence was attached to it.  
This was amended in the similar subsequent case of Servellón García v Honduras, where the 
Court recognised the stigma suffered by the victims as children living in poverty. It even 
noted that this very stigma placed them at risk of serious violations.
1283
 Yet, the judgment did 
not clarify the normative grounds compromised. It suggested that this contravened Article 19 
ACHR (children’s rights) and while it recalled the relevance of non-discrimination standards, 
no violation of this provision was found. In this connection, it is important to bear in mind 
that the stigma of the poor as criminal continues to be a determinant factor for the disparate 
levels of violence against some segments of the population, such as Afro-descendants, 
something with which the Court continues to be confronted.
1284
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A somewhat similar oversight appears in the Cotton Field case mentioned above, whose 
ruling acknowledged that most women victims of violence had a precarious socio-economic 
situation. In its commendable review of equality and non-discrimination, the Court 
condemned the gender stereotypes that had facilitated the violence and the passivity of state 
authorities. Interestingly, however, the Court seemingly missed the fact that those stereotypes 
were linked to or compounded by preconceptions based on the victims’ socio-economic 
position. In fact, it was a particular subgroup of women, namely those who were young, 
immigrant and poor, those who were seen as disposable and less deserving of protection by 
the authorities.
1285
  
Against this background, the most recent judgments of the Court represent a significant step 
forward in seeing and weighing, as a separate harm, the stigma and disrespect attached to the 
experience of poverty. The case of Gonzales Lluy et. al v. Ecuador admittedly focused on the 
stigma associated with an HIV condition, rather than with poverty. But in doing so, the Court 
also underscored how such stigmatisation led to poverty, while the latter, in turn, exacerbated 
the stigma and impeded resilience.
1286
 Importantly, stigma was addressed within the 
framework of both the right to personal integrity (Article 5) and the prohibition of 
discrimination (Article 1.1).
1287
 The judgment in Hacienda Brasil Verde, however, provides 
the most direct and clear response to the recognition harm resulting from poverty. As will be 
seen below, the Court applied the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of economic 
status to the invisibility of the workers in the eyes of law enforcement officials. In the Court’s 
view, the officials’ passivity and lack of diligence and the little importance attached to the 
workers’ grievances reflected a lack of condemnation of what had happened to them. The 
Court attributed this to prevalent preconceptions about workers from the poorest regions. 
Although it did not specify the content of these preconceptions, the Court explained them as 
perceptions that ‘normalised’ the treatment dispensed to the workers and which, consequently, 
made them less deserving of protection.
1288
 Interestingly, no specific statements or actions of 
the authorities were singled out in this respect, which suggests that the Court’s conclusion 
rested on the general context of the case.  
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Considering the normative developments allowed by the ACHR, it may come as a surprise 
that stereotypes, preconceptions and the invisibility accorded to poverty were not really 
tackled until recently. The recent case law, however, is promising and attests to the 
importance of integrating those harms into the legal analysis. Even in cases that are first and 
foremost about destitution and economic exploitation, there is a dimension of recognition that 
needs to and can, normatively speaking, be integrated. Doing otherwise exposes those in 
poverty to further invisibility while leaving untouched some of the underlining causes of the 
violations.  
 
1.2. Discrimination on account of poverty and the integration of social structures 
into the legal analysis  
Linked to questions of stigma and misrecognition, although not limited to them, is the 
consideration of the harm derived from discrimination for reasons of poverty. As mentioned 
in previous chapters, proponents of substantive equality conceive of anti-discrimination norms 
as having the potential to tackle issues of poverty and socio-economic exclusion.
1289
 For one 
thing, substantive equality presupposes an active state and a commitment to redress social 
group disparities.
1290
 For another, this conception of equality, at least in its transformative 
strand, is arguably equipped to address the stereotypes and social arrangements behind 
measures that negatively impact on destitute people. In practice, though, supranational 
adjudicatory bodies and more particularly, the European Court of Human Rights have rarely 
used antidiscrimination laws to scrutinise stereotypes and disparate disadvantages on the basis 
of poverty.
1291
 Until recently, this was also true for the Inter-American Court.   
At the outset of this chapter it was noted that the Court long ago recognised, in the framework 
of an advisory opinion, that discrimination on economic grounds is prohibited by the 
ACHR.
1292
 Yet, it took a while before this was applied in contentious cases. After some failed 
attempts, the Court eventually examined the existence of discrimination for socio-economic 
reasons in the cases of IVF v. Costa Rica and, shortly after, in Gonzales Lluy v. Ecuador. In 
both, poverty was taken jointly with other grounds, as pointed out earlier. Also of note, these 
rulings on economically-based discrimination did not have much to do with the stigmatisation 
and stereotypes associated with the experience of poverty. Rather, what amounted to 
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discrimination in both cases was the disparate impact and particular burdens confronted as a 
result of lacking economic resources.  
In the case of IVF v. Costa Rica, the Court concluded that the ban on IVF techniques 
constituted indirect discrimination based on economic status, given the ‘disproportionate 
impact on the infertile couples who did not have the financial resources to undergo IVF 
abroad’.1293 The disproportionate impact the Court referred to was not based on statistical data 
indicating that a much larger number of least well-off couples were affected by the ban. 
Rather, the disparate impact seemed to refer to the much reduced capacity those people had to 
cope with the ban. While people with financial means had at least the chance to seek 
alternatives to circumvent the ban and obtain treatment, those who lacked resources did not. 
Although the Court’s reasoning was concise, it marked an important step forward in 
protecting socio-economically disadvantaged people against unequal access to rights and 
services. The distributive potential of the finding was furthermore amplified by the reparation 
orders. The Court requested the inclusion of IVF within the Social Security Scheme of Costa 
Rica, so as to make it available without discrimination.
1294
  
For its part, as seen earlier, the case of Gonzales Lluy addressed the applicant’s poverty as a 
ground of (direct) discrimination intertwined with her HIV condition, age and gender. 
Stigmatisation was a key component of the discrimination experienced by the girl and the 
family, but this mostly concerned her HIV condition. Discrimination against her for reasons 
of poverty was situated in the differentiated, less favourable conditions that the lack of 
resources had for her access to health services and her options for coping subsequently with 
social barriers associated with a life with HIV. In sections III. 1.1 and 1.3 above it was said 
that the line of reasoning adopted in the cases of IVF v. Costa Rica and Gonzales Lluy et. al v. 
Ecuador provided a situated account of poverty that accounted better for the applicants’ lived 
experiences, including the specific burdens and harms that they encountered. But there is 
another notable aspect of these two judgments that is of great importance to the present 
discussion, that is, how the Court, in addition to emphasising the overlapping identities or 
social positions of the victims, underscored the role of social barriers and institutions.  
This was mainly done, as noted above, through the lenses of the so-called ‘social model of 
disability’.1295 Since this model is built upon a structural understanding of disability, its use 
with regard to the interplay between disability, poverty and other axes of disadvantage allows 
for a structural notion of intersectionality. As discussed in previous chapters, intersectionality 
is too often misconceived as concerned with the interplay between multiple identities.
1296
 Yet, 
its added value does not lie in recognising an ever-increasing number of sub-groups or 
identities in need of protection. One of its greatest potentials is rather to illuminate the 
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synergetic way in which structures of power work.
1297
 Thus, the Court’s attention to 
‘attitudinal and social barriers’ in the IVF and Gonzales Lluy cases has two important effects. 
One is that it makes the structural perspective behind the social model of disability suitable 
for approaching the rights deprivation associated with poverty and other social differences 
besides disability. Second, by doing so, it paves the way for the law to interrogate social 
structures instead of singling out people’s traits, thus directing laws and policies toward the 
roots of violations. These are in fact some of the important insights that ended up being 
downplayed in Hacienda Brasil Verde. This is the other case that merits close analysis in this 
section.  
The prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of economic status alone has only been 
applied in the recent case of Hacienda Brasil Verde, which offers a number of interesting 
aspects. Since some of them have already been discussed, here I shall focus on two questions. 
The first is how the Court regarded poverty as an issue of ‘structural discrimination’. The 
second is how the Court applied the prohibition of discrimination with regard to both the 
material conditions of deprivation experienced by the applicants and the lack of recognition 
and disrespect endured.  
Although in Hacienda Brasil Verde the Commission had alleged de facto discrimination,
1298
 
the Court followed the representatives’ argument that the slavery and forced labour 
experienced by the workers reflected ‘structural discrimination’.1299 In rather obscure 
language, the analysis started by considering extreme poverty or marginalisation as a source 
of vulnerability that gave rise to positive obligations of protection from the state.
1300
 
According to the Court’s case law, every person who finds herself in a situation of 
vulnerability is the holder of ‘a special protection’.1301 The Court applied this to poverty. The 
scope of the state’s positive obligations depended on the particular needs for protection 
arising from the applicants’ condition of extreme poverty.1302 From here, and without defining 
structural discrimination, the Court went on to hold that when there was structural 
discrimination, the state incurred international responsibility if it failed to take specific 
measures to alleviate the victimisation suffered by the individuals concerned as a result of 
their particular situation of vulnerability.
1303
 These measures were lacking in Hacienda Brasil 
Verde. But since the right to be free from slavery enshrined in Article 6 ACHR also entails 
positive obligations which, in this case, demanded, among others, an adequate and effective 
oversight of the estate in question and a prompt response once the crimes were reported to the 
police, one may wonder what positive actions were to be taken on the basis of the workers’ 
poverty. Could the state have been required to provide goods and services so as to redress or 
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alleviate poverty, the main source of their vulnerability to slavery? Also implicit in the 
statement that the state should have reacted to existing structural discrimination seems to be 
the view that the fact that people like the rescued workers were disproportionally affected by 
poverty in itself amounted to structural discrimination. The judgment, however, left these 
questions open.  
The Court instead looked at the risks created by poverty. It was not contested that poverty was 
the main factor leading to the workers’ recruitment into slavery-like labour, which also held 
true for the 85 rescued workers from Hacienda Brasil Verde. They lived in poverty, came 
from the poorest regions of the country, lacked education and were illiterate, which made 
them prone to recruitment into slavery by fraud and deceit. This was, according to the Court, 
‘a situation of imminent risk for a determinate group of persons’ which was known to the 
state for years. The state, however, had failed to act duly upon it. The Court thus attributed the 
slavery and trafficking suffered by the applicants to their economic status, which gave rise to 
discrimination, in violation of Article 6 taken in conjunction with article 1.1 ACHR. 
Moreover, this discrimination on the basis of economic status (Article 1.1 ACHR) was, in the 
Courts’ view, ‘structural’ and ‘historical’. The conclusion was that ‘the State did not consider 
the vulnerability of the 85 rescued workers […] by virtue of the discrimination on the grounds 
of economic status to which they were subjected’.1304 
Turning to the applicants’ discriminatory denial of access to justice, which was examined 
within the framework of Article 25 ACHR (right to an effective remedy) instead of Article 8 
ACHR (right to a fair trial), the Court followed the Commission’s and representatives’ claim 
that the judicial passivity and investigative shortcomings revealed ‘structural discrimination’ 
against the workers.
1305
 Emphasising that the abuses disproportionally affected uneducated 
people from the poorest regions, such as the 85 workers, the Court ascribed the impunity and 
lack of judicial diligence to a ‘normalisation’ of the working conditions to which those people 
were subjected.
1306
 In other words, the victims’ discriminatory access to justice was the result 
of existing ‘preconceptions’ that turned their harsh working conditions into something 
socially accepted. Hence, while the finding of discrimination regarding the right to be free 
from slavery related to redistributive wrongs consisting of the most severe forms of economic 
exploitation, this economic discrimination in access to justice exposed the misrecognition 
harms – invisibility, devaluation – caused by poverty.1307  
But the Court not only directly applied the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of 
‘economic status’ listed in Article 1.1 ACHR.1308 It also found, as just mentioned, ‘structural 
discrimination’ in the enjoyment of the rights to be free from slavery and to access justice. 
This is not the first time the Court has referred to ‘structural discrimination’.1309 However, in 
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Hacienda Brasil Verde it went beyond the recognition of a context of structural 
discrimination, as previously done in the gender violence case of Cotton Field.
1310
 This time 
the Court held Brazil accountable, albeit with hesitant wording, for (not reversing) the 
historical structural discrimination endured by the rescued workers.
1311
 The hesitation in the 
wording appears to reflect the judges’ disagreement on the point. On the one hand, Judge 
Ferrer Mac-Gregor argued that this was the first case where the Court expressly found that a 
state was internationally responsible for ‘perpetuating a historical situation of structural 
exclusion’.1312 On the other, though, Judge Vio Grossi declared that the judgment’s reference 
to ‘historical structural discrimination’ did not imply a declaration of the state’s international 
responsibility on that ground. Instead, it could only be considered the context in which the 
facts of the case took place.
1313
 Meanwhile, Judge Sierra Porto criticised the judgment for 
suggesting that the state was solely responsible for the existence of poverty and slavery in 
Brazil. Against this, he argued that ‘the existence of structural social problems does not 
automatically generate Brazil’s international responsibility’.1314  
The trouble with the finding of structural discrimination is furthermore compounded by the 
lack of clarity that surrounds the application of the concept. For example, in one case the 
Court took into account the ‘structural discrimination’ suffered by the group to which the 
applicant belonged but without holding the state accountable for structural discrimination.
1315
 
Meanwhile, in Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic the Court referred to abundant 
material documenting widespread discrimination against Afro-descendants. And yet it 
decided, contrary to the arguments of the Commission and the representatives, that it was 
unnecessary to make a ruling on the alleged context of structural discrimination. Likewise, the 
Court in Xákmok Kásek, as mentioned above, spoke of de facto discrimination and not of 
structural discrimination. So it is actually uncertain when structural discrimination is a matter 
of context, as in Cotton Field, and when a violation in itself, as in Hacienda Brasil Verde.  
The Court’s reasoning regarding structural discrimination in the right to be free from slavery 
on account of the victims’ economic status in Hacienda Brasil Verde is, moreover, not 
entirely clear as to the specific conduct or effect that amounts to discrimination. I think the 
most feasible interpretation is to consider that the workers’ economically-based 
discrimination lies with the fact that people like them, living in severe poverty, were 
overwhelmingly exposed and subjected to rural slavery, forced labour and trafficking. Judge 
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Ferrer Mac-Gregor also advanced this view in his concurring opinion.
1316
 However, as already 
pointed out, the Court’s argumentation also hints at the state’s liability for inaction in the face 
of existing poverty. While the first line of reasoning implies that the state is obliged to adopt 
measures to prevent and protect people living in poverty from being exploited, enslaved or 
trafficked, the second line of reasoning goes further. It conveys the idea that entrenched 
poverty may be conceived as discrimination, at least in this case.  
In any event, in order for both interpretations (which are not mutually exclusive) to stand, a 
more intersectional approach to the rights holders affected is needed, that is, as explained 
earlier, an approach that integrates into the discrimination analysis the applicants’ position as 
young Afro-descendant men. Or, in other words, an approach that incorporates racism. One 
important reason for this is that doing otherwise may frustrate the transformative potential of 
the notion of ‘structural discrimination’ as applied to poverty. As the term ‘structural’ 
suggests, one of the most promising features of structural equality should be shifting the focus 
from group traits to the social structures and institutions producing inequality. In the case at 
hand, this required going beyond the workers’ characteristics of poverty repeatedly 
emphasised by the Court.  
Even regarding poverty as discrimination may not be as far-fetched as it may appear at first 
sight if the problem is presented in terms of the way poverty is entrenched and concentrated in 
one specific sector of the population that has suffered long-lasting discrimination. Thinking of 
poverty this way resonates with the view of other human rights monitoring mechanisms, 
including the Inter-American Commission.
1317
 According to the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, the intersection between poverty and racism 
can be seen in the legacy of de jure and de facto discriminatory regimes that ‘have left a large 
number of racial and ethnic groups […] trapped in conditions of “chronic deprivation of 
resources” with limited choices and vulnerable to multiple violations of their rights’.1318 
Along similar lines, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has 
explained:  
Racism and structural discrimination against people of African descent, rooted in the 
infamous regime of slavery, are evident in the situations of inequality affecting them 
and reflected, inter alia, in the following domains: their grouping, together with 
indigenous peoples, among the poorest of the poor […] [and in the] additional 
difficulties they face in access to and completion and quality of education, which 
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results in the transmission of poverty from generation to generation; [and] inequality 
in access to the labour market […].1319 
It is somewhat surprising that this line of international normative sources was not 
incorporated by the Court into its judgment in Hacienda Brasil Verde, considering its 
increasing and expansive use of international sources. Doing so could have helped it to assess 
the role of racial discrimination, on which it was eventually silent. This silence, alongside the 
confusions around the notions of ‘structural’ and ‘de facto discrimination’, complicates the 
Court’s ability to provide an adequate legal response to structural inequality, or to some forms 
of structural inequality. At least, this seems to be the case for racism, in particular, bearing in 
mind that this is not the first time that the Court has disregarded structural racial 
discrimination in the face of evidence of it.
1320
  
 
2. Avoiding norm reductionism and promoting awareness of legal pluralism  
2.1. A more comprehensive approach to convention norms: what does the right to 
property offer to those with fewer possessions?  
In cases concerning economic difference or disadvantage, several Convention norms have 
been mobilised before the Inter-American Court. As noted in Chapter 5, given the 
multidimensionality of poverty and the lack of provisions specifically aimed at dealing with 
this feature, it is natural that a myriad of rights are involved in cases of socio-economic 
disadvantage. In the Inter-American Court’s case law, those include the Convention rights to 
life (Article 4); to humane treatment (Article 5); to freedom from slavery (Article 6); to fair 
trial (Article 8); and to a lesser extent, the prohibition of discrimination (Article 1.1 and 24) 
and the right to property (Article 21). The availability of such a broad spectrum of Convention 
norms facilitates a comprehensive analysis of the cases studied here. Yet, as noted above the 
prohibition of discrimination was until recently underutilised. Chapter 5 reached a similar 
conclusion with regard to this and the right to property. Against this background, it is worth 
asking what has the right to property, as interpreted by the Inter-American Court, offered to 
those with fewer possessions in the Americas? 
 Albeit briefly, the Court has taken into account the applicants’ experience of poverty from 
the perspective of the right to property. This is noteworthy if we think of the difficulties that 
sometimes arise when it comes to protecting the possession of those who have little property. 
Difficulties particularly affect those whose life circumstances involve situations of precarious 
legality. Recall the cases of Roma and Traveller eviction discussed in the previous chapter. 
The destruction and loss of their belongings has not attracted, for the most part, the protection 
of the right to property. At the Inter-American Court, however, the judgment in Uzcátegui et 
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al. v. Venezuela offers a different approach. As noted earlier, in this case the Court found a 
violation of the right to property for the material losses caused in a poor household during a 
police operation. The ruling, notably, rested on the severe impact that the damage and 
destruction of the household structure and mobile goods had on the applicants – the family of 
the deceased victim, given their socio-economic disadvantage.
1321
  
Of note, the Inter-American Commission has also endeavoured to grasp the pecuniary losses, 
however small they may be, of impoverished individuals in legally precarious situations. In its 
merit report in the case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians (also known as Benito Tide 
Mendez and Others), the Commission was willing to declare a violation of the right to 
property of documented and undocumented Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent who, 
as a result of their expulsion from the country, lost their belongings and personal items 
without being compensated.
1322
 Interestingly, however, this line of reasoning was not upheld 
by the Court. Once the case reached San Jose, the Court adopted a Strasbourg-like approach 
to the proprietary complaint (Article 21 ACHR). Leaving aside those allegations that fell 
outside its temporal jurisdiction, the Court was of the view that there was no need for a 
separate ruling on the loss of household items, personal effects, clothing, livestock, cash and 
wages. In its opinion, these allegations were related to facts addressed under other 
provisions.
1323
  
It remains to be seen how this issue will evolve. What is clear though is that the stakes can be 
higher than usually recognised. Even when the above proprietary claims appear as accessory 
aspects of the cases, they may have devastating consequences for the persons concerned. In 
the aforesaid case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians, for example, the Court itself 
observed that people like the applicants were usually ‘dropped at the border’, often arriving in 
Haiti ‘with nothing more than the clothes on their back. They may have to beg for food and 
for a place to sleep’.1324 This also held true for the victims in that case. In fact, their 
representative asked the Court to take into account the fact that following their expulsion, the 
applicants ‘were placed in […] circumstances of extreme poverty’.1325  
 
2.2. Integrating international and regional norms with a view to the indivisibility of 
rights 
When it comes to norms outside the ACHR, the Court’s practice of cross-referencing 
encompasses growing and varied sources. They include binding and non-binding instruments, 
with a general and specialised focus on different areas of regulation, as well as national and 
international judicial decisions. The references in the cases studied here include, for example, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the 
                                                          
1321
 IACtHR, Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela, Judgment of 3 September 2012, paras. 204-206. See also, The Santo 
Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment of 30 November 2012, para. 274.   
1322
 IACommHR, Benito Tide Mendez and Others v. The Dominican Republic, Merits, Report no. 64/12, Case 
12.271, 29 March 2012, paras. 329-332. 
1323
 IACtHR, Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Judgment of 28 August 2014, paras 
442-443. 
1324
 Ibid., para. 169.  
1325
 Ibid., para. 122. (The victims’ representative asked the Court to take into account these circumstances for the 
purpose of applying more flexible procedural and evidentiary rules).  
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Child; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; UN Committees’ 
General Comments; resolutions from the UN Human Rights Council; the International 
Guidelines on HIV/AIDS; the Slavery Convention and the Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery; judgments from the International Criminal Court for the former 
Yugoslavia and other international criminal courts; judgments from the European Court of 
Human Rights; decisions from the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights; and 
pronouncements and reports of UN Special Rapporteurs. The list is actually much longer. In 
addition, especially in recent cases, the Court has increased its references to the laws and 
decisions of American states – even if mostly with a focus on Latin America and the United 
States.
1326
  
Having said that, it is convenient to point out that many of the international norms and rulings 
indicated above have not been used in direct connection with poverty-related violation claims. 
But this does not mean that the Court’s practice of normative integration will not play a 
greater role in future cases dealing with socio-economic disadvantage.
1327
 This may well be 
the case. In fact, already a while ago it was suggested that ‘one possible avenue for action to 
rejuvenate the system so that its institutions can begin to address issues of poverty is to 
develop the interrelationships among instruments, whether binding or hortatory’.1328 But for 
the time being, references to international norms on socio-economic rights and child rights 
have been the most relevant extra-Convention sources in the cases examined in this chapter. 
That is why the following discussion concentrates on the relationship between the Court’s 
normative integration and the socio-economic rights dimension of the cases.  
The Court’s embracing of indivisibility and interdependence has come hand in hand with 
awareness of legal pluralism. Indeed, a large part of the extra-Convention norms incorporated 
into the case law studied concern socio-economic rights. Several judgments attest to this. 
Already in the Street children case, for example, most references to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) were made with a view to connecting the state’s obligation to 
adopt measures of protection under Article 19 ACHR with children’s socio-economic 
wellbeing. According to the Court:  
The American Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child form part of 
a very comprehensive international corpus juris for the protection of the child that 
should help this Court establish the content and scope of the general provision 
established in Article 19 of the American Convention.
1329
   
                                                          
1326
 See e.g. IACtHR, Artavia Murillo et al. ("In vitro fertilization") v. Costa Rica, Judgment of 28 November 
2012, paras. 185 (fn. 283), 255-256 and 262; Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador, Judgment of 1 September 2015, 
para. 256; I.V. v. Bolivia, Judgment of 30 November 2016, para. 197. 
1327
 This not just because of the Court’s legal praxis, but also because of the way applicants and third-party 
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1328
 Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, Human rights from the perspective of poverty. A path unexplored 
in the Inter-American system (Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, 2007), at 40. 
1329
 IACtHR, The “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment of 19 November 1999, 
para. 194. The Court had already held that in interpreting a treaty, it should take into consideration (1) the 
agreements and instruments formally related to it, as required by Article 31.2 of the Vienna Convention); and (2) 
the system within which the Convention is inscribed, as indicated by Article 31.3 of the Vienna Convention. See 
IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 on the The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the 
Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law, Adopted on 1 October 1999, para. 113. 
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On this basis, the Court resorted to, inter alia, the CRC obligation to protect children against 
discrimination (Article 2); the obligation to ensure to the maximum extent possible their 
survival and development (Article 6.2); the duty to afford special protection and assistance to 
children deprived of their family environment (Article 20.1); and the right of children to an 
adequate standard of living, including the provision of assistance and material support to 
parents and other caregivers (Article 27.1 and 3). The Court incorporated these CRC 
standards to define the scope of the protection measures envisaged by Article 19 ACHR, 
which thereby involved socio-economic rights. Given the seriousness of the crimes 
perpetrated by state agents against the child victims in this case, the Court obviously 
concluded that the state failed to comply with these obligations.
1330
 Although the Court did 
not explicitly say so in the Street children case, it is interesting to note that its interpretation of 
the special measures of child protection appears closely related to its broad interpretation of 
the right to life. Despite the fact that the immediate violation of the right to life in that case 
arose from the execution of children, the judgment referred to the right to ‘not be prevented 
from having access to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence’.1331 Importantly, 
this reading yielded the foundation of the right to a dignified life under Article 4 ACHR, 
which has since served as an umbrella norm for the integration of socio-economic rights, 
particularly as defined by international sources. 
 As explained in Chapter 4, this normative framework has mostly been developed in 
indigenous cases where the appalling living conditions of the communities threatened the very 
survival of their members. These were the cases of Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa, and Xákmok 
Kásek v. Paraguay. In all of them the Court found that the extreme poverty of the community 
members and the state’s failure to ensure their access to basic services and goods such as 
water, sanitation, food, health and education fell short of enabling them to live with dignity, in 
contravention of the right to life (Article 4 ACHR).
1332
 The Court’s attribution of 
responsibility for violation of the right to a dignified life in those cases followed a two-fold 
track. In the first place, the Court noted that the state bore responsibility for the land 
dispossession suffered by the communities, which deprived them of the means for a dignified 
existence. In the second place, once the communities settled at the side of highways and the 
state was aware of the concrete risks and deprivations faced by the community members, the 
Court considered that the state had failed to secure living conditions compatible with human 
dignity. 
In order to define the minimum conditions for a life with dignity, the Court took into account 
the rights provided by other instruments ratified by Paraguay, such as the Additional Protocol 
to the American Convention on Human Rights regarding Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and ILO Convention No. 169.
1333
 In connection with the latter, the applicants’ 
representatives argued in Yakye Axa that ‘in light of ILO Convention No. 169 […] protection 
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 IACtHR, The “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment of 19 November 1999, 
para. 196. 
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 Ibid., para. 144.  
1332
 IACtHR, The Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of 17 June 2005, paras. 161-176; 
The Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of 29 March 2006, paras. 157-178; The 
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 IACtHR, The Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of 17 June 2005, para. 163. 
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of the right to life and integrity of the indigenous peoples cannot be disassociated from 
protection of economic, social, and cultural rights’.1334 On the other hand, it is worth 
mentioning that in Xákmok Kásek, unlike the previous Paraguayan cases, the Court did not 
really examine the concrete obstacles to accessing social services and the ensuing harms 
experienced by the applicants. Rather, the Court appeared to focus on minimum deliverables. 
It basically applied indicators provided by other monitoring bodies such as the UN Committee 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and the World Health Organization, which it 
contrasted to the coverage and figures attained by the state.
1335
  
The commitment to indivisibility was taken a little further in Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador, 
where the Court undertook extensive normative considerations on the right to health. But 
neither the ACHR nor the provision of the Protocol of San Salvador, which authorises 
oversight of some social rights via the individual petition system established in the ACHR, 
refers to that right.
1336
 The Court nonetheless examined this within the framework of the 
rights to life (Article 4 ACHR) and to humane treatment (Article 5 ACHR). Invoking 
numerous regional, international and domestic sources (both binding and non-binding) on 
economic and social rights, the judgment scrutinised two kinds of obligation: the state’s 
obligations to monitor the provision of private health care services; and the applicants’ claims 
regarding the quality, accessibility and other aspects of the health care provided.  
The Court explicitly recalled the indivisibility and interdependence of civil and political rights 
and socio-economic rights with a view to interpreting the obligation to secure both categories 
of rights as comprising several dimensions of the right to health. On this basis, the Court 
brought in standards on, for example, the ‘accessibility’ of health services, goods and 
facilities as developed by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and which, 
remarkably, included economic accessibility (or affordability).
1337
 Likewise, it asserted that 
the right to health of people living with HIV required a comprehensive approach that was 
inclusive of continuous prevention, treatment, care and support. In this vein, the Court also 
referred to international and comparative sources promoting the adoption of a comprehensive 
approach precisely because of the costs and financial difficulties in accessing HIV 
treatment.
1338
 The issue of socio-economic disadvantage did not, however, take a prominent 
place in this part of the judgment, which, rather, elaborated on other aspects of the right to 
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1335
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health. Though the judgment broke new ground in the field of the right to health, the 
standards developed in this field will not be dealt with here.
1339
   
Instead, the discussion that follows looks at the judgment’s method of analysis and 
conclusions regarding indivisibility. These more general issues can be of relevance in a 
number of cases concerning socio-economic disadvantage, since many of these are likely to 
involve socio-economic rights demands. From this perspective, a first noteworthy aspect of 
the judgment is that though the Court ultimately opted for infusing Convention rights with 
elements of social rights, as it usually does, the direct justiciability of the right to health was 
seriously considered. This is revealed by Judge Pérez Pérez’ concurring opinion. He 
explained that the main motivation for writing his separate opinion was ‘the constant 
proposals made during the deliberation of the case to cite the right to health as the main right 
violated by the State’s action’.1340 He and Judge Sierra Porto rejected that possibility, which, 
as posited by the victims’ representatives, would rely on the alleged justiciability of Article 26 
ACHR (Progressive Development).  
This provision refers to the progressive realisation of ‘the rights implicit in the economic, 
social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the 
Organization of American States’.1341 As mentioned in Chapter 4, Article 26 has been 
interpreted by some as allowing the Court to adjudicate on a broad list of socio-economic 
rights. This is despite the fact that the Protocol of San Salvador – the Inter-American treaty 
specialised in social, economic and cultural rights – explicitly establishes the judicial 
enforceability of only two social rights enshrined therein. In addition to the indivisibility of 
human rights, the pro-adjudication argument usually rests, inter alia, upon a pro-personae 
interpretation of the Convention and notably, upon the precedent laid down in the 2009 case 
of Acevedo Buendía.
1342
 Also referenced in Chapter 4, this judgment held that the Court had 
competence to examine the violation of all Convention rights, including those socio-economic 
rights flowing from Article 26 ACHR. It pointed out, inter alia, that since the provision was 
placed under the part entitled ‘State Obligations and Rights Protected’, it was ‘subject to the 
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 IACtHR, Acevedo Buendía et al. (‘Discharged and Retired Employees of the Comptroller’) v. Peru, 
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general obligations contained in Articles 1(1) and 2’,1343 that is, the obligations to respect, 
ensure and adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to Convention rights.  
It is nonetheless interesting to observe that none of the conflicting positions around the 
justiciability of Article 26 ACHR contest the indivisibility and interdependence of rights. The 
opposition to using the said provision to adjudicate social rights, as reflected in the position of 
Judges Sierra Porto and Pérez Pérez, posits that the best way to give application to 
indivisibility and interdependence is by examining the socio-economic rights dimensions 
implicit in Convention rights. Those who favour the direct application of Article 26 ACHR, 
like Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor, argue conversely that this indirect approach does not 
sufficiently advance the indivisibility and interdependence of rights.
1344
  
While an exhaustive analysis of the debates surrounding Article 26 is beyond the ambition of 
this work, the integrated normative perspective adopted by the Court in this context deserves 
some attention. Of particular interest is the Court’s appeal to a consensus-like argument with a 
view to supporting the possible adjudication of Article 26 ACHR. In fact, in Acevedo Buendía 
the Court revisited the debate among states’ representatives during the travaux préparatoires 
of the ACHR in order to determine what kind of protection they intended to afford to social, 
economic and cultural rights. In doing so, it suggested that states were inclined to grant these 
rights as much protection as possible. However, as Judges Sierra Porto and Pérez Pérez 
observed in Gonzales Lluy – as did scholars before them – the Court referred to only four of 
the 23 states that participated in the Inter-American Specialized Conference of 1969. What is 
more, many of those countries which were not mentioned in the judgment were either 
reluctant or against enforcing Article 26 socio-economic rights through the individual petition 
system established in the Convention.
1345
 Nevertheless, it is plausible that the justiciability 
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argument might fare better under a ‘true’ consensus framework. That would be the case, in 
other words, if the point of reference were the normative protection that the American states, 
especially Latin American countries, accord to social rights in their domestic legal orders. 
However, it is doubtful that this consensus argument could attain much weight when the 
question is more about competence than just interpretation.    
But further normative sources were silenced in Acevedo Buendía. In opening adjudication 
space for socio-economic rights, the Court also ‘forgot’, as Judge Sierra Porto points out, the 
aforementioned Protocol of San Salvador.
1346
 The Court referred to the views of the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
1347
 but not to the Inter-American 
Instrument specialised in economic, social and cultural rights. This line of reasoning brings 
back one problematic feature of the Court’s integrated perspective on human rights norms 
already discussed in Chapter 4, namely, its selectivity.  
The Court’s readiness to integrate a wide range of normative sources for the purpose of 
addressing socio-economic claims, including those that may arise in connection with poverty, 
has proven useful and even desirable. But to take real advantage of the opportunities offered 
by human rights integration, the Court should be more careful to remain inclusive and non-
selective. This is particularly important when it comes to adjudicating on new, controversial 
or otherwise sensitive issues. At stake is not only the need to preserve the Court’s legitimacy 
among different stakeholders and especially among member states, but also the opportunity to 
give sound and clear guidelines to those actors. The lack of consistency in the Court’s 
normative integration as applied in Acevedo Buendía has been singled out because of its 
relevance to the way poverty-related claims could be handled in the future. However, the case 
law studied reveals further instances of selectivity or ‘cherry-picking’ in the Court’s approach 
to international normative sources.
1348
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Against this backdrop, it should be noted that the Court has recently attempted to clarify some 
elements of its integrated normative approach. For instance, in the IVF case, it explained that 
international human rights law was of particular relevance for its ‘systematic interpretation’ of 
the Convention, that is, pursuant to Article 31.2 of the Vienna Convention, with a view to 
interpreting the Convention norms within the legal system or legal context to which the 
ACHR belongs.
1349
 For its part, the Court accorded ‘special relevance’ to comparative law for 
the purpose of its ‘evolving interpretation’. Based on Article 29 ACHR, this requires the 
Court to interpret the Convention in the light of present times, the latter being especially 
needed when it comes to issues that did not exist or were not envisaged at the time the 
Convention was drafted, such as in vitro fertilisation techniques.
1350
 This, as well as further 
clarifications of the Court’s method of integration, are welcome since, as discussed above, 
this normative practice is not always consistent and inclusive.  
Thus far I have discussed the normative frameworks within and outside the Convention that 
have been used most frequently in cases involving claims of socio-economic disadvantage. 
The remainder of the chapter turns to a reflection on the possible incorporation of other, less 
used norms which are nonetheless worth exploring.  
 
2.3. Reflecting on the integration of non-state-generated norms 
The case law analysed here also discloses the relevance of international financial agreements 
and other norms developed by state and non-state actors, whose rules certainly shape socio-
economic differences across peoples and countries. The Court was confronted with this issue 
in Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay.
1351
 The state in this case had subscribed to a bilateral 
investment treaty with Germany that protected and promoted capital investments from both 
countries. The disputed land, whose restitution the community was demanding while settling 
along a highway, was in the hands of German private investors. Although the state authorities 
had supported the restitution claim of the indigenous community and invited the corporations 
to sell the land, they had refused to do so. The state eventually argued that those private actors 
were protected by the investment treaty.
1352
 In response, the Court first attempted to reconcile 
the norms in tension. While noting that it had not been provided with the trade treaty in 
question, it observed that government had conceded that the instrument in question allowed 
for capital investments made by a contracting party to be nationalised for a public interest. It 
followed, so argued the Court, that this could be used for the restitution of the land to the 
indigenous community. That said, priority was nonetheless accorded to the human rights 
obligations derived from being a party to the ACHR. The Court held that bilateral investment 
agreements could not be applied in contravention of the American Convention. In justifying 
this approach, emphasis was placed on the ‘singularity’ of the ACHR. As a multilateral treaty 
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on human rights, this ‘stands in a class of its own and that generates rights for individual 
human beings and does not depend entirely on reciprocity among States’.1353 
It is evident that in practice the problem addressed above is far more complex than would 
appear from a declaration of subordination to human rights law. So long as other states and, 
especially, non-states actors do not commit to respect human rights, violations like the ones 
addressed in Sawhoyamaxa will persist, given the increasing leverage and power of financial 
institutions and private corporations. The Court, however, did not refer to the conduct of these 
actors or to their (arguable) obligations to respect human rights, which is understandable. 
After all, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hold non-state actors and non-member states liable. 
Even so, more recently the Court has been inclined to highlight the emerging human rights 
norms moving in that direction. In the indigenous case of Kalina and Lokono, for example, 
the Court took ‘note of the “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”, endorsed by 
the Human Rights Council of the United Nations, which establish that businesses must respect 
and protect human rights, as well as prevent, mitigate, and accept responsibility for the 
adverse human rights impacts directly linked to their activities’.1354 Although the rest of the 
analysis focused on the obligations of the respondent state, the fact that the Court ‘took note’ 
of those norms is remarkable.
1355
    
The fact that this kind of normativity is made visible and that the state is called upon to 
reconcile commercial and human rights helps account for the actual interaction taking place 
between different laws and actors. It also carries significance for political and legal 
mobilisation, while providing guidance and support to states wanting to uphold human rights. 
As noted in the previous chapter, incorporating international financial agreements and non-
state actors into the picture may also illuminate the causes of poverty and inequality in a way 
that exposes the role of those actors and the law in creating it. This conversely reveals that the 
law can be used for challenging socio-economic disadvantage and the rights deprivations it 
engenders. 
 
V. Concluding notes on Chapter 6 
So far there are very few rulings of the Inter-American Court in which questions of socio-
economic disadvantage have had a protagonist role in the plight of litigants or in the Court’s 
reasoning. Rather, this issue has been a contextual, supplementary consideration in several 
cases and in most of them the Court has shown a general sensitivity to the matter. Although 
usually addressed briefly, the Court has taken note of people’s socio-economic disadvantage, 
which appears legally relevant. Thus, unlike what was seen in Chapter 5, in the Inter-
American Court’s case law economically-neutral readings of cases are not really an issue. 
Poverty as such has furthermore been regarded as a factor that facilitates human rights 
violations and which affects the proportionality analysis and the reparation awards. The 
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Court’s predominant approach to poverty is that of something derivative from membership of 
a group historically discriminated against or rendered vulnerable. The Court thus frequently 
examines claims of socio-economic disadvantage through the angle of the rights of children, 
indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, women and other disadvantaged groups. In the light of 
this and of its most recent judgments dealing with socio-economic disadvantage, it is possible 
to discern in the Court’s discourse an openness to recognising people living in poverty as a 
group in a vulnerable situation, entitled to ‘special protection’. Likewise, socio-economic 
disadvantage appears closely related to group discrimination.  
An important consequence of this framework is that it helps to expose the elements of 
difference and inequality involved in the experience of poverty. Additionally, state obligations 
tend to be specified and subjected to stricter standards in that context. The Court has had more 
difficulty, though, when it comes to enriching or problematising a narrative centred on socio-
economic disadvantage. In other words, while the Court has been able to integrate poverty 
within the experience of excluded identity groups; it has not done the same the other way 
around. This carries practical problems for both rights holders and state parties. Still, the 
Court’s recent case law has notably refined its analysis of socio-economic disadvantage from 
an intersectional perspective. This has led it to consider more closely the interaction between 
people’s socio-economic disadvantage and other identities and social locations. But the 
Court’s relatively integrated view of rights holders is still in need of development, for at least 
two reasons. First, most of what was analysed in this chapter concerns limited remarks on the 
socio-economic disadvantage of rights holders, since very few cases have dealt directly with 
poverty-related claims. Secondly, either because of the latter and/or because of the focus on 
groups historically discriminated against, the Court has not always conducted an 
individualised assessment of proportionality where an integrated view of people living in 
poverty could play out significantly. All these elements may partially explain the limited 
attention devoted to questions of autonomy in the cases studied. Nevertheless, where this has 
been discussed, it is remarkable that the Court has distanced itself from reductive narratives 
that depict impoverished people as fully autonomous or as denuded of agency. This allows a 
more comprehensive view of poverty and the rights violations it produces, while making it 
easier to build frameworks of international responsibility for poverty-related violations. 
Unlike what was seen in cases concerning claims of cultural disadvantage, the normative 
repertoire used by the Court to deal with rights claims of socio-economic disadvantage is 
relatively broad. Besides reasons of treaty wording and litigation strategies, the variety of 
provisions used in this field may also have to do with the relative diffuse nature of poverty-
related claims. Either way, the point is that these claims have been approached from different 
normative angles both substantively and procedurally. The Convention norms applied in this 
framework include the right to (a dignified) life (Article 4), the prohibition of slavery (Article 
6) and the right to access justice (Articles 8 and 25), although these last provisions have been 
used more in the context of advisory opinions than in cases involving questions of socio-
economic disadvantage. Only recently has the prohibition of discrimination (Articles 1.1 and 
24) come to play an important role, while that of the right to property (Article 21) is still 
evolving. From the perspective of international law and also, gradually, comparative law, the 
quantity and variety of normative sources offered by the judgments studied is even larger. 
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This is especially so in the most recent cases. Yet, the Court’s holistic normative approach to 
claims of socio-economic difference offers some problematic aspects. In the first place, and 
similarly to what was seen in its case law on cultural difference, the Court still falls short of 
being sufficiently inclusive and non-selective. Further, while the comprehensive normative 
analyses undertaken by the Court have resulted in a proliferation of (at times, quite 
innovative) standards, these often lack clarity.  
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
*** 
I. Introducing the findings and final reflections 
We have come to the end of the study. In this final chapter, I will present the research findings 
and some concluding reflections. To do so, let me first recapitulate the main research 
questions behind this work. As explained in Chapter 1, I started with five main queries. At the 
exploratory level, I wondered: 1) what are the main legal narratives and categories used by the 
European and Inter-American courts of human rights (as well as the applicants before them) 
to address claims of cultural and economic disadvantage? In particular, (1.1) what place do 
identity-based categories and other normative classifications have in the adjudication process? 
(1.2) how comprehensive or fragmentary are those legal frames, as used by applicants and 
courts? (2) what consequences follow from the use of those normative frames? More 
concretely: (2.1) do they allow the rights holders’ lived experiences to be accounted for; (2.2) 
do they direct attention to the actual interests at stake; (2.3) do they interrogate the roots of the 
alleged violations or rather situate the problem in people’s particularities?  
At the normative level, I asked: (3) should the courts distance themselves from some of the 
legal categorisations currently employed for dealing with cases concerning cultural and 
economic difference? If so, (4) which alternative normative framework could assist the courts 
(and possibly litigants too) to address the complexity involved in those cases? In particular, 
could an integrated approach to human rights promote an analysis that makes for better justice 
for people’s lived reality while engaging with the roots of the alleged violations? (5) How 
could such a framework be operationalised; which legal tools could be helpful? 
The answers to these questions, as well as some caveats and new questions, are discussed in 
two parts. Section II examines how the ECtHR and IACtHR deal with cases of cultural 
difference and economic disadvantage; the narratives and categories used; their normative 
effects; and the differences and commonalities between the two courts. In doing so, section II 
discusses research questions 1, 2 and 3. Section III, for its part, explores the opportunities and 
challenges of an integrated approach to human rights law, as well as some tools and legal 
concepts potentially useful for a comprehensive legal analysis. This second part thus deals 
with questions 4 and 5. The third and final part of the conclusions (section IV) reflects on 
future lines of research that might be encouraged by the present study.  
 
II. Cases of cultural and economic difference in Europe and the Americas 
Given the complexities and concerns surrounding cases of cultural and economic 
disadvantage, it appears natural, so to say, to resort to the simplification offered by legal 
categories. Nevertheless, to differing degrees over-reliance on normative ‘boxes’ that bolster a 
unidimensional or fragmentary analysis appears problematic for the handling of the cases 
studied and for similar future cases. In fact, approaching human rights norms and rights 
holders in a disaggregated fashion seems to exacerbate rather than alleviate the challenges 
identified in Chapters 1 and 2. However, the analysis conducted with regard to both the 
317 
 
European and the Inter-American Courts of Human Rights also suggests that a degree of 
integration is already taking place and that moving further in this direction is both feasible and 
desirable.  
 
1. Cultural and economic difference before the European Court of Human 
Rights 
In the area of case law examined in this study, claims of cultural difference have proven to be 
relatively easier to translate into legal terms than claims of economic disadvantage. This could 
be attributed, at least in part, to the legal traction of identity and group assertions as well as 
the fact that the ECHR is well suited to dealing with claims defined in terms of 
misrecognition and civil and political rights. These elements, by contrast, did not generally 
apply to the handling of claims concerning economic disadvantage. In the context of the 
ECtHR’s case law, claims of the latter kind had trouble in mobilising identity/group 
frameworks of protection, while they were usually identified with socio-economic rights and 
resource-hungry obligations. Thus, the analysis reveals that the legal frames used in cases 
involving cultural difference on the one hand and economic difference on the other, are quite 
dissimilar. Yet, as will be seen below, both sets of cases offer some similar challenges. 
The analysis in Chapter 3 (on cultural difference) shows that arguments of cultural difference 
and group identity have a prominent place in a large proportion of the cases examined. This is 
particularly so in those concerning caravans and the ‘Gypsy’ lifestyle, as well as in cases 
involving Islamic veils. Questions of group cultural/religious identity, mostly associated with 
symbols and practices, were often overemphasised. In doing so, the Court focuses on defining 
and evaluating the cultural and religious identities and practices in question, which raises a 
number of problems. These include essentialism and stereotypes and issues of fairness and 
neutrality, as well as the sidelining of other relevant aspects of the cases. Notably, some 
dimensions of the applicants’ experience, especially those connected with gender, socio-
economic status and migration background, are unnecessarily overlooked. Something similar 
holds for socio-economic harms related to Convention and extra-Convention rights and to 
structural issues. In this sense, it is possible to assert that the centrality of cultural/religious 
identity is frequently accompanied by a one-sided view of applicants and of the harms and 
norms at stake. To that extent, the resolution of such cases is indeed guided by a rather 
fragmentary or compartmentalised line of reasoning.  
The application of the integrated framework proposed in this study shows that the Court could 
have derived some useful normative insights had it considered rights holders as a whole. 
Examining the applicants’ multiple identities and social positions, for instance, could have 
affected the proportionality analysis or the width of the margin of appreciation, as well as the 
admissibility and outcome of discrimination claims. In this connection, it is interesting to note 
that the Court has only occasionally tackled allegations of discrimination. When this 
happened, the Court, with the notable exception of cases of child educational segregation, 
generally endorsed a rather formalistic and single-ground review. As a result, it quickly 
dismissed claims of compounded (multiple or intersectional) discrimination. An integrated 
view of rights holders also problematises the Court’s approach to individuals’ agency and 
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choice. In several cases studied, and especially in those where issues of cultural/religious 
identity are salient, the Court takes the view that people are either fully autonomous or 
constrained and passive. What is more, it often accords meaning to people’s choices and 
derives normative consequences from either their exercise or lack of autonomy. This 
understanding of autonomy appears flawed and fragmentary. It fails to take note of a number 
of contextual and structural factors constraining individuals’ choices, while simultaneously 
downplaying the agency of those who subscribe to certain cultural/religious practices.  
Finally, a comprehensive examination of the rights and harms involved in the cases shows 
that judgments and decisions could potentially have benefitted from considering a broad array 
of legal arguments. This notwithstanding, in several cases, particularly those with an emphasis 
on cultural/religious difference and group identity, some Convention rights, such as Articles 
14 ECHR and 1 and 2 Protocol No. 1, are too rapidly discarded. Similarly, harms to socio-
economic rights not provided by the ECHR, such as loss of employment and deprivation of 
social security, are ignored or accorded little weight in the characterisation of the case and in 
the proportionality analysis. While the Court’s stance on regional and international norms has 
been more encompassing, the lack of consistency in their integration has added some 
difficulties to the handling of contested cases. This is particularly evidenced by the varying 
criteria applied by the Court as to what normative aspects are relevant to the issue of 
consensus and under what conditions there is consensus. Also, it was seen that the Court has 
not always clarified when to depart from relevant international standards and why. On a few 
occasions the Court has also dealt with tradition-based norms and acknowledged their 
significance for the resolution of cases concerning cultural disadvantage. It has yet to be seen, 
though, whether the Court will additionally consider informal or decentralised norms that may 
also shape the normative environment and the stakes of the case.  
It is interesting to observe, however, that in some cases the discourse of cultural difference 
and identity is more tenuous, despite significant arguments about groups and vulnerability. 
This is so in cases dealing with the educational segregation of Roma children and the eviction 
of Roma and Travellers from informal settlements. The focus on cultural distinctiveness and 
group identity is likewise mitigated in Islam-related cases concerning curricular exemptions 
and male religious dress. Without intending to draw a clear causal link, it was observed that 
some of the difficulties and dichotomies mentioned above are less present in these cases. In 
other words, here the Court’s reasoning appears to be more comprehensive. The Court, for 
example, fares better in considering the applicants’ multiple positioning, including non-
privileged traits, and in considering allegations of discrimination, structural barriers and 
socio-economic harms.  
The analysis thus far suggests that claimants have greater chances of success and the Court, in 
turn, is more inclined to be receptive when their cultural identity or the group behind their 
claim is perceived as valuable, widely accepted or otherwise rooted in society. Likewise, 
responses have been more favourable when the applicant is perceived as having no choice or 
otherwise finding it impossible to avoid the culturally-based disadvantage. Nevertheless, 
recent case law also indicates that this approach might be undergoing change. The Court is 
showing some reluctance to dismiss the seriousness of rights interference on the basis of the 
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applicant’s ‘choice’. But it remains to be seen whether this line of reasoning will unfold and 
apply consistently across cultural/religious, and hopefully other, claims of difference. Finally, 
the findings summarised above indicate that accommodation is more likely when applicants 
stand on the more privileged side of traits that do not involve culture or religion and when the 
claim can be satisfied without needing to change socio-economic arrangements or remove 
structural barriers.   
At times, the Court focuses not on the religious identity or group of the applicant but on 
categories associated with societal/national identity, such as laïcité, secularism and neutrality. 
When this happenes, it was seen that some of the problems of the group identity framework 
are nonetheless reproduced. A compartmentalisation-like issue arises to the extent that an 
overemphasis on those categories leads to an abstract judicial review, detached from the 
specific persons and interests at stake in the case at hand. Lastly, it was noted that the notion 
of group vulnerability, which was another important frame of analysis for the cases reviewed, 
could be applied in a more flexible and less fragmentary way than the cultural/religious 
identity frame. Nevertheless, this potential does not really crystallise in several cases 
examined. For one thing, the application of group vulnerability in cases involving Roma and 
Travellers (especially the ‘early’ cases) often does not bring practical effects; nor does it 
allow multiple vulnerabilities to be taken into account. For another, the notion of group 
vulnerability is totally absent in cases involving Muslims, despite the fact that these cases, 
like those concerning Roma and Travellers, involve an ethno-cultural minority affected by 
exclusion and discrimination. These paradoxes raise the question of whether group 
vulnerability is being conceived as an a priori attribute – similar to identity – rather than as a 
flexible concept for dealing with disadvantage. If that were the case then some of the 
difficulties of the cultural identity ‘compartment’ would re-emerge under group vulnerability.  
I will now turn to cases of economic disadvantage. A first interesting aspect disclosed by 
Chapter 5 is that the focus on group identity and its accompanying fragmentary analysis is not 
really at issue in this area of case law. Claims concerning poverty or economic disadvantage 
are rarely put forward or examined through the prism of identity and group vulnerability. At 
first, I thought this could have some advantages. One might think that an approach that is not 
too concerned with identity or group boundaries would provide a fertile ground for looking at 
cases comprehensively. However, what I noticed in the Court’s case law on economic 
disadvantage is that arguments of group identity and difference are not simply not 
emphasised, but virtually absent. And this, quite surprisingly, seems to raise difficulties. It 
appears as if without recourse to those kinds of argument, the Court did not have some of the 
reasons or means to examine important aspects of the cases, such as relations of inequality 
and the socio-economic experience of rights holders. Setting these aspects aside means that, 
again, the picture before the Court is substantially incomplete.  
So, to recapitulate, when it comes to claims of cultural difference, one main form of legal 
categorisation operated by focusing on whether the applicant belongs to a protected or 
otherwise vulnerable identity group entitled to greater responsiveness. Viewed against the 
background of a preoccupation with the prospect of an endless inflation of protected identity 
groups, a handy solution for the Court appears to be to think of only one identity or group and 
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to privilege those which seem immutable. But this scheme appears problematic not just 
because it entails essentialism and obscures relevant aspects of the cases. The identity group 
‘compartment’ also seems to leave claims of socio-economic disadvantage without one 
important frame of analysis, that is, the notion of groups and its related attention to inequality 
and vulnerability. Yet, the study suggests that the need for simplification invokes other 
categories and fragmentary frames of analysis.   
Indeed, another form of compartmentalised analysis was identified, that is, an analysis based 
on the state’s prerogatives over socio-economic policy and budgetary management. Looking 
at cases from this perspective also has the effect of fragmenting, unnecessarily, the Court’s 
perspective. An example of this was found in the different reasoning and outcomes offered by 
rulings that are relatively similar as to the actors, norms and interests at stake but that differ as 
to the centrality accorded to the state’s socio-economic policies. Take the cases defined as 
being about child removal, family separation and the right to family life and compare them 
with those that are framed from the perspective of the state’s migration policy and its socio-
economic limitations in that context. While in all those cases children were among the main 
affected rights holders and the right to family life was a key common interest, these aspects 
are substantially displaced once the case fell into the ‘box’ of the state’s socio-economic 
policies. Similarly, it was seen that examining a case through the framework of the state’s 
general social policies, as happened in Garib v. the Netherlands, triggers the application of an 
extremely abstract and deferential review. This review obscures the concrete circumstances of 
the applicant and the specific harms incurred and rights affected.  
The integrated framework proposed in this study shows that in cases in which the Court has 
regard for the applicant’s economic hardship, it rarely considers the interplay between this 
and other identities and social positions. In particular, the Court often overlooks the specific 
way in which the gender, racial/ethnic and body-ability position of the applicant shapes or 
exacerbates the rights interferences related to poverty. It was seen that identity-neutral 
readings of poverty tend to obscure the particular barriers and harms encountered by women, 
minorities or people with disabilities who live in poverty, such as higher risks of 
discrimination and violence (as in Soares de Melo v. Portugal), maternal death (as in Şentürk 
v. Turkey) and denials of autonomy rights (as in O'Donoghue and Others and Garib v. the 
Netherlands). Further, obscuring the ‘different faces of poverty’ leaves some of the roots of 
the violations untouched, such as compounded stereotypes. While conceiving of rights holders 
as a whole would be particularly relevant from the perspective of indirect and intersectional 
discrimination, which is largely unexamined by the Court, the issue could also change the 
analysis under substantive provisions.  
But examining the case from an integrated perspective on rights holders also provides 
interesting findings regarding legal discourses on individuals’ autonomy. The case law 
confirms the idea, advanced by scholars, that people living in poverty are frequently seen as 
either fully responsible for their (bad) choices or as lacking agency and being in need of 
guidance or supervision. The first kind of rhetoric is admittedly more used by states than by 
the Court. Yet, the latter does not always challenge this fragmentary understanding of 
autonomy or implicitly upholds it. Since states often resort to the idea that poverty and the 
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rights violations that come with it are the result of individuals’ autonomy and thus outside the 
state’s responsibility, the message given by the Court does matter. In addition, it was seen that 
the Court does, in a few cases, deprive impoverished rights holders of agency and uses this as 
justification for its findings. As revealed by the Garib case, such agency denial conceals the 
nature and extent of the harm inflicted on the applicant. The Court’s appreciation of the range 
of rights holders affected in the cases is, however, more comprehensive, especially as regards 
the visibility given to children. By doing so, the Court also reinforces the socio-economic 
dimension of rights, specifies certain obligations in a way more attuned to the persons 
involved and places the issue of poverty and the ensuing rights restrictions within a concrete 
social context.  
An integrated approach to harms and norms, in turn, reveals that the Court has recognised, in 
limited circumstances, the humiliation and debasement endured as a result of extreme 
poverty. However, ‘recognition’ harms of stereotyping, stigma and discrimination have yet to 
be integrated into the Court’s legal analysis of poverty-related claims. Most such harms are 
largely overlooked. On the other side, and despite its caution about introducing socio-
economic issues, the Court sometimes gives effect to the socio-economic rights dimension of 
the cases. This is particularly so in complaints involving acute destitution or severe 
interference with intimate rights and which are not framed as being about social policy. From 
the perspective of Convention and extra-Convention provisions, the analysis shows that a 
relatively broad range of Convention norms are considered in poverty-related cases. 
Nevertheless, the prohibition of discrimination and the right to property remain unexamined, 
usually with scant motivation. The use of extra-Conventional sources has been rather uneven 
across the cases. Some rulings rely on several international and regional norms that appear 
relevant to the cases and which specify or complement the ECHR’s standards. The 
examination of comparative material and consensus, however, has been rather occasional and 
unclear. In fact, in a few cases the Court missed the opportunity to derive useful insights as 
regards, for example, the use of less restrictive means or providing authoritative support for 
its findings. Finally, although in the case law studied the issue of tradition-based norms does 
not appear to be significant, as it is for cases of cultural difference, another kind of non-state 
normativity appearsto be worthy of consideration. This is the norms generated by private 
actors and international financial institutions, which might play an important role in cases 
concerning economic disadvantage. As such, and in view of the factual and legal dimensions 
such norms could illuminate, it was argued that their visibility and integration merits 
consideration.   
Finally, it is interesting to observe that in both areas of case law (on cultural and economic 
disadvantage), rights claims encounter more resistance and are less likely to be considered 
from an integrated perspective when they are perceived as being positive claims of 
accommodation, exemption or provision. A reflection of this can be found in cases defined as 
recognition of cultural or religious difference, which rarely incorporate redistributive or socio-
economic issues. By contrast, cases challenging ‘negative difference’ (stigma and exclusion), 
such as those concerning school segregation, fare better in the integration of socio-economic 
aspects. For their part, cases involving duties of economic assistance frequently sideline 
issues of stereotyping, stigma and discrimination.  
322 
 
 
2. Cultural and economic difference before the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights 
The bulk of the Inter-American case law on issues of cultural difference concerns collective-
oriented complaints from indigenous and Afro-descendant communities. These are also the 
cases with the strongest accent on group cultural identity. A few other cases involve culture-
related claims of difference and exclusion from individuals and groups belonging to 
minorities and/or with a migrant background. The case law on collective claims to land and 
resources by indigenous and Afro-descendant communities shows that the protection of 
cultural identity is at the core of the special guarantees and accommodations granted to those 
groups. These have been articulated on the basis of an expansive interpretation of the right to 
property (Article 21) that encompasses communitarian forms of ownership and a number of 
other specific entitlements. The protection afforded is founded on the special and collective 
attachment of indigenous peoples to their ancestral territories. In this context, the Court has 
focused on a set of (mostly ‘traditional’) practices and beliefs worthy of legal protection and 
which are expressions of the cultural distinctiveness of indigenous people. It was seen that in 
attempting to define their culture, the Court has essentialised it. A number of problems were 
identified as a result.  
The Court’s interpretation, while responsive to indigenous and Afro-rural communities who 
have been qualified as ‘tribal’, carries the risk of limiting the socio-economic empowerment 
of the people protected. The Court’s interpretation has in fact confined some important 
guarantees to ‘traditional’ economic activities. Moreover, focusing on the protection of 
indigenous cultural identity has made a number of rights conditional upon conforming with a 
relatively narrow cultural script. Indigenous people who deviate from that and other persons 
and groups who may also have a communitarian way of life and similar needs of protection 
against land insecurity and discrimination may thus have a hard time in seeking protection. 
Another problem has been the risk of endorsing or facilitating stereotypes about indigenous 
and tribal peoples and their members. This appears to have been reinforced by a legal 
protection restricted to rural and ‘traditional’ practices as well as by the Court’s initial 
reluctance to acknowledge the economic agency of indigenous people in managing their 
reparations. Finally, to the extent that the indigenous/tribal cultural framework has also been 
crucial in responding to the demands of Afro-rural populations, there has been a likely risk of 
obscuring the specific needs and concerns of these individuals and groups. In this connection, 
the analysis also suggests that the discourse on cultural identity appears to be detached from 
questions concerning structural barriers and discrimination. In this sense, and in view of what 
is further discussed below, the cultural identity frame has indeed produced or facilitated a 
rather fragmented analysis. 
It must be pointed out, though, that the collective orientation of the judgements also plays an 
important role in determining the scope of analysis undertaken by the Court. The integrated 
framework applied in this study reveals that this communitarian accent had much to do with 
the occasional sidelining of the particular circumstances of certain community members, 
particularly in the reparation awards. While the merits analysis of most collective 
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indigenous/tribal cases understandably concentrates on the community concerned, in some 
cases the Court does take into account the differential impact of the rights interferences across 
community members. Interestingly, this happens in a few collective land cases which are not 
addressed through the lenses of cultural identity under Article 21 ACHR, but through an 
alternative frame, namely, that of a dignified life under Article 4 ACHR. It is here and in 
some individual cases whose main narrative is not that of cultural identity that the Court is 
sensitive to the multiple identities and social positions of the applicants. This is particularly so 
for indigenous and minority children and women. For this purpose, the Court relies more on 
the notion of vulnerability than on equality and anti-discrimination clauses. This part of the 
analysis shows that in fact the Court has applied the concept of vulnerability in a more 
flexible and comprehensive way than its European counterpart. Rather than speaking of 
vulnerable groups and giving the impression that vulnerability operates as an attribute, the 
Court has discussed the heightened risks and vulnerabilities faced by some groups and 
persons. Nevertheless, since the Court has embraced a substantive or structural conception of 
equality, it is somewhat puzzling that this has been underutilised for the purpose of addressing 
questions of intersectionality and inequality. But before going further into the norms and 
harms addressed by the Court, it is worth mentioning a few additional findings regarding the 
rights holders involved in the cases studied.   
First, it was seen that the Court only occasionally deals with questions of individual autonomy 
for the purpose of adjudicating the cases studied. One possible reason for this is the Court’s 
tendency to concentrate more on the group’s socio-historical conditions than on individual 
circumstances. In any event, the Court has rejected the argument that applicants have 
autonomy and free choice to avoid or mitigate the impairment of their rights. Yet, it was noted 
that until a few years ago the Court did endorse a view of indigenous/tribal persons as lacking 
autonomy, especially on economic matters. As regards other rights holders, such as 
neighbouring communities and private landowners, their consideration by the Court has been 
incremental. At first, they were just mentioned. More recently, however, the Court has noted 
the relevance of taking them into account, particularly for the purpose of implementing the 
Court’s rulings. It is not possible to explain this greater visibility only in terms of the 
comprehensiveness of the judicial approach, though. That might also have to do with the 
progressive attention devoted to questions of necessity and proportionality. While the Court is 
yet to fully explore the potential normative insights arising from ‘seeing’ other affected rights 
holders, it has made a revolutionary enlargement of the range of rights holders to be 
considered. This is the recognition of indigenous/tribal communities, collectively, as 
Convention rights holders.    
As one would expect from a jurisprudence marked by issues of cultural difference and 
identity, a large number of ‘recognition’ injuries have been addressed by the Court. However, 
these are not the only harms involved in the cases studied. When it comes to socio-economic 
harms in cases approached from the viewpoint of culture and Article 21, the Court mainly 
tackles them through reparations. It ordered a number of redistribution-driven measures. 
‘Redistribution’ wrongs are not so present, however, in the merits analysis of such cases as 
they are in indigenous judgments that do not have the cultural identity framework as 
protagonist. Taking into account the applicants’ economic grievances in its reparation awards 
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is quite significant. But this does not mean that integrating this element into the merits 
analysis would be superfluous. Even if we think of reparations only, we need to recall that any 
reparation award must always keep a direct relationship with the findings of violation. 
Analysing the case law from an integrated perspective also revealed that the right to a 
dignified life (Article 4 ACHR) proves to be a useful avenue for bringing in economic harms 
next to problems of cultural misrecognition. At the same time, though, the Court’s 
ambivalence towards the justiciability of socio-economic rights via Article 26 ACHR has 
shed uncertainty on how far the Court can go in realising the indivisibility of rights.  
Looking at the norms at stake in the case law from an integrated perspective has also 
disclosed the utility and desirability of going beyond the right to property. Recent case law 
has shown the relevance of (previously neglected) political rights, which are suited to 
grounding participation rights for indigenous and other people. Likewise, it appears necessary 
to consider the applicability of equality and non-discrimination, particularly with a view to 
exploring possible root causes of violations, such as racial and other forms of structural 
inequality. Using equality clauses, interpreted in a substantive or structural light as the Court 
has done, could also lessen the tendency of a culturally-based right to property to place all the 
attention on the particularities of the group or culture in question. The Court has nonetheless 
been quite open to considering a large range of international, regional and even tradition-
based norms, which is remarkable. For this purpose, the Court relies on an evolutionary and 
dynamic interpretation (identified with the living instrument doctrine and the pro-personae 
principle). In doing so, the Court ensures that states do not lower the rights protection 
provided by other human rights commitments or by their own legislation. From international 
binding and non-binding norms the Court also derives specific safeguards not provided for by 
the ACHR. It is not that clear, however, what weight the Court accords to binding and non-
binding norms and on what grounds. Similarly, the Court’s integration of domestic laws and 
rulings as well as its recent reference to consensus does not appear entirely consistent and 
inclusive. So, while the use of such sources may be useful, the selectivity and lack of 
consistency in their use appears problematic, especially in light of the contestation 
surrounding the cases studied. Finally, the analysis undertaken in Chapter 4 shows the 
potential and actual gains to be had by incorporating customary or tradition-based norms into 
the legal assessment of the Court. These norms have assisted the Court in defining the 
beneficiaries and scope of reparations, interpreting Convention rights, weighing cultural 
claims and foreseeing implementation hurdles. But since this development has so far been 
confined to indigenous/tribal assertions, it has yet to be seen how the Court will engage with 
other kinds of tradition-based norms.  
Turning to cases concerning economic disadvantage, Chapter 6 suggests that also here the 
Court has shown sensitivity and flexibility towards claims of disadvantage and exclusion. 
While it has issued very few judgments which focus on poverty-related claims as such, it has 
generally been attentive and responsive to questions of socio-economic disadvantage. As a 
result of this and other aspects further discussed below, this line of case law stands more in 
contrast with the ECtHR’s case law than that on cultural difference. To start with, the IACtHR 
does not avoid issues of socio-economic policy and usually regards the applicants’ economic 
circumstances as something legally relevant. This has an effect on the proportionality 
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analysis, the assessment and crafting of remedies and the application of some Convention 
provisions. In addition, the IACtHR, unlike the ECtHR, does not show any particular 
deference or devise any particular categories of review for cases involving states’ socio-
economic policies. The categorical and compartmentalised analysis that often accompanies 
that line of reasoning before the ECtHR is thus not at issue in this area of case law before the 
IACtHR. It is likewise interesting to observe that the IACtHR applies arguments about groups 
and disadvantaged identities to examine the applicants’ claims of economic disadvantage. 
These include the notion of vulnerability, which suggests that people living in poverty are 
regarded as a group in vulnerable situation entitled to special protection.  
The application of an integrated approach to rights holders has shown that the Court 
frequently examines claims of economic disadvantage from the vantage point of children, 
indigenous, persons of Afro-descent, women and other groups affected by discrimination. In 
this sense, the Court appears keen to integrate poverty within the experience of other 
disadvantaged identity groups. Nevertheless, the analysis also indicated that the Court has had 
more difficulty in doing the reverse, namely, problematising the applicants’ experience of 
poverty by considering other identities and social positions. On the basis of the Court’s ruling 
in Hacienda Brasil Verde, it was seen that this difficulty in engaging with intersectionality 
means overlooking crucial aspects of both the applicants’ lived reality and structural causes of 
violations. It also impliedssetting aside considerations that could provide stronger grounds for 
justifying the Court’s findings and giving better guidance to states. At the same time, though, 
other recent cases offer a more refined understanding of intersectionality and its practical 
application through the prohibition of discrimination. This, in turn, has enriched the Court’s 
normative repertoire, since for a while the anti-discrimination clauses were underutilised in 
poverty-related cases. From another perspective, it was also found that the Court has devoted 
limited attention to questions of autonomy in cases of this kind. It nonetheless appears that the 
Court has so far rejected a narrative of poverty that conceives it as the result of people’s free 
choices. While the implications of this stance have not unfolded in the rulings examined, it 
was noted that this could have some notable normative impact (e.g. in bolstering the 
development of normative frameworks of state responsibility for poverty-related violations).  
While the issue of the protection of rights holders other than the applicants does not have 
much incidence in the case law studied here, it was possible to identify one area in which it 
may play an important role. This is the state’s economic limitations and, more precisely, the 
prohibition of retrogression on socio-economic matters. Although this has not yet been 
discussed by the IACtHR, it was seen that taking into account a broad range of rights holders 
that is inclusive of those who are economically worst off may be helpful in illuminating 
whether and how the aforesaid prohibition (whether framed as such or as a limitation of 
Convention rights) is frustrating the state’s redistributive efforts to improve the situation of 
people living in poverty. The Commission has undertaken this line of reasoning and it is 
possible that the Court may do so in future cases concerning socio-economic disadvantage. 
What the Court has already done in the cases studied is to distinguish among applicants so as 
to bring to light those who may be less visible, such as those who have fewer means and the 
children and women among them. In doing so, the Court applies differentiated standards or 
derives specific normative consequences. 
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An integrated approach to the harms and norms involved in the cases has, for its part, 
provided further insights. One is that the Court has only recently addressed, as a separate 
harm, the stigma, stereotypes and invisibility attached to the experience of poverty. This 
confirms that even in cases that are first and foremost about destitution and economic 
exploitation, there is a dimension of recognition that needs to and can be integrated. What is 
more, doing so helps to expose some of the underlying causes of violations. It was seen that 
mostly in this connection, although not limited to that, the Court applies the prohibition of 
discrimination on the grounds of economic status, which represents a remarkable normative 
development. In the context of its cases on poverty-related discrimination, the Court has also 
taken important steps to bring to light the role of structural barriers and of what it has called 
‘structural discrimination’. Part of the transformative potential of the notion of structural 
discrimination as applied to poverty has, however, been diluted by the Court’s oversight of 
racism and the lack of clarity on the content and scope of structural discrimination. As to 
other Convention norms, the Court’s approach is quite comprehensive, but it was noted that 
the protection offered by the right to property to those with fewer possessions has recently 
been rendered ambivalent. Equally large is the range of international sources referenced by 
the Court, which mostly plays out in the incorporation of socio-economic rights standards. 
Nevertheless, some issues of selectivity were again identified in the use of external sources. 
Meanwhile, as regards non-state generated norms, the study revealed that the Court has taken 
some steps to increase the visibility of international financial obligations and of emerging 
human rights obligations for private actors. This might foster interesting normative 
developments in the future, while in the meantime providing a better account of the 
interaction taking place between different norms and actors involved in the creation of 
poverty and its ensuing rights violations.  
The analysis in Chapters 4 and 6 indicates that the Court tends to accommodate or otherwise 
respond to claims of cultural and economic difference. However, some caveats apply to this 
conclusion. First, we should bear in mind the relatively limited spectrum of claims of cultural 
difference decided by the Court. So far, they mostly concern indigenous or other persons and 
groups regarded as tribal, whose concerns and values happen to have attained broad 
international support. It has yet to be seen how the Court would address religious or other 
types of cultural claims, including those from unpopular minorities. Second, the flexibility 
and responsiveness of the Court in cases of economic disadvantage needs to be assessed in the 
context of a small sample of cases in which poverty-related violations have a prominent place 
in the arguments of the parties and/or the Court.  
In addition, Chapters 4 and 6 suggest that the Inter-American Court has a general inclination 
to undertake a comprehensive review of the cases under examination. This notwithstanding, 
both chapters also indicate that there are some aspects of its work that call for caution. First, it 
is important that the Court remains vigilant about the consequences of its preoccupation with 
groups, their characteristics and their disadvantages. In particular, it should be wary that this 
does not translate into an emphasis on the group, difference or disadvantage in itself (which 
amounts to essentialism) at the cost of individual circumstances and of social structures and 
institutions. Second, the Court also needs to review the selectivity, limited inclusivity and lack 
of clarity in which it has often become embroiled in the pursuit of normative integration. 
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Justifying why more weight is given to certain international or comparative sources and why 
departing from others, as well as clarifying the content and scope of standards set on the basis 
of extensive normative reviews, are required not only to preserve the Court’s legitimacy. 
Doing so is also necessary to provide clear guidance to states and other stakeholders, which 
are confronted with an intricate multitude of relevant norms. This should also be seen in the 
context of judgments that are, on average, 120 pages long. This might sound trivial, but I 
think it is not. It makes the Court’s profuse normative considerations, which are not always 
clear as to their value to the case at hand and to future cases, even less accessible.  
 
3. Understanding commonalities and divergences between the regional courts 
3.1. Commonalities 
The discussion in part II (cultural difference) reveals that in a significant number of cases both 
courts adopt a normative approach centred on group ethno-cultural identity. This focus 
appears justified in several respects. Among these are the legal argumentation of the parties 
and the need to define who the applicant is in order to identify the set of rights and restrictions 
that are accordingly applicable. However, the culturally-based legal framework also ends up 
mobilising a narrow set of legal arguments. Importantly, at times it overshadows the real-life 
experience of rights holders and a wider range of relevant harms and norms. This is 
particularly so in cases concerning a Roma way of life, the Islamic headscarf and 
indigenous/tribal culture. Thus, while the approach taken by the regional courts in these cases 
varies considerably, they share some interesting features. One is that both courts undertake an 
appraisal of the value and meanings of those identities and cultures. In doing so, they 
essentialise them. They also, in different ways, overlook the circumstances of concrete 
individual applicants as well as those of other rights holders who are either similarly or 
differently situated vis-à-vis the applicants. Additionally, these judgments and decisions often 
address cultural harms and restrictions of civil and political rights, while making the socio-
economic stakes of the cases more or less invisible. This is more acute in the case of the 
European Court than in the Inter-American Court. In cases where the normative salience of 
group identity is not accompanied by an emphasis on cultural affirmation or preservation, the 
normative oversights are less intense and integration is more present in both courts. 
Nonetheless, both courts display a more comprehensive stance at the level of the norms that 
are relevant to deciding the cases. They are quite keen on integrating international and 
regional norms. The tendency appears particularly strong in the case of the IACtHR, which in 
addition shows a readiness to consider customary or tradition-based norms.   
Another remarkable commonality across the case law studied concerns something that was 
not really said or tackled: racism. Since the case law selection for claims related to cultural 
difference or disadvantage led me to concentrate on ethno-cultural minorities (or non-
dominant groups), I anticipated racism to be a possible problem at the background or the 
foreground of such cases. Questions of race and racism indeed underpin a large sample of 
cases concerning cultural difference, but both courts say little or nothing about this. With 
cases of socio-economic disadvantage, however, for which I did not target any particular 
category of persons but a general segment of claimants in material hardship, the mediation of 
328 
 
issues of racism was not so foreseeable. Yet, it turned out that several cases on economic 
difference examined by the two regional courts also involve ethno-cultural minorities, 
migrants, asylum seekers or persons with a migrant background. Taking an intersectional 
view of rights holders and cross-thinking about harms and norms in such cases brought to 
light, respectively, the applicants’ racialised positions as well as risks of preconceptions and 
disparate effects based on race inequality. Interestingly, though, racism, a pervasive form of 
structural inequality, is left largely unchallenged, or not named at all by either of the regional 
courts. The question arises immediately: why? I think this research has been able to raise the 
question but not to offer an answer. The study’s content and scope cannot provide an 
explanation of that oversight. What the research nonetheless suggests is, firstly, that the 
silence around race is irrespective of the integrated or fragmentary character of the legal 
analysis. Therefore, answers need to be found elsewhere. Secondly, the study also indicates 
that cultural and economic requirements or restrictions may be particularly burdensome for 
ethno-cultural minorities, migrants, asylum seekers or persons with a migrant background. 
And this, in turn, could mean that, at least in recent decades, racism may have been working 
more through cultural and economic measures than through blatant forms of racial exclusion.  
The above, moreover, suggests that bringing together the examination of claims of cultural 
and economic disadvantage was worth doing. The study has shown that using the scholarship 
and normative developments regarding diversity and human rights provides interesting 
insights for dealing not just with people’s cultural differences, but also with differences in 
economic position. It has been seen that both kinds of claim may have, as just noted, 
important commonalities. But the research also disclosed significant interactions. For 
instance, the legal approach developed in the context of one type of case may not work for the 
other (e.g. the identity focus applied to claims of cultural difference cannot easily be 
transposed to claims of economic disadvantage). Further, the harms and experiences that are 
typically associated with the realm of cultural rights claims can be relevant to cases dealing 
with socio-economic disadvantage and vice versa.  
Similarly, it is interesting to observe that certain legal concepts or techniques (further 
discussed infra III. 3) that are typically employed in one kind of case could well be useful for 
others. For instance, the use of participatory rights (such as prior consultation) that are usually 
associated with the handling of claims of ethno-cultural difference in indigenous cases may 
well serve in dealing with claims of economic disadvantage (such as those involving eviction 
or other serious restrictions affecting the rights of impoverished populations). Conversely, the 
concept of progressive realisation of rights and the related ‘reasonability review’, which are 
typically confined to dealing with socio-economic claims, could also assist in the resolution of 
cases concerning cultural disadvantage. These cases may also raise issues of progressive 
change and review of public policy. At the same time, though, it was seen that both kinds of 
claims are understandably mobilised and addressed in different ways. Importantly, the 
research acknowledges that cultural aspects, especially those linked to cultural expression, are 
meaningful to people. They are part of people’s sense of belonging and self-realisation. As 
such, it may be healthy to let normative assertions of cultural difference or identity flourish in 
a manner that does not apply to aspects of socio-economic difference, as the latter is most 
usually expressive of inequality and disadvantage. 
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3.2. Divergences 
The discussion in part III (economic disadvantage) shows more divergences than 
commonalities between the two courts. Firstly, the visibility and legal relevance of people’s 
economic disadvantage are quite dissimilar. In the ECtHR this was sidelined on a number of 
occasions by both the applicants and the Court. But that was not so much the case at the Inter-
American Court. Secondly, while the concept of group vulnerability appears unsuitable to 
people living in poverty for the ECtHR, the opposite holds true for the IACtHR. Thirdly, the 
legal discourses on agency and the degree of consideration given to socio-economic rights are 
also notably different. Although the IACtHR admittedly goes further in addressing 
discrimination and stigma for reasons of poverty, for a while the stance of the two Courts was 
not so different in this regard. Also less contrasting is their practice of normative integration 
as regards the incorporation of regional and international norms. Nevertheless, while the 
ECtHR shows substantial deference to states on socio-economic matters, the IACtHR does 
not. And while the ECtHR has not always used the normative insights provided by its 
consensus review, the IACtHR’s reliance on comparative and regional law has been selective.     
A general salient difference is that the European Court appears more reluctant than the Inter-
American Court to undertake a comprehensive analysis inspired by intersectionality and 
indivisibility. The Inter-American Court has also adopted an integrative stance that is more 
inclusive of customary norms and multiple international sources than the one applied by the 
European Court. However, the integration of regional norms by the Inter-American Court 
appears to be more selective and unsystematic than in the European Court. The IACtHR’s 
standard setting within the framework of extensive normative reviews is also less clear. And it 
is worth mentioning that the ECtHR’s emphasis on and deference to the state’s identity or 
socio-cultural context does not seem to have been an issue at the Inter-American Court. The 
latter’s jurisprudence lacks normative categories based on the state’s characteristics. 
However, rather than a normative choice, this appears to be the likely consequence of not 
having much regard (deference) for the context or particularities of states parties.   
The fact that the Inter-American Court is more inclined to engage in human rights integration 
has to do with the context in which the system developed. As explained in this study, an 
integrated approach to human rights tries to make law fit human beings and their reality, not 
the other way around. This effort was undertaken by the Inter-American Commission first and 
then by the Court when they started to monitor human rights in the region. This came from 
the need to respond to massive violations and to deal with recalcitrant states in a continent 
immersed in political conflict and widening economic inequality. As mentioned at the outset 
and further demonstrated by the case law discussed in this study, the Court’s legal culture was 
significantly modelled on that reality. Or, to put it simply, it shaped its interpretations and 
working methods. Not by chance is the Inter-American Court used to conducting in situ visits 
to the affected areas/populations, engaging in extensive fact-finding work and receiving and 
hearing expert evidence from different disciplines. All these working methods facilitate a 
contextual and comprehensive view of the cases under examination. Take, for example, the in 
situ visits. To the extent that the Inter-American judges can verify for themselves the 
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seriousness and the sorts of restriction complained of, it is easier for them to see the variety of 
actors, harms and norms involved in the cases. Had the European Court had the chance to 
visit the camping sites and the lands from which Roma and Travellers were evicted, for 
instance, would it have simply found, as it did, that alternative sites were available or that the 
claim about school disruption by the children was simply not substantiated?  
Another factor that makes a difference is the role of the Inter-American Commission. The 
broad promotional powers enjoyed by this body, as explained in Chapter 2, have placed it in a 
position of proximity with the actual human rights problems of the region. The Commission is 
thus well familiarised with the context of the cases and the structural deficiencies leading to 
violations, both of which have been addressed through its monitoring activities. As a result of 
this, every time the Commission submits a case to the Court and intervenes before it, it brings 
to the latter a number of insights and claims based on its comprehensive view of the human 
rights situation in the respondent state and in the rest of the continent. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the Commission has called upon the Court to declare the existence of structural 
discrimination; apply the notion of intersectionality; recognise the harm faced by rights 
holders other than the applicants; and address the links between poverty and rights violations.  
Nevertheless, it is also important to point out that the regional context that forged both courts 
has changed. In the case of the Inter-American Court, most states now have (more or less 
consolidated) democracies, large-scale violations have receded and even the socio-economic 
landscape has improved in at least part of the region. The fact that the regional context has 
changed does not mean that the drive towards integration is no longer needed or useful – to 
the contrary. As seen in this study, ‘new types’ of human rights issues, such as claims 
concerning difference and inclusion, pose a number of challenges to human rights courts. 
Moreover, many of these claims raise complex issues such as structural violations, multiple 
identities and changing relations of power and disadvantage. To tackle these, the integrated 
framework proposed in this study retains utility. But at the same time, having more stable 
democracies and states willing to cooperate and dialogue about human rights implementation 
does reinforce the need to review the way the Inter-American Court engages in a project of 
human rights integration. This appears especially needed in view of the difficulties of 
consistency and inclusivity that the Court has displayed in its practice of resorting to a wide 
range of regional and international norms.  
In light of the foregoing, it is also easier to understand the adjudication style of the European 
Court as well as the difficulties it faces in taking a more comprehensive and relational 
perspective on the cases. As noted in Chapter 2, the ECHR and the Court were set up in a very 
different scenario to that of the Inter-American system, one of mostly democratic states 
committed to human rights and with relatively similar political and historical traditions. For a 
while, the Court examined mostly isolated violations and fine-tuned human rights obligations. 
However, the European landscape has also changed significantly since the times of its origin. 
Notably, a number of member states are struggling with structural or even systematic 
violations and appear less cooperative. Likewise, older members face important changes and 
challenges after becoming much more plural and economically unequal than they used to be. 
Since the regional context has changed, so may the legal approaches to dealing with it. Thus, 
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there is nothing fixed about the legal culture of the European Court of Human Rights that 
might impede its adaptation in a way that makes it more receptive to human rights integration 
than it is currently. In fact, the diversity of cultures coexisting in Europe makes changes in the 
Court’s legal perspectives even more likely and legitimate. 
In view of the distinct and common oversights and challenges that were identified in 
connection to the use of compartmentalised lines of reasoning, I have found it to be desirable 
for the ECtHR and the IACtHR take some distance from them. This does not mean that doing 
so is the only or even the main avenue for improving or enriching the adjudication of 
contested cases, such as those concerning cultural and economic difference. The analysis 
undertaken in the present study nonetheless confirms that one way in which the European and 
Inter-American courts could do so is by embracing a more integrated approach to human 
rights law. While admittedly this could be interpreted as meaning a number of different 
things, in this study I have advanced one particular framework of analysis that could prove 
helpful. The following section first sums up the potential and actual opportunities, revealed by 
the case law studied, that make human rights integration helpful. Then, the discussion 
discloses the challenges and limitations that make human rights integration a difficult and 
ambitious enterprise.   
 
III. Opportunities and challenges of an integrated approach  
1. Opportunities of an integrated framework of human rights law 
A relational and integrated framework of human rights law such as the one applied in this 
study offers a number of opportunities for adjudicating claims about difference and inclusion. 
Notably, it has potential for (1) doing better justice to the lived experiences of rights holders; 
and (2) enriching the repertoire of relevant judicial arguments while illuminating alternative 
accounts of the cases. The opportunities created by 1 and 2 also mean that an integrated 
perspective holds potential for (3) delivering a context-sensitive justice and redirecting 
attention to the role of social relations and structures.  
 
1.1. Doing better justice to the lived experiences of rights holders 
The first level of integration applied in this study proposes to look holistically at the rights 
holders affected in a case. This means paying attention to their multiple social positions and 
the real-life conditions under which they exercise autonomy, while being attentive to rights 
holders other than the applicants. Doing this, as reflected by the case law analysis, has the 
potential to counterbalance the tendency to replace the concrete assessment of the applicants’ 
experience with abstract and/or essentialist understandings of their identity. Likewise, it could 
lessen questionable assumptions about the agency of rights holders. By having a fuller picture 
of the rights holders and engaging in intersectionality analysis, courts could also render a 
more accurate account of the causes and effects of the restrictions and, in the case of the Inter-
American Court, devise attuned remedies. Further, they could identify who are most 
disadvantaged and thus in need of differentiated responses or accommodation. Finally, such 
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an understanding of rights holders could draw the courts’ attention to customary and specific 
human rights norms tailored to the identities and social positions of those persons.  
 
1.2. Enriching the repertoire of legal arguments 
The second level of integration applied in this study proposes to look holistically at the norms 
implicated in a case. By doing this, it has been seen that courts could open up the repertoire of 
available legal arguments, which would otherwise appear quite reduced in cases defined along 
relatively compartmentalised lines of reasoning. In addition, looking at harms and norms that 
are not immediately associated with the case (cross-thinking, as explained in Chapter 1) has 
also proven to be useful. It could avoid displacing issues of socio-economic rights in cases of 
cultural difference and issues of stereotype or misrecognition in cases of economic difference. 
For both kinds of case, such analysis could also bring to light structural inequalities and 
political marginalisation. A comprehensive normative approach could furthermore provide 
relevant grounds for justifying which rights claims are accommodated or granted heightened 
protection. Finally, by taking into account a broad set of norms, the courts could increase the 
normative interaction/dialogue with member states and with local communities in an inclusive 
and non-selective way, so as to embed contested decisions/interpretations in regional and 
local reality. Along the way, courts could also gain insights that might help in assessing 
(usually in the context of a proportionality analysis) the use of less rights-restrictive 
alternatives to achieve legitimate goals.  
 
1.3. Promoting context-sensitive justice and attention to social structures 
Another positive aspect of using an integrated framework of human rights law to deal with 
complex or contested cases is its openness to divergent or ‘unique’ solutions that better fit the 
specific context of the case. This is to say that an integrated approach to human rights law, as 
understood here, is context-sensitive and does not aim at standardisation. In fact, at this point 
one may fairly argue that, eventually, all we have discussed thus far comes down to context. 
In other words, a view of human rights attentive to intersectionality and to other individuals 
and groups, as well as to related harms and norms, is all about context-sensitive adjudication. 
And indeed, it is. Yet, it is submitted that the concepts and tools encompassed by the 
integrated framework applied here appear, in principle, to be more precisely defined and 
workable than the open-ended idea of context.  
Moreover, it should be noted that each court has its specific ways of discussing questions of 
context. In the case of the European Court, for example, context-based arguments mostly 
concern a situation or climate prevailing in the respondent state. In dealing with claims of 
ethno-cultural difference, the ECtHR often refers to the state’s commitment to equality, 
neutrality and secularism. Similarly, in cases involving economic disadvantage, the ECtHR 
pays attention to the state’s budgetary constraints or to particular concerns behind its socio-
economic policies. For the Inter-American Court, however, the preoccupation with context 
lies elsewhere. One of the main contextual issues considered by the IACtHR in both cultural 
and economic disadvantage cases is the history and social status of the group(s) to which the 
applicant allegedly belongs. The difference in approach is, again, more likely to be the result 
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of historical and political factors than of legal considerations. Either way, the point is that 
context is not just about the political, cultural or socio-economic circumstances of the 
respondent state or the locality where the disputed events took place. But neither context 
needs to be reduced to the social status of any given group. Against this backdrop, 
acknowledging the multifaceted condition of rights holders and of the legal environment into 
which the cases are inserted promotes a context-sensitive view that is more inclusive and 
nuanced than the two versions just mentioned. The contextual impulse behind the integrated 
framework applied in this study has the advantage of not being too inclined towards any of 
those poles, while also considering the context of the individuals concerned. 
In addition to context, the framework proposed has the potential to shift attention to social 
relations and structures, which may be some of the root causes of violations. This potential 
follows from several aspects of the framework. First, it starts from the perspective of rights 
holders, which makes it easier to pinpoint institutional exclusion and structural barriers. 
Second, the multiple positioning of rights holders is not examined from the angle of their 
identities as such, but from their social positions and the relations that attribute power and 
disadvantage to their identities. Looking at cases this way revealed, for example, the problems 
created by job and housing markets that penalise those (mostly women) undertaking care 
work; the incidence of racial discrimination and pervasive poverty in cases concerning Roma, 
Travellers and indigenous people; and institutional deficiencies in the reception of asylum 
seekers, to mention just some. Insofar as an integrated framework of human rights promotes a 
fuller understanding not just of the rights holders, but also of the norms and the harms at 
stake, it lessens the risk of reducing both the problem and the solution to the group or person 
concerned (more particularly, to her identity or personal autonomy) or to some normative 
category. If the problem and the solution are not reduced to that, then we may be inclined to 
look at social relations and institutions as well.  
But many of the opportunities described above may not come to be realised. One reason for 
this is that, as this study suggests, an integrated approach to human rights law faces specific 
challenges and limitations.  
 
2. Challenges and limitations of an integrated framework of human rights law 
To start with, an integrated approach to human rights law such as the one applied in this study 
does not make the judicial task easy – to the contrary. Judges may not have the time, the 
resources or even the training to, for example, apply intersectionality or take into 
consideration a broad range of norms outside their material competence. This is a first big 
challenge. Hence, while I have explored the potential offered by each dimension of 
integration advanced in this study, I do not think it is realistic to expect human rights courts – 
or, for that matter, other courts of justice – to go into each and every ‘layer’ of integration. 
Yet, this study suggests that because of the relational character of the framework proposed, 
that is, because of the interaction between its different ‘layers’, it is likely that applying one of 
these ‘layers’ could lead to work with others, thus illuminating additional aspects of the case. 
For example, taking an intersectional approach to rights holders that exposes their multiple 
affiliations and social positions may reveal the relevance of international or tradition-based 
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norms that are tailored to their specific experience or to which they feel bound. And this, in 
turn, will translate into a richer normative picture, thus reinforcing awareness of legal 
pluralism and normative integration. The visual below represents the mutually reinforcing 
relationship among the different ‘layers’ of human rights integration: 
 
Irrespective of the possibility that an integrated approach in one area may lead to its adoption 
in another, it is submitted that even doing a little bit of integration may be worthwhile. The 
analysis undertaken here suggests that any enlargement of the court’s perception of complex 
cases could enrich the legal analysis, which would be a gain in itself. How much integration 
they undertake, however, cannot be answered only by reference to the courts’ willingness or 
cultural predisposition to do so. As noted above, what this study has shown is that a 
satisfactory resolution of cases concerning cultural difference and economic disadvantage 
does not depend simply on the use of the model suggested in the present study. In other 
words, it is not possible to say that the only or main explanation behind the normative 
perspectives applied by the two regional courts lies with the level of integration or 
fragmentation of human rights law. Nor can the explanation be exclusively situated in the 
legal traction of group identity arguments or other normative categories. Extra-legal factors 
have proven to be of great importance. The political context and historical background in 
which human rights courts are embedded, as well as the working methods forged by those 
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conditions, also play a decisive role, as already noted. Consequently, a move towards greater 
integration, in the sense advanced in this study, is not a success recipe for resolving difficult 
cases or for mitigating the anxiety they engender. Rather, a more comprehensive framework is 
one avenue for enriching the adjudication of these cases by looking beyond fragmented 
normative frames and categorical thinking so as to interrogate whose and which rights are 
being considered or forgotten. This may increase the contextualisation of the cases and the 
crafting of more nuanced, convincing rulings.    
Up to this point the focus has been on the judges. However, there is no reason to think that 
judges are the only or main actors called upon to adopt an integrated human rights framework. 
Equally important is the role of litigants and third-party interveners. As seen in the previous 
chapters, the framing of the cases has depended to a large extent on the parties, so it is firstly 
up to them to present a fuller picture to the judges. Further, it was also seen that litigants and 
third-party interveners may provide the courts with valuable empirical and normative material 
that helps judges to gain a richer understanding of the case at hand.  
But further challenges relate to the complexity that an integrated approach to human rights 
law adds to the adjudicatory task. In addition to questions of time, resources and expertise 
mentioned above, it should be noted that the application of an integrated approach to human 
rights may neither provide clear-cut answers to difficult cases nor lessen normative conflict or 
divergence. For one thing, such an approach distances itself from a priori formulas and 
category-centred reasoning to promote instead flexible and contextual decision-making. This 
might remove the concern about an endless proliferation of protected identities or categories, 
but it also removes handy forms of simplifying and anticipating the resolution of complex 
cases. For another thing, the endeavour to situate human rights norms in their broader 
normative environment (by integrating other relevant norms) and consider their interaction 
makes normative friction more, not less, visible and likely.   
A third limitation has to do with the nature of litigation. Compared to other mechanisms for 
dealing with social conflict and disputes, litigation is probably one of the least suited to 
applying intersectionality and giving effect to the interdependence and indivisibility of rights. 
This follows from, among others, the intrinsic tendency of adjudication to categorise, the 
rigidity of evidentiary rules and the courts’ limitations of material competence. For example, 
if in order to apply intersectionality courts were to require applicants to prove discrimination 
on each (intersecting) ground, it would be quite difficult to have intersectional discrimination 
legally enforced. Likewise, it is undeniable that for courts such as the ECtHR and (to a lesser 
extent) the IACtHR, which are mainly entrusted with adjudicating civil and political rights, 
the ability to engage with the socio-economic rights dimension of cases is under permanent 
strain. From this perspective, it is always convenient to temper our expectations about what 
laws and tribunals can do while being encouraged to draw on the insights of human rights 
integration into social policy, politics and other fields.  
Having said this, I will now turn to a brief reflection on the legal techniques that were or 
could be helpful in developing an integrated approach to cases of cultural and economic 
difference or, for that matter, to other complex cases that may fall under a narrow frame of 
analysis.  
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3. Some useful legal tools and concepts 
The present study has elaborated on a few main avenues to promote an integrated analysis of 
cases that are often examined in a disaggregated fashion. Put simply, these avenues consist of 
intersectionality, indivisibility and normative interdependence. But the case law studied also 
provides interesting examples of specific mechanisms that foster an integrated analysis. These 
can be described as procedural and participatory tools. What is more, the study shows that 
while some legal concepts are taken as applying to claims of either cultural or economic 
difference, they may well serve to deal with the other. Making this mutual interaction visible 
may help human rights courts and other actors to use those legal concepts in a more integrated 
manner. The following lines thus provide a (non-exhaustive) overview of such procedural and 
participatory tools and legal concepts.  
 
3.1. Procedural and participatory tools 
Procedural tools: As already discussed, an integrated analysis has been facilitated not just by 
the substantive normative stance taken by the courts. In some cases, procedural mechanisms 
have played an important role. One notable example is the admission of third-party 
interventions. Particularly used in the practice of the ECtHR, these interventions have 
introduced a wide range of normative arguments while also providing contextual and 
empirical information about the rights holders involved in the cases. This has enabled the 
Court to access material that could significantly enrich its understanding of the cases and 
which might otherwise remain unknown to the Court. Third-party interventions are being 
increasingly used in the context of the Inter-American Court too.  
A second and somewhat related tool is the use of expert evidence, which has been prominent 
in the practice of the Inter-American Court. It was seen that the insights of legal and non-legal 
experts from different disciplines have shed light on the living circumstances and harms faced 
by individuals and communities as well as on the political, historical and legal background of 
the cases. Again, this has allowed the Court to get a fuller picture of the cases in a way that 
probably would not have been possible without those experts’ inputs. 
A third notable tool is the opportunity to conduct in-situ visits or other working methods that 
ensure some proximity with the material reality in which the case takes place. The singular 
experience of the Inter-American Court reveals that first-hand contact with the context of a 
case makes it easier to develop a sense of the many actors and interests at stake. The practice 
is certainly uncommon for courts of justice and, as such, alien to the current options of many 
courts. Yet, it may be worth keeping it in mind, for working methods and evidentiary rules, 
like any other norm, evolve and change.   
Participatory tools: The Inter-American jurisprudence on indigenous rights has shown the 
potential of legal tools for fostering people’s participation. The Court has required states, at 
the least, to conduct informed consultation processes and, at best, to obtain the free prior and 
informed consent of indigenous communities on matters affecting them. By requiring states to 
undertake a process of dialogue, the Court has opened up a path that may bridge the abstract 
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civil/political convention rights with indigenous people’s cultural perspectives and economic 
needs. Participation can mitigate law’s tendency to categorise and reify (cultural) identity 
claims. It may also bring to the surface a wider set of interests and concerns that may be 
relevant to resolving the dispute in question. While the European Court’s case law studied 
here does not apply a consultation-like requirement, it does show that there are alternative 
ways to foster participation. One alternative is to assess, in the context of the proportionality 
analysis, the extent to which state authorities have attempted to engage in dialogue. In 
Winterstein v. France, for instance, the state authorities deliberately rejected the applicants’ 
request to enter into mediation and participate in a study concerning their situation. In any 
case, it is important to bear in mind that, as mentioned earlier, there is no reason to think that 
participatory tools should be reserved for indigenous people or for cultural identity claims. 
Such mechanisms could well serve whenever the rights of otherwise unheard communities are 
threatened by regulations or decisions that overlook their specific needs, including economic 
ones. The requirements of consultation endorsed by other international bodies in the field of 
eviction and risk of homelessness (referred to in Chapter 3, section IV 2.2) attest to that.    
 
3.2. Legal concepts  
Living instrument or dynamic interpretation: Seeking to update the respective human rights 
convention to current circumstances, both courts rely, although to differing extents, on 
normative sources derived from international, regional, national and even non-state law. This 
offers the courts a relatively comprehensive outlook on the cases. The concept of consensus 
also works along similar lines. Yet, for all these techniques it was seen that an important 
factor in getting the best out of those tools for integration is to avoid selectivity in the sources 
and arguments to be considered while being mindful of providing clear guidance and 
justifications about what weight is given to them.  
Dignity: In the ECtHR’s case law this concept appears to have been applied most frequently 
in relation to recognition and protection against humiliation. In the Inter-American Court’s 
case law, however, the concept has been used in close connection with some level of socio-
economic security, as reflected in the notion of dignified life. What these practices suggest is 
that although dignity may often be associated with either cultural/identity or socio-economic 
issues, it can actually be helpful for grasping both. Dignity is contingent and relational. As 
such, it lends itself as suitable for an integrated approach. This is also favoured by the 
concept’s attention to rights holders and by its positive connotations, which arguably are more 
positive than those pertaining to the concept of vulnerability.  
Vulnerability: In both areas of case law examined, the notion of vulnerability has appeared 
open to accounting not just for identity group disadvantages, but also for those resulting from 
economic precariousness. This was more notably the case with the IACtHR than the ECtHR. 
Previous chapters discussed some of the risks posed by the approach adopted by each court to 
the concept of vulnerability, so these will not be restated here. Instead, I am interested in 
highlighting how this concept lends itself as suitable for an integrated analysis. Vulnerability 
appears to be comprehensive enough to account for varied and overlapping forms of risk and 
disadvantage, whether symbolic or material. It is also more flexible than other normative 
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categories. It does not have clear boundaries and can be applied through substantive and 
procedural provisions. Notably, it may grasp issues of inequality without the constraints of 
equality law while bringing to light the role of social institutions in both producing and 
alleviating vulnerability.  
Equality and non-discrimination: This legal concept has been interpreted, as seen in this 
study, in very different ways. As a result, it has produced quite disparate outputs. 
Nevertheless, the nature and normative place of equality and non-discrimination makes it, at 
least potentially, well suited to promoting an integrated view of human rights. In fact, the 
concept sits as a general principle of law that cuts across civil/political and socio-economic 
rights, as well as individual and group grievances. From the discussion in previous chapters, 
however, it appears that a substantive or structural reading of equality and non-discrimination 
provisions is more helpful to integration than alternative interpretations. Substantive equality 
enables the adjudicator to pinpoint structural, intersectional and de facto inequalities, 
including those on grounds of economic disadvantage. This might imply acknowledging, for 
example, that certain cultural patterns not only institutionalise cultural subordination but also 
socio-economic and political disadvantage, while the latter in turn reinforces cultural 
domination. An additional advantage of taking this perspective is that this does not require 
courts to define and protect any particular lifestyle or identity. From a substantive equality 
perspective, what matters is, rather, injustice and inequality, whether related to culture, 
identity, economic conditions or other circumstances. 
Progressive realisation and reasonableness: The concept of progressive realisation has 
featured in the IACtHR’s case law in relation to what has made it known, the legal 
enforcement of socio-economic rights. One of the main standards of review developed to 
operationalise the progressive realisation norm governing social rights is that of 
reasonableness. Although this concept was not applied as such in the case law reviewed, its 
underlying rationale was present in a few cases before both courts, mainly in relation to socio-
economic policy. To determine whether states have discharged their obligations, courts apply 
reasonableness to scrutinise whether deliberate, concrete and non-discriminatory measures 
were adopted, as well as whether the disadvantaged position of certain groups were taken into 
account and situations of greater risk prioritised in the design and implementation of socio-
economic policies. Through this concept they thus evaluate the adequacy, flexibility and aims 
of laws and policies, including related decision-making processes. So, one interesting feature 
of reasonableness is that it may facilitate the examination of the policies in place and thus the 
underlying institutional arrangements leading to violations. This, in turn, means analysing the 
case beyond legal categories and compartments, thus facilitating a more integrated approach 
to the issues debated. But here again we find a useful legal concept that has been confined to 
one realm of rights claims, this time socio-economic issues. However, why not use this legal 
device to examine cultural/identity issues more comprehensively? After all, cultural/identity 
rights often require cultural change and thus time to be fully realised. In this respect, they are 
not so different from assertions of socio-economic rights. Further, cultural/identity 
disadvantages are usually institutionalised through norms and policies. Therefore, the review 
of social policies can also be of great assistance here.      
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Redefinition of legal concepts: The case law studied provided a number of examples of how 
redefining already established legal concepts made them flexible enough to integrate different 
interests and needs. This has been most notably achieved when the redefinition enlarges the 
array of human concerns and experiences underlying the concept. Examples are the 
reformulation of the right to property and the notion of ‘injured party’ (and thus, the concept 
of right holder) in the Inter-American Court’s case law, as well as the inclusion of caravans 
and irregular houses within the notion of ‘home’ in the European Convention. Yet, often these 
redefinitions remain tailored to certain identities, as seems to be the case with collective 
property and collective rights holders for indigenous people. But why should these or other 
forms of conceptual expansion remain circumscribed to predefined categories or groups?  
The above list is by no means exhaustive and aims more at opening rather than at closing the 
conversation. Just to give one additional example, we may well consider the potential for 
integration of the ‘less restrictive means’ test. In fact, it was seen that the rationale behind this 
tool is to question regulations or measures regarded as normal or acceptable from the 
viewpoint of reasonable alternatives. By doing this and forcing the state to explain why things 
could not be done differently, courts substantially enlarge their understanding of the case. 
This holds relevance for issues of both cultural and economic difference, which are 
particularly prone to be accepted or insufficiently scrutinised.   
 
In view of the above discussion and other questions raised by this study, the following section 
will conclude with a few thoughts on possible future lines of research.  
 
IV.  Thinking of future lines of research 
It is hard not to think of possible lines of research in the light of what this study has not been 
able to cover. From this perspective, one may wonder, for example, how an integrated 
framework of human rights could assist in the handling of other type of claims concerning 
difference and inclusion. Interesting candidates would be those dealing with age and sexual 
diversity. One notable aspect of legal struggles around age is that age, like cultural and 
economic criteria, is widely accepted as a basis for organising society and individuals’ 
entitlements. Further, since age is something that affects us all and that we do not choose, the 
differences in power and inclusion accorded to age are prone to engender challenges similar 
to those examined in cases of cultural and economic disadvantage. Also attractive for present 
purposes are LGBTI rights claims of difference. These cases involve complex and sensitive 
issues that bring before judges similar challenges to those identified with regard to cultural 
and economic disadvantage. What is more, some of the ECtHR’s judgments concerning 
sexual diversity have adopted a discourse that may seem more concerned with the denial of 
basic social protection to gays, lesbians and trans-people than with the full affirmation and 
recognition of their identity and autonomy. For some, the attention to socio-economic security 
(e.g. access to pensions, inheritance rights and state-funded gender-reassignment treatment) 
may be a practical way of granting protection while avoiding the most controversial 
questions. For others, however, that may amount to an unfortunate displacement of crucial 
aspects of the case. In addition, one could argue that some jurisprudence focused on gender 
identity and sexual orientation may render invisible the problems experienced by people with 
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intersex variations. One could then enquire whether a more integrated approach might be 
possible, one that does not reproduce the fragmented analysis imposed by binaries of sex, 
gender and sexual orientation.    
A final area of claims of difference that I think could benefit from an integrated legal analysis 
is that involving migrants and refugees. This is not just on account of the fact that they are, as 
noted earlier, more usually affected by both cultural and economic disadvantage. As was seen 
in some cases, just situating a complaint within the framework of migration policy may 
significantly narrow the judicial line of sight. Moreover, the experience of migrants and 
refugees is prone to being seen through dichotomist lenses. If they have fled their country 
because of severe socio-economic deprivation, they may fall within the category of ‘economic 
migrants’, which leaves them with little international protection. Meanwhile, legal discourses 
tend to emphasise what their choices and autonomy are presumed to be. The ‘voluntary’ 
character of their relocation as well as the prospect of changing their situation are then 
grounds that often conceal crucial aspects of their plight.  
Following in the line of legal research, it may be worthwhile exploring whether (as this 
research suggests) and how the social model of disability, one of the clearest and most recent 
examples of a holistic human rights framework, could be expanded to other areas of human 
rights law. In other words, future research could elucidate what human rights law in general 
could learn from the social model of disability and the ways in which its expansion could be 
operationalised. Something similar holds for a study on the integrated model of human rights 
endorsed by the African system and the African Court of Human Rights in particular.  
Lastly, I cannot conclude without mentioning research based on empirical methods and non-
legal disciplines. Some of the limitations of the present study in fact flow from its focus on 
law and jurisprudence. I think empirical research could provide invaluable insights as to how 
social movements, civil society organisations and policy-makers, for example, deal with some 
of the questions underlying this research. What does human rights integration mean, if 
anything, to them? Could cross-thinking analysis be useful to their quest? I think that asking 
these questions in fields other than law may be useful, for there are surely other ways of 
‘crossing divides and seeing the whole’ when dealing with problems of social difference and 
exclusion. 
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SUMMARY OF THE THESIS 
 
People increasingly resort to human rights courts seeking protection against devaluation, 
disadvantage or exclusion on account of their cultural and economic particularities. But 
adjudicating these claims is no easy task, for they raise complex and contested questions in 
human rights law. How do the European and the Inter-American courts of human rights 
(ought to) deal with rights claims of cultural difference and economic disadvantage? The 
research argues that some prevailing approaches to these types of cases may be adding, 
instead of alleviating, the difficulties. Notably, when it comes to cases defined by cultural and 
economic difference, a fragmentary legal approach is frequently applied. This is to say that 
rights claims are often interpreted and resolved by the manner in which they fit certain 
‘boxes’ or ‘compartments’ typically defined by identity group-based categories or by 
typologies of rights and other legal divides.  
It is contended that such a ‘compartmentalised’ approach is not of much help in addressing 
the challenges brought about by claims of cultural and economic difference. Moreover, it fails 
in making justice to rights holders’ lived reality and tends to leave the roots of the alleged 
violations unexamined. A more integrated (holistic) perspective is desirable. It is argued that 
better justice could be done by examining in a comprehensive and relational manner whose 
and which rights are actually at stake in those cases. To do so, the research proposes a ‘cross-
thinking’ line of analysis to be applied through an integrated and person-centred normative 
framework. This framework relies on feminist legal methods, cultural studies and critical 
legal theory; and it operates as follows. It starts by looking at rights holders. Here, the study 
suggests three questions to consider. First, people have multiple identities and social 
positions, which shape their enjoyment of human rights. An integrated perspective takes 
account of this complexity and avoids reducing the person’s experience to a single identity or 
social position. Second, though individuals’ agency is often presented in a divisive way (that 
is, as something that one has or does not have), an integrated perspective acknowledges that in 
real life people are neither fully autonomous nor fully constrained. It perceives individuals’ 
autonomy as a process that unfolds depending on context, social relations and structures and 
avoids assigning meaning to people’s choices. Third and last, an integrated view of rights 
holders invites consideration not only of applicants but also of other persons potentially 
affected by the issue contested in the case.  
From here, the framework proceeds to an integrated view of the relevant harms and norms. 
Here, two questions arise. First, one needs to ask oneself whether besides the harms and rights 
immediately associated with the dominant legal narrative of the case, other harms and rights 
may be implicated too. Where civil and political rights seem to be at the core of the case, an 
integrated approach would ask whether socio-economic rights issues might be at stake, and 
vice versa. Where a case is presented as dealing with identity recognition, an integrated view 
would also consider whether discrimination, socio-economic exclusion or political 
marginalisation are involved, and vice versa. Second, an integrated approach to human rights 
norms also recognises that these norms are part of a broader normative environment at both 
the national and international levels. This means encouraging ‘pluralism awareness’ at two 
levels: with regard to other convention norms and other relevant international normative 
sources; and with regard to domestic regulations (both state-based and tradition-based). All in 
all, by using this integrated perspective, the research intends to shed light on what 
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intersectionality, interdependence and indivisibility can add to the resolution of cases 
concerning cultural difference, on the one hand, and economic disadvantage, on the other. 
More than 200 judgments and decisions from the European and the Inter-American courts of 
human rights (ECtHR and IACtHR, respectively) are examined through the integrated 
perspective described above. As regards cases of cultural difference, the focus is on 
complaints brought by ethno-cultural minorities or non-dominant groups. In the context of the 
ECtHR, these are Muslims, Roma and Travellers, while in the IACtHR, the selected cases 
concern indigenous and Afro-descendant applicants. As regards the ‘economic disadvantage’ 
cases, the research concentrates on claims brought to both regional courts by persons who live 
in poverty or are otherwise socio-economically disadvantaged.  Although many of the cases 
reviewed involve a multiplicity of rights holders, norms and interests, the research shows that 
both courts – in different ways and degrees– often examine them in a rather 
‘compartmentalised’ manner.  
When it comes to cultural difference, the courts’ normative approach tends to be centred on 
group ethno-cultural identity. This focus poses several difficulties, such as essentialism, 
stereotypes and a tendency to displace other aspects that are important for the adjudication of 
the case.  Notably, the cultural identity focus has often eclipsed gender relations, economic 
background and other social positions of applicants.  Likewise, limited attention has been 
given to rights holders other than the applicants who are also affected by the measures 
contested. Moreover, and notably in the ECtHR, the exercise of individual autonomy has been 
interpreted in an ‘all or nothing’ fashion, leading to contestable normative responses. From 
the perspective of harms and norms, the judgments and decisions defined by cultural 
difference and identity have frequently left structural inequalities and socio-economic issues 
unexamined. This is more acute in the case of the European Court than in the Inter-American 
Court.  
The case law concerning poverty shows more divergences between the regional courts, the 
ECtHR being more inclined towards compartmentalised analysis. Claims of economic 
disadvantage are rarely put forward or examined through the prism of identity group in the 
ECtHR. Nevertheless, identity-neutral readings of poverty have obscured the particular 
barriers and harms encountered by women, minorities or people with disabilities who live in 
poverty. In addition, another form of fragmentary thinking has played out in this case law 
namely, an analysis based on the state’s prerogatives over socio-economic policy and 
budgetary management. Looking at cases from this perspective has triggered the application 
of abstract and lenient reviews that overlook the concrete circumstances of the applicant and 
the specific harms incurred and rights affected. Likewise, ‘recognition’ harms of stereotyping, 
stigma and anti-discrimination norms have yet to be integrated into ECtHR’s legal analysis of 
poverty-related claims. Until recently, this also held true for the IACtHR. While the latter 
admittedly takes a more comprehensive review of the rights holders and norms involved in 
poverty-related cases, it often does so in a selective and unclear manner.    
The research shows that taking into account the multiple positioning of rights holders as well 
as the normative interactions involved in complex and contested cases may provide useful 
insights for adjudicating them. It may assist in the contextualisation of the violations, the 
proportionality analysis and the assessment of reparations. Looking holistically at the harms 
and norms implicated in a case also enlarges the repertoire of available legal arguments. It 
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may bring to light wrongdoings that may otherwise remain invisible and provide relevant 
grounds for justifying which rights claims are accommodated or granted heightened 
protection. Yet, adopting such an integrated perspective is a difficult endeavour for human 
rights courts. What is more, it is only one possible avenue for crossing legal divides and 
having a more holistic view of difficult cases about difference and exclusion.  
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SAMENVATTING VAN DE THESIS 
 
In toenemende mate doen individuen beroep op mensenrechteninstellingen om bescherming 
te zoeken tegen benadelingen of uitsluiting vanwege culturele en economische redenen. 
Echter, het beoordelen van deze mensenrechtenclaims is geen eenvoudige opgave aangezien 
ze vaak gaan over complexe en gecontesteerde onderwerpen. Hoe behandelen het Europees en 
het Inter-Amerikaans Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens deze claims en hoe zouden ze zulke 
claims idealiter moeten behandelen? Het onderzoek in deze doctoraatsthesis argumenteert dat 
sommige gangbare benaderingen in deze type van zaken meer kwaad dan goed doen. In deze 
zaken wordt namelijk vaak een gefragmenteerde benadering toegepast. Dit houdt in dat claims 
vaak geïnterpreteerd en opgelost worden binnen een bepaald hokje. Dit hokje wordt op zijn 
beurt gedefinieerd wordt door categorieën die gebaseerd zijn op groepsidentiteit of door 
rechtstypologieën en andere vormen van juridische scheidslijnen. 
Een dergelijk gecompartimenteerde aanpak is echter niet nuttig voor het benaderen van 
problemen die voortvloeien uit claims die gebaseerd zijn op culturele en economische 
verschillen. Bovendien slaagt deze aanpak er niet in om de realiteit waar de rechthebbende 
zich in bevindt te vatten en heeft het de neiging om de ware toedracht van de vermeende 
schendingen niet te onderzoeken. Vandaar dat een meer geïntegreerd (holistische) perspectief 
dan ook wenselijk is. Dit onderzoek argumenteert daarom dat er tot betere rechtspraak kan 
gekomen worden indien er op een omvattende en relationele wijze zou worden onderzocht 
wiens en welke rechten in zulke zaken in het geding zijn. Om dit te realiseren stelt het 
onderzoek een ‘cross-thinking’ analyse voor die moet worden toegepast via een geïntegreerd 
normatief kader waarin het individu centraal staat. Dit kader is gebaseerd op feministische 
juridische methoden, culturele studies en kritische juridische theorie. 
Binnen dit normatief kader wordt er eerst gekeken naar het perspectief van de 
rechthebbenden. Hierbij wordt er in het onderzoek voorgesteld om drie aspecten in 
beschouwing te nemen. Een eerste heeft betrekking op het feit dat mensen meerdere 
identiteiten bezitten en verschillende sociale posities bekleden, wat de uitoefening van hun 
mensenrechten mee bepaalt. Een geïntegreerd perspectief houdt rekening met deze 
complexiteit en vermijdt dat de ervaringen van een persoon tot één enkele sociale 
positionering worden gereduceerd. Ten tweede, ondanks het feit dat ‘agency’ dikwijls op een 
zwart-wit wijze geïnterpreteerd wordt (met name iets dat men wel of niet heeft) erkent een 
geïntegreerd perspectief dat mensen in de realiteit noch compleet autonoom noch volledig 
beperkt zijn in hun handelen. Dit perspectief beschouwt de autonomie van een individu eerder 
als een proces dat plaatsvindt afhankelijk van de context, de sociale relaties en structuren en 
het vermijdt dat er betekenis wordt toegekend aan de keuzes die mensen nemen. Tot slot 
vestigt een geïntegreerde visie op de rechthebbende niet alleen de aandacht op de verzoekers 
in een zaak, maar focust het ook op andere individuen die mogelijk ook getroffen worden 
door de betreffende zaak.  
Vervolgens bekijkt dit normatief kader de benadelingen en de toepasselijke normen vanuit 
een geïntegreerd perspectief. Deze benadering houdt twee aspecten in: Ten eerste, dient men 
zich af te vragen of er naast de benadelingen en de rechten die rechtstreeks met het dominante 
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narratief van de zaak worden geassocieerd, er ook nog rekening gehouden moet worden met 
andere benadelingen en rechten in de zaak. In een zaak waar burgerlijke en politieke rechte de 
kern van de zaak lijken te vormen, zou een geïntegreerde aanpak bijvoorbeeld nagaan of er al 
dan niet ook socio-economische rechten in het geding zijn. Of wanneer een zaak wordt 
voorgesteld als gaande over de erkenning van een identiteit, dan zou een geïntegreerde visie 
ook nagaan of discriminatie, socio-economische uitsluiting of politieke marginalisatie een rol 
spelen, en omgekeerd. Ten tweede, houdt een geïntegreerde visie ook een erkenning in dat 
mensenrechten deel uitmaken van een ruimere, normatieve context, zowel op nationaal als 
internationaal niveau. Dit betekent dat gevoeligheid voor pluralisme (‘pluralism awareness’) 
moet worden aangemoedigd op twee niveaus: enerzijds op het niveau van andere 
verdragsnormen en anderzijds op het niveau van andere relevante internationale, normatieve 
bronnen en aan de andere kant op het niveau van nationale normen, zijnde zowel 
staatsrechtelijke als traditionele normen. Door deze geïntegreerde aanpak beoogt het 
onderzoek klaarheid te brengen in wat intersectionaliteit, wederzijdse afhankelijkheid 
(interdependence) en ondeelbaarheid (indivisibility) kunnen toevoegen aan de 
geschilbeslechting van zaken die betrekking hebben op culturele en economische verschillen.  
Meer dan 200 arresten en beslissingen van het Europees- en Inter-Amerikaans Hof voor de 
Rechten van de Mens (respectievelijk het EHRM en het IACtHR) werden onderzocht aan de 
hand van het hierboven beschreven geïntegreerd perspectief. Bij zaken met betrekking tot 
cultureel onderscheid ligt de focus op klachten van etnisch-culturele minderheden of van niet-
dominante groepen. In de context van het EHRM gaat dit over moslims, Roma en 
woonwagenbewoners, terwijl de geselecteerde zaken van het IACtHR betrekking hebben op 
inheemse verzoekers en verzoekers met Afrikaanse herkomst. Wat de zaken over 
economische benadeling betreft, concentreert het onderzoek zich op vorderingen die bij beide 
regionale mensenrechtenhoven werden ingesteld door personen die in armoede leven of die 
op een andere manier socio-economisch achtergesteld zijn. Het onderzoek toont aan dat beide 
gerechtshoven, zij het elk op hun eigen manier, de zaken behandelen op een eerder 
gefragmenteerde wijze. 
In de zaken die over een cultureel onderscheid gaan, hebben beide hoven de neiging om een 
normatieve benadering te volgen die zich concentreert op de etnisch-culturele identiteit van 
een groep. Deze focus brengt verschillende problemen met zich mee, zoals: essentialisme, 
stereotypering en de neiging om andere aspecten die belangrijk zijn voor het beslechten van 
de zaak over het hoofd te zien. Het benadrukken van de culturele identiteit leidt er namelijk 
toe dat de gender relaties, de economische achtergrond en andere sociale posities van 
verzoekers vaak worden overschaduwd. Bovendien wordt er slechts beperkt aandacht besteed 
aan andere rechthebbenden die geen verzoekers zijn maar wel door de aangevochten 
maatregelen worden geraakt. Daarnaast wordt, in het bijzonder door het EHRM, de 
uitoefening van individuele autonomie op een ‘alles of niets’- wijze geïnterpreteerd. Dit heeft 
geleid tot betwistbare normatieve responsen. Wanneer men de rechtspraak analyseert vanuit 
het perspectief van benadelingen en normen, blijkt dat arresten en beslissingen die betrekking 
hebben op claims rond culturele benadelingen, vaak structurele ongelijkheden en socio-
economische kwesties links laten liggen. Dit vaker het geval in de rechtspraak van het 
Europees Hof dan van het Inter-Amerikaans Hof.  
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De jurisprudentie over armoede vertoont dan weer meer verschillen tussen de regionale 
hoven. Hierbij heeft eerder het EHRM meer de neiging tot het toepassen van een 
gefragmenteerde analyse. Claims die gebaseerd zijn op economische achterstand worden door 
het EHRM slechts zelden onderzocht vanuit het perspectief van de groepsidentiteit. Een 
dergelijk identiteit-neutrale interpretatie van armoede, verdringt de specifieke barrières en 
benadelingen die vrouwen, minderheden of personen met een functiebeperking in hun leven 
moeten ondergaan, naar de achtergrond. Daarnaast worden zaken ook vanuit het perspectief 
van de Staat geanalyseerd waarbij het sociaaleconomisch beleid en het begrotingsbeheer als 
een voorrecht van de Staat wordt gezien. In de praktijk leidt het onderzoeken van zaken 
vanuit dit perspectief tot abstracte redeneringen die geen rekening houdt met de concrete 
context waar een verzoeker zich in bevindt, de specifieke manier waarop een benadeling 
plaatsvond en de rechten die werden aangetast. Ook de benadeling die voortvloeit uit 
stereotypering, en stigmatisering enerzijds en de toepasselijke antidiscriminatie normen 
anderzijds moet nog worden geïntegreerd door het EHRM in de juridische analyse van claims 
die betrekking hebben op armoede. Tot voor kort gold dit ook voor het IACtHR. Het Inter-
Amerikaans Hof hanteert echter geleidelijk aan een meer alomvattende methode bij de 
beoordeling van rechthebbenden en normen in armoede gerelateerde zaken, ook al gebeurt 
deze toepassing nog steeds op een eerder selectieve en onduidelijke manier.  
Dit doctoraatsonderzoek toont aan dat rekening houden met zowel veelvoudige posities van 
rechthebbenden als met normatieve interacties in complexe en betwiste zaken, nuttige 
inzichten kan opleveren voor de beoordeling ervan. Het kan helpen bij de contextualisering 
van de rechtsschendingen, bij de proportionaliteitsanalyse en bij de beoordeling van de 
schadevergoeding. Door op een holistische manier naar de benadeling en de toepasselijke 
normen van een zaak te kijken, breidt ook het repertoire van juridische argumenten uit waarop 
men beroep kan doen. Het kan bovendien misstanden aan het licht brengen die anders niet aan 
de oppervlakte zouden komen. Verder kan een holistische aanpak ook relevante 
rechtsgronden aanbieden om te rechtvaardigen welke claims worden ingewilligd of een betere 
bescherming krijgen. Desalniettemin blijft het een moeilijke oefening voor 
mensenrechtenhoven om een dergelijk geïntegreerd perspectief aan te nemen. Een 
geïntegreerd perspectief is bovendien slechts enkel één van de mogelijk manieren om 
juridische scheidingslijnen te overbruggen bij complexe zaken over onderscheid en 
uitsluiting.  
 
